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Glossary
Administrative-command	 Soviet	period	economic	administration
system	(of	government)	 system	in	which	guidance	was	exercised	
(Administrativno-komandovaia	 by	the	Communist	Party	structures
sistema upravleniia)
Appellation	(Kassatsiia)	 A	legal	procedure	which	became	
possible	under	the	Russian	system	of	
government	during	the	19th	century	
legal	reforms	
Central	Executive	Committee	 The	highest	administrative	decision	
of	the	USSR	(Tsentral´nyi	 making	organ	in	the	Soviet	system	of	
ispolnitel´nyi komitet SSSR) government
Chinovnik	 Civil	servant,	both	state	and	local	
administration
Commissar	(Komissar)	 A	head	of	a	Soviet	Commissariat	
(ministry),	a	member	of	the	Soviet	
Government	(Sovnarkom)
District	(Uezd)	 An	administrative	area,	which	in	the	
tsarist	period	was	below	the	province	
and	after	1993	was	also	a	part	of	a	city
Double	(dual)	government	 A	joint	system	of	the	party	and	the	state	
with	a	regulated	decision	making	
hierarchy	between	the	two	systems
Duma		 A	town	council,	both	in	the	tsarist	
period	and	after	1993	(Russian	towns	
could	choose	whether	to	use	the	name	
duma	or	soviet)
Emergency	law	 Legislation	which	was	widely	used	in	
(Chrezvychainyi zakon)		 the	post	191	revolutionary	building	of	
the	Soviet	state	
Estate	 (Soslovie)	 A	social	stratification	of	a	
specific	and	hereditary	group	of	people.
The	four	tsarist	period	estates	were	
nobility,	towns	people	(merchants	and	
professionals),	clergy	and	peasants.	
Executive	committee	 Executive	organ	of	a	soviet	at	local,	
(Ispolnitel´nyi komitet)		 regional,	republican	and	state	levels		
Federal	administration	 State	administration	above
(Gosudarstvennaia	 the	republican,	regional	and	local	
administratsiia)	 administrations
Federal	government	 State	level	government,	which	includes
(Gosudarstvennoe		 both	the	representative	and	executive	
upravlenie)  side.
Federal	law	 After	1993,	all-state	wide	law	which	
(Federal´nyi zakon)		 needs	to	comply	with	the	Constitution	
of	the	Russian	Federation
Glasnost “Openness”.	A	policy	of	administrative	
transparency	which	was	most	famously	
adopted	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev	in	195	
but	also	used	in	the	administrative	
ideology	of	the	tsarist	period.
 
Goskomstat	 The	State	Statistical	Committee	in	the	
Soviet	Union	which	collected	statistical	
9information	from	sectoral	ministries	
and	regional	organizations
Governor	(Gubernator)	 Before	191,	the	head	of	the	provincial	
administrative	area.	After	1992	the	head	
of	a	regional	level	of	administration	
(oblast).
Gosudarstvennoe	 State	bureau,	state	administration	
uchrezhdenie  agency
Guberniia 	 Province.	A	tsarist	period	administrative	
area	which	was	below	the	state	and	
above	the	local	towns	and	villages.
	
Gubernskoe prisutstvie The	tsarist	state	administration	of	
provincial	affairs
Komsomol	 The	youth	organization	of	the	
Communist	Party
Landed	nobility	 A	land	owing	aristocratic	estate	which	
(Dvorianstvo)		 had	a	dominant	position	in	the	Russian	
Government	till	the	end	of	the	19th	
century
Local	self-government	 Town	or	city	local	government	which	is	
(Mestnoe samoupravlenie)		 made	of	an	elected	council	(duma	or	
soviet)	and	an	executive	organ	
(administration	or	executive	committee)
Local	administration	 The	executive	side	of	local	government,	
(Mestnaia administratsiia)	 made	of	professional,	paid	staff	and	
headed	by	a	mayor,	or	in	the	Soviet	
period	called	the	executive	committee,	
headed	by	a	chairman
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Nomenklatura A	list	of	posts	filled	by	the	Communist	
party,	a	closed	system	of	rewards	and	
benefits
Obkom	 A	regional	executive	committee	in	the	
(oblastnoi ispolnitel´nyi		 Soviet	period,	which	was	the	
komitet)  administration	of	a	regional	government
Oblast	 Both	in	Soviet	and	post	1993	Russia,	a	
regional	level	(of	government)	which	
has	its	own	elected	assembly,	
administration	and	head	of	the	
administration	(presently	the	governor)
Peasant	 A	member	of	a	rural	estate,	freed	from	
bondage	in	164
Peasant	commune	(Mir)	 A	type	of	local	self-government	in	the	
peasant	villages	of	19th	century	Russia.
Perestroika	 “Restructuring”.	A	reform	of	Mikhail	
Gorbachev´s	leadership	period	(195–
1990)	aimed	to	cut	down	the	economic	
ineffectiveness	of	the	Soviet	government	
system	and	to	bring	more	political	and	
economic	freedom	to	the	local	level	
while	preserving	the	Socialist	system.
Politburo	 The	Communist	Party´s	Central	
Committee	executive	organ	which	
guided	the	party	organizations	by	giving	
directives	to	party	members	and	
informed	the	leadership	on	
developments	in	the	country
Postanovlenie	 Official	regulation,	order	
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Prokurator		 Public	prosecutor	who	also	has	a	
general	duty	to	supervise	administrative	
decision	making	with	wide	
discretionary	rights
Prokuratura	 The	office	of	the	prosecutors
Prosecutor	General	 The	head	of	Russian	prosecutors
Rule	of	law	government	 A	government	which	is	divided	into	
(Pravovoe gosudarstvo)	 legislative,	judicial	and	executive	
systems,	and	which	confirms	to	a	norm	
hierarchy	where	a	constitution	(which	
puts	emphasis	on	human	and	individual	
rights)	is	the	basis	of	all	decision	making	
and	official	action	and	in	which	the	
discretion	of	officials	is	limited	by	law.
Senate	 The	highest	legislative	organ	in	the	
Imperial	Russian	Government,	which	
also	included	the	judicial	body	acting	as	
the	highest	court	of	appeals
Soviet	(Sovet)	 After	191	the	local	government	body	
which	was	made	of	a	representative	
assembly	and	an	executive	committee	
acting	as	the	administration	of	an	area.	
Usually	refers	to	the	representative	body	
in	the	Soviet	system	of	government.	
State	Duma	 The	lower	house	of	the	parliament	in	the	
Russian	Federation
Town	government	 Tsarist	period	local	government	made	of	
(Gorodskoe upravlenie)	 a	duma	(elected	council)	and	an	
executive	body	(gorodskaia	uprava)
12
Town	administration		 An	executive	body	of	the	tsarist	period	
(Gorodskaia administratsiia  town
/uprava)
 
Ukaz Decree.	For	instance	the	Presidential	
ukaz,	widely	used	since	1991
Uskorenie “Speeding	of	socialist	development”.	
Political	slogan	used	in	195–196
Ustav After	1993,	a	fundamental	law	of	a	self-
governmental	area	such	as	a	city
Vedomstvo	 (Government)	agency/bureau
Zemstvo	 A	rural	self-government	organ	which	
had	an	elected	assembly	and	an	
executive	body,	164–191
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Introduction
The	year	1991	was	a	definite	one	in	the	last	major	transition	of	Russian	
history.	The	building	of	 the	new	Russian	state	was	dependent	upon	the	
structures	of	the	old	Soviet	Union,	while	the	social	system	was	itself	being	
simultaniously	abolished	and	replaced.	At	this	time,	there	were	two	fronts	
in	operation:	the	internal	transition	of	the	Russian	society	and	the	state	in	
order	 to	overcome	 interrelated	political,	economical	and	social	barriers	
was	one	front.	The	international	transition	aimed	at	meeting	new	demands	
for	 global	 and	 European	 cooperation	 based	 on	 certain	 values	 and	
obligations	 rising	 from	 then	 was	 the	 other.	 The	 year	 1991	 saw	 the	
culmination	 of	 both	 front	 in	 this	 transformational	 period	 of	 Russian	
history.	
From	 a	 historical	 perspective,	 this	 study	 examines	 one	 area	 of	 this	
transition:	changes	in	Russian	administration.	For	this	is	the	critical	factor	
in	the	building	of	a	new	relationship	between	the	state	and	society	in	Russia	
today.	In	the	study	I	have	drawn	a	general	picture	of	developments	in	local	
administration	from	the	point	of	view	of	administrative	culture.	The	main	
focus	 of	 the	 study,	 however,	 has	 been	 the	 executive	 body	 of	 local	
government.	
The	contemporary	Russian	state	includes	three	administrative	structures	
which,	within	the	system,	all	have	separate	status	and	meaning:	the	federal,	
regional	 and	 local	 level.	 All	 levels	 have	 a	 representative	 (elected)	 and	
executive	(administrative)	side	of	government	and	the	judiciary.	The	federal	
administration	 includes	 the	 sectoral	 ministries,	 central	 agencies	 and	
services.	These	federal	bodies	have	their	branches	in	the	regional	and	local	
(municipal,	city)	level.	The	regional	administration	includes	the	executive	
side	of	 regional	 government,	headed	by	 a	 governor	who	has	 so	 far	been	
elected	by	the	population	of	the	region.	The	local	level	means	the	executive	
side	of	the	local	municipal	government	which	is	also	headed	by	an	elected	
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mayor.	The	regional	and	municipal	administrations	fulfill	both	federal	and	
self-government	functions.	
These	three	structures	have	not	always	existed	in	their	present	form.	For	
instance,	there	have	been	different	types	of	regional	structures,	such	as	the	
republics	 in	 the	 former	 Soviet	Union	which	 in	 actuality	 fell	 somewhere	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 present	 regional	 government.	 In	 19th	 century	
Russia,	the	state	level	was	much	further	away	from	life	at	the	local	level	than	
it	is	today.	
The	local	level	concept	itself	has	been	formulated	differently	in	history	
than	it	is	today.	This	is	also	partly	a	reason	why	the	local	administration	has	
received	 less	 attention	as	 a	 separate	 entity	 in	 research.	 Studies	 about	 the	
transition	 period	 usually	 concentrate	 either	 on	 changes	 in	 the	 state´s	
political	 system	 or	 case	 studies	 which	 are	 problem	 specific.	 Along	 with	
macro-economic	 studies,	 a	 major	 interest	 has	 been	 the	 development	 of	
state-regional	relations	in	the	1990´s.	Information	about	the	development	
of	 local	 administration	 in	 Russia	 is	 scattered	 among	 different	 types	 of	
literature.	 It	 is	 therefore	 difficult	 to	 collect	 because	 of	 the	 very	 different	
levels	of	analysis	and	formulation	of	questions	involved.	Yet	the	effect	which	
territorial	 arrangements	 have	 had	 on	 administrative	 networks,	 policy	
implementation	 and	 the	 position	 of	 civil	 servants	 has	 been	 huge	within	
Russian	 history.	 The	 meaning	 of	 territoriality	 for	 the	 development	 of	
administrative	culture	therefore	needs	more	attention.	
Similarly,	 local	 administration	 as	 a	 separate	 concept	 from	 local	
government	has	received	rather	little	attention	in	the	studies	of	the	present	
transition. Historically	the	concept	itself	is	a	rather	loosely	defined	one.	In	
this	study	it	means	the	executive	functions	of	local	government,	the	joint	
jurisdiction	 of	 the	 state	 and	 municipalities	 and	 the	 territorial	 state	
functions	in	municipalities.	This	definition	includes	the	implementation	
of	 both	 locally	 made	 decisions	 and	 state	 imposed	 (legally	 sanctioned)	
obligations.	
Before	 the	collapse	of	 the	Soviet	Union,	 studies	of	Russian	and	Soviet	
administrative	 systems	 could	 broadly	 speaking	 be	 categorized	 into	 two	
groups:	 totalitarian	 theory	 which	 stressed	 the	 political	 and	 economic	
unitarian	links	and	controlled	practices;	and	socialist	theory	of	the	state	in	
which	political	ideology	was	understood	to	translate	directly	into	structures.	
Since	1991	a	more	varied	view	on	 the	Soviet/Russian	 state	has	begun	 to	
emerge.	This	includes	elements	from	both	orthodox	approaches	as	well	as	
new	 theoretical	 insights	which	see	 the	Soviet	Union	as	having	possessed	
1
features	of	different	types	of	competition	and	“market”	(for	instance	Simon	
Kordonskii	2000).
For	Russian	administration	the	political	history	of	Russia	is	the	story	of	
alternating	 cultural	 identities.	The	municipal	 administration	 at	 the	 local	
level	 has	 been	 a	 target	 for	 a	 series	 of	 political-economic	 developments	
inflicted	upon	it	by	other	levels	of	government	or	by	the	ongoing	transitions	
in	these	relations.	The	local	level	has	thus	not	dominated	as	an	independent	
accelerator	of	events.	In	the	history	of	Russian	administration,	there	have	
been	 two	 major	 waves	 of	 cultural	 influence.	 The	 first	 has	 seen	 the	
municipalities	as	a	direct	functional	part	of	state	governmental	organs	and	
state	 ideology.	The	 second	has	 seen	 them	more	 a	 representative	 of	 local	
cultural	 and	 economic	 interests	with	 at	 least	 some	autonomous	decision	
making	potential.	Importantly,	though,	it	is	the	relationship	with	law	that	
has	been	the	basis	of	the	center´s	relationship	with	the	local	level.	
Transitional	periods	have	served	a	socialization	function.	That	is,	 they	
have	tried	to	change	the	citizens	understanding	of	what	is	good	and	desirable	
in	society.	Yet	while	the	concept	of	good	government	refers	to	the	modern	
day	vision	of	an	effective	administration	and	stresses	its	relationship	with	
law,	many	of	the	issues	in	focus	today	were	raised	over	a	hundred	years	ago	
in	discussions	of	structural	changes.	One	such	issue	has	been	the	citizen´s	
relationship	with	the	government.	This	fundamental	question	has	followed	
all	administrative	transitions.
This	work	therefore	connects	four	fields	of	study.	It	connects	cultural	and	
organizational	 studies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 administrative	 science	 and	
administrative	history.	Combining	organizational	and	cultural	studies	is	a	
well	 established	 and	much	used	 theoretical	 approach,	particularly	 in	 the	
research	of	organizational	learning.	Conceptual	tools	have	been	borrowed	
from	 these	 organizational	 studies.	 In	 the	 historical	 part	 of	 the	work	 the	
starting	point	is	a	theory	of	public	administration.	Here,	I	have	wanted	to	
understand	 the	 cultural	 logic	 underpinning	 previous	 forms	 of	 local	
government	instead	of	looking	at	the	past	via	a	“pure”	historical	method.	To	
this	end,	conceptual	tools	from	the	study	of	law	and	legal	institutions	have	
been	useful,	such	as	legality,	legal	protection	and	democratic	control.
Since	the	subject	of	this	study	is	administrative	culture,	mere	description	
of	 structural	 arrangements	 would	 not	 suffice.	 Instead	 of	 choosing	 one	
“macro-theory	 of	 Russian	 studies”,	 the	 culture	 of	 administration	 is	
approached	more	 on	 its	 own	 terms	which	 includes	 both	 the	 ideological	
level	of	change	and	structural	arrangements.	Culture	is	seen	as	being	born	
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at	the	intersection	of	these	two	in	the	social	system	of	organizations.	It	is	
thus	 a	human	product	which	 eludes	 any	 rigid	 theoretical	 categorization.	
Administrative	 culture	 is	 seen	 to	 include	 various	 elements	 and	 conflicts	
between	these	different	elements	form	an	essential	part	of	its	production.	
The	basic	ideas	of	structuration	theory	developed	by	Anthony	Giddens	
are	used	in	a	modified	version,	along	with	more	recent	interpretations	of	
organizational	and	bureaucratic	culture.	Theoretically	the	central	question	
is	what	should	one	concentrate	on	when	studying	administrative	culture?	Is	
it	 the	 structures	 (economic,	 political,	 legal	 and	 administrative)	 which	
organize	institutional	work?	Or	is	it	the	human	interaction	in	bureaucratic	
social	groups	or	some	type	of	a	combination	of	these?	
The	 chosen	 starting	 point	 has	 been	 the	 structural	 environment	 of	
administrative	work	which	I	call	the	ecology	of	administration.	Transition	
in	administrative	culture	is	explained	as	a	process	in	which	the	effects	of	
structural	changes	are	felt	in	the	social	system	of	organization	which	returns	
these	 effects	 to	 the	 structures,	 either	 as	 desired	 development	 or	 as	
dysfunctions.	 Culture	 is	 the	 social	 system	 of	 a	 structurally	 governed	
administration.	In	this	sense,	culture	cannot	be	looked	at	separately	from	
structure.	
The	 research	 therefore	 asks:	 how	 do	 structural	 reforms	 and	 the	 old	
culture	of	institutions	meet	in	transitions?	To	help	answer	this,	two	historical	
periods	have	been	chosen	as	objects	of	study:	
1.	 The	 administrative	 reforms	 before	 the	 revolution	 leading	 to	 the	
October	 revolution	 (19–1916)	 and	 the	 subsequent	 cultural	
radicalization	 of	 the	 socialist	 government	 during	 Stalin	 (191–
193).
2.	 The	 perestroika	 years	 as	 a	 reform	 period	 of	 the	mature	 planning	
system	 (196–1991)	 and	 the	 consequent	 change	 to	 capitalist	
government	system	since	the	beginning	of	the	90´s	(1991	onwards).
3.	 Because	 the	 intention	 has	 been	 to	 draw	 a	 general	 picture	 of	 the	
Russian	 administration	 from	 historical	 perspective,	 the	 empirical	
work	forms	just	one	part	of	the	whole.	
I	 have	 chosen	 a	 group	 of	 dominant	 cultural	 elements	 in	 these	 historical	
transition	periods	to	see	what	meaning	they	held.	The	aim	has	been	to	form	
ideal	 types	of	 local	 administrations	which	would	 show	 the	 transitions	of	
administrative	culture.	To	pinpoint	the	effects	of	structural	changes	on	the	
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social	system	of	the	administration,	I	have	chosen	to	concentrate	on	a	few	
central	 elements	 which	 can	 be	 found	 in	 different	 types	 of	 bureaucratic	
organizations	and	which	are	also	central	to	the	idea	of	the	rule	of	law.	These	
elements	 are	 studied	 at	 two	 levels	 of	 change:	 the	 political	 ideologies	 of	
administrative	change	and	actual	state	buildings.	
Political	ideologies	of	administrative	change	are	useful	and	meaningful	
because	 they	 show	 the	manifest	 goals	 of	 organizations	 and	 thus	 help	 to	
reveal	unintended	side-effects	which	materialize	in	the	formation	of	a	new	
administrative	culture.	The	state	building	stage	of	 transition	 includes	 the	
description	 of	 the	 administrative	 ecology	 for	 each	 time	 period.	 Here,	
authority	 relations	 and	 legislative	 changes	 dominate.	 The	 lengthy	 time	
covered	 includes	 different	 types	 of	 structural	 arrangements	 in	 terms	 of	
municipal	vs.	local	level	state	administration	relation	and	different	types	of	
municipal	administrations	themselves.	The	Russian	city	administration,	as	
a	legal	concept,	is	explained	in	different	time	periods	to	show	what	types	of	
authority	 and	 political	 power	 have	 existed	 and	 in	what	 proportion.	The	
relationship	with	 law	and	higher	supervising	bodies	 is	 thus	 incorporated	
closely	into	the	analysis.	
Methodologically,	a	case	study	has	been	used.	I	treat	the	four	time	periods	
as	 separate	 cases.	 In	 the	 last	 part	 (the	 present	 day	 transition)	 analysis	 is	
based	 mostly	 on	 a	 material	 collected	 in	 one	 sample	 organization.	 The	
attempt	is	not	to	describe	all	aspects	of	the	political	and	economical	events	
in	chronological	order	but	to	look	at	the	transitional	time	periods	through	
selected	elements	of	administration	in	order	to	see	how	they	have	changed	
in	 relation	 to	 the	previous	 system.	The	aim	 in	each	historical	period	has	
been	to	create	an	ideal	type	of	administrative	culture	which	has	developed	
during	the	transition.	The	ideal	types	are	answers	to	both	the	question	of	
what	 and	why.	The	description	of	 administrative	 elements	 of	 ideal	 types	
helps	to	understand	the	central	question	of	transition:	why	is	changing	the	
structures	 and	 law	 not	 enough	 to	 change	 the	 culture	 of	 administration?	
Conversely,	what	have	been	the	elements	of	administrative	culture	and	the	
mechanisms	 of	 change	 which	 have	 made	 the	 realization	 of	 political	
ideologies	of	administrative	change	difficult? By	looking	at	this	connection	
we	can	make	sense	of	the	difficulties	faced	in	major	social	changes.	
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1 Theoretical Framework 
1.1 How to Define “Administrative Culture”
1.1.1 Defining Concepts in the Study of Administrative Cultures
The	 definitions	 given	 to	 key	 concepts	 deserve	 concentrated	 attention,	
because	 they	 touch	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 how	 we	 perceive	 meanings	 in	
cultures.	When	 the	 subject	 of	 study	 is	 an	 alien	 culture,	 this	 task	 is	 even	
more	acute.	Surprisingly,	the	present	day	transition	literature	has	not	paid	
much	 attention	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 concepts	 in	 political	 and	 economic	
studies.	 In	my	view,	 this	has	contributed	to	the	 lack	of	dialogue	between	
transitional	 societies	 and	 the	 West	 which	 has	 resulted	 in	 unhistorical	
thinking	during	the	1990´s.	
The	study	comprises	three	different	cultural	perspectives:	Russian/Soviet,	
Anglo-American	and	Finnish.	As	an	example,	 the	word	“administration”	
has	 carried	 very	 different	 connotations	 in	 all	 these	 cultures,	 which	 are	
bound	to	the	historical	roots	and	social	dynamics	of	each	time	period.	The	
discourse	 between	 political	 and	 scientific	 spheres	 heavily	 influences	 the	
official	 meanings	 of	 words.	 I	 support	 Ilmari	 Susiluoto´s	 view	 that	 “the	
grammar	 of	 politics	 has	 a	 wide	 task	 in	 examining,	 for	 instance,	 the	
“grammar”	of	planning	discussion,	the	latent	and	manifest	meanings	of	the	
term	planning,	or	the	rational	and	emotional	aspects	of	Finnish	planning”	
(author´s	 translation	 from	 Susiluoto	 19:	 60).	 This	 example,	 given	 by	
Susiluoto,	is	also	a	descriptive	one	in	the	context	of	the	present	study.	With	
new	terminology,	social	action	is	given	meaning	which	is	connected	with	
the	political	and	social	relations	of	society.	The	study	of	change	thus	needs	
to	understand	the	previous	meanings	of	words	and	the	values,	goals	and	
rationale	which	they	carry	with	them.	Translation	becomes	interpretation	
and	analysis	of	ways	of	life	(comp.	Susiluoto	19:	4–5.)	
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I	use	three	key	concepts:	“ideology	of	administrative	change”,	“structures”	
and	 “new	 culture”	 which	 are	 the	 components	 of	 the	 transition	 of	
administrative	culture.	Each	of	these	concepts	has	inspired	many	thorough	
studies	of	their	meaning	and	effects	in	society	and	institutions.	My	goal	has	
not	been	to	create	any	new	definitions	or	go	into	the	different	variations	of	
their	use.	I	have	quite	straightforwardly	chosen	such	definitions	which	are	
appropriate	for	the	understanding	of	the	transition	process.	For	instance,	I	
use	definitions	of	structures	and	a	culture	in	a	way	which	is	directly	based	
on	my	theoretical	view	of	the	transition	process	itself.	These	definitions	will	
be	described	more	extensively	in	the	following	chapters	of	this	study.	
Here	I	only	want	to	briefly	address	the	concept	of	ideology.	Ideology	as	
an	everyday	 term	has	been	used	 in	a	very	 liberal	manner,	much	 like	 the	
concept	of	culture,	to	include	anything	from	a	written	document	to	what	
ever	is	“in	the	air”	in	a	society	at	a	certain	historical	moment.	Often	it	 is	
used	 as	 a	 synonym	 for	 doctrine.	 For	 instance	 Darrell	 P.	 Hammer	 has	
described	doctrine	as	“the	authoritative	and	usually	well-publicized	ideas	
that	make	up	the	official	philosophy	(…)”.	 In	his	view	“ideology	 is	 those	
political	 values	 that	 are	 parts	 of	 the	 belief	 system	 of	 the	 individual.	 In	
contrast	 to	 doctrine,	 ideology	 tends	 to	 be	 ambiguous,	 inconsistent,	 and	
even	irrational.”	(Hammer	196:	5.)
I	use	the	concept	of	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	which	is	
behind	 all	 major	 administrative	 transitions.	 It	 is	 a	 synonym	 for	 official	
ideology	which	is	used	in	building	state	institutions.	It	includes	both	state	
doctrine,	such	as	marxism-leninism	in	the	administrative	ideology	of	the	
Soviet	Union,	and	the	general	political	 ideology	of	constitutional	 liberal-
democracy	in	which	the	core	“doctrine”	is	the	free	competition	of	different	
(legal)	views	in	the	society.	It	would	probably	be	best	to	say	that	doctrine	
means	 the	 core	 values	 of	 a	 particular	 political	 ideology.	 For	 instance	 in	
liberal	democracy	such	core	values	include	freedom	of	individual	liberties,	
such	 as	 free	 speech,	 or	 the	 right	 to	 private	 property.	 From	 these	 follow	
principles	of	free	information	flow	and	property	rights	protection.
In	 this	 study,	however,	 the	hierarchies	 of	 definitions	do	not	matter	 as	
much	as	the	relevance	of	concepts	for	administration.	I	have	concentrated	
on	the	ideological	thoughts	of	the	decision	making	elite	to	find	out	what	
types	 of	 official	 purposes	 of	 action	 have	 existed	 for	 administrative	
organizations.	 What	 is	 good	 administration	 in	 general?	 How	 are	 basic	
political	 relations	 organized	 in	 administrative	 decision	making?	What	 is	
the	relationship	with	law	and	economy,	and	so	on.	
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In	the	empirical	research	I	have	two	objectives.	The	first	one	is	to	define	
the	meaning	of	the	elements	of	administrative	culture	based	on	a	general	
framework	of	administrative	theory.	The	second	is	to	examine	the	meaning	
these	concepts	have	in	the	respective	cultural	cases	under	study.	
The	most	vexing	lexical	task	is	to	define	the	concepts	“administration”,	
“control”,	 “power”	 and	 “guidance”.	 These	 are	 words	 without	 which	 the	
examination	 of	 administrative	 culture	 is	 hardly	 possible.	 Discussing	
administrative	culture	easily	becomes	frustrating.	The	most	common	use	of	
the	word	power,	for	instance,	is	as	a	substitute	for	authority.	Yet,	from	an	
administrative	studies	point	of	view,	these	two	belong	to	separate	spheres,	
the	first	meaning	general	possibility	to	influence	affairs,	the	latter	stating	an	
official	position	in	a	system.
It	 is	often	quite	 important	 to	make	a	clear	distinction	between	 formal	
organizations	and	the	social	system	in	which	the	daily	culture	is	formed.	
Susiluoto	points	out	 that	 in	 the	 study	of	 the	 Soviet	 administration,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	understand	the	difference	between	terms	relating	to	action,	in	
separation	to	words	used	in	the	description	of	structures.	Translating	terms	
from	 Russian	 to	 English	 and	 Finnish,	 for	 instance,	 requires	 theoretical	
work	 based	 on	 understanding.	 For	 instance,	 the	 word	 “upravlenie”	
(administration,	government,	in	Finnish	hallinto)	has	been	translated	with	
the	use	of	several	words.	On	one	hand	there	are	“administration”,	“leadership”	
and	 “politics”,	 on	 the	 other	 there	 are	 “steering”,	 “management”,	 “control”	
and	“guidance”.	The	first	group	underlines	the	structural	side	of	the	word,	
its	connection	with	bureaucracy	and	authority	relations,	where	as	the	other	
group	puts	stress	on	the	action	perspective	of	its	meaning.	(Susiluoto	19:	
II-III,	23–24.)
In	 the	Western	 discourse	 guidance,	 supervision	 and	management	 are	
often	used	as	synonyms	for	administrative	work	in	a	very	general	manner.	
In	this	work,	these	words	have	their	specific	meanings	which	correspond	
with	 different	 administrative	 elements.	 Some	 of	 the	 most	 meaningful	
changes	in	transitions	take	place	in	relation	to	guidance,	power	and	control.	
In	my	work	guidance	refers	to	supervision,	the	steering	of	everyday	work	
and	relations	between	actors	according	to	legal	requirements	and	ethical/
procedural	 principles.	 Power	means	 an	 ability	 to	 affect	 wanted	 changes.	
Control	means	an	ability	to	secure	the	work	process	for	the	advantage	of	the	
decision	 maker.	 Guidance,	 control	 and	 power	 are	 thus	 parameters	 of	
administration	which	effect	other	elements	of	administrative	culture	such	
as	leadership,	personnel,	organization	and	economic	relations.	
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When	the	meaning	of	these	words	is	examined	in	the	different	historical	
context,	something	essential	about	the	cultural	differences	between	different	
regimes	can	be	revealed.	These	differences	will	be	looked	at	in	the	description	
of	the	political	ideology	of	change	in	the	191–193	period,	and	again	in	
the	1991–2000	period.	The	differences	show	not	just	the	meanings	of	words	
themselves,	 but	 the	 whole	 theoretical	 and	 political	 context	 which	 they	
advance.	Words	have	a	double	role:	they	communicate	the	new	while	they	
are	used	in	the	state	building	process.	
Structures,	formed	according	to	new	meanings,	are	connected	to	values	
which	 structures	 advance,	 and	 power	 which	 different	 groups	 in	 these	
structures	 have.	 The	 latter	 is	 particularly	 interesting	 for	 the	 history	 of	
administration.	The	personnel	chosen	in	different	times,	develop	practices	
of	planning	and	control.	The	political	meaning	which	different	professional	
groups	inside	the	administration	have	acquired	along	with	the	growth	in	
importance	 of	 their	 work,	 has	 significant	 meaning	 for	 the	 creation	 of	
cultures.	 Different	 professions	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 have	 influenced	 the	
interpretation	 of	words.	 Susiluoto	 pointed	 out	 the	meaning	 of	 the	word	
“steering”	which	as	a	term	of	cybernetics	has	belonged	to	the	language	of	
engineers,	mathematicians	and	planners.	As	the	planning	and	steering	tasks	
became	more	 complicated	 in	 the	 Soviet	Union,	 the	 political	meaning	 of	
these	groups	also	grew.	(Susiluoto	19:	51.)
One	important	aspect	of	the	study	of	words	is	to	remember	that	words	
and	organizational	languages	have	both	manifest	and	latent	meaning.	These	
differences	can	be	very	important	for	daily	routines	of	organizations.	When	
major	changes	take	place,	organizational	learning	requires	replacing	words	
with	new	ones,	or	attaching	new	meanings	and	values	to	them.	In	transitional	
studies,	 it	 is	 therefore	 important	to	remember	that	 the	same	persons	can	
mean	 different	 things	 with	 the	 same	 words	 when	 speaking	 of	 different	
times.	For	a	researcher	then,	this	represents	a	challenge	in	understanding	
the	cultural	context	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	studied	organizations.
1.1.2 Elements of Administrative Culture
The	study´s	definition	of	administrative	culture	needs	to	combine	elements	
which	do	not	mix	easily:	the	structural	characteristics	of	organization	and	
the	social	behavior	of	people	in	them.	Much	has	been	written	about	what	
constitutes	 culture	 and	 how	 it	 can	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 administrative	
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environment.	Different	fields	come	to	conflicting	conclusions.	Legal	experts	
and	economists	stress	those	structural	components	which	should	exist	and	
often	 treat	 “culture”	 as	 something	 which	 inhibits	 progress.	 Transitional	
studies	made	from	an	economic	perspective,	concentrate	on	building	new	
models	and	seek	to	explain	the	errors	of	old	ones	in	(macro)	economically	
rational	 terms.	As	with	 purely	 legal	 studies,	 culture	 is	 often	 viewed	 as	 a	
group	of	unsolved	problems.	
Social	sciences,	on	the	other	hand,	have	developed	a	multitude	of	different	
concepts	 of	 culture,	 which	 leads	 to	 everyone	 picking	 according	 to	 their	
preferences.	Definitions	of	culture	range	from	unconscious	assumptions	to	
concrete	physical	artifacts	(for	a	list	of	definitions	see,	for	instance,	Rousseau	
1990:153).	From	an	administrative	sciences	point	of	view,	this	variety	may	
not	 always	 give	 the	 best	 chances	 for	 analyzing	 ongoing	 processes.	 It	 is	
generally	agreed	that	such	a	thing	as	culture	exists	and	that	it	effects	daily	
functioning.	The	connection	between	large	societal	changes	and	adminis-
trative	development	has	only	recently	received	more	attention.	Unfortunately	
for	Russian	development,	the	early	years	of	the	latest	reform	period	meant	
the	attempt	to	simply	destroy	the	old	state	structures	without	offering	an	
alternative.	The	experience	taught	at	least	one	thing:	that	the	complexities	
associated	with	changes	in	large	public	organizations	require	the	combined	
use	of	perspectives	and	methods	of	different	fields.	
There	are	 several	ways	of	 looking	at	an	administration:	 structural	and	
behavioral/social,	 legislative	 work	 and	 implementation,	 planning	 and	
control,	and	so	on.	The	division	of	economic,	political	and	“administrative”	
aspects	has	been	used	both	by	socialist	and	capitalist	writers.	For	instance,	
Makarenko	(199)	who	has	written	about	the	development	of	bureaucracy	
in	the	Stalinist	culture,	has	stressed	the	need	to	consider	forms	of	production,	
political	and	social	structures	in	the	study	of	national	administrations.	In	
his	view,	the	culture	of	administration	is	closely	connected	to	the	interests	
of	that	class	which	has	the	dominant	position	in	society.	(Makarenko199:	
32.)	In	this	sense,	and	as	far	his	views	reflect	the	general	socialist	perspective,	
he	 represents	 one	more	 classification:	 elite	 –	 democratic	 administration,	
which	has	been	used	in	different	forms	within	administrative	literature	(for	
instance	 Heady	 1996	 has	 examined	 such	 approaches	 to	 administrative	
cultures).	
My	choice	has	been	to	look	at	the	basis	of	administrative	culture	and	its	
development	in	historical	ruptures.	In	my	operationalization	of	the	concept	
of	culture	in	these	matters,	I	concentrate	quite	heavily	on	the	structural	side	
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of	culture.	Structures	effect	practices	and	ways	of	thought.	I	see	structures	
as	a	medium	through	which	internalized	and	even	unconscious	aspects	of	
culture	are	transmitted.	(Comp.	Rousseau	1990:	15–15.)
The	 study´s	 perspective	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 Heady	 (1996)	 who	 has	
examined	several	ways	to	categorize	the	elements	of	administration.	He	
sees	that	administration	can	be	defined	primarily	in	two	ways:	by	its	basic	
structural	 characteristics	 or	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 behavioral	 characteristics	
which	are	attached	to	structures	to	describe	bureaucratic	behavior.	In	the	
latter,	the	more	common	emphasis	underlines	the	negative,	dysfunctional	
traits	of	organizations.	The	writer	has	composed	three	central	structural	
elements:	1.	hierarchy	(principles	and	levels	of	graded	authority,	order	of	
control),	 2.	 differentiation	 and	 specialization	 (division	 of	 labor,	 goals,	
roles),	and	3.	qualification	or	competence	(professionalism).	(Heady	1996:	
4,	9.)	
Heady	 detected	 three	 variants	 for	 looking	 at	 bureaucratic	 behavioral	
characteristic.	The	 first	 could	 be	 called	 “	 the	Weberian	 ideal”	 in	 which	
functional,	 desirable	 behavior	 is	 expected	 and	 accepted	 as	 natural	 in	
bureaucratic	 operations.	 Another	 stresses	 dysfunctional	 behavior	 which	
develops	 from	the	 rationalistic	orientation	of	bureaucracy	and	structural	
features	 designed	 to	maintain	 it.	 I	would	 call	 this	 the	 “typical	 transition	
model”	which	in	the	study	of	Russia	concentrates	on	the	failures	of	change.	
The	third	alternative	in	Heady´s	list	relates	the	propriety	of	behavior	to	the	
bureaucratic	environment	and	results	in	a	more	flexible	standard	as	to	what	
behavior	 can	 be	 considered	 functional.	 (Comp.	 Heady	 1996:	 .)	 This	
approach	can	also	be	called	“cultural”	since	it	aims	to	understand	the	logic	
of	things	from	the	actor´s	perspective.	
In	this	study,	groups	of	elements	are	not	separated	into	two	of	which	one	
is	 purely	 structural	 and	 the	 other	 social.	The	 elements	 of	 administrative	
culture	are	most	of	all	derived	from	the	theoretical	formulation	of	transition	
in	 which	 transitional	 purposes	 are	 overriding.	 Yet,	 to	 have	 a	 common	
measurement	“model”	for	each	historical	case,	the	elements	also	have	to	be	
the	 same	 in	 each	 case.	The	 elements	 can	 be	 found,	 for	 instance,	 in	 the	
modification	of	Markku	Kiviniemi´s	model	(1994)	in	which	rules,	resources	
and	 external	 relations	 presuppose	 certain	 elements	 to	 be	 present	 in	
administrative	 systems.	They	 are	 also	 present	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	
transitional	society	which	is	given	later	in	this	work.	
In	the	structuration	theory	of	cultural	change	used	in	this	study,	structures	
and	behavioral	elements	of	administrative	culture	become	one	by	way	of	
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creating	new	practices	and	patterns	of	thought.	These	practices	and	patterns	
of	thought	reflect	the	core	values	of	organization	which	have	their	origins	
in	the	political	ideology	of	administration.	
There	are	two	main	manifestations	of	culture:	values	which	determine	
what	people	think	ought	to	be	done	and	practices	which	include	everything	
inside	the	organization	(Brown	1995:	,	21.)	For	me	values	mean	the	ethics	
of	an	organization	which	are	carried	into	principles	of	behavior.	Practices	
mean	procedural	rules	which	are	followed	without	reconsideration	in	every	
day	situations.	In	practices	we	can	therefore	see	how	ethics	work	and	what	
logic	institutions	follow.	
I	 look	 at	 the	 changes	 in	 administrative	 elements	 in	 the	 transitional	
process	 through	 three	 themes:	 the	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	
change,	state	building	(organization,	laws	and	economy)	and	the	transformed	
culture	 of	 the	 administration.	The	 political	 ideologies	 of	 administrative	
change	play	an	important	part	in	the	strategic	decision	making	of	the	elite	
which	guides	transitions.	Political	ideologies	of	administrative	change	give	
new	definitions	to	administration.	New	linguistics	determine	the	thinking	
which	is	officially	recognized	in	Constitutions	and	other	laws.	Looking	at	
these	 definitions	 adds	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 possible	 side	 effects	 and	
risks,	 if	 not	 of	 direct	 causes.	 Cultural	 transition	 changes	 the	 self-under-
standing	of	both	citizens	and	administrators.
Ideologies	 of	 administrative	 change	 include	 three	notable	 aspects:	 the	
use	of	metaphors,	stories	and	myths.	Both	in	the	191	and	1991	ruptures,	
metaphors	have	been	used	to	create	powerful	images.	These	have	been	used	
to	 gain	 political	 power	 and	 legitimize	 administrative	 authority.	 Political	
ideologies	both	include	and	exist	as	stories	themselves.	Stories	can	be	used	
to	control	because	they	are	memorable,	they	generate	belief,	and	appeal	to	
legitimate	values.	Organizational	codes	of	ethics	can	be	anchored	into	well	
known	stories.	Myths	are	beliefs	which	are	often	enshrined	in	stories	and	
which	 influence	 how	 actors	 understand	 meanings	 and	 react	 in	 social	
situations.	 Andrew	 Brown	 has	 separated	 four	 functions	 of	myths	which	
influence	 the	 development	 of	 culture.	 First,	 myths	 create,	 maintain	 and	
legitimize	past,	present	or	future	actions	and	consequences.	Second,	they	
maintain	 and	 conceal	 political	 interests	 and	 value	 systems	 which	 affect	
whole	 organizations.	 Third,	 they	 explain	 and	 create	 cause	 and	 effect	
relationships	 under	 conditions	 of	 incomplete	 knowledge.	 Fourth,	 they	
rationalize	the	complexity	and	turbulence	of	activities	and	events	to	allow	
for	predictable	action	taking.	(Brown	1995:	14,	22.)
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The	third	and	fourth	variants	are	particularly	interesting	for	understanding	
organizational	cultures	in	transition.	Typical	examples	of	how	myths	maybe	
used	to	reduce	anxiety	is	by	making	some	things	to	be	either	beyond	the	
reach	of	action	(for	instance	Russian	“historical	way”	or	national	character	
which	makes	westernizing	impossible),	absolutely	necessary	(dictatorship	
of	 the	 proletariat)	 or	 something	which	 can	 be	 remedied	with	 a	 straight	
forward	and	one	sided	action	(privatization	policies	as	a	method	of	changing	
the	state	or	collectivization	to	create	a	new	class	base).	
For	this	study,	important	in	these	myths	are	the	images	which	are	created	
of	citizens	and	civil	servants,	their	positions	and	roles	in	society.	Similarly,	
it	is	interesting	to	look	at	what	types	of	ethical	codes	can	be	found	in	stories	
of	political	ideologies	of	administrative	change.
State	building	means	the	practical	implementation	of	the	purposes	of	
the	 official	 ideology	 at	 the	 structural	 (institutional)	 level	 (comp.	 for	
instance	 Sharlet	 1999).	 Changes	 in	 the	 original	 meaning	 of	 a	 political	
ideology	take	place	when	risks,	new	opportunities	and	unintended	side-
effects	appear.	Institutions	begin	to	have	new	social	meanings.	I	 look	at	
transition	both	through	the	institution	building	of	the	state	administration	
(of	which	the	local	level	is	a	part)	and	at	the	work	organization	level.	In	
the	first,	the	emphasis	is	on	the	effects	of	structural	changes	on	the	role	
and	position	of	 state/local	 level	 administration	and	 the	organization	of	
hierarchies	according	to	the	new	(mostly	legal)	requirements.	In	the	latter,	
the	emphasis	has	been	on	personnel	and	client-relations	(i.e.	good	service	
and	openness).
Political	 scientists	 have	 attempted	 to	 categorize	 political	 regimes	with	
corresponding	 administrative	 cultures	 (for	 example	Heady	 1996).	 I	 have	
not	categorized	different	historical	administrations	but	the	nature	of	state	
level	decision	making	is	an	integral	part	of	describing	the	lower	level.	
Finally,	the	new	culture	(social	system)	shows	us	the	real	meaning	the	
different	cultural	elements	of	the	new	structures	have	had.	Transformation	
processes	in	different	elements	of	the	administration	lead	to	the	creation	of	
new	practices	and	patterns	of	thought	which	reflect	new	institutionalized	
values.	 New	 administrative	 ethics	 and	 procedural	 principles	 are	 created	
which	show	the	basic	assumptions	of	the	organization.
In	transition,	 the	old	culture	mediates	 the	range	and	differentiation	of	
public	 resources	 and	 rules,	 and	 of	 external	 relationships	 as	 a	 result	 of	
changes	of	ideological	purposes.	The	transformed	administrative	culture	is	
in	fact	a	transformed	version	from	the	ideal	administrative	type	described	
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by	the	political	ideology	in	each	historical	case.	Each	theme	has	sub-themes.	
The	logic	which	I	follow	is:	
1.	The	basis	of	cultural	changes	 is	a political ideology of administrative 
change which	 includes	 purposes. Purposes	 tell	 about	 the	 vision	 of	 good	
government,	and	about	the	type	of	changes	which	are	needed	to	reach	it.	
An	ideology	of	administrative	change	involves	presumptions	about
•	 the	economical	basis	of	government
•	 authority	(formal	decision	making	positions,	territorial	arrangements	
of	hierarchy)
•	 use	of	information	and	language	in	the	administration
•	 leadership
•	 personnel	and
•	 external	 relations	 (i.e.	 types	 of	 clients,	 elites,	 relationship	 with	
them).
	
2.	Purposes	 are	 carried	 into	 state building	 in	which	 there	 are	 changes	 in	
rules	and	resources.	Structural	changes	represent	ethical	choices.	Changes	
which	take	place	are	looked	at	in	the	following	elements:	
law and rules
•	 sources	of	law	and	rules,	and	their	order	of	importance
•	 the	territorial	element	in	the	development	of	and	execution	of	laws	
and	rules
•	 legal	culture	and	legal	institutions
administrative organizations
•	 hierarchies,	their	territorial	basis	and	relations	between	institutions
•	 systems	of	civil	service
economy	
•	 the	economic	base	of	state	building
•	 the	relationship	between	economy	and	politics
•	 the	territorial	element	in	economy.
	
3.	A new culture	is	formed	in	the	social	system	of	the	organization.	Changes	
in	different	cultural	elements,	and	the	level	of	institutionalization	of	different	
administrative	elements	begin	to	show.	The	elements	of	the	new	culture	are:
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•	 economy:	financing	of	administrative	work
•	 authority:	 type	 and	 ownership,	 market	 of	 authority,	 territorial	
hierarchies	
•	 law	 and	 rules:	 legal	 consciousness,	 discretion	 in	 administrative	
decision	making,	legal	control	of	administrative	work,	territoriality	
in	laws	and	rules,	and	in	their	application
•	 organization:	guidance	and	control
•	 information	and	language:	openness	and	publicness,	 language	and	
symbolism
•	 leadership:	 roles	 in	 the	 organization	 and	 in	 the	 administrative	
market
•	 personnel:	 working	 style,	 specialization	 and	 professionalization,	
hiring	and	promotion	practices
•	 citizens	 and	 other	 clients:	 relations	 to	 different	 groups	 in	 the	
society.
Each	historical	case	is	looked	at	with	this	set	of	questions.	The	resulting	four	
ideal	types	of	administration	show	the	most	significant	cultural	elements	of	
each	 time	 period	 and	 their	 changes	 within	 the	 theoretical	 framework.	
Concepts	relating	to	an	ideal	type	(the	liberal-democratic	one	in	this	case)	
can	be	used	in	two	ways.	They	can	show	the	relevant	similar	features	which	
correspond	 with	 the	 ideal	 type	 or	 qualities	 which	 differ	 in	 other	
administrative	 cultures.	 More	 interesting,	 however,	 is	 to	 discover	 the	
meaning	 which	 the	 same	 concepts	 have	 in	 different	 administrative	
cultures.
The	concepts	are	not	predictive	nor	exhaustive	of	what	an	administration	
in	each	case	is	like.	Not	all,	possibly	even	important	qualities	are	included.	
The	aim	is	to	make	the	narrative	assuring	enough	to	submit	evidence	for	
each	element.	The	“cultural”	and	“transitional”	are	then	bound	to	the	limits	
of	 my	 outline,	 and	 are	 not	 universal	 by	 nature.	 The	 descriptions	 of	
administrations	 which	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 research	 material	 are	 not	
mechanical	patterns	for	the	interpretation	of	individuals	and	their	behavior	
in	different	situations.	Instead	they	give	an	overview	of	the	most	dominating	
cultural	features	of	different	historical	administrations.
The	materials	used	in	the	description	of	different	historical	time	periods	
are	not	objectively	comparable.	In	this	sense,	each	group	of	material	used	to	
describe	historical	time	periods	forms	a	separate	“case”.	Here	it	 is	vital	to	
notice	that	the	groupings	can	include	in	themselves	many	subcategories	of	
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which	“power”	and	“control”	are	among	the	most	meaningful	ones	for	the	
social	system	of	administration.	The	material	upon	which	the	categorizing	
has	been	done	covers	such	a	wide	variety	of	descriptions	and	analysis	that	
not	all	historical	time	periods	can	be	described	with	comparable	precision	
to	every	point	on	the	list.	New	empirical	material	has	been	collected	only	
for	the	last	time	period	of	1991	onwards.
1.1.3 Administrative Ethics, Procedural Principles and 
Citizenship in the Liberal-Democratic Ideal Type
The	present	day	(European)	liberal-democratic	administration	ideal	type	is	
used	 as	 a	 reference	 point	 in	 this	 work.	 I	 claim	 that	 this	 framework	 is	
applicable	 to	 a	 study	 of	 different	 historical,	 political	 and	 philosophical	
foundations	for	administration.	This	is	because	a	“cultural	yardstick”	gives	
the	researcher	a	chance	to	see	differences	between	cultures	which	go	beyond	
structural	arrangements.	
The	political	programs	of	different	time	periods	serve	as	guidelines	for	
state	building.	Culture	in	this	sense	is	a	practical	realization	of	values	(comp.	
Virtanen	196:	4).	I	suppose,	to	some	degree,	that	certain	types	of	structures	
help	 enable	 the	birth	of	 a	 certain	 type	of	 behavior,	while	 others	make	 it	
more	difficult.	For	instance,	the	structures	which	build	upon	the	ethical	and	
procedural	 choices	 of	 a	 liberal-democratic	 rule	 of	 law	 administration,	
should	not	in	principle	lead	to	undemocratic,	dictatorial	or	highly	corrupt	
administrations.	Alternatively,	one-party	systems	of	authoritarian	govern-
ment,	 without	 the	 separation	 of	 powers,	 make	 organizational	 learning	
through	 open	 interaction	 with	 society	 difficult.	 In	 this	 way	 structural	
arrangements	are	ethical	choices:	moreover,	they	are	choices	conducive	to	the	
appearance	of	a	certain	type	of	culture,	either	immediately	or	over	time.	
The	ethics	of	administration	is	a	central	issue	in	the	legitimation	of	a	new	
order.	As	Camilla	Stivers	has	pointed	out,	the	process	of	restoring	support	
and	 legitimacy	 to	government	will	mean	a	return	 to	an	emphasis	on	 the	
public	aspects	of	its	work	and	to	the	basic	issues	of	democracy	(Stivers	1994:	
443).	 Different	 definitions	 of	 ethics	 are	 connected	 to	 different	 types	 of	
government.	For	instance,	in	the	case	of	the	liberal-democratic	ideal	type,	
ethical	 principles	 of	 administrative	 work	 and	 the	 content	 of	 democracy	
stand	out.	Yet,	these	terms	have	been	used	in	the	past	with	different	lexical	
and	practical	meanings.
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Since	 the	1993	Constitution	of	Russia,	 the	 rule	of	 law	concept	 (or	 the	
German	legal	term	Rechtstaat)	has	been	used	in	the	evaluation	of	Russian	
state	building.	This	concept	has	acquired	wider	meaning	than	its	original	
legal	interpretation	of	law	based	reliability	and	predictability.	In	the	language	
of	Western	economic	and	political	organizations,	rule	of	law	usually	means	
legal	certainty	in	administrative	actions	and	decisions,	i.e.	administration	
through	law	(Sigma	papers:	no	2:	9).	Today	it	more	widely	 includes	the	
respect	and	advancement	of	human	rights	in	general.
It	is	practical	to	use	the	rule	of	law	concept	to	understand	the	value	basis	
of	Russian	administration,	because	 law	has	 twice	been	a	political	 tool	of	
major	system	change.	Law	has	also	been	the	key	instrument	of	state	building	
aimed	at	altering	the	most	basic	assumptions	of	public	institutions,	i.e.	the	
social	 contract	 (Grosenick	1994:19)	of	 the	 administrators.	Furthermore	
law	is	closely	connected	to	many	of	the	cultural	elements	under	study	here.	
Administrations	 share	 aspects	 of	 citizenship,	 public	 organization	 and	
professionalism	(work	organization).	The	citizenship aspect	means	that	the	
administration	forms	a	link	between	the	political	sphere	and	the	citizen.	In	
general	the	government’s	responsiveness	refers	to	a	correspondence	between	
the	decisions	of	officials	and	the	wishes	of	the	people	who	are	subjects	of	
these	acts.	(Anckar	194.)	The	link	is	not	direct	because	in	modern	states	a	
complicated	mediation	structure	formulates	the	“public”opinion.	Democ-
racy	can	be	seen	as	a	system	defined	by	the	people´s	ability	to	participate	in	
the	decision-making	process.	Democracy	deals	with	power,	not	the	fulfilling	
of	 needs	 and	 wishes.	 (Anckar	 194.)	 Democracy	 means	 the	 public	
accountability	of	public	institutions,	which	have	to	at	least	take	into	account	
the	lawful	equality	of	various	interests.
Liberal	democracy	is	not	a	dictatorship	of	the	majority	but	a	compromise	
by	 those	 who	 take	 part	 in	 the	 decision	 making.	 At	 the	 actor	 level,	 the	
resolution	 of	 interest	 conflicts	 between	 individuals	 must	 at	 least	 be	
compatible	with	the	non-negotiable	values	of	rights.	(Clark	&	Dear	194:	
155,162.)	These	same	non-negotiable	values	of	rights	form	the	basis	of	the	
relationship	 between	 administration	 and	 its	 citizens.	 Discretion	 is	 used	
with	 the	 intent	 of	 protecting	 individual	 citizens	 from	 arbitrary	 decision	
making:	the	administration	has	horizontal	authority	(i.e.	the	delegation	of	
decision	making	to	interested	parties,	as	an	opportunity	to	take	part	in	the	
preparation	 of	 decisions);	 concepts	 of	 public	 interest	 (i.e.	 broadened	
definition	of	expertise);	and	local	community	which	strengthens	the	link	in	
a	non-coercive	way.	(Comp.Stivers	1991:	444–446.)	
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Peters	(194)	has	presented	a	classification	of	societal	cultures	into	three	
groups	with	different	client-administration	relationships.	The	closest	to	the	
liberal-democratic	ideal	type	would	be	found	in	societies	which	are	either	
rationalist-deductive	 such	 as	most	 of	Continental	Europe,	 or	 pragmatic-
empirical	such	as	the	United	Kingdom,	the	USA	and	Northern	Europe.	In	
the	first	group	decisions	about	an	individual	case	are	made	on	the	basis	of	
deductive	reasoning	from	a	 legal	premise	which	both	the	citizen	and	the	
administrator	 accept.	 The	 ideal	 is	 minimal	 use	 of	 personal	 discretion.	
(Peters	194:	41.)
The	 second	 group	 uses	 generalities	which	 are	 drawn	 from	 a	 series	 of	
individual	decisions.	This	way,	each	case	is	to	an	extent	a	new	one	which	
can	 be	 modified	 according	 to	 situational	 reasons.	 The	 ideal	 is	 a	 well-
informed	 individual	 administrative	 decision	 based	 on	 a	 precedent.	The	
work	of	a	single	administrator	is	made	more	difficult	when	all	the	specifics	
need	to	be	counted.(Peters	194:	42.)	Both	of	the	above	variations,	however,	
require	a	large	amount	of	trust	between	organization	and	citizen.
The	third	group	is	the	non-Western	world,	were	administrative	decision	
making	 is	 generally	 assumed	 to	 be	 a	 result	 of	 personal	 bargaining	 and	
negotiation.	 Rules	 which	 the	 administration	 itself	 has	 promulgated	
constitute	a	place	from	which	to	begin	bargaining.	(Peters	194:	43.)	This	
type	 of	 personal	 “flexibility”	 is	 often	 characterized	 as	 being	 typical	 for	
societies	 in	 transition.	The	 political	 instability	 of	 the	 country	 intensifies	
what	can	be	considered	a	permanent	dysfunction	from	the	view	of	a	stable	
rule	of	law	ideal.	Trust	is	personal	and	not	institutional.	
The	 liberal	 tradition	 has	 been	 ambivalent	 about	 the	 role	 government	
should	 have	 in	 society.	 The	 traditional	 liberal	 view	 is	 that	 government	
should	only	have	authority	when	it	is	necessary	for	the	protection	of	life,	
liberty	and	property	of	citizens,	and	legitimacy	to	do	so	only	when	it	has	
popular	 consent	 (Hollis	 &	 Plokker	 1995:	 51).	 The	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	
Scandinavian	 model	 has	 meant	 an	 active	 state	 which	 regulates	 the	
development	 of	 the	 whole	 society.	This	 type	 of	 government	 needs	 large	
popular	support.	The	present	neutral	liberal	democratic	ideal	type	tries	to	
combine	 these	 two	 views	 of	 government. In	 the	 ideal	 case,	members	 of	
society	have	an	internalized	sense	of	responsibility	based	upon	the	notion	
that	by	following	the	rules	they	will	benefit	the	most.	There	is	trust	in	the	
way	laws	work	within	the	administration´s	daily	routines.	
The	public organization aspect	 requires	 legality.	 Legal	 practices	 in	 the	
administration	 have	 a	 significant	meaning	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 citizenship	
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within	the	society	(comp.	Burbank	199:	2).	In	a	state	governed	by	the	rule	
of	law,	norm	hierarchy	is	clear:	there	is	trust	that	laws	are	beneficial	and	that	
every	 one	 normally	 follows	 them.	There	 is	 horizontal	 cooperation	 and	
transparency	between	different	public	organizations.	Instead	of	mere	orders	
and	coercion,	transparent	procedures	and	communication	ideally	help	to	
make	decisions	more	rational	and	cost-effective.	Even	in	the	least	favorable	
situation,	they	hinder	illegal	activity	and	the	misuse	of	discretion.
The	citizenship	and	public	organization	aspects	of	administrative	cultures	
are	 guided	 through	basic	 legal	 principles	 and	procedural	 principles.	The	
first	 include	the	 legality-principle	(decision	making	based	on	 laws,	norm	
hierarchy)	 and	 equality-principle	 (equal	 treatment	 of	 citizens	 in	 similar	
cases).	The	other	principles	include	that	of	proportionality	(administrative	
actions	 are	 in	 reasonable	 proportion	 to	 the	 issue),	 the	 goal-directness	
principle	(discretion	can	not	advance	inappropriate	goals)	and	the	protection	
of	 legitimate	 interests	 -principle	 (including	 prohibition	 of	 retrograded	
decisions).	(Ryynänen	1991:	11,	Sigma	Papers:	no.	2:	9–14,	Mäenpää	1996:	
13–202.)	 In	 transitional	 periods,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 not	 all	 principles	 are	
institutionalized	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Similarly,	 some	principle	may	never	be	
institutionalized	 and	 a	 legal	 legitimation	 is	 created	 for	 this	 situation.	The	
discretionary	rights	of	a	single	administrator	are	important	because	discretion	
is	a	part	of	real	power.	It	can	be	called	“the	area	of	free	consideration”	in	which	
legality	 and	 expediency	 are	 used	 as	measurements.	 (Ryynänen	 1991:	 12.)	
Political	environment	influences	the	way	administrators	use	discretion.
Discretion	 is	 also	 connected	 to	 relationships	 in	 hierarchies,	 guidance	
and	 information.	 Discretion	 is	 limited	 or	 affected	 by	 different	 types	 of	
written	directives,	orders,	assessments	and	so	on,	which	circulate	within	the	
administration.	In	terms	of	rule	of	the	law,	these	guidance	tools	should	be	
based	on	an	appropriate	 law	which	authorizes	such	regulation.	Adminis-
trative	 guidance	 should	 not	 exceed	 the	 limits	 given	 for	 administrative	
regulation	and	higher	administrative	organs	should	not	be	able	to	command,	
limit	 or	 extend	 the	 implementation	work	 of	 lower	 levels	 based	 on	 their	
position	in	the	hierarchy.	(Mäenpää	1992:	13.)	
The	procedural	principles	include	the	official´s	duty	to	work	actively	for	
the	individual´s	case.	They	also	include	a	right	to	be	heard	and	to	be	informed,	
legal	reason	for	decisions	which	are	explained;	and	time	limits	based	on	laws	
which	are	followed.	(Mäenpää	1996:	242–255.)	In	transitional	periods,	the	
changes	may	happen	to	any	direction	depending	on	the	starting	point.	From	
the	point	of	view	of	democracy,	the	right	to	be	heard	and	be	informed	would	
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seem	the	most	acute	requirement.	At	the	same	time,	time	limits	may	in	some	
cases	be	just	as	important	for	the	equal	treatment	of	citizens.	
Both	 the	citizenship	and	public	organization	aspects	of	administrative	
culture	depend	on	the	third	aspect	which	is	the	work organization aspect.	
The	 professional	 ethics,	 the	 ethics	 of	 the	 organization	 and	 the	 personal	
beliefs	of	an	administrator	play	a	role	in	the	process	(Moilanen	1999:	12.).	
In	the	work	organization,	rule	of	law	and	private	rights	either	materialize	or	
face	 obstacles.	The	 concept	 of	 professional	 ethics	 has	 been	 particularly	
important	 in	many	public	organizations	 in	which	legal	 training	has	been	
valued.	In	the	Soviet	Union,	engineers	were	considered	to	be	qualified	as	
all-round	 managers	 of	 different	 types	 of	 organizations.	 The	 definitions	
which	 are	 given	 to	 different	 administrative	 elements	 vary	 in	 different	
professions.	In	transitional	times,	though	professionalism	changes.	This	can	
lead	to	conflicts	in	work	ethics	among	different	organizational	groups.	
In	the	liberal-democratic	ideal	type	the	legal	protection	of	individual	
rights	emerges	from	the	formal	limits	of	legal	and	administrative	decision	
making.	Legal	protection	is	a	value	which	is	deeply	embedded	in	the	ways	
of	 thought	 that	 people	 have.	 Yet	 within	 the	 relationship	 between	 legal	
protection	and	administration	there	exists	an	interesting	duality	of	state	
and	 society.	 It	 is	 from	 this	 duality,	 that	 rights	 appear	 within	 the	 real	
world.
	“Rights”,	as	such	originate	from	extralegal	ideas,	which	were	turned	into	
practical	principles	 and	 institutionalized	 as	 a	 result	 of	political,	 religious	
and	 social	 development.	The	 development	 of	 states	 since	 the	 early	 20th	
century	has	made	 the	appearance	of	new	rights	possible.	Two	 important	
new	categories	of	rights	have	evolved:	civil	rights	and	human	rights.	Neither	
is	an	objective	concrete	fact	which	can	be	found	in	society	as	such.	They	are	
not	parts	of	economical	exchange	relations	which,	for	instance,	the	Soviet	
legal	theories	used	as	the	only	objective	basis	of	law.	Instead,	they	are	created	
as	purely	politically	based	moral	rights.	Both	are	incorporated	in	the	rule	of	
law	concept.	
Rights	in	today´s	political	discourse	are	assumed	to	have	a	strong	moral	
status.	Especially	 since	 the	diffusion	of	 the	human	 rights	 concept,	 it	 has	
been	thought	that	rights	exist	even	without	the	approval	of	the	state,	which	
has	 infact	made	 their	 institutionalization	possible.	The	creation	of	Soviet	
legal	thinking	and	creation	of	administration	took	place	in	a	world	where	
these	ideas	were	just	emerging.	Western	legal	thinking,	on	the	other	hand,	
had	developed	further	as	a	result	of	its	liberal	state	politics.	
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The	idea	of	rights	materializes	as	rule	of	law	when	it	guides	the	work	of	
authorities	whose	legitimation	is	guaranteed	by	the	state.	The	state	is	seen	
both	as	the	object	of	the	process	and	its	legitimation.	When	rights	become	
institutionalized	at	a	procedural	level,	it	is	possible	to	talk	about	a	rule	of	
law	society.	
In	a	rule	of	law	society,	legal	norms	thus	formally	create	(at	an	imperative	
level)	 a	 reciprocal	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 Rights	
appear	in	the	real	world	context	when	this	relationship	extends	beyond	
the	 boundaries	 of	written	 law	 into	 legal	 consciousness	 of	 both	 parties.	
Legal	consciousness	means,	above	all,	social	control	which	requires	trust.	
Rule	of	law	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	administrative	system.	It	involves	the	
transition	of	self-interest	with	regard	to	the	way	person	who	work	in	the	
administration	see	their	double	role	as	both	citizen	and	administrator	of	
citizenship.	
When	 considering	 the	 amount	 or	 depth	 of	 legal	 consciousness	 in	 a	
particular	 society,	 it	 is	good	 to	remember	 that	 it	 is	not	 the	same	as	 legal	
culture.	 Jane	 Burbank	 has	 suggested	 that	 “legal	 culture	 rests	 upon	 the	
citizenry´s	recognition	of	the	legal	system	as	a	preferred	means	of	solving	
conflicts	 and	punishing	 evil.”	 (Burbank	199:	 5.)	 It	 is	useful	 to	 see	 that	
legal	culture	can,	for	instance,	have	some	elements	of	rule	of	law	and	many	
traditional	ways	of	behavior.	Legal	consciousness	on	the	other	hand,	deals	
with	institutionalized	rights	between	the	citizens	and	the	state.	
Naturally,	the	qualities	of	liberal-democratic	ideal	type	do	not	correlate	
directly	with	reality.	The	liberal-democratic	ideal	type,	in	its	purest	form,	is	
a	myth	built	upon	the	presumption	that	everything	is	governable,	legitimate	
and	rational,	including	power.	This	myth	is	important	because	when	a	myth	
is	widely	 accepted	 in	 society,	 it	 becomes	 a	major	 force	 of	 social	 change.	
People	develop	practices	and	get	accustomed	 to	a	way	of	 thinking.	They	
pass	this	tradition	to	the	next	generation	and,	most	importantly	depend	on	
other	people	in	the	same	society	to	believe	in	it	too.	The	practices	and	ways	
of	thought	which	are	developed	go	on	even	after	the	myth	itself	has	stopped	
corresponding	with	 reality	because	 they	have	become	a	part	of	everyday	
social	tradition.	(Comp.	Virtanen	196:	29,	Yaney	193:	13.)	
The	essence	of	 looking	at	political	 ideologies	as	a	starting	point	 in	the	
administrative	culture	is	thus	clear.	The	stated	desirable	value	change	and	
the	actual	evolving	practices	are	connected	to	each	other	because	organi-
zations	require	trust	between	their	members.	Trust	in	a	deeper	sense	is	built	
upon	rules	which	uphold	certain	types	of	values.	In	a	mature	culture	the	
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interpretation	of	rules	and	the	expectations	of	people	are	based	on	these	
same	values.
1.2 How to Define “Transition”
1.2.1 What Does Transition Mean for Administrative Culture?
Administrative	 culture	 is	 often,	 quite	 understandably,	 seen	 from	 the	
integrationist	(functional)	view	of	culture	which	stresses	consensus	and	the	
leadership´s	role	in	modifying	and	creating	it.	In	the	ideal	type	Weberian	
organization	(Weber	196),	the	subordinates	have	internalized	the	general	
ideology	and	practice	 it	 in	 their	actions.	There	 is	a	reliance	on	rules	and	
procedural	 rationality	 in	 which	 decisions	 follow	 from	 programs	 and	
standards.	 Stability	 exists	 and	 goals	 are	 reasonably	 consistent.	When	 the	
manifest	 goals	 and	 language	 do	 not	 match	 the	 actual	 developments	 in	
behavior,	language	becomes	formalistic	and	ideology	symbolic.	As	the	gap	
between	the	manifest	and	latent	become	more	evident,	keeping	control	of	
matters	becomes	all	the	more	difficult	and	goal	attainment	is	endangered.	
(Martin	1992,	comp.	Sormunen	and	Kuparinen	1990.)
Civil	servants	effect	large	societal	change	programs	in	their	daily	decision	
making.	 In	 transitional	 situations,	 administrative	 questions	 of	 structural	
arrangements	become	highly	political.	In	fact,	political	power	“slides”into	
the	 administrative	 system,	 because	 the	 foundation	 of	 political	 decision	
making	is	weak	(Salminen	&	Temmes	2000:	3).	The	object	of	a	study	of	
administrative	transition	can	be	reduced	to	a	question	most	fundamentally	
connected	with	the	role	of	administration	itself:	why	is	changing	legislation	
not	enough	to	enact	a	transition	of	administrative	culture?
Firstly,	it	is	important	to	separate	the	definition	of	culture	from	several	
common	-sense	understandings	of	culture.	Especially	within	the	studies	of	
transition,	 culture	 (as	 a	 definition	 of	 something	 unconnected	 with	 the	
structures)	easily	becomes	a	wavering	description	for	everything	“qualitative”	
from	high	culture	to	“national	character”.	It	is	then	usually	a	waste	basket	
for	 things	 which	 are	 diffuse	 and	 vague,	 but	 which	 somehow	 seem	 to	
influence	daily	functions.	
Another	view	is	to	see	culture	as	an	equivalent	to	the	normative	goal	of	
an	organization.	In	which	case	unmet	requirements	are	seen	as	a	proof	of	
the	failure	of	that	particular	“culture”.	An	example	is	looking	at	the	socialist	
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administration	from	the	point	of	view	of	its	official	ideological	requirements	
only	to	conclude	that	the	socialist	culture	(actually,	ideology	in	this	case)	
was	doomed.	
Culture	can	also	be	equated	with	the	myths	of	the	organization.	Myths	
are	 important	 to	 transitions	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 effect	 the	way	 public	
organizations	are	defined.	Conceptions	are	created	which	are	separate	from	
daily	life	and	which	change	very	slowly.	Myths	reinforce	aspects	which	have	
gained	importance	in	the	past.	(Comp.	Vuori	1994:	15.)	In	this	role,	myths	
maybe	 a	 strong	 component	 of	 transitional	 risks	which	may	 create	more	
permanent	 dysfunctions	 in	 organizations	when	 central	myths	 are	 under	
attack.	
In	 revolutionary	 changes,	 new	myths	 may	 be	 created	 in	 the	 form	 of	
transitional	purposes	which	rise	from	the	political	ideology	of	administrative	
change.	An	example	is	Communist	utopia.	Even	in	less	dramatic	situations,	
transitional	 purposes	 connote	 “mythical”	 qualities	 such	 as	 “democratic”,	
“civil	rights”,	“liberal”	and	so	on.	These	have	different	meanings	for	different	
people	who	may	be	disappointed	in	each	other´s	definitions.	Again,	myths	
are	an	element	which	has	significance	 in	 the	 transition	of	culture	and	 in	
preservation	of	established	culture.	But	perceptions	and	mystified	meanings	
are	not	cultures.	
In	 this	 work	 culture	 specifically	 refers	 to	 the	 rules	 of	 organizational	
behavior	 which	 are	 governed	 by	 institutionalized	 norms.	 Cultures	 are	
concrete	entities.	Structural	factors	are	present	in	cultures	both	as	objective	
frames	for	action	and	practices	which	reveal	values	behind	the	rules	(i.e.	
laws)	 of	 society.	Culture means	 institutionalized practices and patterns of 
thought reflecting certain values and norms.	Institutionalization	can	be	legal,	
open	and	officially	wanted.	It	can	also	be	practical,	illegal	and	even	a	type	of	
taboo.	The	main	criteria	in	the	assessment	of	the	importance	of	a	practice	is	
to	look	at	its	meaning	in	goal	attainment.	What	channels	of	administrations	
are	 used	 in	 getting	 decisions	made,	 what	 sources	 of	 authority	 are	 these	
decisions	based	on,	and	what	gives	access	to	the	channels	and	sources	of	
authority?	
Alena	Ledeneva	(2000)	has	written	about	formal	and	informal	practices	
which	 coexist	 and	 sustain	 each	 other.	 Both	 exist	 in	 all	 societies	 but	 in	
different	 balances.	 In	 stable	 conditions,	 a	 good	 formal	 system	 has	 good	
filters,	such	as	the	rule	of	law.	There	is	less	room	for	informal	practices.	The	
more	abstract	qualities	the	formal	system	has	(such	as	laws),	the	stronger	
and	more	elaborate	the	informal	order	and	rules	become.	The	more	effective	
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the	 informal	 practices,	 the	more	 ineffective	 the	 formal	 order.	 (Ledeneva	
2000:	331.)	
Ledeneva´s	thoughts	coincide	with	the	political	process	view	of	culture	
which	sees	organizational	environments	and	group	boundaries	as	constantly	
changing.	 Individuals	have	 fragmented,	fluctuating	 self-concepts	because	
they	 are	 faced	 with	 inescapable	 contradictions.	 (Martin	 1993.)	 In	 the	
creation	of	a	new	administrative	culture,	authority	is	often	in	persuasions	
and	power	in	shifting	coalitions.	Decision	making	is	bargaining	and	there	is	
no	unifying	force	of	thinking	because	goals	are	inconsistent	and	pluralistic.	
(Comp.	 Sormunen	 and	 Kuparinen	 1990.)	 The	 self-interests	 of	 actors	
override	decision	making	rationality	and	goal	functionality.
The	concreteness	of	cultures	and	their	close	connection	within	structures	
of	society	becomes	evident	in	the	changing	of	laws	in	transitional	societies.	
This	 is	 usually	 hard	 work	 and	 even	 when	 it	 is	 successful,	 the	 effective	
implementation	is	difficult.	Why	is	this	so?	The	obvious	answer	from	the	
point	of	view	of	the	organization	of	administrative	work,	is	that	there	is	a	
crisis	of	functionality.	What	are	the	elements	of	this	crisis?	In	the	answer	
given	 by	 this	 study,	 the	 institutionalized	 forms	 of	 old	 structures	 hinder	
transition.	 Old	 forms	 have	 left	 a	 mark	 in	 the	 patterns	 of	 thought	 and	
practices	 of	 organizations.	 Theoretically	 then,	 a	 connection	 between	
structures	and	cultures	needs	to	be	found.	
Structures	 and	 social	 systems	 often	 become	 “one”	 in	 the	 common	
understanding	of	public	organizations.	In	this	study,	this	view	is	reinforced.	
Structures	are	seen	as	products	of	historical	developments	which	are	shaped	
by	the	actions	of	groups	of	people.	(Bendix	19:	13.)	Organizations	have	
certain	 official	 goals	 around	 which	 the	 daily	 work	 has	 to	 be	 arranged.	
Structures	 are	not	only	 supposed	 to	advance	 these	purposes	but	 in	 reality	
they	also	affect	the	way	these	purposes	can	be	achieved	(Denhardt	1994:	12,	
comp.	also	Ledeneva	2000:	331.)	In	this	respect,	structures	have	a	normative	
character.	Structural	arrangements	involve	orders	of	importance.	Assessment	
of	administrative	ethical	principles,	 for	 instance,	requires	 looking	at	how	
structures	support	or	hinder	the	realization	of	these	principles.	In	this	study,	
this	 normative	 character	 is	 mirrored	 against	 a	 definition	 based	 on	 the	
previously	examined	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	administration.
In	 Anthony	 Giddens´	 theory,	 which	 I	 borrow	 in	 an	 altered	 form,	
structures	 (rules,	 resources,	 transformation	 relations	 and	 properties	 of	
social	systems)	and	social	systems	(regular	social	practices	of	reproduced	
relations	between	actors)	meet	 in	 the	 structuration	process	 in	which	 the	
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conditions	 governing	 structures	 also	 effect	 the	 reproduction	 of	 social	
systems. (Giddens	194:	24.)	A	related	view	has	been	presented	by	Markku	
Kiviniemi	(19)	who	looks	at	public	organizations	as	a	combination	of	the	
structural	(objective),	cultural	(subjective	in	his	analysis)	and	organizational	
action	which	mediates	the	former	two.	
I	see	that	structures	of	administrative	culture	involve	manifest	functions	
(comp.	Riggs	1964,	Beck	1996)	of	the	organization.	Structures	are	made	of	
rules,	 resources	 and	 official	 transformation	 relations	 (Giddens	 194,	
Kiviniemi	 has	 used	 organizational	 action	 in	 place	 of	 transformation	
relations	19:	).	They	include	legislation	which	defines	authority	and	its	
proper	 use,	 and	 sets	 official	 tasks	 for	 different	 levels	 of	 administration.	
Resources	 include	 money,	 concrete	 material	 objects	 (buildings	 and	
equipment)	and	personnel	which	brings	along	its	education	and	professio-
nalism.	Official	transformation	relations	mean	formal	internal	and	external	
relations	 in	 which	 authoritative	 decisions	 are	 made.	 Transition	 means	
organizational	 action	 which	 has	 certain	 purposes.	 Rules	 and	 resources	
create	conditions	for	possible	actions	(Kiviniemi	19:	6.)
In	the	description	of	transition	of	culture	I	have	borrowed	from	Markku	
Kiviniemi´s	research	a	view	in	which	the	environment	for	transition	consists	
of	three	levels:	the	societal,	governmental	and	organizational	(agency)	level	
(Kiviniemi	1994:	10).	The	accent	in	this	study	is	on	the	organizational	level.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 the	 environment	 is	 going	 through	 a	 major	 social	
change,	 it	 affects	 the	administrative	organization	more	directly	 than	 in	a	
stable	 situation.	The	 ecology	 of	 transitional	 administration	 is	 looked	 at	
from	the	point	of	view	of	it	producing	new	risks	for	the	ethical	basis	of	an	
organization.	 Transitions	 include	 great	 decision	 making	 uncertainties.	
Legislation	and	its	implementation	usually	cause	unintended	side-effects	as	
well.	Transitions	produce	administrative	risk	cultures	(see	following	chapter	
1.2.3).	 Learning	 requires	 understanding	 the	 logic	 of	 new	 demands	 and	
successful	 adaptation	 to	 them.	 In	 major	 changes	 this	 often	 involves	 an	
“unlearning”	of	the	past	logic.	In	revolutionary	changes	the	“unlearning”	is	
often	coercive	which	again	produces	side-effects	of	its	own.	
For	a	transition	to	succeed	in	its	purposes,	all	three	levels	of	society	have	
to	be	connected	 to	each	other	 in	 the	actions	of	people	 sharing	 the	 same	
meanings.	Problems	arise	when	these	connections	serve	different	purposes	
for	different	actors	and	actor	groups.	Goal	attainment	is	disrupted	by	side	
effects	of	 the	 social	 system	which	 return	 them	as	dysfunctions.	 In	many	
cases	the	dysfunctions	become	institutionalized	and	it	is	difficult	to	separate	
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them	from	the	formal	system.	An	important	example	is	the blat	in	the	Soviet	
system,	which	Ledeneva	(2000)	has	studied	extensively.	Blat,	as	a	system	of	
mutual	 assistance,	 was	 used	 as	 an	 informal	 daily	 practice	 in	 the	 official	
administrative	market	(Kordonskii	2001)	of	the	state.	
Seeking	 the	 transition	 of	 culture	 primarily	 involves	 studying	 the	
development	of	the	elements	of	a	particular	culture	in	contexts	which	set	
new	requirements	for	the	old	culture.	In	the	transitional	process,	culture	
is	“born”	in	the	old	culture	as	a	result	of	adaptation.	In	addition	to	seeing	
the	concept	of	culture	as	being	a	social	context	of	action	(comp.	Kiviniemi	
1994),	I	see	it	as	a	process	in	which	structures	and	social	action	develop	
(comp.	 for	 instance	Griseri	 199:121).	Thus, a transition is a process in 
which a new administrative culture is born inside the old culture. It	 has	
transitional purposes	which	means	an	ideology	of	administrative	change.	
The	implementation	of	purposes	first	has	effects	on	the	old	structures in	
the	 form	of	 state building	which	 is	done	 through	new	 rules	 and	public	
resources,	 and	 in	 changes	 of	 external	 relationships.	 During	 periods	 of	
state	 building	 the	 authority,	 tasks,	 range	 and	 strength	 of	 public	
organizations	changes.
The	formation	of	a	new	culture	takes	place	in	three	different	stages:	
1. Integration of	the	old	culture	and	the	structural	changes.	The	state	
building	 which	 is	 based	 on	 the	 transitional	 purposes	 can	 be	 in	
conflict	with	the	old	culture	which	produces	new	dysfunctions	and	
risks,	or	intensifies	existing	dysfunctions.
2. Mediation of	 the	 transitional	 purposes	 is	 done	 in	 organizational	
learning	in	which	unintended	results	are	typical.
3. Institutionalized	 new norms	 in practices and patterns of thought	
emerge	in	time	as	a	result	of	changed	consequences	for	 individual	
administrators	and	for	the	organization	as	a	whole.	The	successful	
transition	of	culture	means	new	norms	for	action	and	thought.	
In	transitional	situations,	changed	structures	and	the	old	culture	usually	do	
not	evolve	simultaneously.	Structures	can	change	rather	abruptly	through	
revolutionary	transformations,	but	social	system	changes	need	more	time.	
Other	times,	a	changed	social	system	signals	great	need	for	reform	at	the	
structural	 level	 where	 changes	 are	 politically	 difficult	 to	 achieve.	 The	
directions	of	 structures	and	social	 systems	can	even	be	contradictory,	or	
one changes	much	faster	than	the	other.	The	new	culture	is	never	completely	
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identical	with	transitional	purposes.	Permanent	old	dysfunctions	and	the	
power	 balance	 of	 the	 changing	 administrative	 market	 effect	 the	 way	
mediation	takes	place.	
1.2.2 Transitional Purposes and Structures
Transitional	purposes	are	intended	solutions	to	question	as	to	how	people	
should	 live.	 These	 questions	 are	 answered	 in	 the	 political	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change.	 The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	
deals	with	fundamental	questions	as	to	why	the	administration	exists.	For	
instance	 in	 the	 latest	 changes	 of	 Russian	 state,	 this	 has	 to	 do	 with	 the	
introduction	 of	 new	 concepts	 of	 democracy	 and	 public	 organization. 
Essentially	all	political	ideologies	of	administration	build	legitimation	for	
authority.
In	 administrations,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	 state,	 is	 reflected	 in	 structure:	
new	 legislation,	 policies	 supporting	 it	 and	 resources	 given	 to	 the	
administration	to	fulfill	its	duties.	The	objective	may	be	in	practice	badly	
formulated,	 idealistic	or	under	 constant	political	 re-examination.	All	 the	
same,	 major	 systemic	 changes	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 state	 are	 not	 possible	
without	it.	
Purposes	 which	 are	 given	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 political	 ideology	 of	
administrative	change	may	have	 impossible	objectives.	As	Hogwood	and	
Peters	have	pointed	out,	this	can	have	two	consequences.	In	some	situations,	
impossible	objectives	can	motivate	people.	In	other	they	lead	to	a	situation	
in	which	there	are	no	useful	targets	to	aim	for	and	consequently	no	realistic	
criteria	 by	 which	 performance	 can	 be	 judged.	 Guidance	 about	 the	
appropriate	 level	of	 resources	becomes	difficult. All	of	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 a	
lower	level	of	achievement	than	is	realistically	and	cost-effectively	possible.	
(Hogwood	&	Peters	195:	2.)
The	 formulation	 of	 purposes	 effects	 implementation.	 Hogwood	 and	
Peters	 (195)	have	separated	 two	 types	of	purposes.	 In	 the	first	case,	 the	
smooth	operation	of	the	political	system	is	the	overriding	criterion,	which	
means	that	vague	objectives	maybe	desirable.	In	the	second	case,	substantive	
achievements	 from	 the	 use	 of	 scarce	 resources	 are	 the	main	 focus,	 and	
vague	objectives	may	lead	to	these	resources	being	used	for	objectives	which	
would	not	be	priorities	if	explicit	decisions	were	taken.	(Hogwood	&	Peters	
195:	26.) 
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While	 answers	 to	 these	 questions	 are	 being	 sought,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
remember,	 as	 Hogwood	 and	 Peters	 have	 pointed	 out,	 that	 there	maybe	
different	 interpretations	 of	 objectives	 (i.e.	 purposes).	This	 may	 even	 be	
regarded	as	a	desirable	source	of	variation	in	a	system	of	federalism	and/or	
decentralization	of	programs.	(Hogwood	&	Peters	195:	26.)	Organizational	
interpretations	of	what	purposes	mean	and	how	they	are	put	into	practice	
are	 important	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 administrative	 cultures	 at	 all	 levels	 of	
bureaucratic	 hierarchies.	 Purposes	 which	 are	 vague,	 may	 cause	 many	
tensions,	inter-organizational	conflicts	and	contests,	as	well	as	opportunities.	
Interpretations	 of	 purposes	 are	 connected	 with	 the	 formerly	 discussed	
theme	of	 language	definitions	 and	with	 the	birth	of	 unforseen	 risks	 and	
side-effects.	
Sructural	changes	carry	ethical	choices.	In	the	reformation/revolutionary	
programs,	 strong	old	administrative	cultures	need	 to	be	approached	at	a	
deeper,	basic	assumption	level	for	a	real	change	to	take	place.	New	ethical	
principles	 need	 to	 be	 a	 part	 of	 the	 organization´s	 “social	 contract”	 for	
implementation	as	daily	procedures.	The	leadership	is	most	effective	when	
it	can	employ	ethical	changes	 strategically.	Behavior	changes	are	difficult	
when	organization	members	 are	 expected	 to	 change	 ethics	 solely	on	 the	
basis	of	their	importance.	(Grosenick	1994:	190.)
The	strategic	choices	of	the	leadership	in	this	process	mean,	most	of	all,	
structural	arrangements	which	reflect	values.	Changing	culture	is	difficult	
because	 learning	 new	 behaviors	 means	 changing	 organizational	 conse-
quences.	This	 is	 often	 so	 difficult	 that	 it	 is	 easier	 to	 start	 a	 whole	 new	
organization	with	new	employees.	(Thomson	&	Luthans	1990.)
In	his	analysis	of	social	change	and	civil	service	ethics,	Antti	Kivivuori	
(194)	has	listed	ways	in	which	administrative	structural	changes	affect	the	
consequences	of	work.	For	instance,	new	tasks,	authority,	strength,	range	
and	rules	are	the	changes	which	lead	to	new	types	of	choices	by	individuals.	
As	 the	 administration	 grows,	 the	 need	 for	 new	 control	 organizations	
increases	 and	 it	 becomes	more	 difficult	 to	 pinpoint	 actual	 responsibility	
relations	 from	outside.	Weakened	control	 and	 responsibilities	 add	 to	 the	
ethical	choices	a	single	administrator	has	to	make.	At	the	same	time	work	
tasks	 require	 large	 units	 which	 leads	 to	 divisions.	 These	 work	 against	
intergroup	 cooperation,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 many	 administrative	
decisions	 (such	 as	 welfare)	 build	 human	 relations	 and	 require	 ethical	
choices	 from	 the	 whole	 organization.	 In	 addition,	 new	 norms	 of	
administration	can	be	contradictory	and/or	contain	more	general	language	
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which	requires	interpretation,	or	delegation	of	authority	to	lower	levels	of	
administration.	(Comp.	Kivivuori	194:	32–33.)
In	the	historical	parts	of	this	work	it	is	impossible	to	show	changes	at	the	
organizational	 level	directly.	One	must	merely	 suspect	 that	 some	 type	of	
organizational	learning	has	taken	place.	Instead	the	intention	has	been	to	
show	how	political	ideologies	have	been	operationalized	to	change	organi-
zational	structures	and	practices.	
In	 the	 assessment	 of	 transitions,	 the	 attempt	 is	 normally	 to	 somehow	
separate	that	which	is	generally	administrative	from	the	transition	process.	
Larjavaara	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 looking	 at	 transitional	 processes	 is	 not	
identical	 to	 mapping	 general	 dysfunctions	 of	 administration,	 which	 are	
dominant	 negative	 features	 of	 the	 (existing)	 administrative	 culture	 and	
stand	in	the	way	of	development	and	planning	of	organizations	and	their	
work	(comp.	Larjavaara	2001).	In	this	work,	permanent	dysfunctions	(for	
instance	Temmes	1991:	15–16)	are	of	course	one	aspect	of	administrative	
culture	 which	 will	 be	 looked	 at.	 But	 because	 I	 see	 culture	 as	 a	 process,	
permanent	 dysfunctions	 and	 transitional	 side-effects	 cannot	 always	 be	
separated	in	the	structuration	process.	In	transitions,	old	dysfunctions	often	
lose	their	meaning,	new	ones	are	created	as	side-effects	of	risk	administration.	
It	is	also	possible	to	see	transition	as	a	process	in	which	the	balance	between	
dysfunctional	parts	of	bureaucratic	life	changes	as	well.	
This	 is	 why	 clear	 understanding	 of	 both	 the	 new	 purposes	 and	 the	
characteristics	 of	 the	 old	 culture	 is	 so	 important.	The	 basic	 problem	 in	
transitional	administrations	 is	 that	 the	old	culture	serves	other	functions	
than	the	ones	which	the	new	transitional	purposes	would	have	it	advance.	
Side-effects	which	are	born	in	the	social	system	often	take	over	and	become	
dominant	forces.	More	political	and	social	pressure	is	born	in	the	external	
relations	of	the	administration	as	a	result	of	the	subsequent	dysfunctions	of	
the	system.	In	this	way,	dysfunctions	both	create	a	need	for	transitions	and	
make	 successful	 goal	 attainment	 in	 them	difficult.	A transitional cycle of 
administrative culture	 is	 thus	created.	In	this	process,	 the	dysfunctions	of	
the	old	culture	are	easily	recycled	into	the	new	administrative	culture.	This	
often	signifies	failure	of	the	original	purposes	in	the	eyes	of	citizens.	
The	meaning	of	 trust	 is	paramount	 in	transitions	because	the	political	
system	 is	 weakened	 by	 changes.	 As	 Guy	 Peters	 has	 pointed	 out,	 it	 is	
fragmented,	full	of	ideological	argumentation	and	“blockage”.	Bureaucracy	
then	steps	in	to	fill	the	power	vacuum	in	the	system.	As	more	power	passes	
on	 to	 it,	 the	 image	 of	 government	 as	 authoritarian	 and	 impersonal	 is	
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reinforced	 in	 the	population.	This	 reduces	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	political	
system	–	and	thus	prevents	the	executive	bodies	from	becoming	effective	
rule-making	bodies.	(Peters	194:	56–5.)
Understanding	transitional	administrations	is	easier	if	the	stress	is	both	
on	the	manifest	(official)	and	latent	(unofficial,	side-effect)	administrative	
functioning.	These	are	important	in	understanding	why	people	act	the	way	
they	 do,	 because	 often	 people	 change	 their	 behavior	 from	 the	 intended	
when	the	side-effects	become	large	and	meaningful	enough.	In	the	end	of	
this	development,	side-effects	can	assume	the	directive	role	of	the	execution	
of	 law.	Actual	 culture	 can	deviate	 from	 law	and	official	 policy	 goals	 and	
form	 a	 different	 type	 of	 organization	 from	 the	 one	 intended	 by	 the	
leadership.
Transition	of	culture	involves	fast	changes	which	often	leads	to	ineffective	
organizational	 learning.	New	 risk	 positions	 appear	 rapidly	which	makes	
planning	 very	 difficult.	 In	 major	 structural	 changes,	 the	 shared	 climate	
breaks	and	people	often	need	to	find	quick	individual	survival	solutions.	In	
administration,	where	 law	and	 rules	normally	 (compliance	with	 the	 law,	
ethical	codes	and	professional	standards)	make	the	 ideal	climate,	a	more	
instrumental	(pursuit	of	organizational	or	personal	interests	regardless	of	
consequences)	attitude	can	appear	(comp.	Denhardt	1994:	13).	
In	transition,	people	rearrange	and	re-prioritized	elements	even	when	
this	is	not	officially	in	their	competence.	Inside	the	administration	different	
internal	 binds	 (authority	 relations,	 promotion	 and	 status	 guarding	
pressures,	 traditional	ways	of	assessing	different	 types	of	matters	and	so	
on)	may	cause	administrators	to	act	in	a	way	which	conflicts	with	formal	
stated	purposes.	Mutual	 favoritism,	nepotism	and	 corruption	 are	 typical	
examples	of	conflicts.	The	actual	weight	different	actors	in	an	organization	
have	 is	 further	more	 not	 bound	 by	 organizational	 limits.	 Group	 goals	
inside	an	organization	can	be	protected	and	advanced	by	outside	pressures	
coming	 from	 the	 political	 arena	 or	 from	 authorities	 representing	 other	
organizations.	
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1.2.3 The Ecology of Transitional Administration and 
Organizational Pathologies
What	happens	to	administration	when	the	society	around	it	changes	rapidly	
and	becomes	unpredictable?	My	answer	is	that	the	administration	becomes	
a	 risk	 organization.	 Its	 ethical	 base	 is	 at	 risk	 because	 of	 the	 economic,	
political	and	social	pressures	of	the	surrounding	society.	There	can	be	two	
types	of	risks:	outside	structural	changes	which	threaten	the	organization,	
and	 cultural	 opposition	 inside	 the	 organization	 which	 hinders	 (ethical)	
change	imposed	upon	it	by	outside	structures	and	leadership.	
On	the	basis	of	existing	 literature	 it	 is	possible	 to	say	that	 the	Russian	
federation	has	twice	been	a	risk	society	where	many	permanent	dysfunctions	
of	 the	 old	 administrative	 culture	have	 been	 reproduced	 in	 altered	 forms	
during	the	transition.	Risks	and	side-effects	are	often	the	same	thing	and	
their	 analytical	 definition	 is	 at	 best	 relative.	 In	 his	 framework	 for	 the	
evaluation	of	 administration	 Juhani	Nikkilä	 (1992)	has	proposed	 to	find	
out	the	extent	to	which	things	happened	as	planned	or	consequentially.	In	
addition	he	proposes	to	look	at	the	meaning	of	changes	for	the	administration	
and	its	environment.	(Nikkilä	1992:	.)	Side-effects	are	then	things	which	
take	place	 in	 spite	of	planning	 and	are	often	unwanted.	Risks	 are	 effects	
which	 have	 significance	 for	 the	 administration	 and	 its	 environment	 and	
may	create	difficulties	for	purpose	attainment	in	the	future.	
	 I	 have	 looked	 at	 the	 Russian	 administrative	 cultures	 as	 “markets”	
(Kordonskii	 2000)	 in	 which	 different	 actors	 influence	 (mediate)	 the	
formation	of	a	new	culture.	These	markets	could	also	be	named	as	bargaining	
networks	which	would	stress	the	fact	the	there	were	negotiation	rules	and	
an	 attempt	 at	 reaching	 satisfactory	 compromises	 for	 all	 administrative	
parties.	 The	 concept	 of	 market	 puts	 the	 stress	 slightly	 more	 on	 the	
competition	of	different	groups	inside	the	administrative	structures.	
For	 understanding	 the	 environment	 of	 transitional	 administrations,	
important	 factors	 are	 the	 state´s	 role,	 institution	 building,	 center-
periphery	relations,	economic	goals,	and	citizenry	(social	roles,	attitudes	
and	action	in	terms	of	participation)	in	transition.	My	collection	of	risk	
organization	qualities	(based	on	the	writings	cited	at	the	end	of	this	list)	
is	as	follows:	
1)	Structural	changes	effect	two	levels	developing	at	parallel	speed	but,	in	
many	ways,	 separate	directions.	One	 is	 the	political	 state	or	government	
level	and	 the	other	 the	socially	adapting	citizen.	Hectic	change	produces	
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risks	and	does	not	allow	for	proper	planning.	Social,	economic	and	political	
side-effects	of	the	side-effects	themselves	can	become	decisive.
2)	In	the	economy	a	quasi-market	exists	in	which	negative	side-effects	of	
the	past	system	determine	the	present	situation.	New	risk	positions	rise	in	
the	society	while	“legitimate	levels”	of	new	bad	things	become	a	part	of	life.	
This	leads	to	a	normative	horizon	of	broken	trust	which	affects	directly	the	
legal	system,	respect	of	laws	and	administration.	The	earlier	predictable	(if	
not	 just)	environment	becomes	a	 risk	producer	and	 transmitter	of	 latent	
side	 effects	 which	 are	 unintentional.	 These	 produce	 often	 intolerable	
consequences	for	different	citizen	groups.	The	expectations	toward	the	state	
are	lowered	which	leads	to	growing	illegal	means	of	survival.	
3)	Structures	of	the	state	do	not	make	a	coherent	system.	The	social	space	
is	 re-divided	 by	 new	 actors	 and	 security	 institutions	 become	 important.	
There	is	incoherence	in	the	structures	between	manifest	and	latent	functions	
and	their	consequences.	Administrative	authority	is	formally	in	place	but	in	
practice	it	is	diffuse.	New	types	of	actors	can	assume	authoritative	roles	and	
advance	into	important	decision	making	positions.	New	norms	which	were	
created	 to	make	 structures	more	 coherent	 become	 rigid.	 In	 the	 end,	 the	
structures	themselves	can	become	norms.	
4)	 Law,	 rules	 and	 norms	 are	 often	 formalistic.	They	may	 be	 formally	
adopted	when	they	don´t	reflect	the	social	traditions	of	the	environment	
and	 thus	 the	 climate	 of	 the	 surrounding	 society	 makes	 enforcing	 laws	
difficult.	For	the	administrator	the	dilemma	then	is	how	much	can	he	try	to	
enforce	 the	 law?	Should	he	 try	 to	enforce	 it	on	a	 limited	 segment	of	 the	
public,	 and	 if	 so,	 on	 what	 segment?	 Corruption	 rises	 and	 morale	 is	
undermined.	As	a	result,	the	public	view	of	administration	becomes	more	
cynical.	In	this	absurd	way	law	intensifies	problems.	Instead	of	reliance	on	
law,	legitimate	levels	of	bad	things	are	accepted.	Law	may	become	a	naked	
instrument	of	power	relations.	Territorial	aspects	become	important.	Laws	
and	norms	are	not	interpreted	or	executed	in	a	uniform	manner.	
5)	Guidance	can	be	ineffective	because	there	is	a	loss	of	social	thinking.	
At	the	same	time	this	frees	those	who	opposed	or	were	disappointed	with	
the	old	order.	They	are	easily	frustrated,	because	the	structural	weakness	of	
the	system	makes	purposeful	action	difficult.	The	strength	of	professional	
norms	 is	 tested.	 If	 they	 conflict	 with	 new	 norms,	 there	 is	 a	 clash	 of	
expectations.
6)	Power	and	control	change	their	nature.	There	is	a	lack	of	consensus,	
official	 and	 unofficial	 powers	 are	 separated.	The	 need	 for	 more	 control	
 TheoreTical Framework
4
creates	unintended	effects	in	the	structures.	It	is	common	to	intensify	the	
severity	 of	 policy	 rules.	 Territorial	 differentiation	 takes	 place	 in	 actual	
power	and	control.	 In	administration	corruption	can	be	one	of	 the	most	
effective	ways	of	gaining	power	and	control.	
)	In	a	risk	society	new	information	is	flowing	but	it	does	not	produce	a	
balanced	reflection	on	the	new	social	and	economic	demands	required	for	
developing	legislation	and	institutions.	A	new	type	of	ignorance	(difficulty	
in	 choice	 making	 and	 calculation)	 is	 created	 as	 a	 result	 of	 mounting	
knowledge.	 Outside	 models	 can	 be	 accepted	 uncritically	 or	 through	
revolution,	and	the	dichotomous	thinking	(good-bad)	continues.
)	Politics	are	inside	the	administration	which	means	that	administrators	
need	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 left	 by	 politicians	 who	 cannot	 formulate	 clear	 and	
enforceable	policies.	“Best-intentions”	guide	decision	making.	Often	quick	
solutions	 are	 sought.	 In	 the	 long	 run	 there	 is	 an	attempt	 to	 colonize	 the	
future	which	brings	 surprises.	When	 administration	 fails,	 politicians	 see	
that	laws	and	rules	which	have	been	adopted	as	“policies”,	are	not	carried	
out.	The	 rhetorical	 confrontation	which	 results	 in	 this	 situation	 spreads	
over	to	public	debate	and	further	underlines	the	mistrust	in	administrative	
work.	At	 the	same	time,	politics	and	morality	gain	new	importance	over	
scientific	information	because	rational	calculation	is	often	impossible.	
9)	Client	relations	are	complicated	by	the	attempts	to	enforce	the	law.	As	
a	result	of	 the	resistance	by	the	population	to	 law,	 the	public	view	of	 the	
administration	becomes	cynical.	In	the	worst	case,	bureaucracies	can	appear	
as	forms	of	organized	irresponsibility.	
10)	 Class	 structure	 of	 the	 elite	 fluctuates.	 Cliques	 are	 important	 and	
nepotism	 gains	 even	more	meaning	 as	 a	 way	 to	 secure	 positions	 in	 an	
uncertain	 economic	 situation.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 new	 routes	 to	 the	 elite	
emerge,	and	new	types	of	elites	are	borne	within	the	administration.	New	
and	old	members	of	the	administrative	elite	who	coexist	in	the	administrative	
organizations	are	in	subtle	“wars”	in	which	new	ideas	based	on	changing	
values	clash	with	old	routines.	The	traditions	of	preferential	treatment	and	
corruption	are	often	used	by	new	actor	groups	trying	to	gain	power.	It	is	
very	difficult	to	actually	destroy	these	systems	to	introduce	new	professional	
norms.	
11)	 The	 position	 of	 the	 personnel	 varies.	 Cliques,	 nepotism	 and	
corruption	 gain	 importance	 in	 the	 hectic	 changes	 as	means	 of	 survival,	
social	advancement	and	relations	with	citizens.	Education	opens	possibilities	
for	survival	and	handling	uncertainty	becomes	a	cultural	qualification	as	a	
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result	of	manufactured	uncertainty.	In	revolutionary	changes	new	types	of	
administrators	begin	 their	work,	often	coexisting	with	 the	old	staff.	New	
administrators	 are	 often	 eager	 to	 adopt	 the	 new	 role	 they	 have	 in	 the	
building	of	the	state,	especially	if	they	represent	groups	which	were	earlier	
outside	of	elite	recruitment.	In	their	way	stands	the	lack	of	a	reliable	system	
of	measurement	for	success.	A	weak	or	distorted	system	of	rewards	exists	as	
a	result	of	financial	problems	and	the	old	culture.	This	leads	to	more	severe	
policy	rules	and	less	innovation.	(Compare	Riggs	1964,	Beck	1964,	Yanitsky	
1999,	Salminen	&	Temmes	2000,	Rowney	199,	Denhardt	1994,	Grosenick	
1994,	Vartola	194.)
In	administrative	organizations,	the	changes	of	society	are	multiplied	by	
the	general	features	of	administrations	themselves,	of	which	formalism	is	
the	 most	 evident.	 Relying	 on	 the	 formal	 structures	 alone	 can	 bring	
unintended	results	depending	on	the	level	of	formalism	in	which	there	is	an	
incongruence	between	formally	described	institutions	and	real	life	informal	
behavior	 (Riggs	 1964.)	This	 is	 one	 example	 of	 how	 transitions	 intensify	
existing	dysfunctions	in	the	administration.	
In	 transitions,	different	strong	developments	affect	 the	organization	at	
the	same	time	both	from	the	outside	and	as	a	consequence	of	these	from	the	
inside.	This	process	is	usually	very	difficult	for	the	leadership	to	handle,	not	
least	 because	 its	 own	 position	 is	 now	 more	 easily	 changed	 by	 internal	
opposition.	 When	 proper	 planning	 becomes	 possible,	 unintended	 side-
effects	may	have	already	begun	to	dominate	daily	functions	thus	creating	
new	obstacles.
Changing	the	law	is	not	enough	because	transitional	institutions	going	
though	major	changes	which	try	to	replace	their	previous	cultural	 legacy	
are	often	not	culturally	strong	enough	to	sustain	evenly	spread	and	uniform	
administrative	 functions.	 Cultural	 weakness	 is	 based	 on	 new	 legislation	
which	contradicts	old	standards	for	administrative	behavior.	At	the	same	
time	financial	inability	to	provide	the	infrastructure	to	execute	the	changes	
creates	lack	of	trust	in	organizational	purposes	both	inside	and	outside	the	
administration.	 In	 the	 international	 cooperation	 of	 the	 1990´s,	 this	 has	
meant	 that	 there	 has	 been	 a	 reliance	 on	 personal	 ties	 with	 partner	
organizations	because	the	organizations	themselves	are	not	relied	upon	in	
spite	of	their	formal	authority.	
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1.2.4 The Institutionalization of a New Culture
The	institutionalization	of	culture	has	taken	place	when	new	practices	and	
patterns	of	thought	inside	a	structure	are	taken	as	given.	A	new	culture	can	
be	looked	at	from	at	least	two	angles:
1.	 To	 find	 out	what	 kind	 of	 a	 culture	 has	 developed,	 new	dominant	
institutionalized	patterns	of	thought	and	practices	have	to	be	found	
both	at	an	organizational	and	system	level.
2.	 To	see	how	successful	 the	 transition	has	been	 in	 institutionalizing	
new	values,	the	administrative	culture	can	be	mirrored	against	the	
transitional	purposes.	
Culture	is	a	process	of	constant	adaptation	by	the	members	of	organizations	
to	 both	 the	 possibilities	 and	 limitations	 of	 structures,	 and	 an	 attempt	 to	
influence	 the	 conditions	 defining	 these	 structures.	 Routines	 reveal	 the	
actual	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 administrative	 ethical	 principles	 are	
implemented	(i.e.	how	effectively	 laws	are	brought	to	 life	or	discarded	as	
meaningless	to	daily	customs).	
In	major	political	transitions	different	forms	of	systemic	transformations	
can	take	place	which	affect	the	administration	in	various	ways.	Assimilation	
occurs	when	 the	other	party	willingly	 adopts	 the	 identity	 and	 culture	of	
another.	This	usually	 this	 happens	only	within	 a	 small	 elite	 or	 vanguard	
section	of	society.	Except	in	violent	revolutions,	integration	is	more	likely	to	
take	place.	It	means	the	structural	assimilation	of	two	cultures,	but	less	deep	
cultural	assimilation.	People	at	“the	receiving	end”	try	to	maintain	many	of	
their	basic	assumptions,	beliefs,	organizational	practices	and	systems	that	
make	then	unique.	(Comp.	Nahavandi	&	Malekzadeh	19:	2.)
Deculturation	can	also	take	place.	It	happens	when	members	of	the	old	
culture	no	longer	value	their	culture	and	organizational	practices,	but	they	
also	do	not	want	 to	be	 assimilated	 into	 a	new	culture.	 If	 the	old	 culture	
disintegrates,	a	result	is	a	great	deal	of	collective	and	individual	confusion,	
feeling	of	alienation,	loss	of	identity	and	stress.	(Nahavandi	&	Malekzadeh	
19:	2.)	Similar	types	of	feelings	are	evident	among	those	who	are	losing	
in	the	power	struggle	of	the	administrative	elite,	who	resists	the	fundamentals	
of	 the	 change	 and	 see	 imminent	 threat	 to	 their	 position.	They	 see	 that	
previously	 excluded	 groups	 gain	 importance	 and	 new	 types	 of	 values	
emerge	which	require	new	skills,	work	habits	and	contacts	in	the	society.	
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Instead	 of	 open	 separation	 they	might	 use	 different	 types	 of	 retardation	
tactics.	
In	 the	 administration´s	 wider	 environment,	 there	 is	 overlapping	 of	
competing	 and	 often	 incompatible	 types	 of	 social	 systems	 which	 often	
causes	a	deep	feeling	of	guilt	over	not	being	able	to	meet	one´s	own	norms	
in	 the	 surrounding	 society.	 It	 is	 natural	 to	 swing	 extravagantly	 between	
contradictory	 extremes,	 giving	 loyalty	 to	 opposing	 things.	 Both	 at	 the	
individual	and	organization	level	laws	may	simply	be	ignored	or	executed	
only	partially.	(Comp.	Riggs	1964.)
In	successful	transitions	of	administrative	culture,	clients	of	administration	
see	 the	 usefulness	 of	 organizational	 purposes	 for	 themselves	 in	 daily	
routines.	The	 ethics	 of	 structures	 which	 become	 “alive”	 in	 the	 routines,	
establish	the	foundation	of	this	new	social	reality.	Structures	are	not	separate	
from	people.	As	fast	as	a	culture	develops,	a	convergence	takes	place	between	
members	of	an	organization	and	its	structures.	A	more	profound	cultural	
change	goes	beyond	error	correction	in	a	learning	process	when	individual	
members	 create	 new	 requirements,	 their	 own	 sources,	 conditions	 and	
consequences.	This	kind	of	change	rarely	happens	without	larger	changes	in	
the	 structural	 conditions	 and	 thus	 it	 can	 be	 described	 as	 happening	
successfully	 when	 the	 (often	 more	 or	 less	 forced)	 structural	 and	 social	
changes	 work	 towards	 the	 same	 direction	 (Argyris	 19:	 20–24,	 comp.	
Giddens	194).	
Gagliardi	(196)	has	pointed	out	that	policies	can	only	be	adopted	if	they	
are	 produced	 by	 the	 structures	 “naturally”	 or	 –	 in	 his	 opinion	 –	 by	 a	
leadership	 which	 can	 bring	 the	 organization	 into	 new	 territory	 and	
reconstruct	its	competence	and	identity.	(Gagliardi	196.)	From	our	basic	
beliefs	of	what	is	true,	we	build	our	organizational	structures	and	functions	
to	protect	these	beliefs	in	society.	In	successful	transitions,	the	motivation	
of	 administrators	 which	 is	 supported	 by	 structures	 coincides	 with	 the	
acceptance	of	the	public.	A	cycle	of	reinforcement	develops	in	which	the	
institutionalization	of	desired	values	of	the	organization	spills	over	to	the	
society.
Commonplace	routines	of	life	in	the	administration	can	deter	even	large	
scale	structural	policies.	Transitional	periods	mean	confusion	at	the	level	of	
law	making	and	lack	of	clear	policies,	but	they	may	also	open	unexpected	
opportunities	for	a	social	system	which	is	less	controlled.	Giving	up	a	major	
part	of	the	social	values	is	followed	by	a	lament	for	the	past	and	is	a	major	
obstacle	to	planned	development.	(Tilev	1994:	59.)	Unwanted	and	surprising	
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cultural	changes	deny	people	the	time	for	adjustment	which	may	manifest	
itself	in	the	form	of	shock,	inconsistent	behavior	and	resistance.	These	lead	
to	organizational	dysfunctions,	risks	and	side-effects.
Hogwood	and	Peters	discuss	professionalization	of	public	service	which	
increases	 possibilities	 of	 conflicts	 among	 professionals	 when	 a	 policy	
succession	is	undertaken.	When	different	professions	need	to	interact,	they	
will	 tend	 to	 conflict	 over	 the	 control	 of	 clients	 (citizens).	 Professional	
rigidities	are	concentrated	in	law,	where	policy	successions	can	encounter	
institutional	and	behavioral	problems.	In	addition,	recruitment	is	typically	
selective	 and	 training	 attempts	 to	 transform	 personnel	 as	 useful	 for	 the	
organization´s	goals.	In	a	transitional	situation,	people	whose	recruitment	
has	involved	different	values	and	policy	perspectives	need	to	cooperate	with	
new	types	of	organization	members.	(Hogwood	&	Peters	195:	30.)
An	organization	which	is	required	to	inherit	procedures	of	a	predecessor	
organization,	may	find	that	these	are	being	used	to	subvert	the	purpose	of	
the	new	policy	 (Hogwood	&	Peters	195:	30).	Thomas	Fitzgerald	 (19)	
describes	how	the	deep	authoritarian	values	of	many	peresroika	time	plant	
managers	were	 revealed	 during	 the	 freeing	 up	 of	 the	 initiative	 and	 self-
direction	of	subordinates	in	the	transition	process.	The	resentment	over	the	
decline	 of	 status	 was	 “expressed	 in	 delay,	 avoidance,	 disinterest,	 back-
pedaling,	 talking	 for	 the	 record	but	finding	endless	 excuses	 for	 inaction,	
discounting	 benefits	 while	 exaggerating	 costs	 –	 all	 sorts	 of	 “confusion	
games”.
The	ideal	solution	to	this	transitional	culture	problem,	namely	a	planned	
alteration	of	the	entire	structure	and	its	processes	(including	reward	systems	
and	 re-education	 of	 members)	 while	 keeping	 up	 visible	 support	 and	
guidance	from	the	top	leadership,	required	“the	sort	of	end-state	the	change	
project	seeks	to	bring	about”.	An	ideal	solution	can	work	only	if	there	are	
unlimited	resources	of	time	and	attention	invested	throughout	the	whole	
organization.	(Fitzgerald	19.)	In	transitions	where	change	is	often	hectic	
and	planning	thus	very	difficult,	such	time	and	resources	do	not	exist.	
The	 socialization	 of	 long-term	 employees	 of	 any	 organization	 often	
results	 in	 isomorphic	 relationships	 of	 the	 character	 and	 the	 structure.	
(Fitzgerald	 19.)	 In	 transitional	 societies	 the	 connection	 is	 broken	 and	
people´s	self-images	require	drastic	sudden	changes.	Because	the	trust	and	
motivation	 to	 enforce	 the	new	values	 is	 lacking,	 changing	 laws	does	not	
really	change	the	way	people	prioritize	things.	This	creates	a	psychological	
problem	for	anyone	attempting	to	push	forward	changes.	When	negative	
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changes	dominate,	the	natural	response	is	withdrawal	from	the	process	into	
more	immediate	daily	problems	of	survival	or	slowing	down	the	development	
in	order	to	win	time.	Withdrawal	gives	more	political	room	for	authoritarian	
decision	making	which	may	be	temporarily	good	for	political	decisiveness	
of	 the	 elite	 but	 negative	 for	 building	 the	 commitment	 of	 the	 population	
(and	 line	administration)	which	 is	needed	 for	deeper	cultural	 transition.	
Stalling	the	process	on	the	other	hand	can	intensify	dysfunctional	features	
of	systems	and	thus	erode	trust	between	state	and	society.	This	is	one	of	the	
greatest	 concerns	 for	 any	 reformist	 groups	 or	 leaders	 working	 inside	
administrations.	
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2 Methodology
2.1 Research Material and Its Use in the Work
The	materials	which	have	been	used	can	be	put	into	three	groups.	All	groups	
have	 been	 approached	 with	 the	 same	 style	 of	 content	 analysis	 (see	 for	
instance	Tuomi	and	Sarajärvi	2002).	The	material	has	been	used	to	obtain	
answers	either	 to	questions	of	 ideological	purposes,	 state	building	or	 the	
culture	itself.	
The	first	group	of	materials	have	been	used	to	describe	and	analyze	the	
purposes	of	transitions	in	the	political	ideology	of	administrative	change.	
This	 material	 consists	 of	 what	 I	 call	 factual	 material	 about	 transitional	
purposes.	It	includes:	
–	 political	writings	of	Soviet	political	and	state	leaders,	
–	 official	reform	programs,	
–	 legal	and	political	theories	of	society,	economics	and	law	which	have	
been	used	in	state	building	by	Soviet	and	Russian	legal	and	political	
writers	of	different	time	periods.	
	
I	call	 this	material	“factual”	because	the	 ideological	purposes	which	they	
document	 is	 undisputable,	 first	 hand	 material.	 I	 have	 concentrated	 on	
political	writings	and	official	programs	as	a	 starting	point	 in	all	periods,	
with	the	exception	of	the	last	one	where	the	ideological	purposes	have	been	
described	 with	 the	 help	 of	 both	 an	 economic	 program	 and	 the	 new	
Constitution	of	1993.
The	second	group	of	materials	includes	those	which	have	been	used	to	
describe	state	building,	in	other	words	structures	and	their	development	in	
different	time	periods.	This	group	consists	of:
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–	 factual	 material	 of	 structures	 such	 as	 normative	 material	
(Constitutions	 and	 other	 laws),	 the	 history	 of	 structural	
arrangements	
–	 analytical	material	of	structures	such	as	political	science/	economical	
and	legal	studies	of	Russian	administration	by	both	Soviet,	Russian	
and	Western	writers.
Constitutions	have	been	used	 as	 a	basis	 for	 the	description	of	 structural	
arrangements	(hierarchies	of	decision	making,	economical	arrangements,	
authority	of	different	levels,	vertical	relations).	Other	laws	have	been	used	
to	describe	the	tasks	set	for	administration	(in	the	present	day	study)	or	to	
see	 how	 major	 laws	 regulate	 public	 decision	 making.	 Descriptions	 of	
structural	 arrangements	 have	 also	 been	 searched	 in	 general	 historical	
studies	about	the	four	time	periods.	
Besides	writers	 of	 political	 science,	 I	 have	 used	 economical	 and	 legal	
studies	which	approach	Russian	and	Soviet	administration	and	its	functions	
from	different	perspectives.	The	third	group	of	material	has	been	used	to	
describe	the	new	administrative	culture.	In	this	group	there	have	been:
–	 Analytical	material	of	Russian	and	Soviet	administration:	Political	
science/	economical	and	legal	studies	of	Russian	administration	by	
both	Soviet,	Russian	and	Western	writers.
–	 Historical	background	material:	historical	 studies	of	 time	periods,	
administrative	and	political	archive	material	(original	but	collected	
in	ready	volumes),	instructions	of	administrative	organizations.
–	 In	 the	 Murmansk	 city	 district	 administration	 in	 1993	 and	 2000,	
interviews	 were	 conducted	 (all	 together	 31)	 by	 the	 author.	These	
interviews	 dealt	 with	 the	 present	 day	 work	 of	 the	 case	 study	
organization.	The	intention	has	been	to	look	at	the	development	of	
practices	 and	 ways	 of	 thought	 in	 one	 sample	 organization	 in	 the	
studied		year	period.	The	interviews	have	been	recorded,	transcribed	
in	 their	 original	 Russian	 language	 and	 reviewed	 with	 the	 set	 of	
questions	used	in	the	study.	Each	interview	has	been	studied	to	find	
either	direct	descriptions	or	indirect	evidence	for	the	description	of	
those	administrative	elements	which	are	in	the	focus	of	this	work.
–	 The	persons	 interviewed	 all	worked	 in	 the	 same	October	District	
administration	 in	 the	 city	 administration	 of	 Murmansk.	 They	
represented	different	educational	back	grounds	(lawyers,	engineers,	
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economists,	 book	 keepers	 and	 information	 technologists).	 Ages	
differed	from	late	20´s	to	50´s,	most	were	between	30	and	40.	Five	
were	men	and	26	women.	All	worked	in	expert	positions	in	which	
they	either	dealt	with	direct	customer	service	or	higher	administrative	
positions.	
As	in	the	description	of	state	building,	a	picture	of	the	new	culture	has	been	
produced	 through	 the	 use	 of	 different	 types	 of	 materials	 within	 social	
sciences,	 economics,	 law	and	 cultural	 studies.	 Instead	of	 seeing	 this	 as	 a	
methodological	obstacle,	I	have	approached	it	as	an	opportunity	to	build	a	
picture	which	includes	the	inevitable	conflicts	between	different	viewpoints.	
It	is	possible	to	build	a	theoretically	solid	picture	of	a	culture	by	using	just	
one	type	of	material,	but	this	picture	can	easily	be	inadequate	when	we	try	
to	understand	major	administrative	changes.
Structurally	my	work	consists	of	parts	which	universalize	findings	into	
pictures	of	past	Russian	local	administrations,	and	a	part	which	builds	an	
individualized	picture	of	one	sample	organization	along	with	the	analysis	of	
more	 general	 developments	 in	 the	 surrounding	 state	 and	 society	 (comp.	
Salminen	et	al.	2000:	2).	This	type	of	a	structural	imbalance	is	mostly	due	
of	to	the	limits	of	the	available	material.	The	first	three	parts	of	the	study	can	
be	seen	as	a	back	ground	for	the	last	part.
When	choosing	material	I	have	looked	at	the	following	issues:	richness	
or	descriptiveness	concerning	the	arrangements	and	practices	of	Russian	
administration,	economical	decision	making	in	the	Soviet	Union	or	Russia,	
legal	thinking	in	general	or	in	the	work	of	administrators.	Studies	about	the	
use	of	information	and	language	(particularly	censorship)	have	also	been	
important,	 as	 well	 as	 elite	 studies	 connected	 with	 Russian	 and	 Soviet	
government	 (Russian	 administrative	 positions	 and	 nomenklatura	 in	 the	
Soviet	 system).	With	 the	 selected	 studies,	 I	 have	 sought	 answers	 to	 the	
questions	mentioned	in	section	1.1.2.	Proof	for	each	administrative	element	
of	the	culture	has	been	based	on	the	assessment	of	the	reliability	and	validity	
of	the	material	used,	as	well	as	of	the	corroborating	evidence	found	in	other	
materials.	
From	each	 interview,	 excerpts	have	been	chosen	by	way	of	 looking	at	
what	types	of	answers	(general	style	of	describing	one´s	work	and	attitude	
toward	changes)	dominate	the	interview	and	thus	can	support	the	general	
picture	which	 is	 built.	The	 generous	 use	 of	 this	 type	 of	 direct	 quotation	
material	is,	in	my	view,	appropriate	in	a	cultural	study,	particularly	when	a	
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part	of	the	task	is	to	understand	the	language	(terms	and	ways	of	describing)	
which	people	and	organizations	use.	
There	has	obviously	been	a	hierarchy	of	the	importance	of	different	types	
of	materials.	In	the	historical	background	material,	academic	studies	have	
formed	 the	 core	 of	 the	material,	 where	 as	 other	 material	 has	 served	 to	
corroborate	 the	 analysis.	 In	 the	 case	 study,	 interviews	 have	 been	 given	
considerable	space	as	source	material.	
2.2 Evaluating Changes in the Past
This	study	builds	a	picture	of	Russian	local	administration	culture	in	four	
epochs	by	using	a	present	day	ideal	type	as	a	model	for	understanding	each	
case.	 I	 search	 similarities	 and	 differences	 in	 several	 cases	 with	 the	
presumption	 that	 these	 cases	 are	 ultimately	 somehow	 comparable	 (see	
Salminen	et.	al	2000:	2).
Because	one	definition	for	transition	is	the	formation	of	a	new	culture,	
the	past	serves	as	a	good	comparison	of	transitional	changes.	“Cultural”	is	
defined	as	an	ongoing	adaptation	process	of	attempting	to	influence	one`s	
own	 conditions	 which	 have	 been	 produced	 by	 earlier	 generations	 in	
previous	structures.
The	 justification	 for	 the	 study	 of	 history	 in	 organizational	 research	 is	
obvious:	 understanding	 the	 work	 of	 administration	 any	 further	 from	 a	
formal	 structural	 level	 is	 impossible	without	 some	 consideration	 for	 the	
traditions,	 values	 and	 motivations	 which	 rationalize	 practices.	 The	
similarities	which	can	be	found	in	the	administrative	cultures	of	different	
historical	time	periods	help	to	understand	why	the	present	administration	
is	such	as	it	is.	At	the	same	time,	it	must	be	noted	that	not	all	the	historical	
material	deals	with	purely	administrative	matters.	The	political,	economical	
and	 legal	matters	 of	 each	 time	 period	 needed	 to	 be	 included	 in	 such	 a	
sufficient	 manner	 so	 as	 to	 place	 administrative	 developments	 in	 their	
contexts.	This	is	also	why	this	work	includes	quite	a	lot	of	general	history	
concerning	the	periods	studied.	
Even	though	it	is	less	debatable	to	see	why	we	would	need	to	look	back	
to	understand	the	present,	it	is	more	difficult	to	decide	the	precise	approach	
to	use.	The	debate	over	the	proper	way	of	researching	the	past	administration	
will	have	to	be	decided	separately	for	each	research	task.	Seppo	Tiihonen	
(1995),	 for	 instance,	 sees	 the	 value	 of	 historical	 research	 in	 its	 ability	 to	
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answer	 such	 questions	 as	what	 lies	 behind	 the	 surface	 of	 administrative	
practices	 and	 what	 can	 be	 found	 in	 both	 the	 information	 structures	 of	
administration	and	the	language	which	is	used	in	it.	Our	understanding	of	
order	and	meaning	lays	in	the	core	of	all	these.(Tiihonen	1995:	39.)	Both	
pure	historical	methods	and	administrative	studies	can	contribute	to	such	
knowledge	of	the	past.
One	way	of	describing	the	difference	between	administrative	studies	and	
history	is	to	say	that	social	scientists	studying	administration	evaluate	their	
subject	in	a	finalist	manner.	That	is,	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	end	result	
in	all	development.	The	meaning	is	to	find	laws	according	to	which	changes	
in	administration	take	place.	Historians,	on	the	other	hand,	seek	the	unique	
in	a	phenomenon.	They	situate	it	in	its	historical	moment	and	study	it	to	see	
what	was	important	then	and	what	was	the	role	of	administration	in	that	
setting.	 (Tiihonen	 1995:	 39.)	The	main	 difference	 lies	 in	 the	a posteriori	
approach	of	historical	research	which	proceeds	from	empirical	material	to	
the	deduction	of	probable	causes.	If	one	looks	at	a	singular	historical	case,	
it	is	more	than	recommendable	to	use	different	approaches,	when	possible,	
for	 it	 adds	 valid	 information	 into	 the	 description	 and	 analysis	 of	 a	
phenomenon.	But	 in	 transitional	studies	which	aim	to	compare	different	
time	periods	both	with	one	another	 and	with	a	 chosen	goal,	 the	natural	
choice	are	the	starting	points	of	those	administrative	studies.	A	common	
bond	between	different	time	periods	and	different	systems	needs	to	be	built.	
Transition	studies	particularly	like	to	view	the	environment	as	possessing	
more	general	societal	qualities	than	purely	place	and	environment	connected	
historical	peculiarities.
This	discussion	is	connected	to	the	primary	methodological	choices	to	
be	made:	is	the	study	about	causal	relations	or	does	it	explain	the	meaning	
of	 action?	 Transition	 would	 almost	 naturally	 be	 connected	 with	 causal	
analysis	and	quantitative	material	where	changes	appear	to	be	unambiguous.	
It	could	be	equally	argued,	though,	that	teleological	methods	which	explain	
the	meaning	 of	 action	 give	more	 profound	 knowledge	 of	 what	 types	 of	
things	lie	beneath	the	surface.	An	evaluation	of	past	changes	of	culture	does	
not	need	to	exclude	either	methodology,	but	the	material	and	the	analysis	
produced	by	them	are	different.
This	study	hangs	between	the	knowledge	of	traditional	historical	research	
and	 the	general	 theoretical	 view	of	 administrative	 culture	 in	 transitional	
time	periods.	It	seeks	to	explain	the	meaning	of	action	without	a	specific	
intention	of	finding	causal	relations.	At	the	same	time,	 these	two	are	not	
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seen	 as	mutually	 exclusive.	 It	 can	 be	 argued,	 that	 in	 understanding	 the	
meaning	 of	 action,	 we	 produce	 information	 about	 its	 causes	 and	 the	
processes	 which	 are	 taking	 place.	 Understanding	 organizational	 culture	
means	penetrating	beneath	the	level	of	organization	into	that	which	answers	
to	the	question	of	“why?”.	
This	work	does	not	try	to	prove	a	general	law,	but	to	link	the	individual	
ideal	types	together	in	a	framework	of	concepts.	In	other	words,	units	(ideal	
types)	are	not	compared	to	each	other	but	to	the	theoretical	concepts	which	
are	relevant	in	all	cases (Salminen	&	Lehtinen	192).	Problems	of	comparison	
are	numerous:	the	“measurement”	model	and	the	concepts	used	need	to	be	
valid	in	all	of	the	systems	under	inspection.	A	researcher	needs	to	understand	
when	the	practical	functions	of	similar	systems	serve	different	purposes,	or	
when	different	structures	serve	the	same	functions.	Models	can	simplify	the	
picture	 too	 much.	 Sometimes	 there	 aren´t	 enough	 facts	 to	 sustain	 a	
comparison	with	the	ideal	type.	The	most	difficult	question	of	all	is	that	by	
using	a	theory,	can	we	proceed	from	clear	definitions	to	study	the	undefined	
reality.	(Salminen&	Lehtinen	192.)
Most	of	the	problems	can,	to	a	certain	degree,	be	eliminated	by	getting	to	
know	the	historical	environment	which	provides	the	data.	It	is	important	to	
keep	in	mind	what	it	is	that	we	are	looking	for	and	what	are	the	limitations	
of	the	search.	For	the	results	of	this	study,	these	considerations	mean	above	
all	 that	 the	 final	 categorization	 and	 choosing	 of	 relevant	 elements	 of	
administrative	culture	can	be	decided	only	after	the	data	is	collected	and	
interpreted.	In	this	sense,	even	as	the	theoretical	concept	help	reveal	what	
we	are	looking	for,	it	does	not	decide	what	we	will	find.
2.3 Searching for Culture in Case Studies
A	 building	 of	 ideal	 types	 uses	 the	 maximal	 dissimilarities	 of	 different	
systems	and	time	periods	to	show	the	culturally	relevant	elements	within	
each	type	against	the	theoretical	background.	The	present	day	elements	of	
“good	government”	can	be	found	being	interpreted	differently	in	historical	
administrations.	This	concept	helps	us	to	find	qualities	which	are	relevant	
for	 our	 understanding	 of	 administration.	 This	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	
historically	 unique	 conditions	 of	 different	 times	 are	 overlooked	 and	 the	
found	qualities	are	interpreted	as	“negative”	or	“wrong”	if	they	do	not	meet	
the	present	day	requirements.	On	the	contrary,	the	comparison	is	hoped	to	
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add	to	our	possibility	to	understand	the	logic	of	the	past	administrations.	In	
fact,	the	so	called	“good	government”	does	not	exist	anywhere	as	such,	but	
is	a	model	which	helps	us	analyze	the	cultural	logic	of	administrations.
A	case	study	approach	is	used	both	in	the	present	day	study	of	a	sample	
organization	and	as	a	general	structural	method	 in	writing.	 In	general,	a	
case	 study	 is	 appropriate	 when	 the	 investigator	 has	 an	 opportunity	 to	
observe	 and	 analyze	 a	 phenomenon	 previously	 inaccessible	 to	 scientific	
investigation.	(Yin	194.)	The	aim	of	such	research	is	to	make	observations	
of	 an	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 reality	 and	 to	 collect	 and	 organize	 these	
observations	into	a	concept	of	the	phenomenon.	This	type	of	a	conceptual-
inductive	model	puts	importance	into	choosing	of	the	unit	of	analysis.	The	
aim	is	to	find	many	different	sorts	of	data,	which	the	researcher	later	makes	
sense	of	with	the	help	of	an	“observation	method”.	From	the	gathered	data	
qualities	are	formed	and	collected	which	make	up	the	concept	of	the	studied	
phenomenon.	 (Eneroth	 194.)	 Eneroth´s	 ideas	 are	 in	 parallel	 with	 a	
Weberian	model´s	way	of	looking	at	organizations.	This	approach	tries	to	
find	 first	 hand	 knowledge	 about	 the	 subject	 matter	 to	 understand	 how	
social	realities	become	constructed.	Behind	it	is	a	holistic	theory	building	
which	compares	different	types	of	cases	to	see	what	they	have	in	common.	
(Sormunen	and	Kuparinen	1991.)	
Typically,	 qualitative	 research	 is	 interested	 in	 the	 competence	 of	 the	
concept	 which	 is	 drawn	 from	 observations.	 A	 low	 reliability	 is	 actually	
positive	because	the	meaning	is	to	find	as	many	qualities	(data)	as	possible	
using	 repeated	 method.	 (Eneroth	 194.)	 In	 this	 sense,	 reliability	 is	 not	
universal,	bound	to	certain	procedures.
For	the	purposes	of	this	study	it	has	been	necessary	to	be	able	to	somehow	
construct	an	intermediary	methodological	way	of	looking	at	the	situation	
similarly	 to	 the	 concept	of	public	 administration	which	was	done	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 this	 work.	 The	 transitional	 process	 refers	 to	 the	 way	 the	
administrator	 in	 his	 every	 day	work	 adapts	 to	 and	 effects	 the	 structures	
within	 the	 social	 system	of	 the	organization.	 “Transitional”	on	 the	other	
hand	refers	to	something	extraordinary	and	non-stable.	
The	aim	of	the	case	study	part	of	this	work	is	to	describe	the	effects	of	
cultural	 transition	without	 the	 intention	of	seeking	causal	 links.	 I	do	not	
intend	to	find	variables	which	caused	some	chosen	end	result	but	to	describe	
the	transition	from	the	viewpoint	of	the	interviewed	persons.The building	
of	an	ideal	type	based	on	a	present	day	case	means	gathering	heterogenous	
material	 from	 a	 variety	 of	 sources.	 Other	 than	 interviewing,	 the	 study	
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included	 observation	 of	 work	 routine	 in	 a	 customer	 service	 situation,	
acquainting	myself	with	the	staff	and	collecting	written	material	about	the	
regulations	 and	 procedures	 used	 in	 the	 administrative	 work.	 Getting	 to	
know	 the	 actual	 legal	 procedures	 of	 their	 daily	 work	 was	 important	 in	
understanding	the	practical	conditions.	Observation	 included	everything	
from	the	material	conditions	of	buildings,	offices	and	physical	organization	
of	service	(where	people	wait,	how	much	 information	 is	available	on	the	
walls,	where	the	point	of	information	in	the	building	was,	and	so	on).
In	the	practical	field	work,	my	goal	came	close	to	that	which	Silverman	
(195)	calls	realism.	When	discussing	a	topic	with	an	informant,	I	did	not	
plan	to	reveal	truth,	objective	facts	or	something	else	like	that	but	to	take	
responses	as	displays	of	routines,	daily	perspectives	and	possible	motivations	
of	the	people	who	work	as	representatives	of	a	certain	type	of	organization	
in	the	official	roles	of	administrators.	(comp.	Silverman	195.)	It	meant	that	
the	knowledge	so	gathered	does	not	objectively	tell	“what	is	out	there	in	the	
world”	but	what	is	in	the	informants´	world	as	administrators.	That	is,	how	
they	themselves	are	adapting	to	the	situation	at	hand.	Our	roles	and	official	
attitudes	are	ways	 to	survive	 in	our	environment.	The	views	people	have	
about	work	are	a	result	of	many	things:	the	setting,	historical	situation,	daily	
politics,	 personal	 ambitions,	 internal	 conflicts	 of	 the	 administration,	
personal	ambiguity	and	so	on,	which	form	the	background	of	the	world	as	
it	 is	 seen	by	 those	 interviewed.	The	most	 a	 thematic	 interview	can	do	 is	
point	 to	 the	 logical	 connection	 of	 things	 and	 the	 affirmation	 which	
informants	themselves	may	give,	but	stronger	proof	of	causality	cannot	be	
obtained.	Important	instead	is	to	look	at	all	answers	as	personal	descriptions	
of	the	official	roles	of	informants.
2.4 Finding Meanings in Interviews
2.4.1 Self-evaluation as a Way of Discovering Practices and 
Thoughts
Self-evaluation	of	one´s	official	role	 is	different	 from	the	description	and	
analysis	of	administrative	work	as	such,	which	also	requires	a	comprehensive	
description	of	administrative	routines,	decision	making	processes,	customer	
service	and	such	like.	This	would	require	studying	clients	as	well	as	extensive	
participation	in	the	daily	work	of	the	studied	organization.	The	objective	of	
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this	 case	 part,	 however,	 has	 been	 to	 mainly	 concentrate	 on	 the	 self-
understanding	of	the	administrators,	as	far	as	material	facts	and	observation	
of	routines	have	been	used,	they	serve	a	supportive	role	in	the	analysis,	as	a	
type	of	checking	device	against	misinterpretations.	
Self-evaluation	 has	 both	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 from	 a	
methodological	perspective.	The	greatest	hazard	connected	with	my	study	
is	that	as	an	outsider	I	have	entered	an	organization	with	a	de-ontological	
view	of	what	 administration	 should	be	 like.	 I	have	an	 idea	 that	 certain	
things	 are	 bad	 in	 themselves	 irrespective	 of	 circumstances	 (such	 as	
corruption	or	authoritarian	way	of	leadership).	On	the	other	side	of	the	
table	sits	a	person,	who	has	to	have	a	more	consequential	perspective	on	
matters.	He	or	she	may	well	understand	the	good	sides	of	fully	developed	
democracy	but	realizes	that	actions	have	to	be	judged	according	to	their	
effects.	(Comp.	Griseri	199:	11.)
From	this	it	follows	that	what	people	say	their	practices	and	thoughts	are,	
are	things	that	do	not	necessarily	translate	directly	into	action.	Even	when	
people	seem	to	have	fixed	rigid	views,	they	may	act	more	flexibly	in	a	given	
situation.	 A	 result	 is	 that	 they	 seem	 hypocritical.	 In	 addition	 to	 this	
consideration,	 people	 in	 general	 have	 different	 types	 of	 roles	 in	 an	
organization	as	group	workers.	Some	may,	for	instance,	be	more	interested	
in	simply	getting	things	done,	while	others	may	reflect	upon	the	significance	
of	concrete	situations.	(Griseri	199:	51–52.)
Besides	trying	to	map	the	general	attitude	towards	different	elements	of	
administrative	culture	in	the	self-evaluation	of	an	interviewed	person,	there	
is	 also	 the	problem	of	 connecting	 the	findings	 to	 the	organizational	 and	
general	 administration	 level.	 Important	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	
interviewing	 process	 is	 what	 Michael	 Brenner	 (195)	 calls	 “a	 view	 of	
something	between	(inter)	people”.	The	accounts	which	people	give	are	a	
result	 of	 interpretational	 work,	 selected	 aspects	 of	 the	 past	 which	 seem	
important	 within	 the	 frame	 of	 reference	 provided	 by	 the	 interviewer.	
Whether	the	interviewed	persons	stick	to	the	particular	frame	of	reference	
or	 not,	 is	 another	 question.	 Exaggerations	 or	 understatements	 can	 take	
place	for	various	reasons	which	do	not	have	to	do	with	covering	up	things	
or	changing	the	truth.	Each	interviewed	person	has	his	own	style	which	has	
to	be	understood	with	reasonable	confidence	in	order	to	read	the	accounts.	
(Brenner	195.)	
The	starting	point	in	analysis	has	been	not	to	try	to	“read”	anything	into	
the	 interviews	 that	 is	not	visibly	 there.	 In	 this	 sense,	 I	do	not	 follow	 the	
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methodological	objectives	of	content	analysis.	I	do	not	try	to	find	“hidden	
worlds”	beyond	what	the	interviewed	persons	have	themselves	told	me.	I	
see	that	the	limits	of	what	people	can	or	want	to	say	as	indicators	of	cultural	
openness	but	telling	nothing	conclusive	about	“the	hidden”.	
According	to	Barbara	Mostyn	(195),	the	ultimate	purpose	of	analysis	of	
open-ended	material	(content	analysis)	is	to	understand	the	meaning	of	the	
communication,	both	its	manifest	and	latent	meaning	within	the	context	of	
the	respondent´s	own	frame	of	reference.	In	this,	a	researcher	relies	on	what	
the	interviewed	persons	can	tell,	and	not	what	is	necessarily	going	on	inside	
of	their	heads.	It	is	important	that	the	analyst	understands	his/her	subjects	
as	people,	 their	 roles,	values	and	 life	 styles	 in	order	 to	 interpret	 the	data	
(Mostyn	 195.)	 Again,	 subjectivity	 is	 not	 considered	 a	 negative	 thing,	
because	the	aim	is	to	discover	the	internal	logic	of	each	respondent´s	views:	
the	reality	of	their	experiences.
It	is	possible	to	interview	enough	persons	in	key	positions	to	assure	one	
self	that	the	collected	accounts	tell	about	the	general	culture	of	the	studied	
organization.	But	how	much	can	self-evaluation	of	official	roles	actually	tell	
about	the	general	culture	and	its	changes	in	local	administration?	How	can	
one	in	practice	prove	that	there	is	a	connection	between	structural	changes	
and	the	evaluations	which	people	make	about	themselves?	In	the	strictest	
sense	of	positivism,	this	connection	cannot	be	proven	in	my	work.	What	I	
can	do	though,	is	show	that	respondents	claim	there	to	be	a	connection	and	
that	structural	facts	to	an	extent	support	this	claim.	
Whether	 people	 in	 fact	 reacted	 according	 to	 a	 culturally	 sanctioned	
manner	to	questions	is	the	most	intriguing	factor	in	the	interview	material.	
If	this	was	so,	then	in	fact	an	important	quality	of	the	studied	organization	
has	been	found.	But	to	say	that	something	is	“culturally	sanctioned”	requires	
quite	a	bit	of	proof.	In	most	cases,	the	culturally	sanctioned	interpretation	
of	 reality	 is	 so	 fine	 and	delicate,	 that	 it	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 time	 and	personal	
experience	 to	 find	 such	 qualities.	 In	 my	 view,	 general	 knowledge	 and	
personal	understanding	of	how	things	are	expressed	in	a	different	society	is	
the	key	to	finding	out	what	is	in	fact	a	subjective	interpretation	of	something	
and	what	is	clearly	“cultural”.	Further	more,	there	are	different	layers	within	
culturally	sanctioned	responses.	There	is	the	general	culture	of	the	society	
and	then	the	separate	sub-cultures	which	all	have	their	own	unwritten	laws	
(comp.	 Mira	 Bergelson	 2005).	 In	 my	 case,	 I	 had	 to	 first	 penetrate	 the	
“Russian”	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	 “Russian	 administrative”.	 The	 connection	
between	these	two	is	not	always	quite	clear.	
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Motivational	effects	are	connected	with	culturally	sanctioned	responses.	
The	respondent	reveal	a	culturally	important	norm	in	the	way	they	assess	
the	questions	for	answers.	Their	reactions	to	what	is	important	and	what	
is	less	important	not	only	tells	about	the	structural	side	of	the	work.	The	
interview	 is	 a	 process	 during	which	 the	 interviewer	 has	 to	 be	 open	 to	
chances	 of	 topics	 and	 questions	 if	 the	 respondents	 indicate	 that	 the	
questions	do	not	target	the	right	issues.	Asking	“wrong”	questions	can	be	
the	best	way	to	find	out	what	is,	in	reality,	meaningful	for	the	interviewed	
persons,	if	they	actively	correct	the	interviewer.	For	something	not	to	be	
important	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	respondents,	is	indeed	a	result	in	
itself.	
2.4.2 The Interview Process and Themes
A	thematic	interview	was	used	in	this	work.The	same	set	of	questions	was	
asked	from	all	participants	in	both	rounds	and	in	most	cases	in	the	same	
order.	 I	 did	 not	 try	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 interpretations	 the	 interviewed	
persons	gave	to	each	question.	Additional	questions	were	used	when	it	was	
approapriate.	Informants	were	chosen	by	the	organization	itself,	via	those	
superiors	 responsible	 for	 accepting	 the	 researcher.	My	 task	was	 to	make	
sure	that	the	objective	of	the	study	was	sufficiently	clear	to	those	making	the	
selection	after	which	I	had	to	trust	the	superiors	in	their	judgement	over	
who	would	make	a	suitable	informant.The	interviewed	persons	were	“key-
informants”	(Grönfors	192)	whose	formal	role,	willingness	to	participate	
and	work	history	were	considered	appropriate.	In	the	first	case	of	fall	1993,	
informants	were	chosen	according	 to	 their	 seniority	position,	and	 in	 the	
latter	 case	 of	 summer	 2000,	 those	 with	 enough	 work	 experience	 from	
different	levels	of	the	hierarchy	were	chosen.
The	 interview	 topics	 gave	 the	 interviewees	 chance	 to	 describe	 their	
orientation	in	the	workplace	and	to	describe	decision	making	dynamics	if	
they	wished	to	do	so.	The	formal	work	routines	 in	the	organization	have	
played	 a	 secondary	 –	 although	 important	 supportive	 role.	 The	 basic	
assumption	 in	the	field	work	was	that	people	will	 themselves	 tell	what	 is	
important	 for	 them	 without	 too	 much	 provocation.	 Routines	 were	
prioritized	as	the	main	focus	of	attention.	
There	are	several	weak	points	to	the	style	of	interviewing	which	has	been	
chosen.	Brenner	(195)	describes	the	most	typical	problems	faced	in	this	
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type	of	social	interaction	to	which	I	have	added	some	qualities	found	in	my	
particular	case:	
1.	 The	 undesirable	 factors	 which	 operated	 in	 the	 interviewer-	
interviewee	interaction.
2.	 Problems	of	understanding	for	different	respondents.
3.	 No	 verification	 data	 for	 attitudes,	 value	 statements	 and	 cognitive	
experiences.	 The	 only	 way	 of	 assessing	 the	 authencity	 of	 such	
expressions	is	to	scrutinize	the	interaction	for	possible	biasing	effects.	
Another	is	the	comparison	of	different	accounts	to	find	out	if	there	is	
a	high	concordance	between	them.	
4.	 Motivational	effects	in	questions.	There	can	be	a	need	to	respond	in	
culturally	sanctioned	ways.
5.	 The	 informant	 can	 be	 disinterested.	 (for	 a	 fuller	 description	 see	
Brenner	195:	15–15.)
In	the	present	interview	study,	problems	were	found	in	all	four	points	of	
attention.	The	interviewers	age	and	sex	were	definitely	a	factor	which	at	the	
same	time	made	the	connection	less	formal	and	even	open	(the	interviewer	
was	considered	less	threatening),	but	at	the	same	time	diminished	slightly	
the	motivational	level	of	some	respondents	in	the	first	group	of	1993	who	
might	have	considered	a	different	type	of	interviewer	more	official.	Yet,	a	
female	 interviewer	 was	 an	 advantage	 because	most	 of	 the	 interviewees	
were	women	working	with	 either	 pensioners	 or	 people	 receiving	 social	
benefits.
The	interviewer´s	foreign	nationality	did	not	go	unnoticed,	particularly	
in	the	first	round	of	1993	when	the	political	situation	was	open,	but	cannot	
be	 said	 to	have	been	an	obstacle	 in	obtaining	meaningful	 results.	People	
were	surprisingly	open	even	in	the	1993	group	and	in	the	latter	group	of	
2000,	 the	 problem	 of	 foreign	 nationality	 evaporated	 as	 the	 work	 in	 the	
organization	progressed	and	the	collective	became	more	familiar	with	the	
interviewer.	
At	a	practical	level,	some	of	the	words	chosen	for	the	questions	and	had	
been	 proof-read	 by	 native	 Russian	 speakers,	 did	 not	 work	 during	 the	
interview.	A	 typical	 example	was	 the	word	 “challenge”	which	 seemed	 to	
involve	 different	meanings.	The	 different	 cognitive	 styles	 of	 respondents	
also	shows	in	the	answers.	In	the	1993	group	the	difference	between	personal	
styles	was	 larger	 than	 in	 the	 latter	 group.	 Some	are	 very	descriptive	 and	
meThodology
65
personal,	others	more	mechanical	answers	about	observable	facts	without	
any	personal	assessment.	The	more	mechanical	answers	were	in	some	cases	
a	type	of	“shield”	to	avoid	getting	too	analytical.	In	the	latter	2000	group,	all	
were	 voluntarily	 taking	 part	 and	with	 just	 one	 exception,	 were	 eager	 to	
share	their	experiences.
As	the	administrative	organ	had	gone	through	structural	changes	during	
the	90´s,	not	all	of	the	same	functions	were	represented	in	the	interviews	as	
before.	In	the	1993	group,	the	interviewees	represented	a	broad	category	of	
departments	ranging	from	book	keeping,	pension	and	benefit	assignments	
to	inspection	of	businesses.	In	the	2000	group,	all	interviewees	were	working	
within	the	pension	and	benefit	section,	notwithstanding	the	director	of	the	
district	administration.	Some	of	the	departments	from	1993	had	disappeared	
and	the	pensions	and	social	assistance	sector	had	grown.	
The	 actual	 questions	were	 not	 completely	 identical	with	 the	 elements	
listed	in	section	1.1.2.	Some	questions	which	were	attached	to	the	cultural	
elements	list	were	only	asked	indirectly	because	of	political	and	situational	
constraints.	Thus	the	decision	of	what	to	ask	involved	finding	themes	which	
would	have	covered	as	many	of	the	sought	after	elements	as	possible.
The	following	interviews	in	the	summer	2000	were	conducted	based	on	
those	questions	of	daily	work,	which	had	either	remained	poorly	answered	
in	the	first	round	or	had	other	wise	proven	important.	In	other	words,	not	
all	of	the	same	questions	were	asked	the	second	time	around,	and	similar	
themes	were	formulated	slightly	differently.	Comparison	is	thus	made	on	
the	basis	of	the	content	of	answers in	both	rounds,	not	question	by	question	
as	in	structured	interviews.	
The	two	major	themes	covered	in	the	interviews	and	their	sub-themes	
were	the	following:	How	does	the	financial	situation	and	changing	legislation	
affect	the	organization?	
•	 Task	and	structural	changes	(tasks/	services	given)
•	 Personnel	 policy,	 family	 and	 work	 (specialization,	 new	 roles	 of	
personnel,	women	at	work)
•	 Work	 with	 higher	 organs	 of	 administration	 (central	 government,	
legislation)
•	 Information,	 quality	 and	 circulation	 (legislation,	 work	 organi-
zation)
•	 Leadership	(authority,	delegation)
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How	do	the	new	influences	from	society	and	the	political	instability	effect	
the	work?
•	 Political	atmosphere	(stability	vs.	changes)
•	 Clients,	their	service	and	public	opinion	(Client	ethics)
•	 Information,	quality	and	circulation	(media	and	society)
•	 Relationship	with	the	local	soviet/duma
•	 Leadership	(policies)
The	themes	of	politics	and	atmosphere	relate	to	several	cultural	elements	of	
public	administration.	The	administrator	is	situated	in	the	delicate	balancing	
point	of	different	cultural	demands.	In	transitions	the	breakdown	of	both	
the	 political	 structures	 and	 the	 social	 system	 together	with	uncertain	 or	
conflicting	new	views	make	long	tem	planning	very	difficult.	Information,	
for	its	part,	is	an	element	inherent	in	all	political	life.	The	way	it	is	gathered,	
the	pluralism	of	decision	making	and	the	value	of	criticism	in	the	system,	
are	central	questions	of	responsive	administration.	
Officials	 often	 have	 to	 consider	what	 is	 “politically	 possible”,	 in	 other	
words	what	can	be	realistically	done	now	and	in	the	future.	In	times	of	deep	
political	crisis	the	civil	servants	may	be	forced	to	live	in	a	officially	“non-
political”	 environment	 to	 avoid	 any	 future	 confrontations.	This	 may,	 of	
course,	cause	many	practical	and	personal	complications.
The	 idea	 of	 citizenship	 is	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	 questions	 concerning	
citizens.	How	much	can	the	“receivers”	of	the	services	influence	the	planning	
stage	 through	 civil	 servants?	 What	 is	 the	 civil	 servants´	 margin	 for	
discretion?	Whether	 the	 administrator	 sees	his	 position	 as	 a	mechanical	
provider	of	 legally	bound	 services	 to	 a	passive	 client	or	 as	 a	participant,	
assistant	 in	 the	process	of	 coordination	of	 the	 (hopefully	 active)	 client´s	
individual	 situation,	 is	 an	 interesting	 issue.	So,	 too,	 is	 the	 relationship	of	
administration	 to	 local	 interest	 groups	 and	 organizations	 of	 active	
individuals.	The	manifestations	of	“public	opinion”	and	the	responsiveness	
of	the	civil	servants	is	important	for	the	pluralism	of	information,	as	well	as	
for	power	and	its	sources.
The	local	level	structural	changes	and	the	new	tasks	the	administrators	
have	had	to	take	upon	themselves,	make	an	important	part	of	the	description	
of	the	daily	work.	One	area	of	interest	was	the	separation	of	party	politics	
from	the	administrative	structure	in	1993	and	the	practical	new	demands	
which	might	have	risen	from	this.	Particular	interest	was	directed	at	those	
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who	worked	inside	the	old	system.	I	have,	myself,	considered	some	elements	
as	of	more	 interest:	 the	position	of	 single	 administrators,	 the	 changes	of	
official	authority	for	the	work	and	the	idea	of	effectiveness	as	manifest	in	
the	 description	 of	 organizational	 form	 and	 rules	 of	 work.	 In	 the	 Soviet	
Union,	“effectiveness”	held	its	own	specific	meaning	which	included	such	
matters	 as	 political	 correctness,	 stability	 and	 order	 for	 centrally	 guided	
planning	systems	and	speed.	What	I	consired	of	interest	were	the	descriptions	
of	what	is	now	regarded	effective	work.	Of	particular	importance	in	pursuing	
this	area	of	interest	was	discovering	how	much	and	in	what	direction	the	
interviewees	wished	to	develop	their	own	work.
6
3 The Transition of Administrative 
Culture, 1870–1916
This	chapter	describes	 the	main	 features	of	administrative	culture	before	
the	reforms	of	the	19th	century,	the	competing	ideologies	of	administrative	
change,	structural	changes	which	followed	and,	as	a	result	of	all	 this,	 the	
new	 administrative	 culture	 after	 1906.	 The	 analysis	 will	 show	 how	 the	
qualities	of	the	old	culture	affected	the	creation	of	local	administration	both	
in	town	and	rural	forms	of	local	government.	
3.1 The Political Ideologies of Administrative 
Change: Community Government vs. State Functions
3.1.1 The Administrative Culture in the 19th Century Civil 
Service
The	reforms	of	Russian	administration	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	and	the	
beginning	of	the	20th	focused	on	two	main	developments:	the	strengthening	
of	 statehood,	and	 the	connection	between	 law	and	administration	 in	 the	
Russian	empire.	This	synthesis	produced	many	of	the	structural	and	policy	
changes	 which	 enabled	 the	 transformation	 of	 legal	 thinking	 in	 general,	
duties	of	administration	and	 ideas	about	citizenship	 in	Russia	before	 the	
191	revolution.	For	the	development	of	statehood	particularly	important	
administrative	matters	concerned	territorial	strategies,	hierarchy	of	decision	
making	and	the	professionalism	of	the	civil	service.	For	the	development	of	
legal	thinking	the	most	important	administrative	issues	where	the	separation	
of	powers,	structural	arrangements	for	legal	protection	and	the	discretional	
power	of	administrators.	In	19th	century	Russia,	the	state	(as	an	ideological	
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concept)	 was	 embedded	 in	 the	 person	 of	 the	 emperor.	 Before	 1906	 the	
Emperor	 was	 the	 supreme	 authority	 in	 both	 legislative	 and	 executive	
functions	in	Russia.	Unlike	in	other	parts	of	Europe,	in	Russia	the	emperor	
maintained	his	unlimited	position	up	till	the	first	Constitution.	Centralism	
and	absolutism	which	had	their	historical	roots	in	the	Mongol	rule	(1240–
140)	were	a	part	of	organizing	public	affairs	and	unifying	the	state	in	the	
Russian	administrative	culture.	The	rulers	of	Moscow	used	the	Mongolian	
principle	of	compulsory	 service	by	 tying	 the	new	nobility	 to	 the	head	of	
state	through	military	and	civil	service,	making	it	totally	dependant	upon	
the	personality	of	the	ruler.	Similarly,	the	creation	of	new	types	of	estates	
was	 a	 way	 of	 unifying	 the	 structure	 under	 one	 rule.	 The	 landholder	
(pomeshchik)	received	a	size	of	land	from	the	Tsar	in	return	of	service.	The	
relationship	with	the	state	was	one-sided	and	dependant	upon	the	ruler´s	
decisions.	The	bondage	of	the	peasants	(1649)	came	as	an	after	effect	of	this	
move	 to	 centralize	 ownership,	 decision	 making	 and	 political	 control.	
(Tiihonen	1994,	Berman	1963.)	
The	aristocracy	which	 formed	 the	first	 civil	 service	was	an	 interesting	
dichotomy:	at	once	landowners	mastering	the	fate	of	people	given	to	them	
by	the	ruler,	were	simultaneously	servants	of	the	state	themselves.	This	type	
of	 bondage	 to	 the	 ruler´s	 decision	 making	 considerably	 affected	 their	
cultural	role	as	political	and	legal	dependants	of	supreme	power.	As	Fred	
Weissman	 has	 argued,	 in	 Russia	 land	 was	 neither	 a	 means	 of	 self-
aggrandizement	nor	a	mark	of	status,	but	a	way	of	performing	state	service.	
Proprietorship	provided	the	material	support	of	the	nobility	in	their	service	
role	and	insured	that	they	would	retain	contact	with	the	rest	of	 the	 local	
citizenry.	The	nobility´s	role	of	mediating	between	the	Tsar	and	the	people	
applied	particularly	to	the	peasants.	(Weissman	191:13.)	
Besides	 the	 strong	 personal	 power	 of	 the	 ruler,	 the	 autocracy	 of	 the	
Russian	 empire	 had	 a	 religious	 nature	which	made	 it	 different	 from	 the	
ruling	 ideologies	of	 the	West.	The	unity	of	 the	church	and	state,	and	the	
ideology	which	regarded	the	power	of	the	Tsar	to	be	from	God,	meant	that	
people	had	to	obey	him	for	reasons	of	conscience	as	well	as	of	necessity.	
This	prevented	restrictions	on	the	state´s	action.	The	competition	between	
the	Church	and	the	state	which	characterized	the	development	of	Western	
culture	did	not	exist	in	Russia.	Instead	the	Russian	church	was	replaced	by	
the	state	as	a	structural	source	of	cultural	 influence.	Tsar	Nicholas	II,	 for	
instance,	considered	his	position	to	be	a	matter	of	personal	loyalty	to	the	
ideas	of	orthodox	faith	which	he	embodied,	autocracy	as	a	tradition,	and	
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Russia	as	a	land.	This	special	relationship	needed	to	be	passed	on	to	the	next	
generation.	The	 autocratic	 power	 of	 the	 Tsar	 was	 a	 central	myth	 which	
sustained	social	relations	and	in	which	it	was	simply	unthinkable	that	an	
emperor	 could	 share	 his	 power	 with	 anyone.	 Authority	 and	 power	 in	
governmental	decision	making	could	come	from	two	sources:	the	Tsar	as	
the	personal	owner	of	the	land	and	people,	and	God	who	was	represented	
by	him	through	the	church,	of	which	he	was	the	head.	As	the	will	of	the	Tsar	
remained	a	fundamental	source	of	regulation,	the	administration	in	effect	
continued	to	execute	the	will	of	the	autocrat	as	law.	(Hosking	192,	Tiihonen	
1994,	McDaniel	1996,	Berman	1963,	Makarenko	199.)
What	effects	did	this	cultural	reality	have	on	the	development	of	 local	
administration?	Local	administration	developed	in	the	absence	of	a	strong	
town	 culture	 which	 affected	 its	 role	 in	 the	 Russian	 state.	 According	 to	
Makarenko	(199),	the	destruction	of	Novgorod	and	the	strengthening	of	
Moscow	as	the	center	of	the	land	can	be	viewed	as	the	historical	background	
for	 the	 weak	 development	 of	 town	 culture.	 (Makarenko	 199:	 31.)	The	
merchant	class	for	 instance	was	too	weak	to	develop	within	and	from	its	
own	 ranks	 a	more	 emancipated	 circle	 of	 intellectuals	 capable	 of	 being	 a	
meaningful	political	 and	social	power.	Political	 factors	had	also	played	a	
role	in	the	development.
Instead	 of	 a	 strong	 town	 culture,	 the	 development	 of	 administrative	
authority	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Peter	 the	 Great	
institutionalized	 a	 European	 style	 civil	 service	 of	 hierarchical	 positions	
which	served	as	a	legal	basis	for	state	authority.	Yet,	the	development	of	civil	
service	as	a	profession	remained	connected	to	the	earlier	described	social	
system	which	surrounded	the	Tsar	and	maintained	the	official	legitimacy	of	
autocracy.	Within	the	official	structures,	rules	and norms were	connected	
with	family,	debts	of	gratitude,	mutual	favoritism	and	inherited	ties	between	
members	of	a	clan	and	the	Emperor.	Tiihonen	(1994)	describes	how	Russian	
civil	 servants	 traditionally	 were	 chosen	 according	 to	 the	 loyalty	 their	
ancestors	had	shown	to	the	Emperor.	The	official´s	place	depended	on	his	
origin,	former	services	of	the	family	to	the	throne,	his	own	merits	and	his	
service	position.	(Tiihonen	1994.)	
The	 strong	 personification	 of	 institutional	 power	 at	 the	 top	 effected	
administrative	 culture	 through	 the	 personnel	 system	 which	 included	
characteristics	of	both	legitimate	authority	and	rules,	and	social	relations	of	
the	 court.	 In	 the	 100´s	 the	 state	 administration	 culture	 of	 Russia	 had	
developed	a	“mature”	social	system	to	which	social	climbing	was	central.	
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Tiihonen	 has	 described	 how	 elite	 recruitment	 happened	 through	 three	
different	channels:	1)	by	origin	of	birth	in	which	the	best	patron	was	one	
who	 belonged	 to	 the	 same	 family.	 2)	 through	marriage	 to	 an	 influential	
family,	and	3)	by	finding	a	patron	who	was	situated	near	the	court	 in	St.	
Petersburg.	 A	 patron	 was	 needed	 throughout	 one´s	 career.	 Loyalty	 was	
guaranteed	 in	 the	administration	by	this	network	 in	which	criticism	was	
not	allowed	because	it	was	interpreted	to	be	always	directed	at	the	supervisor.	
The	most	valued	qualities	of	a	civil	servant	were	loyalty,	submissiveness	and	
rigid	observance	of	commands.	Methods	of	control	included	the	use	of	a	
secret	police	system,	letter	censorship	and	spying.	How	ever,	it	is	noteworthy	
that	 the	 elevation	 of	 the	 educational	 level	 of	 civil	 servants	 and	 official	
requirements	 of	 education	 also	 consolidated	 the	 authority	 of	 single	
administrators,	particularly	at	the	lower	level.	(Tiihonen	1994.)
The	status	of	higher	administrators	naturally	depended	upon	the	level	of	
power	in	the	top	echelons	of	the	hierarchy.	As	Mustonen	has	pointed	out,	
regulated	social	communication	and	its	credibility	were	a	particular	source	
of	status	for	the	highest	administration	and	it	was	thus	in	their	interest	to	
preserve	 it.	 Furthermore,	 the	 institution	 of	 autocracy	 did	 not	 have	 clear	
outlines.	 It	 overlapped	with	 the	 regular	 administration	by	 controlling	 its	
activities	 with	 the	 help	 of	 personal	 agents,	 and	 by	 way	 of	 trusted	 state	
officials,	 favorites	 who	 represented	 the	 emperor	 in	 these	 institutions.	
Different	administrative	organs	could	be	differently	incorporated	into	the	
system	of	autocracy.	The	level	of	administration	was	not	a	decisive	factor	in	
this	matter,	political	and	situational	factors	were	often	more	important.	The	
principle	of	personification	of	power	played	a	major	role	in	the	formation	
of	jurisdiction	for	personal	agents.	(Mustonen	1999:	22,	23.)	
In	the	old	administrative	culture,	a	major	element	was	the	organization	
of	civil	servants	promotions.	During	the	19th	century,	this	system	had	been	
subject	 to	 several	 reform	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 the	 relationship	
between	efficiency	and	position	–	all	of	which	had	failed.	What	had	remained	
was	a	view	of	all	civil	servants	–	from	the	top	to	bottom	–	having	in	fact	the	
same	legal	position	before	the	Tsar.	The	civil	service	was	a	combination	of	
office	posts	(dolzhnosti)	and	extra-administrative	ranks	(chinyi,	the	original	
rank	table	from	122	has	been	presented	for	instance	by	Aarrevaara	1999:	
2)	which	were	not	connected	to	each	other	directly	 in	 the	appointment	
system.	 Besides	 state	 officials,	 ranks	 were	 given	 to	 municipal	 officials	
holding	 relatively	 high	 administrative	 posts.	 More	 people	 could	 hold	 a	
specific	rank	than	were	office	posts	which	required	it	by	law.	The	main	basis	
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for	appointments	was	the	age	of	a	candidate	holding	a	specific	rank	or	in	
case	of	two	candidates	of	same	age,	the	length	of	tenure	in	one.	Receiving	a	
higher	rank	was	made	practically	automatic	and	considered	a	form	of	legal	
protection	 for	 civil	 servants	 against	 their	 immediate	 supervisors.	 The	
municipal	administrators	were	an	exception	to	the	general	rule	in	that	their	
ranks	were,	 in	many	cases,	bound	to	 the	 length	of	 the	service.	 (Shepelev	
1999:	166–16,	1.)
During	 reform	 discussions,	 the	 proponents	 of	 the	 prevailing	 situation	
viewed	 it	 by	 comparison	with	 the	 general	European	 system	of	 hiring	 and	
promoting	civil	servants	based	on	the	evaluation	of	their	origin,	property	and	
talent.	 In	 Russia	 however,	 the	 basis	 of	 citizenship	 was	 derived	 from	 the	
evaluation	of	a	person´s	rank	which	was	given	to	him	by	the	supreme	power.	
Equality	before	law	was	guaranteed	by	a	general	opportunity	to	rise	in	the	
service	system.	Appointment	depended	on	a	person´s	service	to	the	state	and	
could	 be	 given	 to	 him	 by	 a	 socially	 lower	 level	 person.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
appointment	 system	 was	 seen	 as	 a	 guarantee	 of	 political	 control	 for	 the	
autocracy	combined	with	the	dignity	of	equality.	(Shepelev	1995:	13.)
The	 separation	 of	 office	 posts	 and	 ranks	 in	 the	 civil	 service	 attracted	
persons	of	questionable	suitability.	From	an	efficiency	point	of	view,	there	
was	a	need	to	unify	the	numbers	of	actual	posts	with	required	ranks	and	
equalize	the	qualifications	for	similar	types	of	posts	in	different	areas	of	civil	
service.	The	proponents	of	the	system	of	ranks	considered	official	ranks	to	
be	a	way	of	attracting	people	into	state	service	and	a	keeper	of	work	morale.	
There	was	a	concern	that	giving	up	this	incentive	would	lead	to	some	civil	
servants	 going	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 where	 the	material	 conditions	 were	
better.	(Shepelev	1999:	1,10,	13.)
In	 the	 (dominantly)	 state	 administrative	 culture	 the	 quest	 for	 rising	
status,	decorations	and	additions	to	personal	finances	were	central	matters	
of	guidance.	A	side-effect	was	the	misuse	of	official	posts	in	order	to	better	
one´s	 positions	 in	 the	 hierarchy	 artificially.	This	 was	 done	 by	 changing	
positions	 to	 a	 higher	 rank	 in	 the	 system	 within	 administrative	 organs	
sometimes	 several	 times	 over.	 Another	 way	was	 giving	 people	 job	 titles	
which	exaggerated	the	meaning	of	their	actual	work	assignments.	The	use	
of	“head”	and	“director”	was	not	just	misleading	but	led	to	giving	accordingly	
high	ranks	and	decorations.	The	critics	of	the	time	noticed	the	absence	of	
actual	 devotion	 to	 affairs	 themselves.	 Instead	 there	 was	 an	 underlined	
insistence	on	pleasing	supervisors	upon	whom	an	official´s	career	depended.	
(Shepelev	1999:	11–12.)
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The	 structures	 of	 administration	 developed	 along	 an	 official	
communication	style.	During	Peter	the	Great´s	time,	one	quarter	of	foreign	
words	which	entered	the	Russian	language	were	related	to	administration.	
Another	quarter	were	with	the	military,	another	with	sailing	and	the	rest	
with	French	luxury	items.	(Susiluoto	19:	9.)	From	this	perspective,	 the	
representation	of	state	power	was	both	“foreign”	and	quite	distant	from	the	
culture	of	the	rural	villages.	The	local	towns	thus	formed	a	bridge	between	
these	two	cultural	realities	in	19th	century	Russia.	
3.1.2 Legal Reforms in the Old Administrative Culture
In	 the	 development	 of	 local	 administration	 law	 became	 an	 important	
instrument	 in	 connecting	 society	with	 the	 state.	 In	Russian	history,	 the	
state	administration	became	powerful	 in	partly	by	filling	the	void	in	the	
written	 legal	 authority	 of	 the	 ultimate	 decision	maker.	The	 state,	 as	 an	
institution	 running	 alongside	 the	 ruler,	 became	 the	 object	 of	 different	
policy	programs	with	their	own	ideological	purposes.	These	purposes	were	
attempts	to	answer	different	but	acute	practical	problems	in	the	changing	
society	 and	 its	 economy.	 In	 this	 process,	 the	 administration	 assumed	 a	
very	active	role	which	had	consequences	 for	 the	way	 legal	 thinking	and	
statehood	 developed.	 At	 the	 local	 level,	 administration	 consequently	
developed	its	own	features.	
For	 the	development	of	 the	 legal	 thinking	 in	Russia,	Peter	 the	Great´s	
reforms	were	most	interesting	because	of	the	difficulties	faced	in	the	attempt	
to	change	the	prevailing	relationship	of	law	with	the	surrounding	social	life.	
The	 public	 law	 to	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	 state	 structures,	 had	 been	
developed	in	the	West	over	a	long	period	of	time.	It	required	a	particular	
relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 In	 Harold	 Berman´s	 (1963)	
analysis	 the	 following	qualities	were	missing	 from	the	Russian	state:	1)	a	
monarch	 who	 ruled	 according	 to	 legal	 procedures	 rooted	 in	 the	 entire	
society,	 together	 with	 public	 law	 institutions	 which	 had	 an	 extralegal	
(religious)	historical	character	given	to	him	by	the	society.	2)	A	hierarchically	
coherent	rational	system	of	courts	and	government	cadres	borne	out	of	a	
locally	 active	 public	 and	 private	 legal	 and	 political	 life.	 Berman	 has	
concluded	 that	 both	 were	 difficult	 to	 attain	 in	 a	 system	 where	 the	
overwhelming	majority	of	the	population	were	slaves	without	legal	rights.	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 head	 of	 state	 ruled	 by	 his	 personal	 authority	 and	 used	
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purposefully	legal	means	of	his	own	creation	to	exercise	power	which	was	
derived	from	this	authority.	(Berman	1963.)
Although	autocracy	was	officially	unlimited,	its	functionality	cannot	be	
understood	 merely	 by	 stating	 the	 ideological	 foundation.	 As	 Mustonen	
(199)	has	pointed	out,	in	the	formation	of	its	practical	political	distribution	
the	social-political	structure	of	the	society	was	a	factor	without	which	the	
Emperor	could	not	make	decisions.	In	this	way	the	autocracy	had,	in	fact,	
limits.	Autocracy	should	actually	be	seen	not	as	a	matter	of	persons	but	as	a	
political	institution	of	the	state.	There	was	a	connection	between	the	loyalty	
expected	of	actors	towards	the	autocrat	who,	for	his	part,	took	care	of	their	
material	well	being	and	rewarded	them	accordingly.	(Mustonen	199:	2.)
Even	as	the	system	of	authority	relations	was	such	that	the	autocrat	could	
dictate	his	personal	will	into	the	legislation	and	change	them,	he	could	not,	
however,	 break	 his	 own	 laws.	 Before	 the	 reforms,	 the	 idea	 of	 legality	 in	
Russia	carried	a	meaning	of	strict	obedience	to	the	letter	of	the	law	and	the	
effective	 execution	 of	 this	 by	 government	 organs.	 This	 was	 a	 type	 of	
authoritarian	 relationship	with	 legislation	 in	which	 the	 “progressive”	 law	
was	 in	 harmony	 with	 the	 climate	 of	 the	 monarchy.	 (Taranovskii	 1992:	
303.)
Legally,	the	first	Constitution	of	Russia	meant	breaking	up	this	harmony.	
Law	and	legislative	work	in	general	was	brought	to	the	forefront	of	reform	
debate.	The	battle	for	the	administrative	rule	of	law	was	connected	to	the	
practical	 work	 of	 collecting	 and	 harmonizing	 the	 Codex	 of	 Laws (Svod	
zakonov)	carried	out	by	the	State	Chancellor´s	Office	between	1906–191.	
The	discussion	and	work	of	editors	of	the	Codex	showed	that	legal	reform	
was	used	as	means	to	enact	political	changes.	The	legal	 front	was	mostly	
concerned	 with	 how	 to	 handle	 the	 constitutional	 laws	 of	 the	 country	
(Osnovnye gosudarstvennye zakony)	and	new	requirement	for	separation	of	
powers	between	the	legislator	and	the	monarch.	The	liberal	critiques	of	the	
codification	practices	 saw	 it	necessary	 to	 install	a	clear	hierarchy	of	 laws	
which	would	make	imperial	orders	subordinate	to	state	laws	enacted	by	the	
legislator.	In	addition,	some	form	of	control	over	the	decisions	made	by	the	
Emperor,	arbitrary	changing	of	legal	texts	in	the	codification	process,	rules	
of	 codification	 and	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 codification	 administration	
should	be	defined	by	a	law.	(Borisova	2001:	12–24.)
The	conservative	view	on	legal	reform	saw	that	the	Codex	of	law	should	
be	a	practical	tool	for	the	administration	and	that	it	should	reflect	reality.	
This	meant	that	all	legal	acts,	including	decisions	of	the	Emperor,	should	be	
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included	and	have	the	same	legal	power.	The	liberals	saw	that	this	was	an	
administrative	attempt	to	sabotage	the	beginnings	of	rule	of	law	in	Russian	
government	 by	 undermining	 the	 actual	 meaning	 of	 law	 enacted	 by	 the	
representative	organ.	(Borisova	2001:	25.	40.)	
The	meaning	autocracy	attached	to	the	practical	work	of	administration	
is	 difficult	 to	 show	 directly.	 In	 fact	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 contend	 that	 in	 the	
absence	of	legally	bound	rules	of	governing,	there	could	not	have	existed	an	
actual	guiding	principle	for	all	Russian	administration.	From	this	it	follows	
that	the	institution	of	the	emperor	and	the	institution	of	local	administration	
were	separated	not	just	by	geographical	distance	but	by	different	realities.
3.1.3 The Competing Ideologies of Administrative Change after 
the 1864 Reforms
The	reforms	of	 the	19th	 century	were	a	product	of	both	“the	 top	and	 the	
middle”.	This	was	so,	since	the	initiative	for	big	changes	came	from	both	the	
Tsar	 and	 the	 administration,	 in	which	progressive	minded	 civil	 servants	
were	effecting	the	legislation.	The	Emancipation	of	peasants	by	Alexander	
II	(155–11)	was	a	recognition	of	the	social	risks	which	peasant	unrest	
and	old	fashioned	economy	presented	to	the	autocratic	order.	Defeat	in	the	
Crimean	war	further	strengthened	the	decision	of	abolition	of	serfdom	and	
the	beginning	of	the	great	rupture	in	the	Russian	state	in	164.	(Florinsky	
1969.)
The	initial	reason	for	the	structural	changes	was	territorial	governability	
of	Russia.	President	Mauno	Koivisto	has	contended	that	the	Tsar	wished	to	
relax	the	pressure	on	(state)	bureaucracy	by	creating	a	formal	place	for	the	
local	 level	 in	authority	structures.	 (Koivisto	2001:	122–123.)	At	 the	same	
time,	there	was	a	need	to	find	substitutes	for	the	defunct	local	administration	
institutions	 of	 the	 serfdom	 era	 in	which	 police,	 judiciary	 and	 economic	
powers	were	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	landed	aristocracy.	(Vucinich	
1960:	196.)	According	to	Hosking´s	(192)	analysis,	the	central	bureaucracy	
had	two	territorial	strategic	goals	 in	the	countryside	zemtsvo reforms:	 its	
economic	 and	military	 development	 and	 control	 of	 any	 elements	which	
were	 showing	 too	 much	 local	 initiative.	 The	 first	 question	 remained	
unanswered	during	the	tsarist	time	but	the	last	question	was	attended	by	a	
series	if	change	plans,	of	which	the	Stolypin	reforms	of	the	beginning	of	21st	
century	were	the	most	notable.	(Hosking	192.)
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Georg	F.	Yaney	has	contended	that	the	administrative	culture	at	the	state	
level	in	the	middle	of	the	19th	century	remained	largely	unchanged	after	the	
structural	changes	of	the	160´s.	He	describes	the	administration	as	being	
one	in	which	“the	officials	could	not	adhere	to	the	system	and	still	get	their	
work	done	if	they	wanted	to.	[…]	Chains	of	command	and	office	routines	
were	established,	forgotten,	and	re-established	unendingly,	but	outside	the	
capital	 city	no	 standard	 system	emerged.	When	 an	official	 in	 a	 guberniia	
(province	size	administrative	area)	or	uezd	(smaller	provincial	administrative	
area)	actually	functioned	with	a	purpose	in	mind	larger	than	the	satisfaction	
of	his	own	whims	or	the	demands	of	his	superior,	he	generally	found	that	he	
had	to	work	according	to	custom	and	social	structure	of	the	locale,	utilizing	
his	formal	prerogatives	to	influence	and	manipulate	local	factions	in	whatever	
ways	he	could.	[…]	If	the	rules	of	the	system	came	to	him	at	all,	they	came	as	
a	burden	–	more	faked	reports,	more	facades,	more	formalistic	constraints,	
not	as	a	mechanism	to	be	used	or	relied	on.”	(Yaney	193:	23.)
The	Tsar	wished	to	use	civil	servants	as	a	professional	tool	for	modernizing	
administration,	but	without	being	a	challenge	to	the	autocracy.	In	the	spirit	
of	 the	 great	 reforms,	 guidance	 was	 revised	 to	 include	 the	 concepts	 of	
publicity	 (glasnost),	 legality	 (zakonnost),	 decentralization	 and	 self-
government	(samoupravlenie).	(Pearson	199.)	The	operational	systemati-
zation	 of	 administrative	 practices	 themselves	 was	 a	 goal	 of	 change.	The	
ministries	dealt	with	the	peasant	population	directly	without	the	interference	
of	 other	 administrative	 levels	 and	 were	 very	 keen	 on	 acting	 efficiently.	
(Yaney	193:	239.)	The	following	decades	in	the	Russian	provinces	meant	a	
slow	change	toward	a	society	in	which	these	principles	took	different	shapes	
and	 acquired	 different	meanings	 for	 administrative	 culture.	The	 contra-
diction	between	action	and	administration	effected	the	way	changes	were	
designed	and	how	their	execution	succeeded.	
The	competition	between	political	ideologies	of	administrative	change	in	
terms	of	territorial	arrangements,	hierarchy	of	decision	making	and	legal	
reform,	started	with	the	ideas	of	the	164	legislation	reformers.	These	were	
people	who	thought	that	ideas	of	law	and	legality	should	not	be	the	means	
of	executing	the	will	of	the	sovereign	but	had	a	specified	role.	The	liberal	
bureaucrats	wished	to	bring	Russia	closer	 to	Europe	to	keep	up	with	 the	
progress	of	the	rest	of	world	but	they	preferred	working	within	the	existing	
authority	system.	It	was	the	intention	of	the	reformist,	however,	to	limit	the	
power	of	the	bureaucrats	and	share	the	state	power	with	new	groups	and	
levels	of	the	society	which	materialized	in	both	the	zemstvo	and	municipal	
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reforms.	This	 was	 clearly	 against	 the	 psychology	 of	 a	 society	 in	 which	
questions	of	administration	could	only	be	decided	by	state	officials.	Legality	
in	 the	 new	 thinking	 became	 a	 symbol	 for	 new	 external	 relationships.	
(Taranovskii	1992:	30,	310,	312.)
Discussion	 about	 modernizing	 administration	 coincided	 with	 consi-
derable	academic	debate	over	the	concept	of	local	self-government	in	which	
different	proponents	described	their	preferences	for	the	best	way	to	organize	
center-local	 relations.	 The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	
essentially	became	a	quest	for	local	self-government.	Circles	who	promoted	
the	change	formulated	their	objectives	mainly	in	three	different	ways.	First	
there	 were	 promoters	 of	 communal theory,	 which	 saw	 the	 peasant	 land	
communes	 representing	 local	 self-government	as	 such.	 In	 this	group	 the	
Slavophiles	fought	mostly	against	westernization	in	administrative	change,	
while	supporters	of	autocracy	wanted	to	make	the	dissolution	of	serfdom	
administratively	straightforward.	(Vucinich	1960:	196.)
Second	there	were	intellectuals	and	state	administrators	who	promoted	
social theory	in	which	the	state	and	society	were	seen	as	performing	different	
functions.	Therefore,	 the	 local	 level	which	represented	the	society	had	to	
have	 its	 own	 autonomous	 social	 institutions	 outside	 state	 bureaucracy.	
Logically	included	was	the	idea	that	the	local	level	and	the	state	bureaucracy	
did	not	need	to	have	formal	ties.	(Vucinich	1960:	196–19.)
Third	there	was	the	state theory	of	local	self-government	which	saw	the	
local	level	performing	state	affairs	as	delegated	to	them	by	the	state.	In	this	
perspective	state	administration	(which	was	indivisible)	had	two	structural	
forms:	 the	 bureaucratic	ministerial	 pyramid	 and	 the	 institutions	 of	 local	
self-government.	(Vucinich	1960:	19.)	
The	social	 and	 state	 theories	which	competed	 for	 influence	up	 till	 the	
revolution	of	191	had	the	strongest	influence	on	the	local	level	development.	
The	 differences	 of	 views	 between	 different	 political	 groups	 inside	 the	
administration	were	present	 in	 the	contradiction	of	 the	 so	called	 “police	
state”,	which	meant	a	strong	security	administration	and	sharing	of	power.	
The	 balancing	 of	 administrative	 ideologies	 was	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	
administrative-political	problems	surrounding	the	development	throughout	
the	reformist	era.	Because	of	the	two	different	types	of	cultural	images	of	
administration,	the	development	of	both	structures	and	social	systems	was	
alternately	accelerated	and	slowed.
In	the	164	rural	administration,	social	theory	reform	ideas	were	applied	
to	practice.	Local	self-government	was	outlined	as	a	domestic	type	of	self-
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organization	in	the	immediate	living	environment	of	the	citizens,	and	not	
interfering	 in	 the	 political	 questions	 of	 the	 state.	 The	 philosophical	
thinking	stressed	the	interests	of	the	local	community	being	different	from	
those	of	the	state	and	thus	immune	from	state	interference.	The	zemstvos	
were	 meant	 to	 be	 purely	 local	 and	 dealing	 with	 non-political	 daily	
problems	 which	 were	 not	 considered	 to	 include	 major	 policy	 issues.	
Official	 authority	 in	 the	 situation	 was	 delegated	 by	 higher	 organs	 in	
different	 proportions,	 depending	 on	 fluctuating	 political	 courses.	 Local	
self-government	was	not	meant	to	revolutionalize	the	existing	system	but	
to	add	a	dimension	to	it.	State	and	local	were	separate	and	required	their	
own	 forms	 of	 administration.	 Local	 meant	 an	 elected	 self-government	
taking	 care	 of	 matters	 of	 local	 welfare,	 such	 as	 elementary	 education,	
public	health	and	charity.	 (Weissman	191:15,	 Shlemin	&	Fadeev	1993,	
Abramov	199,	Mamut	et.	al	1995:	21.)
The	deficiencies	found	in	the	zemstvo	reform,	prompted	the	popularity	
of	an	opposite	ideology	of	state	theory	in	the	city	administration	reform	of	
10´s	which	understood	the	local	level	as	taking	care	of	state	functions.	A	
major	writer	of	this	line,	B.V.	Bezobrazov,	saw	the	concept	of	self-government	
as	 “political”	 and	 thus	 not	 compatible	 with	 the	 state´s	 interests	 in	 the	
localities.	 The	 institutions	 of	 self-government	 were	 assigned	 certain	
administrative	 tasks	 not	 by	 virtue	 of	 their	 local	 nature	 but	 because	 they	
could	handle	them	more	efficiently	than	the	state	bureaucracy.	The	zemstvos	
and	town	councils	were	considered	an	integral	part	of	the	state	structure,	
unique	only	 in	 that	 their	personnel	was	 selected	differently	 than	 regular	
civil	 servants.	The	elective	character	of	 self-government	was	essentially	a	
pragmatic	device	for	recruiting	participation	and	did	not	mean	independent	
political	authority.	The	zemstvos	and	town	councils	had	no	rights	against	
the	 state.	 Furthermore,	 the	 delegates	 were	 not	 representatives	 of	 the	
populace	but	state	officials	who	happened	to	be	selected	by	local	residents.	
(Weissman	191:15–16,	Abramov	199.)	Theoretically	 it	was	argued	 that	
the	 local	 level	 was	 protected	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 members	 of	 the	 local	
decision	making	organs	did	not	belong	to	the	professional	bureaucracy	as	
they	were	not	named	by	the	state	government.	Independence	from	the	state	
on	 these	 grounds	 was	 considered	 sufficient	 to	 guarantee	 the	 zemstvo 
members	 free	 room	 both	 in	 discipline	 and	 economics.	 (Abramov	 199,	
Lapteva	1996.)
At	 the	 turn	of	 the	20th	century,	 reformist	 ideas	were	brought	up	again	
when	the	society-state	relationship	required	re-examination.	One	proponent	
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of	local	self-government	was	V.V.	Ivanovsky	who,	in	1903,	wrote	about	self-
governing	organizations	as	slowly	replacing	the	old	way	of	state	structure	
and	 social	 order	 dominated	 by	 the	 central	 bureaucracy.	 He	 saw	 the	
bureaucracy	holding	back	the	development	of	society	by	undermining	the	
citizens´s	self-worth.	The	local	decision	making	organs,	on	the	other	hand,	
were	closer	to	the	populace	and	could	slowly	begin	to	displace	the	central	
bureaucracy.	As	the	process	of	decentralization	advanced,	the	bureaucracy	
would	 eventually	 “retreat”	 until	 administration	would	 be	 entirely	 in	 the	
hands	of	“society	itself ”.	In	the	zemstvo	perspective	a	clear	distinction	was	
drawn	between	the	state	which	was	identified	with	its	officials,	and	society	
(obshchestvo).	The	civil	service	was	seen	as	an	independent	class	or	category	
which	 was	 divorced	 from	 the	 society	 and	 thus	 doomed.	 Through	 the	
decentralization	and	development	of	public	institutions,	the	officialdom´s	
status	as	a	ruling	stratum	would	end.	The	primary	bodies	in	the	progress	of	
society	were	 the	zemstvo	 and	 the	 town	councils,	which	would	eventually	
replace	the	state	administration.	(Weissman	191:33.)
Decentralization	meant	different	things	to	different	groups	involved	in	
the	discussions.	The	Russian	 liberals	 saw	 it	necessary	 to	go	 further	 to	 “a	
real”	decentralization	which	meant	devolution	of	authority.	Mere	delegation	
was	 not	 enough,	 because	 the	 state	 authorities	 were	 passive,	 obedient	
subordinates	of	the	ministries	and	eager	executors	of	all	commands	from	
the	center.	The	only	remedy	would	be	expanded	jurisdictions	for	the	zemstvo	
and	town	councils.(Weissman	191:34–35.)
The	various	reformist	ideas	of	government	collided	with	a	political	order	
in	which	only	those	social	groups	and	political	parties	fitting	the	reformist	
autocracy	were	 legal.	They	 had	 the	 required	 conception	 of	 statehood	 in	
which	autocracy	was	unchanged.	This	was	the	concept	of	a	“national	state”,	
not	a	 “nation”	or	a	 “nation-state”	which	started	 from	the	assumptions	of	
freedom	and	sovereignty.	(Vchislo	1992:	44–45.)	The	meaning	of	reforms	
for	 the	 autocratic	 state	 was	 primarily	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 state	
psychology.	 That	 is,	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 positive	 atmosphere	 for	 the	
government	and	its	initiatives.	The	meaning	was	at	the	same	time	to	erect	a	
strong	power	structure	in	the	form	of	governorship	and	limit	administrative	
interference	 in	 local	administration.	All	of	 this	was	meant	 to	consolidate	
the	unity	of	vertically	organized	government	organs	which	would,	in	turn,	
help	to	revive	the	local	culture.	A	specific	goal	was	to	intensify	cooperation	
between	the	zemstvo	and	urban	governments	in	order	to	make	the	governing	
of	provinces	easier.	(Vchislo	1992:	4,	4.)
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The	last	short	reform	period	of	the	Provisional	government	in	191	was	
important	in	the	sense	that	a	key	principle	of	the	following	socialist	system	
was	put	 into	practice.	Because	of	 the	 lack	of	cohesion	between	state	and	
local	level	decision	making,	local	authorities	often	prioritized	local	matters	
in	their	work.	This	led	to	an	official	need	to	underline	provincial	government	
as	being	both	self-government	and	state	institution.	Critiques	of	localism	
saw	 the	 central	 government	 as	 representing	 the	 will	 of	 the	 people.	 All	
spheres	of	state;	politics,	economics	and	administration	were	to	be	merged	
into	one	unit:	the	local	administration.	The	distinction	between	state	and	
society	were	to	disappear	since	the	administration	were	organs	of	the	state.	
(Orlovsky	 199:	 11.)	 The	 state,	 in	 this	 way,	 represented	 the	 society	 it	
governed.	
In	the	political	theories	of	administrative	change,	the	latter	part	of	the	
19th	century	did	in	fact	bring	about	a	concept	of	separate	local	administration	
in	service	of	the	municipalities.	The	legal	basis	of	local	decision	making	–	
although	not	a	linear	development	–	gave	birth	to	a	separate	entity	in	which	
activity	 was	 controlled	 by	 laws	 defining	 its	 work	 and	 organization.	The	
discussion	 concentrated	 on	hierarchy,	 territorial	 authority	 and	 economy.	
Although	representation	of	the	population	was	also	central	in	the	legislative	
reforms,	external	relations	continued	to	play	a	 less	significant	role	 in	 the	
autocratic	 culture.	 Ideologically,	 popular	 representation	 was	 introduced	
mostly	through	the	idea	of	legality	which	tried	to	underline	the	meaning	of	
state	laws	in	the	post-constitutional	framework.	
3.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since the 
1870`s
The	structural	transformation	of	the	Russian	city	government	started	rather	
late	with	 the	10	Statute	on	Cities.	Previous	 concentration	on	 the	 local	
level	 had	 been	 directed	 at	 the	 radical	 changes	 which	 took	 place	 in	 the	
countryside	 after	 161	 and	 164.	This	was	when	 the	 peasants	were	 first	
freed	 from	 bondage	 and	 then	 allowed	 to	 start	 their	 own	 self-governing	
organs	in	the	form	of	the	zemstvos.	As	a	result	of	the	economic,	social	and	
political	changes	set	in	motion	in	the	late	19th	century,	the	towns	of	Russia	
went	through	several	administrative	changes	which	altered	the	role	of	local	
level	activity,	in	the	administration	of	public	services.	
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The	 growing	 number	 of	 people	 needing	 services	 and	 the	 political	
situation	which	required	decisiveness,	became	dominant	factors	in	the	state	
building	processes	since	the	10´s.	The	decisiveness	which	in	some	cases	
took	the	form	of	counter	reforms,	also	affected	the	implementation	of	local	
administration	decisions.	Local	level	administrative	culture	thus	developed	
as	a	part	of	state	building,	not	of	society	building.	The	reform	period	did	
not	attempt	to	change	the	status	of	the	ruler,	so	the	whole	period	could	be	
described	as	a	sort	of	perestroika of	 the	 late	19th	century.	The	reforms	of	
administration	concentrated	on	matters	of	authority,	economy	and	practical	
task.	It	largely	left	out	matters	such	as	leadership	and	information,	and	only	
formally	touched	upon	questions	of	personnel	(i.e	new	legislation	on	their	
position)	and	clients	(i.e	their	legal	protection).	Yet,	in	comparison	with	the	
old	situation,	significant	changes	did	take	place	in	these	areas,	too.	
3.2.1 The State and the Regional Administration 
At	all	 times,	 the	 state´s	 role	has	been	a	dominating	 force	 in	 the	 cultural	
development	processes	at	the	Russian	local	level.	State	building	in	Russia	
can	be	seen	as	a	separate	but	continuously	interacting	and	contending	force	
in	the	political	process	of	different	times.	The	state´s	interests	have	not	been	
all	together	compatible	with	the	interest	of	the	dominant	class	or	all	groups	
represented	in	the	society.	As	state	functionaries,	the	civil	service	have	had	
an	inclination	toward	a	distinctive	bureaucratic	perspective	rooted	in	their	
functional	role.	(Comp.Weissman	191:5,.)
In	 the	 latter	part	 of	 the	19th	 century	 the	 tsarist	 state	organization	was	
structurally	based	on	a	system	of	 three	different	 levels	of	administration:	
the	head	of	the	state,	the	central	government	and	the	local	level.	Functionally,	
the	organization	itself	was	made	up	of	more	than	just	three	territorial	levels.	
This	did	not	 form	a	coherent	executive	body	but,	 instead,	different	actor	
levels	which	performed	their	tasks	in	separate	social	spheres.	
The	 structure	of	 the	 tsarist	 government	 is	 shown	 in	 annexes	A	and	B	
which	show	the	position	of	the	zemstvos	and	town	administrations	in	the	
system.	 These	 are	 my	 illustrations	 which	 show	 the	 main	 structural	
arrangements	during	the	studied	period.	
The	reforms	of	160´s	eliminated	for	the	most	part	the	earlier	elective	
collegial	posts	 in	 the	central	administration.	The	ministerial	government	
was	formally	divided	between	the	supreme	organs	(verkhovnye organy)	and	
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the	 subordinate	 organs	 (podchinennye organy).	 The	 supreme	 organs	
performed	mostly	coordinating	functions.	They	included	the	State	Council,	
the	Committee	of	Ministers	and	the	Senate.	The	State	Council	advised	the	
emperor	 and	 considered	 legislative	 proposals,	 annual	 budget.	 It	 had	 the	
right	to	make	recommendations	but	no	legislative	powers.	The	Committee	
of	 Ministers	 was	 active	 in	 specific	 matters	 concerning	 the	 work	 of	 the	
administration.	It	also	had	authority	to	issue	recommendations	and	was	in	
this	sense	as	powerful	as	the	State	Council.	The	Senate	acted	as	the	Supreme	
administrative	 court	 in	 disputes	 over	 the	 legality	 of	 subordinate	 organ´s	
decisions.	 In	161	 the	Council	of	Ministers	had	been	established	 for	 the	
purpose	 of	 considering	 legislative	 proposals	 from	 individual	 ministries	
before	 they	 were	 presented	 in	 the	 State	 Council.	 Although	 it	 did	 exist	
formally,	the	meaning	of	this	organ	was	insignificant	in	executive	decision	
making.	(Yaney	193:	250–251.)
His	Majesty´s	Imperial	Chancellery	continued	to	be	one	of	the	supreme	
organs.	After	194	it	was	the	final	place	of	arbitration	in	personnel	matters	
such	as	promotions,	dismissals	and	awards.	In	addition	there	were	supreme	
organs	which	served	the	 imperial	 family.	The	military	council,	admiralty	
council,	finance	committee,	guard	ship	council	and	the	Imperial	office	of	
petitions	were	 also	 supreme	organs.	The	first	 two	had	 the	 right	 to	 enact	
orders	 and	 regulations	without	 the	decisions	of	 the	 State	Council	 or	 the	
Committee	of	Ministers.	(Yaney	193:	252–253.)	
Special	committees	(councils)	for	instance	in	defense,	food	supply,	fuel	
and	 transportation	 were	 used	 on	 a	 temporary	 basis	 to	 solve	 a	 specific	
matters	(Orlovsky	1996:	20).	They	were	often	used	by	the	Emperor	and	his	
ministers	to	bypass	the	regular	supreme	organs	or	to	overcome	resistance	in	
the	State	Council.	(Yaney	193:	254.)	In	this	sense	they	gave	an	avenue	for	
more	 flexible	 decision	 making	 and	 perpetuated	 the	 dysfunction	 of	 the	
system	which	was	the	authoritative	weakness	of	all	supreme	organs.	All	of	
them	could	be	bypassed,	 if	not	by	other	decision	makers	in	the	network,	
then	by	the	ruler	himself.	Yaney	has	contended	that,	in	fact,	the	ministers	
enjoyed	considerable	 freedom	in	a	system	locking	a	clear	 tri-partition	of	
power	 into	 legislative,	 executive	 and	 judicial	 (Yaney	 193:	 254).	 The	
administrative	 developments	 of	 the	 19th	 century	 did	 not	 change	 these	
relationships.	
The	central	administrative	apparatus	which	executed	decisions	approved	
by	the	ruler,	was	made	up	of	the	ministries	which	had	a	right	to	give	orders	
to	 the	 administration	 beneath	 them.	 Each	 of	 the	 ministries	 and	 major	
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departments	in	the	capital	possessed	subordinate	agents	in	the	provinces.	
Through	 them,	 the	 central	 authorities	 exerted	 their	 power	 over	 local	
matters.	Questions	relating	to	the	authority	and	functions	of	local	decision	
making	were	the	concern	of	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior.	Its	position	became	
stronger	 in	 the	 19th	 century	 developments.	 (Tiihonen	 1994,	 Weissman	
191:10.)	In	15	the	Central	Statistical	Committee	had	been	established	in	
the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior	 which	 had	 two	 departments:	 statistical	 and	
zemstvo	affairs.	This	committee	was	responsible	for	the	preparation	of	the	
160´s	peasant	reforms.	(Ministerstvo	vnutrennikh	del	Rossii	2005.)
The	main	structure	of	the	local	level	had	been	systematized	in	Peter	the	
Great´s	reforms.	In	10	the	province (guberniia)	was	created.	These	worked	
beneath	 the	 central	bureaucracies	 as	 the	 territorial	middle	 level	 and	had	
divisions	of	smaller	administrative	areas.	The	administration	was	headed	
by	the	governor	who	was	named	by	the	Senate.	The	smaller	administrative	
areas	called	districts	(uezd)	were	headed	by	commandants	who	possessed	
very	much	the	same	authority	 in	 their	areas	as	 the	governors.	 In	112,	a	
province	headed	by	a	deputy	governor	was	created	between	 the	districts	
and	the	provinces.	(Mezentsev	1996,	Peterson	199:	23–239.)	
Besides	serving	as	the	representative	of	the	supreme	state	authority	the	
governor	was	responsible	for	the	supervision	and	coordination	of	practically	
all	 institutions	 in	 his	 administrative	 area.	 This	 included	 the	 organs	 of	
ministries,	 self-government,	 the	 estate	 bodies	 and	 even	private	 societies.	
Originally	the	idea	had	been	to	organize	the	administration	along	functional	
lines	under	the	governor.	In	practice,	though,	the	governors	combined	in	
their	own	persons	all	gubernatorial	functions.	They	headed	the	provincial	
board	which	was	composed	of	a	general	bureau	and	a	chancellery	divided	
into	various	departments	(McKenzie	192:	32).	
The	 governor´s	 administration	 was	 accountable	 for	 public	 order,	 law	
enforcement,	 health	 and	 sanitation,	 food	 relief	 in	 time	 of	 famine,	 fire	
protection,	economic	prosperity,	local	charities	and	welfare.	Included	in	a	
day´s	 work	 could	 have	 been	 matters	 ranging	 from	 planning	 to	 prevent	
famine	to	the	granting	of	approval	for	a	charitable	ball.	These	wide	territorial	
responsibilities	 created	 tension	 with	 the	 line	 ministries.	 (Weisman	
191:10,44,	 Mezentsev	 1996.)	 In	 fact	 Robbins	 (1996),	 for	 instance,	 has	
concluded	 that	 the	 governors	 were	 legally	 outside	 the	 apparatus	 of	 any	
ministry	 (vnevedomstvennyi).	 Disciplinary	 control	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Internal	 Affairs	 was	 imperfect.	 The	 Ministry	 did,	 however,	 succeed	 in	
developing	the	administration	through	personnel	policy.	Since	the	end	of	
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the	10´s	the	educational	level	of	governors	rose	and	a	growing	number	
had	 legal	education.	 In	the	beginning	of	 the	20th	century	the	Ministry	of	
Interior	began	to	promote	an	idea	that	the	key	provincial	officials	needed	to	
have	experience	in	the	local	administration.	(Robbins	1996:	234–235.)
There	were	a	number	of	control	organizations	which	oversaw	the	decision	
making	 of	 the	 local	 self-government	 organs.	 From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	
century	 till	 the	October	revolution,	a	 typical	number	of	 such	controlling	
organs	in	a	province	was	22	(a	full	list	see:	Shepelev	1999:	.).	Represented	
by	them	were	the	interests	of	the	ministries	of	Interior,	Finance,	Trade	and	
Industry,	Information	and	the	administration	of	State	Control.	 (Shepelev	
1999:.)	The	local	agencies	of	the	central	government	where,	of	course,	not	
bodies	of	local	self-government	but	functioned	directly	as	a	part	of	central	
decision	making.	
The	governor	was	involved	in	numerous	special	organs	where	he	acted	as	
the	chairman	of	a	collegial	body	sometimes	called	a	committee,	other	times	
a	 commission	 or	 bureau.	 These	 bodies	 included	 representatives	 of	 the	
Ministry	of	Interior,	other	ministries	and	the	nobility.	The	police	captain	
worked	as	the	main	subordinate	of	the	governor	at	the	district	level	and	also	
took	part	in	these	various	organs.	(McKenzie	192:	32.)
As	this	description	shows,	the	zemstvo´s	and	later	the	urban	town	self-
government	were	not	established	in	a	vacuum.	By	the	last	part	of	the	19th	
century,	 the	Russian	 local	 level	was	 already	mushrooming	with	different	
decision	 making	 organs.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 different	 organs	 mentioned	
above,	the	local	scene	was	inhabited	by	estate	organizations	and	societies	of	
different	urban	groups.	(McKenzie	192:	32.)	The	reforms	instead,	therefore,	
tried	to	answer	the	problem	of	governability.	
3.2.2 The Local Level in the Post Reform Structures
The	 local	 level	 institution	of	164	were	not	organizationally	very	precise	
and	their	structures	and	 functions	partially	overlapped	with	 those	of	 the	
state	 and	 the	 estates.	The	 basis	 of	 local	 administration	 was	 a	 tripartite	
division	 into	 state	 bureaucratic,	 estate	 and	 local	 self-government	 bodies.	
Legally	however,	there	were	no	written	rules	about	their	interaction	which	
raised	questions	of	state	building.	(Weissman	191:15,1.)
The	zemstvo	 system	 is	 important	 for	 the	 town	administration	 for	 two	
reasons.	 First	 the	 political	 and	 social	 experiences	 of	 rural	 Russia	 were	
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important	background	developments	in	state	building.	Second	the	zemstvo	
served	as	a	comparative	model	 for	 the	practical	construction	of	decision	
making	structures	 in	city	administrations.	The	zemtsvos,	which	had	been	
established	by	the	Statute	on	Zemstvos	in	164,	were	general	administrative	
institutions	 whose	 jurisdiction	 covered	 all	 inhabitants	 living	 in	 their	
geographical	area	(either	district	or	province).	(Yaney	193:	231.)	Originally	
the	zemstvo	system	was	erected	in	34	areas	in	the	European	Russia	and	new	
areas	where	added	only	in	1911–12	(McKenzie	192:	33).	
The	original	164	Statute	organized	the	system	on	district	and	provincial	
levels.	The	zemstvos consisted	of	assemblies	(sobranie)	and	administrations.	
The	lower	level	district	assemblies	had	from	ten	to	96	deputies	who	were	
elected	 every	 three	 years	 by	 three	 electoral	 groups	 defined	 by	 property	
holdings:	 the	 landowners,	 city	property	owners	 and	village	 communities	
(peasants).	The	district	zemstvos elected	members	 to	 the	district	zemstvo	
administration	and	to	the	higher	territorial	level	of	the	province	for	a	three	
year	term.	(Vucinich	1960:	195,	Yaney	193:	231.)	The	main	functions	of	
the	 zemstvo	 assemblies	were	 levying	 taxes,	 financing	 operations	 in	 their	
administrative	organs	and	electing	executive	officers	of	which	the	chairman	
of	 the	 administration	 (predsedatel´ zemskogo	 uprava)	 was	 the	 most	
prominent.
The	 164	 zemstvo	 institution	 followed	 the	 social	 theory	 thinking	 on	
government	 which	 saw	 the	 local	 level	 as	 its	 own	 legitimate	 category	
(McKenzie	 192:	 36).	 As	 a	 political	 construct,	 the	 zemstvo system	 was	
meant	to	give	the	freed	peasants	a	say	in	their	own	local	affairs.	In	effect,	the	
decision	making	process	became	dominated	by	the	nobility	and	consequently	
the	 zemstvos regularly	 adopted	 policies	 which	 suited	 the	 nobility´s	 own	
group	interests.	At	the	same	time	the	peasants	were	 largely	 indifferent	to 
zemstvo	activities.	(Hosking	192,	Shlemin	and	Fadeev	1993,	Yaney	193:	
231.)	 In	 16	 nobles	 and	 officials	made	 about	 55	 percent	 of	 the	 district	
board	members.	By	the	year	1903	the	number	had	increased	into	almost	2	
percent.	(McKenzie	192:	54.)
The	change	of	politics	came	in	the	form	of	the	190	Statute.	This	followed	
the	state	theory	of	government	which	emphasized	that	the	local	level	and	
the	center	had	the	same	administrative	 identity.	The	Imperial	Ukaz	from	
190	which	introduced	the	new	Statute,	explained	that	the	zemstvos had to	
work	in	unity	with	other	governmental	institutions	to	carry	out	state	tasks.	
The	new	electoral	arrangements	were	made	according	to	the	estates	which	
deprived	numerous	categories	of	people	the	right	to	vote.	These	included	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
6
the	 clergy,	 Jews,	 peasants	 and	 their	 associations	 owning	 non-allotment	
land,	merchants,	business	owners	of	a	certain	category	and	people	under	
police	 surveillance.	 Peasants	 could	 take	 part	 only	 as	members	 of	 village	
communities.	(McKenzie	192:3,	42.)
Under	 the	 164	 Statute,	 the	 zemstvo	 officials	 were	 not	 originally	
considered	to	be	a	part	of	the	state	service.	Their	salaries	were	paid	by	the	
zemstvo	organ	and	they	could	not	receive	a	state	pension.	Yet,	their	positions	
were	formally	strong	because	becoming	an	official	required	the	decision	of	
the	Senate.	Taking	an	official	to	court	required	the	decision	of	the	Senate,	
after	which	 the	matter	was	 transferred	 to	a	 judicial	organ.	 (Mamut	et.	al	
1995:	25.)	This	protected	elected	officials	from	being	the	targets	of	arbitrary	
influence.
The	 190	 Statue	 on	 the	 contrary	 demanded	 that	 the	 zemstvo board	
chairman	 had	 to	 be	 a	 person	 eligible	 for	 state	 service.	This	 meant	 that	
peasants	 and	 townsmen	 could	 not	 be	 chosen	 for	 this	work.	The	 statute,	
according	to	its	purpose	of	stronger	central	control,	increased	administrative	
control	over	personnel	and	set	up	an	entirely	new	control	organ	over	the	
zemstvo,	“The	provincial	bureau	of	zemstvo	affairs”,	which	was	to	consider	
the	legality	of	zemstvo	work.	It	could,	without	the	Senate´s	approval,	remove	
members	of	the	zemstvo boards.	(McKenzie	192:5–5.)
By	the	164	Statute	the	zemstvos	could	not	enact	any	general	legislation	
in	 their	 area,	 only	 directives	 on	 specific	 issues.	 In	 this	 respect	 the	 190	
Statute	strengthened	the	role	of	the	zemstvos	by	giving	as	the	right	to	pass	
obligatory	decisions	(postanovlenie)	binding	on	all	local	population	outside	
the	towns.	(McKenzie	192:	4.)
The	practical	power	the	zemstvos	was	also	based	on	cooperation	with	the	
local	 police,	 who	 acted	 in	 case	 someone	 did	 not	 comply	 with	 zemstvo	
decisions.	Zemstvos	could	also	take	individuals	to	court.	In	practice	localism	
was	limited	by	the	Ministry	of	Interior,	which	issued	directions	for	decision	
making	and	implementation	processes	in	the	local	organs.	The	highest	legal	
control	belonged	to	the	Senate	which	decided	matters	between	the	zemstvo	
and	 the	 local	 state	 administrations,	 higher	 administrative	 organs	 and	
governmental	 and	 social	 organizations.	 The	 Senate	 functioned	 as	 the	
Supreme	(constitutional)	court	which	interpreted	the	law	on	a	wide	variety	
of	issues,	including	the	competence	of	authority	of	local	government	organs	
in	different	matters.	(Mamut	et	al.1995:	26.)
The	zemstvos	from	different	areas	were	prohibited	from	forming	unions.	
Restricted	 authority	 meant	 that	 the	 localities	 did	 not	 have	 the	 right	 to	
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formulate	 their	own	educational	programs	or	have	 their	own	policies	on	
health	protection.	This	was	combined	with	a	lack	of	coordination	from	the	
central	government	as	official	contacts	between	provinces	were	not	allowed	
and	 there	did	not	 exist	 a	general	 imperial	 coordinating	center.(Abramov	
199,	Shlemin	&	Fadeev	1993.)	As	a	side-effect,	the	actual	development	of	
different	administrative	areas	was	largely	dependant	on	local	priorities	and	
money.	
The	financial	support	of	zemstvos	was	done	with	local	and	regional	orders	
of	payments.	The	main	source	of	income	was	the	right	of	the	zemstvos	to	
collect	new	taxes.	This	was	a	restricted	right,	since	the	zemstvos could	not	
tax	retail	business	or	industrial	enterprises.	The	only	source	of	tax	revenue,	
therefor,	was	the	land.	The	legislation	of	164	had	given	the	zemstvos	wide	
but	legally	undefined	functions	many	of	which	required	the	approval	of	the	
provincial	 governor	 and	 sometimes	 the	 minister	 of	 Interior.	 Even	 as	 a	
number	of	state	agencies	were	closed	and	their	functions	were	transferred	
to	the	local	level,	the	formal	control	on	decision	making	was	retained	in	the	
center.	Every	decision	could	be	protested	by	the	governor	in	which	case	the	
Senate	decided	the	issue.	The	main	tasks	of	the	zemstvos was	to	take	care	of	
the	 welfare	 of	 legally	 free	 but	 socially	 dependent	 peasants.	 This	 meant	
organizing	 the	 collection	 of	 money	 for	 those	 in	 need,	 bread	 shops	 and	
arranged	points	for	the	inspection	of	epidemics.	Socially	the	zemstvo	system	
directed	 political	 energy	 into	 local	 development	 and	 charity	 and	 eased	
social	 tension	 between	 different	 groups.	 (Giltsenko	 1996,	 Lapteva	 1996,	
Hosking	192,	Shlemin	&	Fadeev	1993,	Mamut	et	al.	1995:22.)
As	a	result	of	the	narrow	official	interpretation	of	jurisdiction,	the	zemstvo	
reform	was	criticized	at	the	time	as	ineffective.	This	was	because	it	had	given	
the	local	level	a	great	deal	of	freedom	but	not	the	power	which	would	have	
come	 with	 being	 incorporated	 into	 the	 general	 state	 system.	 (Abramov	
199.)	The	main	structural	weakness	of	 the	zemstvo	organization	was	 its	
segregated	position	beside	the	imperial	network	of	local	government	bodies	
and	courts.	In	both	administrative	and	judicial	functions	it	was	subordinate	
to	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior.	(Hosking	192.)	This	criticism	also	shows	
that	 the	governor´s	 role	 as	 coordinators	of	 territorial	 administration	did	
not	work	very	well.	
The	Statute	on	Towns	was	made	public	 in	10	and	 it	 introduced	city	
Duma	 (municipal	 assemblies)	 throughout	 Russia	 and	 certain	 parts	 of	
Central	Asia.	(Vucinich	1960:	195.)	The	new	structure	of	authority	which	it	
laid	down	existed	 from	10-	191.	By	 the	end	of	 the	19th	 century	 there	
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were	 four	 types	 of	 towns	 and	 cities:	 the	 provincial	 town,	 and	 its	 capital	
(gubernskii	 gorod),	 the	 county	 town	 (uezdnyi gorod),	 other	 than	 county	
town	 (bezuezdnyi gorod)	 and	 non-administrative	 small	 town	 (zashtatnyi 
gorod).	(Prosiankina1996.)	
The	legal	basis	of	urban	administration	was	based	on	two	decrees	of	10	
and	192	which	regulated	the	organization,	structure	and	authority	of	town	
administrations.	The	town	government	consisted	of	a	municipal	assembly	
(Duma),	an	executive	board,	and	a	mayor	(town	head).The	assembly	was	
voted	every	four	years	by	urban	tax	payers	in	three	separate	social	groups	in	
proportion	 to	 their	 tax	 assessments.	 The	 executive	 board	 –	 the	 town	
administration	–	was	made	up	of	the	city	head	and	two	to	six	members.	It	
was	formulated	by	the	Duma	which	also	chose	its	members.	Similarly	the	
town	 head	 was	 elected	 by	 the	 Duma,	 even	 though	 his	 nomination	 was	
accepted	by	 the	governor	or	 the	Ministry	of	 Interior.	His	position	as	 the	
speaker	of	the	assembly	was	explained	as	giving	maximum	security	against	
possible	illegal	decisions	by	the	Duma.	In	these	arrangements,	the	idea	of	
wider	public	participation	based	on	property	ownership	was	introduced	for	
the	first	time.	Each	subject	of	the	Russian	Empire,	who	was	at	least	25	years	
of	age	and	owned	independently	some	type	of	property	in	the	town,	could	
take	part	in	the	elections	and	be	elected	himself.	(Florinsky	1969,	Giltsenko	
1996,	Prosiankina	1996,	Mamut	et	al.	1995:	2.)
In	comparison	with	the	zemstvos,	the	town	governments	were	given	the	
right	to	pass	decisions	which	were	binding	to	all	urban	inhabitants	under	
the	original	statute.	In	this	respect,	the	zemstvo authority	was	strengthened	
in	13	at	the	provincial	level.	(McKenzie	192:	4.)
The	192	Statute	on	Towns	replaced	the	three-class	electoral	system	with	
a	territorial	division	of	election	units.	This	did	not	contribute	directly	to	a	
more	 equal	 representation.	 Nor	 did	 it	 have	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 state-local	
authority	 relations	 or	 the	 dependancy	 of	 the	 municipalities	 on	 state	
government.	(Vucinich	1960:	200.)
Since	 the	 10	 statue,	 the	members	 of	 the	 town	 administration	were	
considered	 administrative	 officials	 (dolzhnostnye litsa)	 whose	 term	 was	
limited	 to	 four	 years	 (Mamut	 et	 al.	 1995:	 29).	They	were	not,	 however,	
considered	to	be	state	officials	with	the	exception	of	 the	city	secretary	 in	
provincial	cities	who	had	a	special	status.	Outright	nepotism	was	prohibited	
by	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 members	 could	 not	 be	 relatives.	 Half	 the	
members	were	re-elected	in	two	year	periods	in	a	system	of	rotation.	The	
official	guidance	of	the	administration	was	done	by	legislation	and	Duma	
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instructions.	Inside	the	executive	board,	the	division	of	labor	was	decided	
by	the	members	themselves.	(Prosiankina	1996.)	
The	executive	board	handled	administrative	questions	of	town	economics	
such	as	the	renovation	of	the	town,	the	development	of	the	budget,	gathering	
information	 for	 the	 town	 duma,	 starting	 new	 projects	 for	 the	 town,	
collecting	and	distributing	town	funds,	and	defining	time	limits	and	rules	
of	financial	responsibility	of	its	workers	and	administrative	organs.	Decision	
making	 independence	 was	 strongest	 in	 locally	 important	 questions	 of	
property	maintenance:	approval	of	plans	for	private	buildings	on	the	borders	
of	the	town;	giving	permissions	to	fundamental	renovations	and	changes;	
dealing	with	business	issues.	(Prosiankina	1996.)	
Town	funds	were	used	to	finance	such	local	responsibilities	as	the	police,	
fire	fighting,	development	of	public	schooling,	and	jails.	At	the	same	time,	
the	 work	 of	 local	 organizations	 was	 developed	 administratively.	 For	
example,	 In	11,	 the	 local	police	were	given	 regulations	about	 criminal	
investigation.	The	prosecutor	had	the	right	to	appoint	a	named	police	officer	
to	 a	 preliminary	 investigation	 on	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 provincial	
police	chief.	In	16	the	city	of	St.	Petersburg	founded	a	Committee	for	the	
work	of	fire	fighting	which	set	out	to	compare	different	fire	fighting	methods.	
In	the	following	year	another	state	level	commission	was	founded	to	work	
on	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 prison	 system	 and	 criminal	 punishments.	 Foreign	
experience	available	at	the	time	was	used	in	the	recommendations	of	the	
commission.	(Ministerstvo	vnutrennikh	del	Rossii	2005.)
Officially	the	Duma	exerted	control	over	decision	making	through	the	
report	which	was	given	to	it	by	the	board.	On	specific	issues,	commissions	
were	 used	 with	 members	 from	 the	 administration	 and	 among	 eligible	
voting	 inhabitants.	 Commission	members	 could	 participate	 in	 the	 town	
executive	board	meetings	 in	cases	concerning	his	commission.	The	town	
head´s	 authority	 was	 strong	 because	 he	 could	 stop	 the	 processing	 of	 a	
matter	when	the	board	did	not	reach	consensus.	In	these	instances	matters	
were	sent	to	the	governor	and	to	the	(state)	administration	of	town	affairs	
in	the	province.	(Prosiankina	1996.)
The	municipal	administrators	were	usually	men	whose	interests	centered	
around	economic	questions	of	the	town	and	its	population.	In	the	beginning	
of	the	20th	century,	1	%	had	a	higher	or	middle	level	education,	2%	had	
minimal	formal	education	and	49%	were	so	called	home-educated,	which	
in	many	 cases	meant	 that	 they	 had	 the	 elementary	 level	 of	 reading	 and	
writing	skills.	The	rest,	4%	could	not	read	and	write.	(Nardova	1992:	5.)	
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The	sons	of	peasants	and	members	of	 the	 lower	middle	class	 found	new	
advancement	 opportunities	 in	 local	 government.	 After	 having	 finished	
university	 level	 studies,	 representatives	 of	 these	 groups	 could	 find	
employement	as	civil	servants	in	local	administration.	(Edeen	1960:	21.)	
For	 daily	 administrative	 and	 economical	 tasks	 of	 the	 town,	 the	 town	
assembly	could	hire	people.	These	municipal	workers	either	worked	directly	
for	administrative	organs	of	the	zemstvo,	or	for	the	different	town	services	
provided	by	the	administration	(such	as	schools	and	hospitals).	Those	who	
worked	 in	municipal	 services	 could	be	 accepted	 to	 the	 state	 service	 and	
receive	full	rights	if	the	governor	accepted	their	nominations.	(Mamut	et	al.	
1995:	25.)
Even	as	the	authority	of	the	town	administration	was	limited,	the	state´s	
need	 to	 expand	 services	 and	 control	 resulted	 in	 local	 communities	
performing	 many	 functions	 which	 were	 officially	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	
state.	For	instance,	at	the	end	of	the	10´s	the	city	of	Moscow	disbursed	
3%	of	its	budget	for	the	army,	police	and	other	such	functions	which	were	
directly	subordinated	to	the	central	government	and	over	which	it	officially	
had	no	jurisdiction.	(Vucinich	1960:	199.)
As	a	measure	of	government	control	and	unity	in	local	matters,	the	legal	
authority	 of	 the	 town	 administration	 was	 under	 double	 control	 of	 the	
governor	 and	 of	 the	 Administration	 of	 zemstvo	 and	 town	 affairs	 which	
existed	as	the	state	control	organ	in	the	provinces	from	10	to	191.	The	
organ	had	authority	over	both	 the	administration	and	 the	Duma	and	 its	
decision	was	necessary	for	the	city	executive	board.	The	governors	role	was	
strengthened	 in	his	 position	 as	 the	 chairman.	Besides	 the	 legality	 of	 the	
administrations	decisions	(and	complaints	about	them),	the	body	handled	
mistakes	which	had	been	made	 in	 the	 selection	of	 officials	 and	disputes	
between	the	local	public	administration	and	the	local	police	department.	
Since	the	192	decree	it	became	the	supervising	organ	of	both	legality	and	
general	purposefulness	of	zemstvo	work.	Its	members	were	now	decided	by	
the	Ministry	of	Interior	and	included	the	governor,	deputy	governor,	 the	
chairman	and	the	delegate	representatives	of	the	zemstvo	executive	board	in	
the	province.	(Vorobieva	1996,	Giltsenko	1996.)
As	was	 the	 case	 with	 the	 zemstvo	 system	 in	which	 the	 governmental	
office	for	peasant	affairs	(from	14)	and	then	the	land	captain	system	(from	
19)	 served	 as	 the	 controllers	 of	 decisions	 with	 a	 veto	 right	 over	 any	
decision,	the	city	administration	was	also	under	monitoring.	The	mayors	of	
larger	cities	needed	approval	by	the	minister	of	the	Interior,	and	those	from	
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smaller	 towns	 by	 the	 governor,	 to	 start	 their	 work	 as	 public	 officials.	
(Vucinich	1960:	19.)
Even	before	this	there	had	been	laws	and	regulations	which	had	seriously	
limited	the	self-governing	nature	of	the	zemstvo-system	in	the	rural	areas.	
The	government	had	passed	a	decision	in	19	which	gave	the	governors	
the	right	to	supervise	the	transfer	and	appointment	of	all zemstvo	employees.	
The	190	Statute	on	Zemstvos	ruled	that	without	the	governor´s	approval	
no	person	could	be	a	member	of	 the	zemstvo	or	 its	administrative	body.	
Besides	cases	of	illegality,	the	governor	could	annul	zemstvo decisions	when	
these	were	considered	“unsuitable”.	In	addition,	the	landed	gentry	was	given	
an	absolute	majority	in	the	zemstvo	organization.	(Vucinich	1960:	203.)
The	strengthening	of	central	decision	making	coincided	with	adminis-
trative	reorganizations	and	establishing	of	new	central	bodies.	The	Ministry	
of	 Interior	 is	a	good	example	of	 this	development.	The	 local	prisons	and	
places	 of	 arrest	 became	 a	 part	 of	 a	 state	 administration	 restructuring	 in	
19	 when	 the	 Head	 administration	 of	 prisons	 was	 established	 in	 the	
ministry.	All	police	administration	was	made	subordinate	of	the	ministry	
in	10.	The	state	police	and	local	police	were	united	in	the	Department	of	
state	police	the	same	year.	The	number	of	police	officers	and	the	ranks	in	
the	police	grew	both	in	the	capital	and	in	the	provinces.	In	the	following	
year	 a	 decree	was	 passed	which	 allowed	 the	minister	 of	 Interior	 to	 give	
emergency	regulations	at	his	own	discretion	in	any	part	of	the	country	to	
secure	order.	These	regulations	expanded	the	rights	of	the	local	police	and	
the	governors	were	given	the	right	to	pass	binding	commands	during	a	state	
of	emergency,	 let	go	any	civil	 servant,	arrest	and	detain	people	 for	up	 to	
three	months,	and	stop	the	work	of	town	and	zemstvo	organs.	In	the	year	
13,	a	law	was	passed	about	the	establishment	of	Imperial	secret	police.	
(Ministerstvo	vnutrennikh	del	2005.)
The	zemstvo-system	as	a	rural	organization	and	the	 towns	collided	on	
several	points.	In	the	consideration	of	the	entire	local	administration	in	any	
particular	geographical	point,	all	three	sectors	usually	need	to	be	examined:	
zemstvo,	municipal	government	 in	 towns,	and	 local	 state	administration.	
Of	all	the	areas	of	common	interest,	taxation	was	particularly	meaningful	
for	the	practical	work.	The	zemstvos	were	by	law	required	to	take	care	of	the	
offices	of	certain	provincial	officials	and	to	provide	transportation	for	the	
local	judiciary	and	police	officers.	This	made	them	a	unique	combination	of	
both	public	state	providers	and	local	“third	sector”	operators	who	took	care	
of	 local	 hospices	 and	 public	 schools.	 In	 the	 190´s	 the	 zemstvo	 activists	
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debated	among	themselves	the	need	for	a	more	unified	zemstvo	operations	
at	 the	 provincial	 level	 and	 struggled	 with	 their	 governors	 to	 have	 the	
emphasis	of	their	work	be	in	the	social,	health	and	educational	sectors.	Yet	
this	relationship	was	not	clear	cut.	In	some	instances	the	governors	were	
responding	 to	 the	 displeasure	 of	 the	 population	 which	 did	 not	 always	
unanimously	support	all	zemstvo	programs.	
There	 was	 discussion	 about	 the	 missing	 idea	 of	 rule	 in	 the	 lower	
administrative	 levels	 and	 the	 power	 of	 governors	 and	 deputy	 governors	
being	too	weak	in	real	decision	making	relations.	In	particular,	the	activities	
of	 local	 inhabitants	 in	 towns	raised	questions	over	 the	role	of	governors.	
The	governors	themselves	criticized	the	situation	where	their	opinion	was	
not	 asked	 over	 questions	 concerning	 the	 development	 of	 services	 and	
building	projects.	It	was	argued	by	the	minister	of	Finances	(11–16),	
N.	 H.	 Bunge,	 that	 the	 administrative	 power	 rested	 not	 on	 undefined	
authority	but	on	the	exactness	and	definitiveness	of	the	borders	of	authority	
which	give	a	right	to	control	all	sectors	of	governmental	administration	and	
local	government.	(Shepelev	1999:	9.)	
The	decree	of	192	lifted	the	role	of	town	executive	boards	by	making	
them	more	independent	of	the	Dumas	and	into	a	direct	extension	of	the	
state	administration.	This	was	secured	mostly	by	making	the	head,	members	
of	the	board,	and	the	town	secretary	(in	bigger	towns)	state	officials	who	
were	appointed	and	let	go	by	the	state	administration	(the	governor),	and	
were	given	orders	through	the	civil	servant	hierarchy.	The	police	were	used	
as	general	administrative	controllers.	(Nardova	1992:	5.)	The	changes	in	
the	 town	 administration,	 in	 other	 words,	 followed	 those	 made	 in	 the	
zemstvo-organization	according	to	the	state	theory	of	government.	
Strengthened	state	authority	and	diminished	 local	 legal	control	meant	
that	the	Duma	could	no	longer	take	members	of	the	board	to	court.	The	
town	head´s	position	was	weakened	 for	 the	benefit	of	 the	 representative	
and	the	governor	was	given	a	right	to	pass	orders	to	all	sections	of	the	town	
government.	Maybe	the	most	important	method	of	strengthening	political	
control	by	the	center	was	the	governors´	right	to	stop	the	implementation	
of	assembly	decisions	when	these	were	incompatible	with	the	state´s	general	
use	 and	need,	or	 clearly	breach	 the	 rights	of	 local	 inhabitants.	 In	 such	a	
situation,	the	Administration	of	zemstvo	and	town	affairs	–	in	other	words	
the	 state	–	decided	 the	matter.	Further	more,	 the	coercive	powers	of	 the	
local	administration	depended	on	the	local	police	which	undermined	the	
authority	of	the	purely	administrative	organs.	The	local	organs	could	take	a	
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person	to	a	court	or	ask	the	police	to	take	action	in	case	some	one	did	not	
fulfill	 his	 specific	 duties.	 In	 the	 Russian	 Empire,	 the	 police	 retained	 an	
understanding	of	policemen	as	general	administrators.	While	their	general	
concern	 was	 law	 enforcement,	 their	 duties	 also	 included	 such	 tasks	 as	
participation	 in	 tax	 collection,	 statistical	 work,	 registration	 of	 internal	
passports,	 rehabilitation	of	prostitutes,	 temperance	measures	 and	care	of	
orphans.	(Weissman	191:10,	Vorobieva	1996,	Mamut	et.	al	1995:	26,	294.)	
The	mixing	of	duties	and	rights	between	separate	spheres	weakened	local	
administrative	jurisdiction.	
3.2.3 Professionalization and Growth of Tasks in the Local Level
The	closing	decade	of	the	century	saw	a	rapid	expansion	in	the	work	of	the	
zemstvos	and	town	councils.	Between	10	and	190	zemstvo	budgets	had	
only	grown	5.1	%	but	in	the	following	decade	the	number	was	expanded	to	
1%.	Personnel,	“the	third	element”,	grew	accordingly.	The	zemstvo	boards	
often	served	as	organizational	centers	for	the	progressive	movement,	and	
professional	 congresses	of	 the	 third	 element	 served	as	 surrogates	 for	 the	
open	political	meetings	otherwise	prohibited	by	the	authorities.	Lastly,	the	
self-governing	bodies	were	a	forum	for	the	growth	of	“zemstvo	ideology”.	
(Weissman	191:32)
Improvements	 in	 town	 services	were	 seen	 as	practical	matters.	Voters	
included	approximately	30	%	or	less	of	the	electorate	and	assemblies	were	
dominated	 by	 the	 merchant	 and	 honorary	 citizen	 groups.	 The	 gentry,	
meanwhile,	 played	 only	 a	 minor	 role	 in	 the	 urban	 localities,	 even	
disappearing	 altogether	 from	 the	 town	board	of	Moscow.	Politically	 two	
groups	emerged	among	the	decision	makers:	conservatives	who	protected	
the	 property	 owners	 against	 raising	 taxes	 while	 fulfilling	 state-imposed	
obligations,	and	the	liberals	who	wished	to	invest	in	municipal	services	and	
their	development,	particularly	health	care	and	education.	(Brower	196:	
335–33.)
The	number	of	locally	employed	municipal	workers,	indicates	the	level	
of	 local	 community	 activity.	 In	 1912,	 among	 34	 provinces,	 there	 where	
approximately	 3.000	 physicians,	 1.000	 veterinarians,	 1.100	 agricultural	
experts,	 1.000	 insurance	 agents,	 1.400	 other	medical	 workers,	 including	
midwives,	 300	 statisticians,	 500	 engineers	 and	 technicians	 and	 45.000	
teachers.	(Vucinich	1960:	204.)
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The	statisticians´	work	offers	an	interesting	example	of	local	administrative	
culture.	The	first	statistical	investigations	began	in	the	early	10´s	but	the	
greatest	amount	of	work	was	carried	out	 in	the	mid	10´s	and	between	
1906–1914.	 The	 statisticians	 worked	 with	 the	 zemstvo	 and	 carried	 out	
household	inventories	throughout	the	provinces,	resulting	in	publications	
to	determine	taxable	property.	In	193	a	law	was	passed	which	required	the	
zemstvo	 to	 carry	out	property	 assessments.	 In	addition,	 the	 statisticians´	
aim	was	to	collect	data	which	would	show	causes	of	poverty	and	indebtedness	
for	 the	 planning	 of	 reforms.	 In	 199	 the	 central	 government	 started	 to	
subsidize	but	also	closely	monitor	the	statisticians´	work.	The	activities	of	
the	 statisticians	 were	 supervised	 by	 the zemstvo,	 the	 governor	 and	 the	
ministry	in	St.	Petersburg,	all	of	which	could	veto	projects,	hold	funds	and	
reject	 the	appointment	of	 staff	members.	According	 to	 Johnson´s	 (192)	
evaluation,	 the	 professionalism	 of	 the	 statisticians	 brought	 them	 into	
conflict	with	local	governors	and	self-government	leaders.	In	these	situations	
the	administrative	control	was	not	total.	The	statisticians	could	rely	on	the	
support	 of	 the	 public,	 and	 to	 a	 certain	 extent	 on	 one	 another.	 Their	
environment	was	determined	by	opinions	at	all	levels	and	spheres	of	life	in	
society.	The	 inner	 solidarity	 of	 the	 profession	 helped	 local	 statisticians.	
Publications	 influenced	 the	 way	 the	 research	was	 done	 in	 the	 localities.	
During	disputes,	 leading	 statisticians	 could	use	 their	 connections	within	
the	state	administration	and	either	intervene	or	offer	alternative	employment.	
Job	referrals	were	also	given	by	 senior	members	of	 the	profession	which	
affected	local	research.	(Johnson	192:	344–345,	34–349,	356.)
An	other	example	of	professionalization	at	the	local	level	is	the	police.	
The	 Statue	 on	 Towns	 in	 10	 made	 the	 municipalities	 responsible	 for	
funding	 the	 town	police	and	places	of	arrest.	 In	 the	 following	year,	 rules	
governing	the	use	of	police	(gendarme)	in	criminal	investigations,	made	the	
police	members	of	the	state	criminal	process.	The	prosecutor	had	the	right,	
with	the	consent	of	the	gubernatorial	police	chief,	to	appoint	a	policeman	
to	work	on	a	criminal	investigation.	In	19	the	country	policemen	were	
more	closely	linked	with	the	district	police	system	as	they	were	ordered	to	
subordinate	themselves	to	the	police	chief	of	the	area	who	gave	them	their	
instructions.	 In	 10	 the	 police	 were	 organized	 under	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Interior	 as	 an	 independent	 department.	 The	 political	 situation	 in	 the	
country	led	to	a	need	to	separate	the	police	more	clearly	from	the	local	rural	
and	town	administrations.	In	19	rules	were	set	to	ensure	the	financing	of	
police	living	quarters	and	other	material	needs.	(Ministerstvo	vnutrennikh	
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del	 Rossii	 2005.)	 In	 19,	 about	 260.000	 persons	 worked	 as	 state	 civil	
servants.	Of	these	105.000	were	in	the	police.	(Edeen	1960:	26.)The	police,	
in	 other	 words,	 evolved	 from	 local	 officials	 into	 participants	 in	 a	 state	
organization	with	common	interests	secured	by	the	government.	
Along	with	professionalization,	the	economy	was	producing	a	new	type	
of	social	landscape.	Trade	was	accumulating	meaning	as	a	force	of	economic	
growth.	In	Saint-Petersburg	for	instance	almost	as	many	residents	worked	
in	commerce	as	 in	 industry.	Occupational	diversification	was	also	under	
way	but	none	of	the	major	towns	were	predominantly	industrial	by	nature.	
Artisans	remained	as	large	a	group	as	the	factory	workers	and	the	proportion	
of	 educated	 professionals	 and	 other	 white	 collar	 workers	 was	 growing.	
Towns	demanded	new	efforts	from	administrative	services,	particularly	in	
sanitation	and	housing.	(Brower	196:	325,	326.)
Even	 though	 the	 historical	 literature	 points	 to	 the	 dependence	 of	 the	
local	administration	on	the	structures	and	guidance	of	central	bureaucracies,	
it	is	worth	noting	that	at	the	start	of	the	20th	century,	the	state	administration	
itself	was	 barely	 penetrating	 the	 county	 level	 in	 provinces.	According	 to	
Vchislo´s	 analysis,	 the	 government	 did	 not	 have	 real	 authority	 in	 the	
provinces	in	1906–190.	Zemstvos	did	not	attract	large	groups	of	people	to	
beneficial	 social	 activity	 and,	 generally,	 citizen	 activity	was	 not	 a	 typical	
characteristic	 of	 the	 rural	 population.(Vchislo	 1992:	 52.)	 Yet,	 at	 least	 in	
geographical	terms,	the	local	self-government	system	was	covering	a	large	
part	of	the	Russian	empire	in	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century.	In	1914	it	
included	0%	of	all	Russian	territory,	and	had	113	million	people	under	its	
jurisdiction.	 (Mamut	 et.	 al.	 1995:	 29.)	 How	 can	 this	 situation	 be	
understood?
One	explanation	is	that	for	the	majority	of	the	population	who	lived	in	
rural	 areas	 and	 smaller	 towns,	 administration	was	 offered	 via	 their	 own	
corporations.	The	aggregate	size	of	the	tsarist	state	administration	was	not	
impressive,	particularly	given	the	huge	expanse	of	the	empire	it	ruled.	For	
instance,	in	France	the	number	of	administrators	per	thousand	inhabitants	
was	1.6	and	in	Germany	12.6.	In	Russia	it	was	6.2.	Similarly	the	financial	
resources	were	below	European	standards.	In	order	to	rule,	it	was	necessary	
for	the	state	bureaucracy	to	depend	on	other	non-bureaucratic	organs.	Of	
these	 the	 most	 important,	 traditionally,	 were	 the	 estate	 institutions.	
(Weissman	191:11,14.)
The	original	cultural	and	economic	meaning	of	estate	institutions	in	the	
urban	municipalities	 eroded	 as	 the	 towns	 themselves	 saw	 the	 “revolving	
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door”	of	a	changing	population.	In	the	end	of	the	19th	century,	about	20	%	
of	the	inhabitants	in	the	towns	had	either	just	arrived	or	left	by	the	end	of	
the	year.	The	towns	were	both	a	disappointing	experience	for	many	and	an	
environment	 of	 “transitory”	 opportunities.	 (Brower	 196:	 32–32.)	 As	
commerce	expanded,	direct	taxation	of	the	peasant	population	became	less	
important	and	the	meaning	of	trade	grew.	The	role	of	government	changed	
as	well.	 Instead	 of	 being	 a	mechanism	 for	 extracting	 financial	 tribute,	 it	
became	a	structure	which	rested	on	the	developing	nationwide	market.	In	
this	 development	 the	 town	 population	 depended	 on	 grain	 production	
which	caused	great	problems	for	the	peasants.	(Yaney	193:	44.)
In	the	beginning	of	the	20th	century,	central	government	was	pulling	the	
still	largely	agrarian	society	in	two	directions	by	fostering	industrialization	
through	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Finance	 and	 by	 pursuing	 conservative	 social	
policies	which	ignored	the	economic	changes.	This	led	to	repeated	conflicts	
inside	 the	 government	 but	 did	 not	 change	 the	 official	 view	 that	
industrialization	 does	 not	 need	 to	 upset	 the	 traditional	 social	 structure	
which	originated	from	the	divine	authority	of	the	throne.	Mercantile	and	
scientific	contacts	with	the	rest	of	Europe	had	been	encouraged	for	almost	
two	centuries.	New	actors	grew	frustrated	with	not	being	able	 to	express	
their	ideas	in	an	organized	manner	but	only	through	petitions	to	the	Tsar.	
Political	 party	 representation	 at	 the	 state	 level	 was	 not	 possible	 because	
subjects	could	not	be	conceived	as	an	organized	society	but	as	loyal	people.	
The	 Tsar	 viewed	 the	 urban	 population	 with	 particular	 suspicion.	 He	
considered	it	socially	alien	of	Russian	people	even	though	his	governments	
reforms	 and	 the	 works	 of	 his	 predecessors	 had	made	 its	 birth	 possible.	
(McDaniel	1996,	Acton	196,	Shlemin	&	Fadeev	1993.)	The	contradiction	
of	 political	 risks	 at	 the	 top	 and	 the	 practical	 development	 needs	 in	 the	
localities	effected	the	choices	of	administrative	ideology	at	the	turn	of	the	
century.	Political	risks	became	more	acute	as	the	traditional	social	groups	
closest	to	the	Tsar	underwent	change.	
The	 landed	nobility,	which	was	so	vital	 for	 the	autocrat	as	a	 source	of	
support,	eroded	as	many	sold	their	lands.	The	peasant	agriculture	was	left	
on	its	own	as	the	size	of	the	rural	population	swelled.	Political	awareness	
was	growing	as	 literacy	and	contacts	with	the	urban	world	became	more	
common.	The	 lower	 and	 upper	 classes	 of	 the	 society	were	 still	 officially	
categorized	into	estates	but	in	fact	the	occupational	and	economic	variety	
in	these	classes	had	already	changed	their	meaning	(Brower	196:	330).	The	
new	workers	of	the	industries	were	no	better	off	with	no	job	security,	poor	
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wages	 and	 overcrowded	 living	 conditions.	The	 rural	 culture	 which	 they	
came	 from	 did	 not	 prepare	 them	 for	 the	 conditions.	 In	 these	 social	
conditions,	Marxist	ideas	which	had	began	to	gain	room	in	Russia	started	
to	develop	into	a	fully	Russian	version	of	the	ideology.	The	result	was	the	
mobilization	of	radicals	and	conservatives	alike.	(Acton	196.)	
The	first	Constitution	opened	the	door	for	a	real	perestroika	of	the	local	
administration.	In	1906	the	Ministry	of	Interior	started	to	work	on	a	general	
reform	of	the	countryside.	The	aim	was	to	include	the	main	proportion	of	
the	Russian	people	in	local	self-government.	Stolypin	brought	to	the	Council	
of	Ministers	 a	proposal	with	 the	 intention	 to	democratize	 the	 structures	
and	unify	the	decision	making	at	the	local	level.	Voting	restrictions	were	to	
be	lifted,	the	localities´	power	to	tax	would	have	been	increased	and	their	
control	made	to	concern	only	legality.	New	district	councils	with	the	district	
commandant	 as	 the	 head	 were	 proposed	 to	 sort	 out	 the	 confusion	 of	
authority	 between	 government	 and zemstvo	 offices.	 The	 proposal	 was	
opposed	by	the	nobility	on	the	grounds	that	undermining	its	meaning	in	
the	 localities	would	 be	 irresponsible.	 Stolypin	 failed	 to	 get	 support	 even	
from	the	zemstvo	members	themselves,	after	which	the	reform	was	dropped.	
(Hosking	192.)
The	following	debates	 in	 the	state	Duma	hearings	and	 the	subsequent	
changes	showed	among	other	things	the	difficulties	in	turning	the	peasant	
population	 into	 citizens.	 Giving	 up	 class	 barriers	 did	 not	 gain	 unified	
support	from	political	parties.	The	Duma´s Local	government	committee	
made	its	own	proposal	but	the	bill	only	came	to	the	house	in	February	1911.	
The	government	in	this	battle	stressed	the	need	for	more	control	over	local	
decision	making,	the	naming	of	personnel,	its	territory	and	finances.	In	the	
end	the	reform	was	buried	by	the	State	Council.	(Hosking	192.)
Nardova	has	come	to	the	conclusion,	that	both	structurally	and	socially,	
the	need	to	unify	the	system	at	the	lower	levels	was	not	a	move	towards	self-
government	but	a	way	to	diminish	their	elective	character.	(Nardova	1992:	
56.)	Yet	 the	 reforms	 brought	 along	many	 structural	 changes	 at	 the	 local	
level,	which	enabled	its	institutional	development.	As	the	transition	process	
intensified,	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 local	 administration	 culture	 was	
becoming	 both	 the	 central	 state	 building	 tool	 and	 a	 forum	 for	 its	 fast	
developing	political	troubles.	
The	towns	of	the	early	20th	century	did	not	develop	in	an	even	manner.	
There	existed	poor	districts	in	which	the	residents	felt	forgotten	by	the	local	
government.	The	central	areas	on	the	other	hand	benefitted	from	investments	
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in	the	infrastructure	and	services.	The	difference	was	evident	in	the	manner	
these	 areas	 were	 run.	 Public	 order	 and	 the	 following	 of	 administrative	
regulations	was	a	priority	in	the	central	areas	but	in	the	marginal	districts	
arbitrariness	was	more	evident.	(Brower	196:	343.)	The	inequality	in	the	
provision	 of	 services	 and	 fair	 treatment,	 fed	 radical	 feelings	 among	 the	
poorer	 urban	 population.	 Better	 funding,	 flexible	 local	 decision	making	
and	 regulated	 authority	 relations	 to	 give	 it	 room	were	 urgently	 needed.	
Most	of	all,	the	relationship	of	citizen	to	government	demanded	change.	
Socially	the	towns	continued	to	develop	in	their	own	course	which	the	
central	administration	did	not	plan	and	controlled	only	partially.	Pressure	
towards	the	local	administration	was	growing	both	in	terms	of	its	economy	
and	politics.	The	literate	part	of	the	population	was	expanding	the	circulation	
of	 inexpensive	newspapers.	The	different	ethnic	groups	which	made	up	
the	 Russian	 empire	 were	 creating	 a	 split	 population	 of	 diverse	 ethnic	
communities.	 Even	 as	 cities	 were	 essentially	 providing	 possibilities	 for	
assimilation,	the	group	boundaries	were	even	strengthened	by	what	Brower	
calls	 “social	 communication”	 at	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century.	 The	 suspicion	
among	different	groups	further	changed	the	social	environment.	(Brower	
196:	329.)	
The	Constitution	 institutionalized	 the	 social	developments	of	 the	past	
decades.	Its	cultural	aim	was	to	confirm	adherence	to	the	letter	of	the	law	in	
administration.	The	ideas	of	popular	control	of	administration	and	legality	
of	decision	making	were	goals	which	had	emerged	in	the	process	of	class,	
occupational	and	economic	changes	to	which	the	administration	tried	to	
react.	The	slowness	in	structural	reforms	after	the	Constitution,	failed	the	
society	and	created	a	huge	risk.	The	last	structural	change	at	the	local	level	
came	in	191	when	the	Provisional	Government	passed	a	law	establishing	
the	right	of	all	local	inhabitants	to	vote	zemstvo	deputies	in	direct	and	secret	
elections.	 It	 also	 abolished	 the	 non-elective	 offices	 of	 police	 and	 land	
captains,	whose	 duties	were	 transferred	 to	 the	 elected	 bodies.	 (Vucinich	
1960:	20.)	These	changes	came	too	late.	
3.2.4 Law As a Tool for State Building
The	legal	development	 in	 the	19th	 century	had	a	variety	of	effects	on	 the	
administration.	It	would	seem	that	 law	played	no	part	whatsoever	 in	the	
real	formation	and	development	of	decision	making	and	execution	in	the	
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Tsar´s	administration.	As	Taranovskii	has	pointed	out,	the	traditional	view	
of	the	autocratic	regime	has	been	to	see	it	as	combination	of	an	all	powerful	
state	power	and	an	equally	passive	society	which	can	largely	be	attributed	to	
the	absence	of	a	Western	European	legal	tradition	based	on	the	principles	
of	Roman	law.	Yet	simultaneously	the	development	of	the	Russian	state	can	
be	 viewed	 through	 its	 similarities	with	 the	 European	 situation	 since	 the	
great	reforms	of	164	due	to	its	use	of	same	legal	concepts.	Law	as	a	system	
official	norms	and	institutions,	jurisdiction	as	a	sector	of	academic	thinking	
and	lawyers	as	a	developing	group	of	professional-specialists,	appeared	in	
Russia	only	after	the	reforms.	(Taranovskii	1992:	301–302.)
Before	 that	 most	 of	 the	 population	 lived	 under	 local	 customary	 law,	
which	meant	the	decisions	of	village	elders,	landlords	and	local	aristocracy.	
The	national	law	which	existed	included	rule-decisions	and	statutes	which	
were	 often	 unpublished	 and	 contradictory.	There	 was	 no	 national	 court	
system	and	judicial	functions	were	often	adjunct	to	administrative	functions.	
Judges	could	be	former	soldiers	or	administrators	who	had	no	formal	legal	
training.	 (Levin-Stankevich	 1996:	 224.)	A	major	 change	of	 this	 situation	
took	place	when	a	reform	of	the	judiciary	was	implemented	in	165–166.	
It	 established	 a	 hierachy	 of	 courts.	 Judges	 who	 were	 appointed	 by	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Justice,	were	 required	 to	 have	 legal	 qualifications,	were	 paid	
salaries	and	had	life	tenure.	(Bowring	2000.)
The	developments	 of	 local	 administration	 and	 law	were	 connected	 to	
geography.	The	geographical	coverage	of	the	reforms	was	limited	mostly	to	
the	European	parts	of	Russian	provinces.	In	other	areas	changes	happened	
gradually	and	incompletely.	At	the	same	time	reforms	of	courts	and	the	law	
were	significant	for	the	development	of	the	ideas	of	citizenship	and	to	the	
legal	ethos	of	civil	servants.	(Taranovskii	1992:	306–.)	The	modernization	
of	 the	 administration	 itself	 also	 required	 application	 of	 standard	 rules.	
There	was	a	 tendency	 in	post-reform	Russia	 to	depersonalize	procedures	
through	public	law,	formalize	these	procedures	and	to	define	organizational	
relationships	within	the	government	more	precisely.	This	created	a	need	for	
employees	who	had	legal	training.	(Levin-Stankevich	1996:	226.)
Jane	Burbank	(199)	argues	that	law	penetrated	daily	life	in	various	ways	
creating	a	legal	culture	in	which	the	growing	legal	consciousness	of	citizens	
was	a	potential	basis	for	a	rule	of	law	society.	This	legal	culture,	however,	
did	 not	 correspond	 with	 the	 ideals	 of	 people	 knowing	 written	 law	 or	
uniform	 national	 court	 system.	The	 state	 law	 which	 developed	 was	 not	
antagonistic	to	national	definitions	and	re-definitions	of	ethical	behavior.	
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Burbank	argues	that	law	was	in	fact	just	as	essential	to	the	development	of	
the	citizenry	in	Russia	than	it	has	been	elsewhere.	(Burbank	199:2,	5.)
In	the	development	of	autocratic	Russia,	law	had	been	a	major	component	
in	a	paradoxical	way,	and	not	only	in	the	court	system	where	Western	legal	
theories	and	practices	played	a	role.	Through	law	the	Russian	autocracy	had	
a	specific	relation	with	the	traditional	“police	state”	which	came	about	after	
the	reforms	as	a	way	of	secularizing	its	ruling	ideology.	Public	law,	which	
included	administrative	law,	had	a	specific	role	in	the	culture	of	the	system	
in	which	law	was	coercive	(prinuditel´noe pravo).	The	primary	instrument	
of	 this	 law	was	 the	ukaz,	 a	decree	 from	 the	 sovereign	which	maintained	
public	order,	as	did	other	administrative	decisions	(polozhenie estestvennogo 
prava).	 In	 a	 vast	 geographical	 area	 with	 a	 social	 contract	 between	 the	
population	and	the	state	that	did	not	involve	mutual	constraints	or	trust,	
the	 decrees	 also	 served	 as	 a	 method	 of	 control	 upon	 administration.	
Administrative	law	did	not	offer	protection	from	discretionary	decrees	(of	
the	 sovereign).	 Its	main	 purpose	 was	 to	 secure	 compliance	 and	 not	 the	
rights	of	individuals.	(Taranovskii	1992:	302–303.)
The	different	reform	policies	reflected	in	the	laws	were	often	difficult	for	
the	 civil	 servants	 to	 implement.	 George	 Yaney	 has	 contended	 that	 an	
imperial	Russian	 government	 agency	 “often	had	not	 only	 to	 perform	 its	
official	 functions	 and	 enforce	 its	 rules	 but	 also	 to	 conduct	 a	 crusade	 on	
behalf	 of	 them,	 a	 crusade	 that	 went	 on	 simultaneously	 within	 its	 own	
organization	and	in	the	society	at	large.	This	is	why	so	many	of	the	statutes	
of	Russian	law	throughout	the	period	of	111–1905	were	not	enforceable	
legal	 rules	 but	 exhortations	 to	 behave	 or	work	 according	 to	 this	 or	 that	
ideal.	[…]	…	the	laws	either	could	be	ignored	entirely	or	they	could	serve	a	
strong-willed	 official	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 compelling	 people	 to	 do	 his	 bidding	
regardless	of	regulations	to	the	contrary.”	(Yaney	193:21.)	Law	in	this	sense	
was	 a	 tool	 for	 transition	which	 required	 organizational	 adaptation	 at	 all	
levels.	
Client	relations	were	affected	by	the	reforms	of	160´s,	which	brought	
appellation	(kassatsiia)	to	Russian	law	on	the	basis	of	its	misinterpretation.	
However,	the	right	of	a	private	person	to	ask	for	compensation	on	the	basis	
of	damage	inflicted	upon	him	by	the	decision	of	a	state	administrator	was	
very	limited.	Even	more	importantly,	questions	relating	the	to	the	peasants,	
were	reserved	for	the	jurisdiction	of	traditional	law	and	local	(volost´)	court.	
(Taranovskii	1992:	306.)	Yet,	the	right	of	the	peasants	to	appeal	their	legal	
disputes	in	the	zemstvo	courts	(justices	of	the	peace, mirovye sudy)	which	
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the	district	assemblies	elected	(Yaney	193:	232),	was	a	structural	beginning	
for	the	creation	of	general	civil	rights.	
Legal	protection	of	 the	population	and	a	more	general	 idea	of	 service	
were	only	beginning	to	emerge	as	concepts	of	administrative	work.	State	
building	was	 still	 steered	 toward	 the	management	 of	 the	 population	 for	
order	and	stability.	Because	the	legal	guarantee	was	weak,	the	population	
did	 not	 possess	 any	 rights	 as	 such.	 The	 Constitution	 of	 1906	 formally	
changed	this.	The	elements	of	legal	culture	were	two-fold.	The	use	of	appeal	
was	institutionalized	into	the	practices	of	the	system.	Yet,	the	lack	of	political	
freedoms	 resulted	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 security	 organs	 and	 arbitrary,	
secretive	 behavior	 inside	 the	 administration.	 Characteristic	 of	 the	
administrative	culture	was	that	these	two	sides	were	not	connected	directly	
because	 they	 represented	 different	 categories.	 One	 was	 dealing	 with	
authority	 borders,	 the	 other	 with	 the	 secretive	 world	 of	 political	
dissidence.	
An	example	of	the	latter	was	the	counter-reform	of	Alexander	III	(11–
194) who	wanted	to	act	against	growing	political	risks	 to	 the	autocratic	
order	 and	 required	 a	 strong	 security	 administration	 to	 ensure	 political	
stability.	The	Tsar´s	main	advisor	was	K.	P.	Pobedonostsev	who	opposed	
the	 reforms	 of	 the	 previous	 Tsar	 Alexander	 II	 and	 distrusted	 political	
freedom	and	popular	representation.	The	Emperor	demanded	that	the	civil	
service	was	a	unified	 front	against	 the	changing	 society.	The	Ministry	of	
Interior	directed	the	political	control	and	the	counter	revolutionary	work	
through	 its	 locally	 working	 security	 police	 force	 (okhrana)	 which	 was	
separated	 from	 the	 governors	 and	 governor	 generals	 and	made	 into	 an	
independent	 unit.	 (Florinsky	 1969,	 Pushkarev	 195,	 Shlemin	 &	 Fadeev	
1993.)
Because	of	the	difficulties	faced	in	the	changing	of	political	ideology	of	
administration	into	one	allowing	representation	of	group	interests,	the	legal	
means	of	building	a	citizenry	became	all	the	more	important.	Legal	means	
also	served	the	development	of	an	administrative	hierarchy	and	institution	
building.	
Appellation,	 for	 instance,	had	become	an	important	 instrument	 in	the	
formation	 of	 local-center	 relations.	 Local	 appeals	 were	 decided	 by	 the	
Senate	which	acted	as	the	Supreme	court.	The	formal	authority	of	the	Senate	
as	an	administrative	court	was	not	specified	by	any	one	law	in	the	Code	of	
Laws.	Instead	its	role	was	stated	separately	in	specific	cases	which	led	to	its	
jurisdiction	 being	 described	 by	 a	 multitude	 of	 legal	 regulations.	 The	
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authority	of	the	Senate	grew	with	the	ministerial	government.	(Yaney	193:	
259.)
Senate	members	included	former	governors,	generals	and	civil	servants	
without	legal	training.	The	most	important	group	of	complaints	involved	
taxation.	 Complaints	 could	 be	 made	 by	 both	 private	 citizens,	 local	
government	bodies	or	the	governor.	The	zemstvo bodies	were	very	active	in	
appellation	cases,	over	half	of	the	cases	were	initiated	by	them	by	the	end	of	
the	19th	century.	But	zemstvo	decisions	were	also	appealed	which	affected	
the	relationship	between	local	state	bureaucracy	and	the	self-government	
organs.	The	former	saw	a	growing	need	to	follow	up zemstvo	activities.	The	
number	of	private	complaints	before	the	Senate	were	highest	in	1901	(94	%	
of	 all	 tax	 complaints)	 after	which	 the	 governors	 started	 to	 veto	 zemstvo	
taxes	more	frequently.	(Fallows	192:	15–190.)	
For	local-center	relations	the	success	of	the	local	self-government	organs	
in	 the	 Senate	 rulings	 is	 interesting.	 Between	 190	 and	 1904	 the	 local	
government	organs	won	over	two-thirds	of	appeal	cases	which	they	initiated	
and	brought	to	the	Senate.	In	contrast,	 local	state	administration	officials	
won	in	less	than	half	of	their	cases.	The	most	successful	was	the	central	state	
administration	 which	 won	 in	 almost	 all	 the	 cases	 it	 initiated.	 Thomas	
Fallows	 has	 presented	 three	 interpretations	 for	 these	 results.	 First	 is	 the	
liberal	 claim	 in	 which	 the	 zemstvo	 victories	 were	 seen	 as	 proof	 of	 the	
capricious	 ruling	 style	 of	 the	 state	 administration.	The	 second	 is	 to	 see	
zemstvo	success	in	the	Senate	as	a	proof	of	the	governor´s	style	of	discretion	
(proizvol).	The	 third	 is	 to	 see	 the	 appeal	 successes	 as	 showing	 that	 self-
government	organs	did	indeed	have	their	own	authority	and	were	not	as	
persecuted	as	they	saw	themselves.	Maybe	even	more	important	is	the	fact	
that	 private	 citizens	 also	 enjoyed	 some	 institutional	 protection	 against	
capriciousness.	The	governors	often	took	the	side	of	private	parties	against	
local	self-government	organs.	Fallows	has	concluded	that	this	eroded	the	
typical	 dichotomy	 between	 official	 power	 (vlast’)	 and	 society	
(obshchestvennost‘).	(Fallows	192:	19–190.)
The	citizens	and	 the	organs	of	 local	administration	still	another	avenue	
with	which	to	effect	things,	namely	the	prosecutors.	The	Judicial	Reform	of	
164	 changed	 the	 position	 of	 procurators	 (prosecutors)	 which	 had	 an	
alternating	 role	 in	 the	 administrative	 system	 of	 Russia	 throughout	 the	
centuries.	The	prosecutor´s	office	appeared	in	Russia	during	Peter	the	Great´s	
reign	 as	 a	 borrowed	 European	 institution.	 As	 the	 ministerial	 system	 of	
government	was	introduced	to	Russia	in	102,	the	Prosecutor	General´s	post	
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was	 united	 with	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Justice	 and	 his	 position	 fundamentally	
changed.	The	prosecutor´s	office	exercised	supervision	over	the	courts	and	
local	administrative	bodies.	Before	the	160´s	reforms,	the	prosecutor´s	office	
was	seen	as	an	ineffective	organization	due	to	both	its	autocratic	centralism	
and	 its	 own	 organizational	 weakness.	 It	 was	 not	 an	 integrated	 system	 of	
harmonious	 policy	 but	 an	 organization	 subordinated	 to	 a	 minister	 and	
without	 any	 legislation	 to	 define	 its	 structure	 and	 activities.	 Its	 wide	 and	
numerous	functions	made	its	work	unrealistic.	(Kazantsev	199:	44–51.)
The	164	reforms	sought	to	make	the	prosecutor´s	office	most	of	all	a	
prosecuting	organ	which	was	not	responsible	for	the	supervision	of	general	
administrative	 legality	 in	 Russia.	 In	 159–160	 new	 public	 trials	 were	
introduced	along	with	the	right	to	a	counsel	for	the	accused,	presumption	
of	innocense,	defense	Bar	and	new	pre-trial	investigations.	The	162	new	
Court	law	continued	the	reform	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	and	a	debate	over	
what	 type	 of	 legal	 supervision	 the	 government	 needed	 in	 Russia.	 The	
prosecutor´s	office	was	one	of	the	most	loyal	supporters	of	the	autocratic	
regime	and	there	were	fears	it	would	use	its	authority	to	protect	autocratic	
legality	 over	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 (Kazantsev	 199:	 54–59.)	The	 prosecutors´	
attitude	was	understandable	 in	 the	 light	of	 their	position.	Although	 they	
had	court	positions,	they	were	administratively	directly	subordinate	to	the	
Ministry	of	Justice.	(Levin-Stankevich	1996:	235.)
In	the	164	law	the	organization	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	was	based	on	
one-man	 management	 and	 educational	 requirements	 were	 set.	 The	
prosecutor´s	 office	 did	 indeed	 become	 a	 central	 tool	 for	 combating	
revolutionary	movements	 in	Russia.	 It	 treated	 law	from	the	viewpoint	of	
struggle	 against	 unwanted	 political	 elements	 and	 effective	 general	
supervision	 of	 administration	 was	 secondary.	 The	 idea	 that	 general	
supervision	would	 have	 resulted	 in	 growing	 legality	 did	 not	materialize.	
Instead	 dysfunctions	 from	 neglect	 and	 outright	 lawlessness	 continued.	
(Kazantsev	199:	54–59.)
The	 hierarchy	 of	 norms	 did	 not	 change	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 different	
administrative	 changes	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	19th	 century.	The	 rulings	of	 the	
State	 Council	 which	 were	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Tsar	 should	 have	 been	 the	
foremost	 source	 of	 authority	 in	 the	 country	 and	 taken	 precedence	 over	
other	 decisions.	A	minister´s	 order	 should	 have	 been	 taken	 to	 the	 State	
Council	 before	 it	 took	 the	 force	 of	 law.	 In	 actual	 fact,	 the	 Tsar	 himself	
decided	 whether	 his	 ministers	 made	 laws	 without	 consulting	 the	 State	
Council	 first.	Orders	of	 the	Emperor	had	 the	 force	of	 law,	 even	 in	 cases	
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when	they	contradicted	existing	legislation.	The	legality	of	this	balancing	
act	was	found	in	the	wish	that	the	Emperor	did	not	confirm	a	ministerial	
decision	 before	 it	 was	 taken	 to	 the	 State	 Council,	 and	 that	 he	 did	 not	
interfere	with	the	Council´s	decision	making.	(Yaney	193:	261.)	
During	 the	 reign	 of	 Alexander	 III	 in	 15,	 a	 decree	 was	 passed	 that	
proclaimed	all	acts	of	the	Emperor	to	have	equal	force	of	 law	despite	the	
way	 they	 were	 enacted.	 A	 law	 was	 thus	 any	 imperial	 order	 which	 the	
Emperor	had	signed,	or	a	State	Council	decision	confirmed	by	him.	Besides	
this	a	concept	of	a	“temporary	law”	which	meant	those	orders	of	the	Tsar	
which	had	rules	not	yet	written	into	other	laws.	A	minister	acting	on	the	
Tsar´s	instructions	possessed	the	formal	authority	to	issue	decrees	which	
had	the	same	force	as	laws.	In	these	cases,	the	formal	source	of	the	authority	
was	 not	 a	 law	 but	 the	 Emperor´s	 command.	 A	 difference	 between	 an	
administrative	 order	 and	 a	 law	 was	 hard	 to	 distinguish	 because	 neither	
administrative	officials	nor	judges	in	courts	had	the	right	to	pass	judgement	
on	 the	 validity	 and	 judicial	 strength	 of	 tsar-approved	 laws.	Nor	 did	 the	
Senate	 have	 the	 right	 to	 stop	 these	 laws.	The	 Judicial	 Code	 from	 164	
allowed	courts	to	decide	cases	on	the	basis	of	contradictions	between	laws.	
This	rule	was	preserved	in	the	Code	till	1905.	(Yaney	193:	264.)	The	need	
for	 strong	 central	 control	 of	 political	 and	 social	 risk	 eroded	 those	 legal	
restraints	which	the	top	government	decision	making	body	had	previously	
possessed.	In	fact,	a	type	of	legal	arbitrariness	was	institutionalized	with	the	
introduction	of	the	new	15	decree.
Levin-Stankevich	 has	 concluded	 that	 when	 the	 government	 failed	 to	
create	a	legal	officialdom	which	satisfied	its	view	of	legal	culture,	it	altered	
the	work	environment	of	officials	in	the	“judicial	counter	reforms”.	Crimes	
which	 were	 considered	 political	 were	 removed	 from	 the	 jury	 trial	 and	
administrative	 actions	 could	 bypass	 the	 court	 system	 altogether.	 (Levin-
Stankevich	1996:	23.)
From	the	point	of	view	of	administrative	law,	the	October	Manifest	 in	
1905	and	the	first	Constitution	of	Russia	in	1906	meant	a	clear	distinction	
from	a	past	which	demanded	comprehensive	legislative	reform.	These	were	
the	 principles	 of	 basic	 parliamentarism	 and	 popular	 legal	 control	 of	 the	
administration	of	government.	(Manifesto	of	1	October	1905.)
The	Constitution	 defined	 civil	 rights	 and	 provided	 the	 basis	 for	 legal	
protection	against	arbitrary	administrative	acts.	Private	property,	inviola-
bility	of	home	and	protection	from	arbitrary	arrests	and	investigations	were	
among	the	listed	rights.	Criminal	cases	could	not	be	tried	except	through	
The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1870–1916
105
the	 due	 course	 of	 the	 law.	 Freedom	 of	 speech,	 organization	 (although	
restricted	by	more	specific	laws),	religion	and	movement	were	guaranteed.	
(Russian	Fundamental	Law	1906:	article	II.)
Borisova	has	shown,	how	the	limits	of	these	legal	changes	were	clear	in	
the	codification	of	new	laws	into	the	Codex	of	Laws.	Particularly	after	the	
1906	Constitution,	this	was	a	continuous	source	of	criticism	among	legal	
scholars	and	administrators	as	well.	In	terms	of	strengthening	the	consti-
tutionalism	of	 the	monarchy,	 it	was	problematic	 that	 the	 there	was	not	a	
legal	 directive	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 new	 laws	 in	 the	 context	 of	
existing	legislation,	and	that	laws	which	were	included	in	the	Codex	of	laws	
became	altered	in	the	codification	process.	(Borisova	2001:	39.)
It	is	possible	to	divide	the	authority	of	the	Emperor	after	1906	into	three	
categories.	First	was	the	right	of	legislation	in	which	he	possessed	a	wide	
authority,	 particularly	 in	 the	 economical	 sphere	 to	 pass	 administrative	
regulations	alone.	Second	was	the	right	of	judicial	review	which	in	principle	
also	belonged	to	 the	ruler	but	was	 in	 fact	administered	through	officials.	
The	 third	was	 the	 position	 the	 ruler	 had	 as	 the	 head	 of	 administration.	
(Ståhlberg	1916:	12–13.)	The	legislative	authority	of	the	Supreme	power,	the	
Tsar,	was	not	limited.	Nor	was	the	hierarchy	of	norms	altered.	It	remained	
vague	and	gave	the	Emperor	wide	discretion.	
The	core	of	legality	in	Russia	was	a	combination	of	the	rule	of	law	and	
autocracy,	 a	 connection	 which	 was	 not	 all	 together	 clear	 even	 in	 the	
Constitution.	On	one	hand,	properly	enacted	law	was	declared	as	the	sole	
basis	of	all	government.	Elected	state	Duma	and	State	Council	in	which	at	
least	half	of	the	members	were	elected	took	part	in	the	legislative	process.	
Laws	were	not	legal	unless	published	and	received	locally.	The	decrees	and	
directives	issued	by	the	Emperor	for	the	state	administration	had	to	be	in	
conformity	with	the	existing	law.	(Russian	Fundamental	Law	1906:	articles	
III-IV.)
On	the	other	hand,	the	Emperor	possessed	supreme	power	given	by	God	
in	its	totality	throughout	the	entire	state.	At	the	highest	administrative	level	
this	 power	 was	 direct,	 on	 subordinate	 levels	 he	 delegated	 authority	 to	
subordinate	branches	and	officials	whose	acted	according	to	his	orders	and	
with	authority	determined	by	him.	The	scope	of	a	 state	officials´	activity	
was	decided	by	him	on	the	basis	of	the	needs	of	the	state.	His	decrees	were	
not	 subject	 to	 publication	 if	 they	 were	 issued	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
Constitution.	(Russian	Fundamental	Law	1906:	articles	I,	III.)	In	this	sense,	
the	autocratic	legal	culture	at	the	top	of	the	state	was	unchanged.	
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Law	was	 used	 in	 the	 Russian	 state	 building	 in	 the	 traditional	 way	 to	
strengthen	its	authority	and	bind	citizens	into	its	structures.	For	the	citizenry	
the	most	important	factor	was	the	connection	law	played	in	the	formation	
of	its	own	self-worth.	This	development	had	been	taking	place	in	all	social	
groups,	including	the	rural	areas	where	in	the	local	(volost´)	courts	a	type	of	
citizenship	was	being	born	(see	Jane	Burbank´s	article	199).
Similar	 to	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 teaching	 profession,	 lawyers	 as	 a	
profession	had	become	a	liberal	force.	Many	lawyers	were	motivated	by	career	
and	professional	 reasons,	 and	 the	 “state	 careerists”	 conformed	 to	 the	 legal	
interpretations	of	the	Ministry	of	Justice.	Yet,	the	legal	culture	of	the	profession	
had	become	a	political	ideology.	In	a	practical	manner	this	was	advanced,	for	
instance,	by	the	modest	legal	aid	services	since	the	10´s	in	St.	Petersburg	
and	Moscow.	The	rule	of	law	culture	became	a	part	of	the	foundation	for	the	
Russian	legal	profession.	(Levin-Stankevich	1996:	239–243.)
	Legal	culture	thus	developed	together	with	the	political	maturation	of	
the	state.	Paradoxically	the	law	which	was	supposed	to	strengthen	the	state,	
provided	the	means	for	the	development	of	independent	civil	thinking,	the	
opportunity	for	the	appearance	of	protected	rights	and	the	creation	of	rule	
of	law	practices.	In	the	autocratic	system	this	paradox	resulted	in	insuperable	
conflict.	
3.3 The Administrative Culture After 1906: Risk 
Administration Elements in Town Administrations
The	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	in	the	late	19th	century	and	
very	 early	 20th	 century	 concentrated	 on	 finding	 a	 balance	 between	 local	
initiatives	and	state	necessities.	Main	reformist	ideas	in	this	process	tried	to	
find	suitable	limits	to	the	discretion	of	officials,	the	modernization	of	state	
structures	at	all	levels	and	the	creation	of	an	administrative	culture	in	which	
legality	dominated.	
Ideologically	 the	 main	 purposes	 of	 administrative	 change	 in	 Russian	
towns	from	10	(zemstvo	reform	and	town	administration	reform)	until	
the	191	revolution	were	the	following:	
•	 Local	level	authority	would	mainly	be	based	on	state	theory	which	
saw	the	local	administration	as	performing	state	functions.	
The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1870–1916
10
•	 Strengthening	 of	 the	 state	 by	making	 governing	 of	 the	 provinces	
easier	through	decentralization.	
•	 Using	 civil	 servants	 as	 a	 tool	 in	 the	 modernization	 of	 adminis-
tration.
•	 Legality	in	which	the	law	had	a	specified	meaning	in	administrative	
relations.	The	state	of	a	strong	security	administration	was	supple-
mented	by	a	concept	of	shared	power,	formalized	in	the	Constitution	
of	1906.
The	effects	of	the	structural	changes	resulted	in	cultural	change	mainly	in	
four	different	forms:	First,	an	evolution	of	state	practices	particularly	in	the	
legal	field,	which	affected	the	local	level	culture.	Second,	the	social	evolution	
of	estate	structures	into	occupational,	economic,	political	and	ethnic	groups	in	
the	Russian	towns.	The	formation	of	new	types	of	citizen	groups	with	a	diffe-
rent	attitude	toward	the	government	profoundly	changed	the	social	environ-
ment	of	administration.	The	third	form	of	change	was	the	institutionalization	
of	 town	government	authority	and	the	 fourth	was	 the	delegation	of	state	
tasks,	which	resulted	in	new	practical	demands	at	the	local	level.	
The	 transition	of	 administrative	 culture	produced	new	 risks.	This	was	
mostly	due	to	an	inflexible	administrative	market	(comp.	Kordonskii´s	use	
of	the	concept	“administrative	market”	in	the	analysis	of	Soviet	and	present	
day	 Russian	 administration	 in	 2000).	The	market	 was	 risk	 prone	 when	
change	occurred	in	any	of	the	three	parts	of	government:	central	government	
(ministerial	and	gubernatorial),	local	self-government	(Duma	and	adminis-
tration	headed	by	the	mayor)	and	the	estates.	Inflexibility	stemmed	from	
the	 autocratic	 ruling	 culture	 at	 the	 top	of	 the	 state,	which	did	not	 allow	
political	changes	and	in	which	the	formal	ties	between	the	three	parts	of	the	
administrative	market	were	not	clear	or	specified	directly	by	law.	In	these	
factors	 there	were	 no	 clear	 changes	 during	 the	 studied	 period,	 not	 even	
after	the	1906	Constitution.	
The	relationship	between	law	and	state	up	to	and	after	the	acceptance	of	
the	 1906	 Constitution	 defined	 Russia	 as	 a	 predominantly	 bureaucratic	
national	state	structure	in	which	the	Sovereign	had	an	unchanged	official	
position.	The	Tsar	was	not	responsible	for	the	people	and	his	authority	was	
wide.	Culturally	he	represented	continuity	and	stability	which	justified	the	
high	 power	 distance	 between	 him	 and	 the	 people	 he	 ruled.	This	 power	
distance	 was	 replicated	 in	 the	 office	 cultures	 around	 Russia	 where	
administrative	authority	was	in	practice	personal.	
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Yaney	(193)	has	contended	that	the	autocratic	rule	at	the	top	of	the	state	
penetrated	 the	 whole	 cultural	 system.	 The	 background	 to	 the	 legal-
administrative	 relationship	which	 both	 the	 center-local	 relationship	 and	
superior-subordinate	 relationship	 in	 imperial	 Russia	 had,	was	 the	 extra-
legal	 position	 of	 the	 ruler.	The	 hierarchy	which	 existed,	 although	 it	was	
structurally	 quite	 elaborate	 (particularly	 in	 the	 state	 level),	 remained	 a	
system	of	mostly	personal	relationships.	
The	Emperor	retained	a	three	dimensional	role	as	the	head	of	the	state.	
He	 was	 the	 highest	 legislative	 authority	 as	 well	 as	 judicial	 reviewer.	 In	
addition	he	was	the	head	of	the	state	administration	through	which	judicial	
review	was	mainly	 carried	 out.	 (Ståhlberg	 1916:	 12–13.)	The	Emperor´s	
authority	was	direct	in	the	state	administration	but	delegated	in	the	lower	
levels.	The	state	administration	and	the	governors	in	the	provinces	received	
their	respective	authorities	from	the	sovereign	who	decided	its	scope	on	the	
basis	of	“state	needs”.	Decrees	stating	the	decisions	of	 the	sovereign	were	
used	 in	closed	circulation	 since	 they	did	not	have	 to	be	published.	Laws	
were	formally	direct	orders	of	the	ruler	and	legislative	authority	depended	
on	his	personal	discretion.	
Yaney	(193)	has	pointed	out	that	although	the	ruler	could	impose	his	
will	on	the	system	arbitrarily,	he	had	no	way	of	knowing	what	the	end	result	
would	be.	The	subordinates	(in	the	absence	of	legal	rules)	had	no	reliable	
source	 of	 information	 about	 how	 their	 superiors	 should	make	 decisions	
and	behave.	Thus	they	relied	on	the	superior´s	power.	The	more	powerful	
the	superior,	the	more	valuable	he	was	as	a	source	of	help	and	power	to	his	
subordinates.	(Yaney	193:	24–26.)
It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 before	 the	 19th	 century	 reforms	 the	 legal	
norms	 of	 Russia	 prohibited	 any	 civil	 servant	 (slugi)	 to	 use	 discretional	
power	(i.e.	to	decide	matters	based	on	his	own	evaluation).	A	major	factor	
was	 the	 lack	 of	 formal	 education	 among	 officials.	 The	 servants	 of	 the	
Emperor	 were	 his	 personal	 representatives	 and	 behaved	 accordingly.	 In	
addition,	only	a	few	administrators	had	an	education	in	law.	(Taranovskii	
1992:	303–304.)	In	this	sense,	the	19th	century	reforms	did	create	a	slightly	
stronger	authority	base	but,	again,	its	actual	meaning	was	mediated	by	the	
decision	making	procedures	which	underpinned	the	autocratic	character	of	
the	state.
At	the	practical	level	autocratic	decision	making	had	a	multitude	of	side-
effects	which	were	in	conflict	with	the	strengthening	of	law-based	and	more	
democratic	 administration.	Weissman	 (191)	 has	 described	 how	 all	 the	
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above	mentioned	elements	meant	that	the	center	was	contributing	to	the	
administrative	process	a	large	amount	of	written	orders	to	guide	and	control	
the	decision	making	below.	In	its	turn,	the	lower	level	was	adapting	to	this	
by	learning	to	write	such	reports	to	the	top	which	it	felt	were	expected	of	it.	
The	structure	at	the	bottom	was	weak	in	staff	and	diffuse	in	its	power	base.	
Those	officials	who	worked	 for	 local	 administrations	were	overburdened	
with	all	kinds	of	routine	tasks	which	were	piling	up,	taking	their	attention	
away	 from	 the	 main	 interest	 of	 the	 work.	 Weissman	 argues	 that	 the	
administrative	culture	was	marked	by	slowness,	delays	and	corruption,	of	
which	 the	first	 two	were	explained	by	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	administrative	
process	the	smallest	daily	issue	required	approval	from	the	center.	Lower	
rank	officials	were	almost	entirely	dependant	upon	their	supervisors	and	
the	social	order	emphasized	the	uttermost	servility	to	those	in	higher	rank	
and	social	standing.	(Weissman	191:	23–24,	26.).	
Laws	and	regulations	were	used	as	substitutes	for	professionalization	in	
personnel.	The	 lack	 of	 clear	 outlines	 for	 the	 autocracy	 itself	meant	 that	
regulated	social	communication	was	most	important	in	the	decision	making	
process.	The	level	of	administration	was	less	important	than	situational	and	
political	 factors	 (comp.	Mustonen	 199).	The	 lower	 level	 administrators	
were	expected	to	respect	supervisor	autocracy	and	avoid	taking	initiatives	
themselves.	 Their	 low	 educational	 level,	 which	 was	 not	 significantly	
improved	in	the	19th	century,	added	to	the	weakness	of	quality.	
Shepelev	has	pointed	out	that	the	administrative	culture	was	criticized	
for	having	both	the	greatest	and	least	amount	of	control	at	the	same	time.	It	
was	 seen	 that	 the	 lower	 level	 administrations	 served	 formally	 under	 the	
command	of	the	central	administration,	but	in	fact	turned	away	from	any	
responsibility	by	“covering	themselves	with	orders	coming	from	above”.	For	
the	central	administration	the	real	problem	was	that	all	different	ministries	
and	 central	 administrations	 had	 their	 vertical	 lines	which	 produced	 the	
same	effects	 in	addition	 to	having	no	contact	between	 themselves	 in	 the	
administrative	process.	(Shepelev	1999:	.)
A	 “natural”	 side-effect	 of	 these	 dependencies	 was	 bribery.	 Yaney	 has	
called	bribery	not	only	a	form	of	submission	but	more	essentially	a	method	
of	negotiation	and	self-assertion	in	which	the	subordinate	could	make	use	
of	the	superior´s	power.	Bribery,	in	the	absence	of	legal	rules	upon	which	
everyone	depended	for	their	behavior,	was	a	harmonizing	and	stabilizing	
factor.	Bribery	resulted	in	expected	administrative	outcomes.	(Yaney	193:	
26.)
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The	 new	 demands	 for	 legality	 which	 the	 1906	 Constitution	 formally	
instituted	 were	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 elements	 of	 culture	 connected	 with	
personnel.	Bribery,	 as	 a	means	of	 getting	 results	 and	 sustaining	 stability,	
conflicted	 with	 the	 intended	 role	 of	 civil	 servants	 in	 modernizing	
administration.	Elite	recruitment	in	which	a	personal	patron	was	necessary	
surpassed	 legal	 formality.	 In	 this	 sense,	no	 real	 change	 took	place	 in	 the	
latter	part	of	the	19th	century	in	spite	of	some	criticism	which	was	directed	
at	the	system	by	contemporaries.	Promotion	systems	which	built	the	back	
bone	of	the	state	service,	also	affected	the	way	the	local	level	administrators	
viewed	 themselves	 as	 public	 decision	 makers.	 The	 connection	 between	
titles	and	actual	responsibility	was	rather	weak.	Loyalty	and	submissiveness	
were	 regarded	higher	 than,	 for	 instance,	 “legal	 consciousness”.	 In	 reality,	
administrative	guarantee	(a	 type	of	mutual	understanding)	protected	 the	
administrators	from	having	responsibility.
The	administrative	market	 in	 the	 towns	was	made	of	 four	 influencing	
groups	 which	 also	 structured	 the	 new	 administrative	 culture.	 Official	
decision	making	 lines	were	ministerial,	provincial	and	 local	government.	
All	ministries	had	their	provincial	agents	which	exerted	central	authority	
over	local	matters.	The	Ministry	of	Interior	was	the	strongest	central	policy	
decision maker	 effecting	 the	 local	 level.	 Provinces	 were	 headed	 by	 the	
governors	whose	job	was	to	plan,	supervise	and	coordinate	all	task	execution	
in	their	respective	geographical	area.	
The	 town	 government	 line	 was	 made	 up	 of	 the	 four	 year	 Duma,	 its	
executive	board	and	the	mayor	who	was	accepted	by	the	Ministry	of	Interior.	
The	town	administrators	were	at	first	not	considered	state	officials	but	after	
the	 190´s	 the	 centralization	 needs	 changed	 their	 formal	 position.	The	
estates	 continued	 to	 have	 their	 own	 rights	 of	 influence	 after	 the	 1906	
Constitution.	 The	 legal	 boundaries	 between	 the	 bureaucratic	 bodies	 of	
ministerial	 and	provincial	 authorities,	however,	were	not	 clear.	 Similarly,	
from	 a	 state	 building	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 bureaucratic	 bodies,	 estates	 and	
local	self-government	bodies	had	no	clear	rules	about	their	interaction.	The	
Senate	worked	as	the	Supreme	arbitrator	in	cases	of	disputes.	Appellation	
thus	became	an	important	practical	tool	in	the	institutionalization	of	local-
center	 relations.	 On	 the	 whole,	 the	 administrative	market	 was	 prone	 to	
great	risks	if	any	part	of	the	structure	changed.	
In	 terms	 of	 delegating	 tasks,	 after	 the	 turn	 of	 the	 century	 the	 local	
administrative	 culture	 was	 affected	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 localities	 could	 not	
have	 their	 own	 programs	 or	 coordinate	 their	 efforts	 together.	 Their	
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economic	 rights	were	 restricted.	The	executive	boards	dealt	mostly	with	
property	development	and	maintenance.	Personnel	policy	questions	were	
not	 local	after	centralization	began.	There	was	a	strong	link	between	the	
mayor	and	the	governor	of	which	the	latter	worked	as	the	arbitrator	of	local	
matters	 at	 the	 request	 of	 the	 former.	 Double	 control	 of	 local	 decision	
making	by	both	the	governor	and	the	Administration	of	zemstvos	and	town	
affairs	continued	till	191.	Even	though	the	local	level	was	authoritatively	
made	into	an	extension	of	the	state	administration,	its	narrow	jurisdiction	
led	to	a	lack	of	coherence	with	the	state.	The	reaction	to	this	side-effect	was	
political	 control	 in	 the	 form	of	 governor´s	 right	 to	 pass	 orders	 to	 town	
governments.	
From	a	legal	point	of	view,	the	officially	dominating	role	of	central	organs	
meant	several	things.	First	of	all,	in	the	absence	of	local	representation	in	
the	supervision	of	local	administration	and	the	difficulties	of	independent	
judicial	 review,	 arbitrary	 action	was	 easy	 to	 take.	Corruption	flourished.	
“An	administrative	guarantee”	protected	the	civil	servants	from	being	taken	
to	 court	 without	 the	 approval	 of	 their	 administrative	 superiors.	 Since	
administrative	inspection	was	neither	public	nor	judicial,	it	was	taken	care	
of	by	the	state	bureaucracy	itself.	This	resulted	in	the	central	bureaucracy	in	
Saint-Petersburg	trying	to	control	administrative	functions	with	a	constant	
flow	of	directives	and	circulars.	These	dealt	with	the	most	routine	decisions	
such	as	hunting	licenses	and	opening	of	theaters,	which	had	to	be	registered	
and	reported	back	to	the	ministries	in	the	capital	for	approval.	(Weissman	
191:25.)
Developing	 professionalism	 and	 civil	 society	 worked	 as	 a	 mediating	
force	in	the	local	administration.	As	a	side-effect	of	delegating	tasks	to	local	
administrations,	 different	 professional	 groups	 such	 as	 statisticians	 could	
work	more	independently	and	modernize	the	practices	of	administration	
work.	The	central	authorities,	while	important,	played	a	lesser	role	compared	
to	professional	rules	and	local	situations.	The	local	administration	work	of	
the	19th	century	and	before	191	could	be	equally	seen	as	a	multitude	of	
social	 and	 professional	 actors	 and	 power	 levels	 forming	 a	 market	 for	
different	types	and	levels	of	administrative	decision	making.	The	local	level	
was	also	populated	and	greatly	affected	by	 several	different	 types	of	civil	
society	groups	which	influenced	the	local	administration	in	their	own	way,	
and	 to	 a	 different	 extent.	These	 groups	 included	 for	 instance	 commerce	
organizations,	 students,	 newspaper	 staff,	 farming	 societies,	 religious	
societies,	 groups	 of	 national	 minorities,	 professional	 associations	 and	
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charity	 organizations.	Opposition	 in	 the	 country	 grew	 in	 parallel	 to	 the	
activities	of	these	groups.	(Kimbell	1992:	263.)	
Teachers	formed	a	very	visible	and	important	such	group	in	the	towns	
and	villages.	With	their	All-Russian	Union	of	teachers	they	were	a	force	in	
the	liberal	movement.	Teacher	activity	grew	from	practical	demands	of	the	
work.	The	 teachers	 in	 19th	 century	Russia	 had	 low	 formal	 qualifications,	
were	 often	 isolated	 in	 the	 countryside	 and	 met	 a	 deprived	 school	
environment	when	starting	their	work.	At	the	turn	of	the	century,	pay	could	
be	equal	to	that	of	an	unskilled	laborer.	Further	more	their	work	was	strictly	
subordinate	to	the	school	board,	state	 inspectors,	zemstvo	employers	and	
other	 officials	 in	 rural	 towns.	 Even	 so,	 the	 post	 164	 reforms	 meant	 a	
massive	change	in	society	–	for	instance	Scott	J.	Seregny	has	pointed	out,	for	
instance,	that	there	was	not	a	wide	commitment	to	general	public	education	
by	the	zemstvo	institutions.	The	peasant	communities	themselves	carried	a	
major	 part	 of	 the	 load.	 The zemstvo	 did	 not	 find	 adequately	 prepared	
teachers	 and	 teacher	 training	 consumed	 a	 considerable	 part	 of	 their	
educational	budget.	By	10	around	60	teacher	training	schools	had	been	
established	in	Russia.	(Seregny	1996:	169–13.)	
Seregny	states	that	a	major	function	of	the	provincial	administration	was	
to	guard	the	frontier	separating	urban	society	from	the	rural	one.	Teachers	
crossed	that	border	line,	making	it	necessary	to	control	their	activities.	In	
15	teachers´	courses	were	placed	under	official	control	while	the	zemstvo	
financed	them.	Teachers´associations	were	banned	in	15.	Yet	at	the	same	
time,	the	government´s	control	was	insufficient	in	the	vast	land	since	one	
inspector	could	be	responsible	for	as	many	as	100	schools.	(Seregny	1996:	
14–15.)	In	this	way,	the	teachers	became	a	social	force	which	changed	the	
power	distance	between	the	uneducated	masses	and	the	decision	makers	of	
the	society.	
Teaching	became	an	important	 issue	as	a	result	of	 famine	and	cholera	
epidemics	 in	the	190´s.	The	reactions	of	ordinary	people	 in	these	 times	
convinced	 the	 government	 that	 education	 needed	more	 attention	which	
resulted	in	the	growth	of	the	school	network.	Education	became	a	national	
issue,	but	not	an	easy	one.	The	Tsar´s	view	remained	one	of	caution	and	
conservatism.	(Seregny	1996:	1,	12.)
In	time,	even	as	the	formal	controls	of	the	state	were	in	place,	the	social	
changes	in	society	made	it	increasingly	difficult	for	it	to	act.	The	changes	
which	 most	 notably	 took	 their	 form	 in	 industrialization	 and	 agrarian	
difficulties	of	outdated	 farming	 systems	had	many	effects	upon	 the	 local	
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level.	They	undermined	both	the	central	bureaucracy	and	the	estates	which	
had	been	used	as	a	structural	tool	for	enlisting	public	participation	in	local	
affairs	within	the	social	and	political	order	of	the	state.	(Weissman	191:20,	
22,	 2.)	The	 tsarist	 administration	 came	 to	 resemble	 the	 Soviet	Union	 a	
hundred	years	later	in	its	formal	omnipotence	but	daily	inability	to	enact	
needed	action.	
Marc	Raeff	has	 concluded	 that	 communication	between	 the	 state	 and	
society	 started	 to	 break,	 leading	 to	 the	 government´s	 inability	 to	 secure	
adequate	information	on	what	was	going	on	in	the	country.	The	effects	of	
the	192	famine	were	to	a	large	part	a	result	of	this	state	of	affairs.	The	1905	
events	gave	greater	scope	for	the	middle	and	lower	levels,	which	started	to	
improve.	But	 it	 did	not	 change	 the	 center.	Raeff	 sees	 the	 revolution	 as	 a	
direct	end	result.	(Raeff	1966:	35–3.)
The	most	 significant	 changes	 reflecting	 the	 social	 evolution	 of	 towns	
took	place	within	the	estate	structures.	The	new	inhabitants	of	towns	and	
cities	formed	new	political	and	economic	groups	which	not	only	required	
services,	but	also	presented	a	risk	to	the	whole	system.	There	was	also	a	type	
of	growing	social	crisis	at	the	top	of	the	ladder.	The	aristocracy,	through	its	
historical	background	as	a	landed	service	nobility,	associated	itself	with	the	
state	elite´s	goals.	The	social	 system	around	the	Tsar	was	 important	 to	 it	
both	 economically	 and	 socially.	 For	 administration	 this	 connection	 had	
historically	meant	the	creation	of	a	social	culture	inside	it,	in	which	formal	
rules	and	norms	were	equal	 in	 importance	to	personal	debts,	 family	and	
mutual	favoritism.
In	 the	 post-constitutional	 administrative	 culture,	 the	 estate	 structures	
did	not	support	 the	prevailing	order	as	before.	Some	estate	officials	even	
participated	in	the	political	opposition	and	some	of	the	nobility	joined	the	
growing	progressive	movement.	In	the	case	of	the	peasants,	the	dissatisfaction	
took	a	more	direct	form,	for	instance	in	criminality. The	diffusion	of	liberal	
anti-bureaucratic	 attitudes	 among	 the	 elite	 were	 reinforced	 by	 parallel	
sentiments	among	conservatives.	(Weissman	191:30,	36.)
The	Constitution	of	1906	could	be	said	 to	have	 formalized	 those	 legal	
rights	of	legal	protection	which	had	begun	to	develop	after	the	164	political	
and	 legal	 reforms.	 Appellation	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	 successfully	
institutionalized	 practices	 of	 the	 19th	 century.	 At	 the	 level	 of	 practices,	
appellation	became	an	actively	used	method	of	correcting	administrative	
mistakes.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 could	 be	 used	 by	 both	 individuals	 and	
organizations.	Appellation	served	as	a	means	to	institutionalize	jurisdiction	
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limits	of	different	levels	of	administration	in	certain	areas,	such	as	taxation.	
Through	 the	 use	 of	 the	 Senate	 as	 the	 Supreme	 Court,	 a	 type	 of	 legal	
consciousness	 developed.	 For	 the	 general	 development	 of	 legality,	
appellation	had	a	significance.	For	the	rights	of	citizens,	it	had	a	limited,	yet	
noteworthy	meaning.	In	the	absence	of	political	rights,	appellation	could	
only	be	used	in	“purely	administrative”	issues	in	which	there	was	a	breach	
of	 jurisdiction	 or	miscalculation	 in	 decision	making.	 A	most	 important	
such	area	was	taxation.
Local	courts	helped	bind	the	population	to	state	structures	and	developed	
the	 idea	 of	 a	 citizenry.	 Although	 the	 court	 system	 was	 differentiated,	 it	
provided	an	avenue	for	solving	problems	via	the	help	of	law.	In	this	sense	too,	
a	legal	culture	penetrated	the	administrative	system	of	Russia´s	provinces.	
Yet,	for	the	individual,	the	state	had	two	categories	of	legal	protection.	
First	was	the	administrative	sphere,	in	which	locally	made	decisions	could	
be	appealed	in	the	Senate	and	in	which	there	existed	some	legal	protection.	
The	second	was	the	political	sphere,	in	which	the	ruler	and	his	administration	
made	decisions	and	controlled	development	and	in	which	an	individual	did	
not	possess	any	rights	as	such.	The	role	of	the	prosecutor	in	the	latter	became	
culturally	dominant	by	the	end	of	the	19th	century	and	up	to	the	revolution,	
as	its	own	formal	position	underwent	change.	The	prosecutor	assumed	the	
role	of	a	politically	loyal	ally	to	the	central	authority.	
Yaney	has	contended	that	the	bureaucratic	government	was	active	and	
did	not	wait	for	law	to	emerge	from	court	decisions.	The	officials	did	not	act	
only	when	 asked,	 instead	 they	 aspired	 to	 identify	 state	 “necessities”	 and	
create	 plans	which	 could	 be	 executed	 by	 government	 agencies.	 Law	was	
something	 that	 would	 come	 in	 the	 process	 of	 reform	 programs	 which	
carried	 abstract	 conceptions	 of	 necessity	 for	 the	 good	 of	 the	 society.	 In	
contrast	 to	 the	 senatorial	 government	which	had	 assumed	 that	 the	 state	
embodies	an	established	law,	the	Russian	bureaucracy	of	the	19th	century	
developed	out	of	a	realization	that	the	state	had	to	create	law	in	accordance	
with	its	necessities.	(Yaney	193:30.)	
The	 administration	 went	 through	 a	 change	 from	 a	 purely	 personal-
subordination	hierarchy	to	a	more	bureaucratic	state	organization.	But	the	
features	of	the	early	Russian	administration	in	the	provinces	did	not	change	
that	much.	As	the	basis	of	loyalty,	the	Tsar	was	supplemented	by	the	newer	
concept	of	state,	which	enacted	programs	upon	its	citizens.	The	goodwill	
and	wisdom	of	the	state	as	an	institution	and	as	an	abstract	concept	became	
the	political	ideology	upon	which	practical	policies	were	based.
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Earlier	 studies	 (for	 instance	 Hosking	 192	 and	 Shepelev	 1999)	 have	
concluded	 that	 the	 administrative	 culture	 was	 burdened	 with	 risks	 as	 a	
result	of	the	autocratic	rule.	Hosking,	for	instance,	came	to	the	conclusion	
that	at	 the	turn	of	the	century	the	 local	 level	 in	tsarist	Russia	was	one	of	
diffuse	authority	but	with	formally	intensified	control	from	the	center,	and	
one	in	which	leadership	was	placed	upon	many	actors	but	with	an	incomplete	
legal	base	(Hosking	192).
The	 ethical	 connotation	 of	 authority	 as	 independently	 based	 on	 and	
regulated	by	religion,	did	not	exist	in	Russia.	Also	missing	before	the	first	
Constitution	was	the	idea	of	the	sovereign	individual	as	not	just	an	object	of	
the	 authority	 but	 a	 participant	 in	 the	 process	 of	 defining	 that	 authority.	
Power,	 then,	was	 individualistic	 in	 its	 justification	 and	 corporative	 in	 its	
execution.	In	terms	of	the	modern	day	rule	of	law,	this	meant	an	absence	of	
controls	over	decision	making.	Even	after	 the	Constitution,	 this	essential	
feature	of	the	system	remained.	
The	autocratic,	non-democratic	political	situation	did	not	give	the	town	
government	 the	 opportunity	 to	 develop	 at	 the	 speed	 needed	 for	 social	
demand.	In	political	discussions,	the	main	concentration	was	on	the	state-
local	relations,	not	on	the	social	issues	growing	in	the	towns,	particularly	in	
the	poorer	parts.	Consolidation	of	limited	functions	occurred	through	the	
establishment	of	local	administrative	organs	which	organized	a	minimum	
of	 different	 services.	 Economically,	 however,	 the	 administrations	 were	
weak	 and	 their	 rights	 restricted.	 Socially	 they	 hardly	 represented	 the	
interests	of	the	less	fortunate	peasants	coming	into	towns,	and	were	thus	
unable	to	prevent	or	slow	down	the	political	developments	leading	to	the	
revolution.	
The	 changes	 in	 estate	 structures	 due	 to	 industrialization	 and	 the	
development	of	 town	culture	 (media	and	political	awareness)	caused	 the	
most	serious	trouble	for	the	preservation	of	public	order.	This	demanded	
massive	effort	from	the	local	administration,	for	which	it	did	not	have	the	
means	to	respond.	The	town	administration	before	the	revolution	performed	
the	function	of	the	state	in	the	provinces	and	gave	an	avenue	for	the	interests	
of	those	occupational	groups	which	emerged	as	important	for	the	economy	
of	the	towns	in	the	period	of	industrialization.	At	the	structural	level,	the	
local	 level	 acquired	 an	 organization	 which,	 in	 itself,	 was	 already	 quite	
advanced	but	lacked	those	legislative	and	economic	powers	demanded	by	
the	new	challenges.	Thus	the	transitional	purpose	of	making	the	provinces	
more	easily	governed	was	met	only	partially.	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
116
To summarize,	 this	 chapter	 has	 analyzed	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 local	
administration	 in	 the	 autocratic	 structures	of	 the	 imperial	Russian	 state.	
The	stucturation	process	created	a	town	administration	culture	which	had	
its	 own	 limited	 and	 non-political	 authority	 base.	 This	 authority	 was	
mediated	 by	 the	 decision	 making	 procedures	 which	 underpinned	 the	
autocratic	 character	 of	 the	 state.	 Local	 actors	 could,	 within	 their	 own	
restricted	 sphere	 (particularly	 professional),	 effect	 changes.	 Appellation	
and	the	development	of	the	judiciary	were	administratively	important.	The	
local	 level	changed	socially,	economically	and	politically	while	the	center	
did	not.
The	weakness	of	 the	administrative	authority	 (both	 the	organizational	
and	 civil	 servants´),	 however,	 created	 dysfunctions	 (bureaucratism,	
multiplication	of	paper	work)	and	risks	(poor	feedback	and	an	authoritarian,	
personal	decision	making	style).	The	lack	of	a	clear	separation	of	powers	
between	 the	 representational,	 executive	 and	 judicial	 created	most	 of	 the	
side-effects	in	the	transition.	These	were	in	conflict	with	the	strenghtening	
of	 law-based	administration	and	more	democratic,	effective	government.	
The	 next	 chapter	 will	 show	 how	 these	 features	 of	 local	 administration	
continued	to	exist	in	the	new	system	after	191.	
11
4 The Transition of Administrative 
Culture, 1917–1938
This	chapter	describes	the	new	Socialist	administrative	ideology	after	191;	
the	structural	changes	in	which	law	and	the	bureaucratization	of	the	party	
were	important;	the	creation	of	Socialist	institutions	and	personnel	policies;	
and	 the	 subsequent	 totalitarian	 local	 administration	 in	 the	 1930´s.	The	
analyzed	period	has	been	limited	to	the	year	193,	although	the	consolidation	
of	some	of	the	studied	administrative	elements	took	an	even	longer	time.	
The	chosen	period	does,	however,	show	the	risks	and	side-effects	of	the	first	
two	 revolutionary	 decades	 which	 affected	 the	 foundation	 of	 the	 Soviet	
administration.	
I	show	how	the	concepts	of	the	socialist	ideology	were	put	into	practice	
through	the	building	of	Soviet	institutions.	Important	elements	in	the	state	
building	 process	 were	 the	 creation	 of	 uniform	 command	 structures	 for	
policy	implementation	and	information	gathering,	new	personnel	policies	
and	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 a	 Soviet	 legal	 culture.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 this	
chapter,	 I	 analyze	why	 the	 resulting	 local	 administration	culture	differed	
from	the	original	purposes	of	change.	
4.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 
Change: Society Becomes Administration
To	understand	the	creation	of	the	Soviet	state	administration	in	the	light	of	
the	new	administrative	ideology,	I	separate	three	ground	purposes	of	the	
revolution	upon	which	the	creation	of	administrative	change	was	built.	The	
first	 of	 these	 ground	 purposes	 was	 the	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	
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citizen.	The	 earlier	 basis	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	 provider	 of	 order	 between	
different	 social	 groups	 while	 being	 legally	 subordinated	 to	 the	 personal	
interests	of	the	autocrat,	was	replaced	in	the	revolution	by	the	continuation	
of	the	provisional	government´s	idea	of	state-society	relationship.	The	great	
rupture	 was	 Lenin´s	 concentration	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	
representative	of	all	society	(Lenin	196:	154).	Structurally,	Lenin	saw	the	
zemstvos	 as	 essential	 parts	 of	 tsarist	 administrative	 culture	 which	made	
them	incompatible	with the	new	ideology.	(Vucinich	1960:	20.)
As	Russian	society	at	the	time	of	the	revolution	did	not	yet	correspond	
with	 the	 class	 structure	 of	 a	 socialist	 state,	 one	 of	 the	 central	 tasks	 of	
revolutionary	 change	 became	 “the	 fight	 against	 oppressors”	 and	 the	
neutralization	 of	 the	middle	 class	 by	 the	 dictatorship	 of	 the	 proletariat,	
which	constituted	the	second	ground	purpose.	Essential	to	understanding	
the	 political	 theory	 of	 both	 administrative	 change	 and	 principles	 of	
guidance,	was	 the	 fact	 that	 they	were	both	 relative	 to	different	historical	
moments	rather	than	constant	fixed	concepts	in	the	organization	of	action.	
This	 is	 why	 Lenin´s	 own	 writings	 show	 different	 positions	 in	 different	
concrete	 situations.	 Descriptive	 of	 his	 thinking	 was	 the	 combination	 of	
historical	realism	in	the	analysis	of	a	concrete	moment	and	a	utopian	type	
of	dreaming.	(Susiluoto	199:	59,	62.)
As	the	starting	point	of	cultural	transition	was	the	utopian	principle	of	
“From	each	according	to	his	abilities,	to	each	according	to	his	needs”	the	
more	practical	organizational	goal	Lenin	introduced	in	his	writings	became	
the	activation	of	the	masses	for	the	improvement	of	their	own	social	life.	
(Lenin	196:	21.)	For	this	purpose,	Lenin	repeatedly	concentrated	on	the	
question	of	how	to	popularize	administration	to	achieve	the	needed	cultural	
change.	As	the	goal	simultaneously	needed	to	be	total	control	(in	protection	
of	the	majority´s	rights,	as	they	were	interpreted	by	the	leadership)	and	the	
eventual	 disappearance	 of	 all	 classes	 from	 society,	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	
proletariat	needed	for	its	authority	a	state	with	a	centralized	machinery	of	
repressive	 violence.	 (Lenin	 196:	 161–16.)	 The	 idea	 of	 a	 centrally	 led	
country	constituted	the	third	ground	purpose	of	the	transition.	
V.	Makarenko	(199)	has	analyzed	the	revolutionary	process	in	terms	of	
its	effects	on	the	development	of	bureaucracy	in	the	Soviet	state	and	found	
a	strong	connection	between	what	he	calls	“the	bureaucratic	tendencies	of	
the	 revolution”	 and	 the	 political	 choices	 of	 the	 Bolshevik	 leadership.	
(Makarenko	199:120.)	For	Lenin	the	administrative	ideology	was	above	all	
a	 matter	 of	 ownership,	 from	 which	 all	 other	 elements	 followed.	 Thus,	
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structural	matters	were	not	as	essential	as	the	people	who	worked	in	them.	
The	 old	 culture	 of	 repressive	 state	 machinery	 (chinovniki)	 was	 different	
from	 the	 socialist	 regulative	 and	 economic	 ideal	 culture	 of	 government.	
(Rigby	 199:	 12–13.)	 The	 old	 structures	 could	 be	 retained	 if	 only	 the	
capitalists	controlling	them	were	thrown	away.	
The	administrative	ideology	of	change	which	began	to	emerge	in	Lenin´s	
writings	and	in	the	concrete	decisions	made	in	the	early	years	needs	yet	to	
be	 looked	 at	 more	 concretely	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 organizational	 effects.	
Administratively	 the	 ground	 purposes	 of	 the	 revolution	 meant	 a	 dual	
development	 in	 building	 the	 new	 state	 and	 the	 new	 socialist	 life	 style	
through	administrative	regulation.	These	can	be	dealt	with	here	under	two	
headings,	as	follows:
1) Active enforcement of proletarian dictatorship in which	administration 
and law were used as instruments for education and the elimination of	the 
opposition
The	purpose	of	 centralization	was	 thus	 connected	 to	 a	more	 concrete	
problem	of	guidance	and	control.	The	human	“material”	which	at	the	time	
of	 the	 revolution	was	 available	 to	 govern	 the	 country,	 did	 not	meet	 the	
practical	 requirements	 of	 administration.	 Since	 resources	 were	 scarce,	
Lenin	 saw	 it	 necessary	 to	 concentrate	 knowledge	 at	 the	 top	 of	 the	
administrative	 system.	 (Susiluoto	 199:	 6.)	 Centralization,	 which	 was	
essentially	 a	 practical	 requirement,	 needed	 the	 concept	 of	 proletarian	
dictatorship	for	it	to	be	in	harmony	with	the	idea	of	socialist	democratic	
development.	
The	value	of	an	individual	did	not	exist	autonomously	but	as	a	part	of	the	
collective	 in	which	this	 individual	was	useful	 for	the	general	good	of	the	
majority.	 Later	 on,	 the	 general	 good	was	 to	 be	 interpreted	 solely	 by	 the	
party.	For	Lenin,	individualism	in	the	capitalist	sense	inevitably	meant	the	
rise	 of	 opportunistic	 and	 oppressive	 persons	 who	 used	 others	 for	 their	
personal	financial	gain	and	thus	eroded	the	foundation	of	real	democracy.	
Any	 sign	 of	 such	 lack	 of	 discipline	 should	 thus	 have	 been	 rejected	 and	
swiftly	prevented.	
Lenin	introduced	the	idea	of	major	change	at	the	social	level	as	a	level	
from	which	the	society	would	then	advance	to	the	desired	life	style.	In	this	
process,	the	state	left	by	the	earlier	governments	was	needed	as	a	suppressive	
machinery	 to	 advance	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 economically	 disadvantaged	
majority.	Yet	it	was	no	longer	seen	as	a	state	in	its	normal	sense.	It	was	a	
transitional	 state:	a	process	advancing	apparatus,	which	was	supposed	 to	
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evidently	die	away	in	its	old	forms.	(Lenin	1964.)	The	socialist	economy	was	
to	 give	 birth	 to	 a	 socially	 evolutionary	 state	 where	 the	 process	 of	
administration	 and	 the	 tasks	 administered	 would	 have	 a	 newly	 defined	
relationship.	Administration,	as	a	separate	state	institution,	did	not	exist.	It	
was	created	by	the	peasant	population	as	they	took	responsibility	for	tasks	
needed	to	provide	certain	standards	for	the	whole	population.
For	Lenin,	class	struggle	and	state	building	were	linked	together	through	
the	 elaboration	 of	 the	 transitional	 process	 itself.	 In	 this	 sense,	 political	
education	and	continuous	control	of	cultural	reorientation	were	particularly	
meaningful.	 Lenin	 pointed	 out	 how	 confusion	 becomes	 evident	 in	 all	
proletarian	revolutions,	particularly	in	the	Russian	case,	where	the	country,	
in	his	opinion,	was	backward	and	petty	bourgeois	by	nature.	This,	for	Lenin,	
meant	 the	 need	 for	 control	 so	 that	 soviet	 members	 would	 be	 neither	
parliamentarians	nor	bureaucrats	and	would	retain	their	link	with	practical	
work.	Finding	the	chain´s	weakest	link	at	any	given	moment	and	solving	
the	problem	became	the	issue	of	practical	government	work.	The	more	this	
implementation	work	needed	individual	dictatorship,	the	more	necessary	it	
became	to	strengthen	popular	control	from	beneath	so	that	there	would	be	
no	possibility	of	bureaucratism	within	Soviet	power.	(Lenin	196:	463–465.)	
The	view	of	 tsarist	“bureaucratism”	became	one	of	 those	concepts	which	
were	 used	 to	 explain	 and	 ideologically	 legitimate	 the	 differences	 in	 the	
administrative	 cultures	 of	 the	 old	 and	 new	 leadership.	 The	 image	 of	
administration	as	a	class	based	privilege	with	extraordinary	powers	was	to	
be	changed	into	something	serving	the	new	state	and	its	purposes.	
For	 this,	 Lenin	 elaborated	 as	 to	 how	 it	was	 necessary	 to	 immediately	
rebuild	the	civil	service	in	order	to	diminish	its	meaning	and	to	one	day	be	
rid	 of	 it	 all	 together.	 In	 his	 opinion,	 capitalism	 had	 created	 a	 “simple	
democracy”	(of	which	the	equal	pay	was	an	example)	by	perfecting	mass	
production,	 factories,	 railroads,	 the	post	office	and	so	on,	 to	such	a	 level	
that	the	tasks	of	the	old	state	had	become	simple	jobs	of	cataloging,	book	
keeping	and	inspection	which	every	literary	person	could	handle.	Thus	all	
previous	leadership	positions	could	be	replace	with	a	new	system	of	workers,	
supervisors	and	accountants.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	anarchistic	notion	of	
“no	control”	was,	 for	Lenin,	 the	same	as	postponement	of	 the	revolution	
because	 people	 were	 not	 ready	 to	 be	 without	 oppression,	 control,	 book	
keepers	and	supervisors.	The	system	required	iron	discipline	in	which	the	
state´s	personnel	would	be	servants	of	the	proletarian	system,	executioners	
of	orders,	responsible,	modestly	salaried	and	easily	dismissed.	This	would	
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be	 a	 “natural	 order”,	without	 the	 qualities	 of	 salary	 bondage,	 and	would	
ultimately	make	the	rotated	simple	control	and	accounting	tasks	habits	of	
the	people.	Administrative	tasks	would	thus	cease	to	be	special	tasks.	The	
status	which	used	to	be	attached	to	such	positions	and	the	remnants	of	the	
old	“leadership”	role	of	administrator	should	be	wiped	out.	The	abolishment	
of	all	forms	of	rivalry	for	higher	posts	was	necessary	and	it	meant	that	the	
respectful,	 though	not	 very	 highly	 paid,	 service	 could	not	 be	 a	 stepping	
stone	for	a	position	in	the	banking	and	business	community	as	is	case	with	
the	capitalist	societies.	(Lenin	196:	14,	1–19,	201.)	
Accounting	and	control	were	stressed	by	Lenin	as	the	most	 important	
elements	 for	 the	organization	of	 the	first	 stage	of	 the	communist	 society	
where	 all	 people	 become	 employees	 of	 the	 state.	When	 the	majority	 of	
people	start	to	practice	this	type	of	control	over	state	functions	(their	work	
assignments),	control	which	is	distributed	on	an	individual	basis	but	owes	
its	 authority	 to	 the	 collective	 level	 of	 communist	 economic	 and	political	
control,	it	becomes	universal	and	unavoidable	in	society.	The	whole	society	
becomes	one	office,	where	there	is	equality	in	pay	and	work.	The	discipline	
of	the	factory	was	not	a	goal	in	itself	but	a	stepping	stone	to	further	progress.	
Since	 the	 all-state	 wide	 control	 was	 meant	 to	 become	 unavoidable,	 any	
detours	could	be	swiftly	punished.	This	was	to	force	adaptation	to	the	simple	
rules	and	norms	of	societal	life	which	were	soon	to	become habits.	When	
the	tasks	of	the	state	are	simplified	to	the	tasks	of	accounting	and	control	by	
the	workers	themselves,	the	state	ceases	to	be	a	political	state	and	the	public	
functions	 loose	 their	 political	 nature	 by	 becoming	 mere	 bureaucratic	
actions.	At	the	end	of	this	evolution,	the	idealized	communist	state	would	
have	 meant	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 people	 use	 internalized	 traditions	 and	
guidelines	on	a	voluntary	basis	without	coercion	(Lenin	196:	219–220.)
In	this	sense	the	line	between	state	and	society	was	to	be	abolished,	and	
the	 two	 were	 to	 become	 one	 at	 both	 an	 ideological	 and	 practical	 level.	
Administration	was	not	supposed	to	exist	as	a	separate	unit	in	the	chain	of	
power	centers	but	as	a	means	for	the	overall	organization	of	the	new	state	
where	 there	 was	 a	 fusion	 of	 structures	 and	 social	 system,	 unlike	 in	 the	
capitalist	societies.	Again,	the	administration	was,	in	other	words,	to	become 
the	society.	
Similar	to	the	“antibureaucratic”	attitude,	Lenin	did	not	much	care	for	
parliamentarianism	as	a	method	for	the	popular	will	of	expression.	In	his	
opinion,	it	united	democracy	(which	was	ultimately	not	for	the	needs	of	the	
people)	and	bureaucracy	(which	was	against	the	people).	In	the	language	of	
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the	new	ideology,	proletarian	democratism	was	meant	to	root	out	all	signs	
of	bureaucracy	(associated	with	the	social	culture	of	the	past)	in	order	to	
bring	to	effect	a	democracy	for	the	people.	(Lenin	196:	226.)	Democracy	
was	to	exist	most	of	all	in	the	form	of	changes	to	life	as	the	all-state	wide	
system	of	 administrative	 control	 over	work	processes	 started	 to	produce	
results.
A	government	was	supposed	to	be	based	on	the	specific	requirements	of	
the	 majority	 of	 people	 which	 consisted	 of	 poorly	 educated	 or	 illiterate	
peasants	and	factory	workers	who	survived	19th	century	poverty.	The	class	
struggle	concept	meant	discarding	the	idea	that	the	interests	of	these	masses	
could	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 good	 will	 of	 the	 more	 well	 to	 do	 classes	 in	
parliamentary	elections.	Further	more,	democratic	development	meant	the	
disciplinary	 training	 of	 the	masses	who	 at	 the	 outset	might	 not	 be	 fully	
aware	of	the	benefits	of	this	direction.	The	general	good	was	thus	central	to	
the	moral	 legitimation	 of	 the	 new	way	 of	 life	 and	made	 possible	 all	 the	
needed	measures	to	protect	it.	The	masses	were	seen	in	Lenin´s	writings,	
more	or	less	as	recipients	of	the	new	doctrine	who	needed	to	be	involved	in	
the	system	for	their	own	good.	Accordingly,	there	was	no	place	for	free	civil	
society	 in	 this	 formation,	 since	 the	 government	 included	 in	 itself	 the	
elements	which	were	needed	to	both	educate	the	masses	and	control	their	
work.	The	government	which	directed	the	state	was	to	adequately	represent	
the	society.
Logically,	 instead	of	 concentration	on	 the	 state-local	 level	 relations	 as	
such,	the	idea	was	“total	administration”	which	would	include	all	aspects	of	
the	new	life	style.	More	so,	the	political	goal	was	to	involve	all	people	in	the	
decision	 making	 and	 daily	 running	 of	 the	 state	 which,	 in	 this	 relation,	
became	 legitimately	 theirs.	The	required	control	protected	 the	 long	 term	
interests	of	 those	wanting	 to	 see	 the	 state	being	 free	 from	 individualistic	
economical	 and	 social	 goals.	The	new	administrators	 thus	 required,	first	
had	to	understand	these	principles	and	take	a	new	type	of	responsibility	for	
the	first	time	in	their	life.	They	were	expected	to	seize	the	power	under	the	
guidance	of	the	political	vanguard.	Earlier	exclusion	from	decision	making	
was	to	be	replaced	with	a	new	politically	correct	self-discipline	and	status	in	
society.	
At	 the	 practical	 level,	 introduction	 of	 the	 new	 ideology	 first	 meant	
concentrating	on	rapidly	getting	rid	of	the	effects	of	the	old	social	system.	
One	 of	 the	 first	 practical	 acts	 of	 this	 class	 struggle	 for	 the	 Bolshevik	
government,	was	the	differentiation	of	attitude	toward	social	organizations.	
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Everything	which	was	interpreted	as	being	contra	revolutionary	was	to	be	
cut	of	from	the	society	even	though	the	bourgeois	cultural	system	itself	was	
to	be	used.	(Korzhikhina	1995:10.)
In	Lenin´s	writings	relating	to	the	re-education	of	society	was	the	concept	
of	 “elastic	 organization”	 which	 initially	 replaced	 both	 capitalist	 law	 and	
contracts	 to	 manage	 the	 major	 change.	 Elasticity	 meant	 most	 of	 all	
disciplinary	action	which	could	and	should	be	forced	upon	people	in	the	
form	of	a	dictatorship.	Again	Lenin	saw	it	as	fundamentally	naive	to	suppose	
that	the	transition	from	capitalism	to	socialism	would	be	possible	without	
coercion	 and	 dictatorship.	 Crushing	 opposition	 was	 necessary	 for	 its	
superiority	 in	 knowledge,	 wealth	 and	 organization.	 Confusion,	 shifting	
positions	and	uncertainty	were	natural	results	of	the	transitions.	Ideological	
and	practical	control	in	this	situation	were	to	be	implemented	through	the	
courts,	 in	 which	 the	 education	 of	 obedience	 was	most	 effectively	 done.	
(Lenin	196:	455–45.)
Legal	 thinking	 evolved	 from	 the	 early	 “purely	 ideological”	 (such	 as	
Rejsner)	thinking	toward	a	more	institutionally	oriented	version	(Kivinen	
19:	6).	In	192	P.I	Stuchka,	the	first	President	of	the	USSR	Supreme	Court,	
build	 an	 analogy	 between	 “religious	 ideologies	 and	 bourgeois	 law”	 as	
essentially	tools	for	previous	class	oppression.	In	192	Stuchka	considered	
that	communism	specifically	meant	the	victory	of	socialism	over	any	law,	
not	the	establishment	of	some	type	of	socialist	version	of	it.	The	abolition	of	
classes	who	were	antagonist	in	their	interests	essentially	meant	the	death	of	
law.	(Berman	1963:	26–29.)	His	ideas	were	in	line	with	E.	B.	Pashukanis´views	
who,	as	 the	architect	of	 the	first	socialist	 theory	of	 law,	saw	the	 idea	of	a	
social	contract	underlying	a	political	order	which	was	based	on	the	alleged	
harmony	of	equal	individuals.	Law,	by	nature,	is	contractual	and	individual	
and	 thus	makes	 talk	 about	 “proletarian”	 law	 impossible.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	
manifest	ideological	goals	of	the	time,	these	theoreticians	saw	the	coming	
of	communism	as	a	withering	away	of	law	in	general.	(Comp.	Berman	1963:	
26–29.)	
Justice	 was	 officially	 defined	 as	 a	 system	 of	 social	 relations	 which	
coincided	with	the	interests	of	the	dominating	class	and	which	is	upheld	by	
organized	violence.	Law	was	to	be	viewed	in	terms	of	economic	relations	in	
the	society.	Norm	was	not	primary	to	Pashukanis.	He	considered	the	legal	
relations	 in	 the	 society	 to	 be	 objective	 facts	 which	 norms	 reflect.	Thus	
norms	could	not	be	separated	from	this	level	into	something	primary,	as	an	
abstract	set	of	rules.	(Kivinen	19:	6,	39.)	
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The	relationship	with	the	legal	system	and	interpretation	of	the	meaning	
of	law	in	general	were	important	for	administration	in	several	ways.	First	of	
all,	 the	 possibility	 of	 external	 control	 over	 official	 decision	 making,	
something	 emphasized	 in	 a	 democratic	 system,	was	 eliminated.	 Second,	
law	as	an	authority	in	itself	was	turned	into	a	means	of	ideological	control	
and	thus	could	not	be	used	for	the	independent	interpretation	of	decisions.	
Third,	while	courts	did	not	function	as	avenues	of	justice,	individuals	had	
to	find	new	organizations	for	resolving	their	conflicts.	
The	party	which	had	taken	the	place	of	legal	mediators	gave	this	role	to	the	
administrative	 structures.	Kivinen	has	described	how	 the	 legal	 theory	had	
already	discarded	the	methodological	premises	of	Pashukanis	and	began	to	
comtemplate	 the	 concept	 of	 justice	 itself,	 which	 included	 a	 connection	
between	justice	and	a	certain	amount	of	free	will.	(Kivinen	19:	.)
To	go	back	to	the	roots	of	this	change	in	the	ideology,	it	is	useful	to	look	
at	 the	 initial	 legitimation	 which	 Lenin	 gave	 the	 combination	 of	 soviet	
democratism	and	individual	dictatorship	in	the	realization	of	the	needed	
control	of	working	processes.	In	Lenin´s	opinion	it	was	a	completely	rational	
result	of	 the	external	 relations	of	government.	The	amount	of	 repression	
was	 linked	with	 the	educational	 level	of	 the	revolutionary	class,	 the	after	
effects	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 and	 the	 forms	 of	 resistance	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
bourgeois.	The	mass	production	of	industry,	which	was	to	be	the	material	
basis	of	socialism,	required	tens	of	thousands	of	people	at	the	same	time	
and	this	could	only	be	realistically	achieved	by	surrendering	those	people	
to	 the	will	of	one	person.	 Ideally,	 as	 all	were	 to	have	 the	 same	goal,	 this	
direction	should	have	been	quite	pleasant	but	nevertheless	complete.	Lenin	
saw	the	historical	role	of	the	party	as	a	leader	of	the	population	who	had	to	
be	 guided	 away	 from	 its	 social	 roles.	 This	 could	 be	 achieved	 by	 both	
politicization	and	by	the	total	submission	of	the	workers	to	the	will	of	the	
soviet	dictator.	(Lenin	196:	459–461.)
The	political	legitimation	for	the	combination	of	individual	dictatorship	
and	Soviet	democracy	was	in	the	nature	of	the	new	Soviet	state:	it	represented	
the	interests	of	the	majority.	Dictatorship	in	the	name	of	this	majority	then	
was	something	different	than	bourgeois	dictatorship	which	represented	the	
interests	of	minority	groups.	The	Soviet	version	was	 instead	used	 for	 the	
involvement	of	the	masses	in	a	historical	creative	work.	The	interests	of	the	
majority	were	interpreted	by	the	party	which,	in	this	sense,	involved	in	itself	
both	 ideological	 and	 bureaucratic	 (administrative)	 features.	 (Makarenko	
199:	120.)
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Ideologically,	the	repressive	“methods”	were	not	a	side-effect	but	a	means	
of	securing	control	of	any	element	which	could	(in	theory)	pose	a	threat	to	
the	new	order.	In	repressions,	the	ideology	went	through	a	transformation	
from	a	theory	of	liberation	of	worker-peasants	to	a	theory	of	a	bureaucratic	
legitimation	of	dictatorship.	Graeme	Gill	 (1990)	has	 interpreted	 the	core	
principle	of	the	political	system	to	mean	that	political	authorities	were	not	
accountable	 in	 any	 direct	 sense	 to	 the	 populace	 for	 their	 actions.	 “With	
history	interpreted	in	terms	of	abstract	class	forces,	notions	of	responsibility	
and	accountability	in	an	immediate	and	practical	sense	were	inappropriate.	
[…]	 The	 perceived	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	
citizenry	was	an	antagonist	one	in	which	notions	of	guilt	were	defined	in	
broad	social	terms.	This	made	the	attribution	of	guilt	both	unpredictable	
and	wide	ranging	in	its	effect.”	(Gill	1990:	29,31.)
Vladimir	Makarenko	(199)	has	approached	the	same	theme	in	terms	of	
the	bureaucratization	process	of	the	revolution.	As	the	party	took	the	role	
of	social	and	political	organizations	in	the	state,	the	main	goal	of	repression	
soon	became	the	elimination	of	any	type	of	independent	communication	
within	 that	 party.	The	 party	 became	 an	 organ,	 the	 role	 of	which	was	 to	
communicate	the	orders	of	the	leadership.	At	the	same	time,	as	marxism	
became	 state	 ideology,	 it	 was	 institutionalized	 as	 a	 faith	 in	 the	 party.	
Particularly	 in	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 Stalin	 regime,	 the	 ideology	 was	
interpreted	to	be	so	vague	and	inexact	that	it	could	be	used	to	legitimate	any	
political	decision.	(Makarenko	199:	239.)
The	connection	between	the	party´s	own	control	and	growth	objectives	
and	the	governing	of	the	rest	of	the	society	deserves	more	attention	because	
it	explains	many	cultural	developments	which,	at	first,	seem	to	contradict	
the	party´s	ideological	visions.	Party	membership	grew	from	24.000	in	191	
to	52.354	in	1922.	The	rotation	was	high	since	more	actually	joined	and	
took	 the	 places	 of	 those	 who	 had	 either	 died,	 withdrawn	 or	 had	 met	
expulsion	from	the	ranks.	In	addition,	many	workers	started	their	tasks	in	
new	 regions	 to	which	 they	 had	moved.	The	 institutionalization	 of	 party	
membership	 took	 place	 from	 1919	 to	 1922,	 during	 which	 a	 general	 re-
registration,	the	standardization	of	the	party	card,	and	a	full	census	of	party	
members	were	carried	out.	Central	party	organs	tried	to	build	order	in	the	
lower	level	organs	and	exclude	political	unsuitable	persons	with	letters	and	
instructions.	(Gill	1990:	35.)
A	second	aspect	was	the	practical	demands	made	upon	the	lower	levels	
by	the	central	organs.	Political	purposes	were	non-specific	and	difficult	to	
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implement	as	practical	tasks	to	be	carried	out	by	the	often	non-educated	
low	level	party	workers.	The	results	of	these	difficulties	at	the	ideological	
level	was	central	authority	complaints	of	“localism”	and	“groupism”	leading	
to	an	emphasis	on	democratic	centralism.	(Gill	1990:	39–42.)	Ideologically,	
local	 freedom	 was	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 need	 to	 advance	 proletarian	
dictatorship.	It	also	posed	a	threat	to	the	party	itself.	
Lenin	 worked	 for	 the	 redirection	 of	 power	 to	 the	 party	 in	 the	
administration	 –	 by	 any	means	 necessary.	 For	 instance	 T.	H.	 Rigby	 has	
contended	that	Lenin	worked	towards	this	end	through	the	soviets	and	was,	
in	fact,	prepared	to	seize	power	against	the	soviets	in	order	to	maintain	it.	
The	more	liberal	view	of	“all	power	to	the	soviets”,	which	would	have	allowed	
different	socialist	parties	to	stay	in	the	soviets,	was	discarded	in	the	process	
–	mostly	for	the	sake	of	effectiveness.(Rigby	199:	26.)	To	enhance	the	self-
discipline	of	the	new	administrators,	Lenin	introduced	the	idea	of	a	double	
bureaucracy	which	would	control	most	of	all	 the	party	and	state	systems	
from	 above.	 The	 legitimation	 was	 that	 the	 roots	 of	 the	 much	 hated	
“bureaucratism”	were	 to	 be	 removed	 from	 the	 administrative	 culture	 in	
order	to	build	communism.	Double	bureaucracy	was	also	connected	with	
personnel	 policies	 which	 needed	 to	 be	 decided.	 Instead	 of	 letting	 local	
forces	decide	all	by	themselves	in	elections,	central	party	organs	began	to	
use	appointments.	(Susiluoto	199:	1,	Gill	1990:	4.)	The	foundation	for	
the	double	decision	making	system	was	politically	created	from	the	premise	
that	the	cultural	learning	process	of	administrators	required	this.	It	was	also	
in	 line	with	democratic	centralism	which	was	 in	 line	with	Lenin´s	views	
about	organization.	
At	the	level	of	theory,	“bureaucratic”	meant	exclusion	of	real	life	social	
factors	as	the	basis	of	decisions	and	a	concentration	on	orders,	obedience,	
the	non-political	and	personal	aspects	of	administration,	all	of	which	were	
seen	as	representing	the	old	culture.	In	practice,	the	main	feature	in	Lenin´s	
ideological	views	on	bureaucracy	was	that	they	depended	on	the	leadership´s	
alternating	 political	 choices.	These	 choices	 depended	 on	 the	 situational	
historical	 demands	 of	 strengthening	 political	 power	 and	 adding	 to	
production	efficiency.	The	political	ideology	of	administrative	change	was	
not	an	issue	for	the	masses	to	discuss	or	vote.	Real	outside	and	inside	threats	
(e.g.	 “wrong”	 class	 structure,	 hunger,	 unemployment,	 private	 small	
entrepreneurs	and	landowners)	seen	by	the	Bolshevik	leadership,	resulted	
in	elitist	politics.	The	methods	of	terror	and	its	consequences	consolidated	
this	way	of	thinking.	
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Elite	formation	was	already	being	debated	among	Communists	during	
the	 early	 transition	 years.	One	 view	 emphasized	 the	Russian	 proletariat,	
which	was	different	from	the	more	industrialized	(and	in	this	sense	more	
revolutionarily	 advanced)	 proletariat.	The	 new	Bolshevik	 administration	
was	mostly	a	victim	of	the	old	tsarist	bureaucracy	which	had	infiltrated	the	
new	 administration	 through	 the	 old	 civil	 servants.	The	 other	 view	 saw	
bureaucratization	in	the	structures	themselves,	where	the	tsarist	adminis-
trators	were	joined	by	the	new	ones	to	create	a	soviet	civil	service	elite.	The	
“cultural”	explanation,	which	emphasized	the	unpreparedness	of	the	Soviet	
working	 class	 and	 which	 was	 promoted	 by	 Lenin	 himself,	 won.	 (Sakwa	
19:	195.)
The	 utopian	 vision	 of	 a	 non-bureaucratic	 administrative	 culture	 was	
combined	with	a	need	to	create	a	solid,	dependable	state structure.	Double	
bureaucracy,	which	had	built-in	systems	 for	party	control	and	new	work	
ethics,	 were	 combined	 in	 the	 writings	 concerning	 the	 new	 model	 of	
administration	in	which	the	best	“material”	would	be	collected.	This	model	
administration	 took	 the	 form	 of	Workers´and	 Peasants´Inspection.	The	
requirements	for	the	administrators	included,	first	of	all,	recommendations	
of	 trusted	 Communists,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 state	 structure,	 theoretical	
education	of	government	and	book	keeping,	and	ability	to	cooperate	closely	
with	the	Central	control	committee	for	the	whole	system	to	work	fluently.	
Lenin´s	vision	was	that	the	model	commissariat	would	be	a	cross	between	
an	agency	(i.e.	academic	administration)	and	research	 institution	(i.e.	an	
academy	of	administration).	(Lenin	1964:	393–394.)
An	 important	 aspect	 of	 party	work	 inside	 the	 administration	was	 the	
underlining	 of	 theoretical	 and	 educational	 requirements	 for	 adminis-
trative	 work.	 Lenin	 supported	 the	 creation	 of	 special	 books	 about	 the	
organization	 of	 administrative	 work,	 and	 sending	 representatives	 with	
the	 right	set	of	mind	to	study	administrative	 issues	and	collect	 literature	
from	Germany	and	England.	In	addition,	a	commission	was	to	be	set	up	for	
the	creation	of	entrance	exams	for	candidates	willing	to	work	in	the	new	
model	administration	and	in	the	Party	Central	organization.	(Lenin	1964:	
395–396.)
The	fusion	of	party	control	and	administrative	structures,	therefore,	was	
not	 just	 a	 method	 of	 political	 control	 but	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 ethical	
transformation	 of	 administrative	 culture.	 For	 Lenin,	 this	 transformation	
was	 the	 essential	 requirement	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 revolution	 which	
needed,	most	of	all,	trust	between	the	administration	and	those	it	governed.	
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(Lenin	1964:	390,	393.)	Ethically	then,	Lenin´s	ideas	present	an	ideal	type	
administration	 in	 which	 the	 formerly	 disadvantaged	majority	 of	 people	
could	both	have	food	on	the	table	and	learn	new	social	and	political	roles	
while	 being	 organized	 and	 controlled	 by	 administrators	 with	 practical	
integrity	and	political	knowledge.	The	methods	used	would	be	accepted	as	
historical	necessities	to	build	the	economic	base	of	the	system.	Symptomatic	
for	these	broad	elaborations	was	that	they	did	not	tie	the	authority	of	the	
administrators	 into	 anything	 else	 except	 concepts	 which	 could	 only	 be	
interpreted	by	a	dictatorial	head.	At	the	ideological	level,	there	was	only	a	
vague	 connection	 between	 the	 changing	 existing	 structures	 and	 the	
principles	 upon	 which	 administrative	 practices	 would	 be	 built.	 In	 this	
respect,	the	most	concrete	elements	of	the	political	ideology	have	to	do	with	
concepts	of	effectiveness	and	legality.	
2) Fulfilling the economic needs of the peasant class through industrialization 
by changing legal principles and introducing	 organizational models which 
underlined control, accountability and discipline.
Lewin	 (1995)	 describes	 the	 Russian	 social	 system	 as	 being	 archaic,	
meaning	 that	 the	 peasantry,	 which	 had	 now	 in	 actuality	 become	 the	
dominant	 force,	 relapsed	 back	 to	 pre-capitalism.	This	 was	 the	 result	 of	
cumulative	processes	started	at	the	beginning	of	World	War	I	and	finished	
with	 the	 ending	 of	 the	 Civil	War.	 For	 the	 peasant,	 all	 the	 political	 and	
economic	upheaval	had	meant	the	destruction	or	weakening	of	any	market	
and	export-oriented	sectors	of	agriculture,	and	the	restoration	of	the	rural	
distributive	commune	(mir).	Lewin	sees	the	common	man	in	the	vast	rural	
landscape	turning	inwards,	towards	“a	family-consumption-oriented	ocean	
of	microfundia-institutions	 that	 calculated	 “mouths	 to	 feed”	 rather	 than	
productivity	and	market	opportunities.”	This	was	a	method	of	self-defense	
and	survival	but,	as	Lewin	points	out,	it	was	also	very	much	in	contrast	with	
the	social,	economical	and	political	aims	of	the	new	regime.	The	peasants	
–	even	as	they,	instead	of	the	urban	proletariat,	had	in	fact	replaced	the	old	
elites	of	landowners	as	the	actual	dominant	mass	in	the	society	–	remained	
culturally	 distant	 from	 the	 ideological	 aims	 of	 the	 Bolsheviks.	 (Lewin	
1995.)
To	 tackle	 social	 challenge	presented	by	 the	peasant	population	and	 to	
bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 different	 economic	 realities	 of	 Russia,	 Lenin	
underlined	 the	 economical	 aspects	 of	 the	 revolution.	 He	 demanded	 a	
focusing	of	all	governing	functions	“from	the	management	of	people	to	the	
management	 of	 material	 things	 and	 productive	 processes”	 as	 rapid	
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industrialization	 was	 crucial	 to	 the	 socialist	 development.	 (Lenin	 196:	
154.)	This	meant,	above	all,	the	creation	of	an	economy	in	which	there	was	
not	a	guarantee	of	a	(peasant)	individual,	but	a	collective	entity	–	the	class	
through	 which	 all	 its	 members	 received	 their	 status.	This	 idea	 of	 class	
representation	meant,	among	other	 factors,	 that	economic	relations	were	
legitimized	with	new	types	of	legal	concepts	that	break	old	norms	of	contract	
between	actors.	
In	contrast	with	the	old	social	theories	which	had	attempted	a	mild	type	
of	perestroika	within	 the	existing	order	and	had	at	 their	best	 introduced	
European	standards	of	legal	responsibility	to	the	administration,	the	new	
ideology	claimed	to	build	concepts	on	a	basis	of	a	socialist	consciousness.	
Economical	factors	were	dominant,	since	the	state	was	to	be	a	provider	of	
all	needs.	Society	which	was	represented	by	the	state,	could	not	be	socialist	
without	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 social	 networks	 which	 served	 the	 new	
economy.	As	administration	became	the	central	part	of	this	total	economy,	
new	legal	thinking	was	created	to	support	contracts	between	actors	in	the	
new	situation.	
Although	the	State	and	Revolution	did	not	give	a	road	map	to	the	future,	
Lenin	was	very	much	concerned	with	precision,	discipline	and	accountability.	
These	were	central	issues	in	the	legislative	work	which	started	right	at	the	
beginning	and	in	which	the	old	structures	were	accommodated	to	meet	the	
new	goals.	(Rigby	199:	23,26.)
The	early	development	of	legal	thinking	and	daily	norm	creation	went	
hand	 in	 hand.	 Legal	 theories	 and	 practices	 were	 developed	 as	 the	
administrative	programs	and	laws	were	put	into	action.	In	this	sense	it	is	
hard	 to	 separate	 the	 two.	 Laws	 and	 administrative	 programs	 became	
ideological	 as	 revolutionary	 purposes	materialized	 through	 their	 imple-
mentation.
Legal	 thinking	 in	 the	 socialist	 society	 was	 a	 key	 sustaining	 achieved	
changes.	Somehow	these	changes	needed	to	be	legally	grounded,	explained	
and	 justified.	Civil	 law	which	concentrated	on	 the	 economic	 relations	of	
actors	 was	 the	 foundation	 of	 new	 Soviet	 administrative	 law.	 Evgeni	
Pashukanis	 argued	 that	 the	 victory	 of	 a	 planned	 economy	 would	 form	
merely	technical	connections	between	economic	organizations.	The	basis	
for	the	understanding	for	his	legal	theory	was	the	relationship	between	the	
legal	and	political	superstructures.	Instead	of	seeing	the	legal	as	a	result	of	
the	political,	Pashukanis	used	Marx´s	idea	that	the	legal	superstructure	was	
an	expression	of	economic	relations.	In	the	socialist	society,	 the	previous	
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legal	 nature	 of	 economic	 organizations	 would	 disappear.	 (Pashukanis	
195.)	
Pashukanis	criticized	the	use	of	norms	as	a	tool	for	the	study	of	objective	
justice	 in	 society.	Since	 legal	 relations	were	born	as	a	 result	of	economic	
relations,	 norms	 could	 not	 exist	 outside	 of	 this	 reality.	 Similarly,	 it	 was	
impossible	for	the	state	as	such	to	support	the	authority	of	norms,	if	they	
were	mere	formal	statements	in	government	laws.	A	connection	between	
real	 social	 relations	 and	 law	 was	 needed,	 particularly	 since	 power	 and	
suppression	 could	 not	 be	 included	 in	 the	 legal	 concept	 of	 the	 state.	
Pashukanis	critized	the	concepts	of	“capitalist	state”,	“origin	and	meaning	of	
legal	 norms”,	 and	 the	 positivist	 legal	 tradition	 which	 was	 based	 on	 the	
connection	of	these.	(Pashukanis	195.)
Pashukanis	reflected	the	new	basis	for	legal	culture	in	his	criticism	of	the	
Soviet	administrative	organs	which	relied	on	legal	experts	(often	from	the	
previous	 system)	 to	 find	 out	whether	 something	was	 permitted	 “from	 a	
legal	 point	 of	 view”.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 inspection	 of	 legislation	 with	 the	
presumption	 that	 an	 answer	 can	 be	 found	 there.	The	 right	 question	 in	
Pashukanis´mind	would	have	been	to	ask	whether	something	is	permissible	
from	a	political	point	of	view.	The	legal	form	and	administrative	[political]	
goals	were	inseparable.	(Pashukanis	195.)
Despite	criticism	of	 the	capitalist	 state	as	a	guarantor	of	 law,	 the	actual	
development	of	Soviet	legal	thinking	was	also	connected	with	the	creation	of	
the	new	economic	system.	In	the	new	political	reality,	the	state	as	the	supreme	
guarantor	of	 legal	authority	was	replaced	by	the	political	 leadership	of	the	
party	 which	 now	 represented	 the	 general	 interest	 (a	 goal	 which	 was	
undoubtedly	also	supported	by	Lenin).	For	this	reason	Harold	Berman,	for	
instance,	paradoxically	describes	Lenin´s	thinking	as	being	in	line	with	the	
traditional	 European	 legal	 positivism which	 considers	 all	 laws	 to	 be	
commands	of	sovereign	power.	As	a	continuation	of	this	cultural	element,	
Lenin	built	an	idea	of	socialist	government	which	gave	orders	and	punishments	
in	the	interest	of	the	majority	which	it	represented.	(Berman	1963.)
The	discussion	about	the	use	of	organizational	principles	from	the	West	
in	the	building	of	Soviet	work	organizations	had	two	themes.	First	was	the	
need	 for	 rationalization	 and	 lean	 organization	 which	 used	 Taylorism	 in	
system	building.	The	other	was	the	control	of	society.	Taylorism	responded	
to	the	need	to	have	order	in	a	chaotic	situation	where	both	administration	
and	production	were	in	disarray,	and	statehood	was	supported	mainly	by	
the	army	and	strict	Communist	party	central	leadership.	Rationalization	in	
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the	 form	 of	 Taylorism	 was,	 for	 Lenin,	 a	 weapon	 against	 bureaucratism.	
(Susiluoto	199:	3,	6.)
Rationalization,	 Taylorism	 and	 moderate	 agricultural	 policies	 were	
united	in	the	form	of	equilibrium	theory	which	saw	Lenin´s	ideas	supporting	
slow	development	toward	socialism.	This	line	was	opposed	by	Stalin	who	
demanded	the	continuation	of	revolutionary	policies	and	the	abandonment	
of	social	peace	because	of	the	economic	situation	in	the	country.	Ten	years	
after	 the	 revolution	only	0,6	%	of	 all	 cultured	 land	belonged	 to	 the	 state	
farms.	Moreover,	these	state	farms	owned	only	1,1%	farming	land	compared	
to	9,	3%	of	private	farms.	(Nove	199.)	
Rationalization	 strategies	 were	 considered	 too	 weak	 in	 this	 situation	
where	technology	was	getting	too	old	for	a	more	refined	division	of	labor.	
Stalin´s	line	meant	the	aggressive	use	of	Western	technology	and	production	
methods.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 Stalin	 saw	 that	 the	 social	 situation	 required	
finishing	 the	 revolution	 rather	 than	 seeking	 consensus	 and	 balance.	
Discussants	who	supported	transitional	policies	were,	from	Stalin´s	point	
of	view,	 the	objective	enemies	of	 soviet	power	and	socialism.	Revolution	
from	above	meant	both	the	building	and	destruction	of	the	system	at	the	
same	time.	(Susiluoto	199:	,	94.)
Lenin´s	 broad	 concepts	 were	 taken	 further	 by	 Stalin	 for	 whom	 the	
general	industrialization	process	was	based	on	a	concept	of	the	“alliance	of	
the	proletariat	with	the	peasant”.	Because	of	the	continued	practical	threat	
of	not	being	able	to	feed	the	city	population	and	the	army,	Stalin	politically	
rationalized	that	this	alliance	could	not	be	based	on	the	satisfaction	of	the	
personal needs	of	the	peasantry.	Instead,	for	future	development,	the	union	
was	supposed	to	guarantee	the	economic	needs	of	the	peasantry	as	a	class.	
For	this	it	inevitably	needed	new	machines	and	farming	technology	which	
were	 all	 provided	 by	 the	working	 class	 in	 the	 industrial	 sector.	This	 co-
operation	which	Stalin	named	“the	union	of	metal”	was	intended	to	bring	
the	two	classes	closer	to	each	other	in	order	to	prepare	for	the	destruction	
of	social	class	divisions.	Mere	change	in	the	conditions	of	separate	individual	
peasants	 would	 not	 affect	 the	 modes	 of	 production	 in	 the	 countryside,	
which	was	a	change	acutely	needed	for	the	building	of	a	new	social	order.	
This	itself	was	the	justification	of	collectivism,	for	which	much	agitational	
work	and	strengthening	of	co-operatives	as	preliminary	stages	of	collective	
structures	were	needed.	(Stalin	1951:11.)	
In	practice	these	political	ideas	had	two	purposes.	First,	the	strengthening	
of	 the	 working	 class	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 less	 useful	 peasants	 and	 the	
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politically	unwanted	middle	class.	Second,	the	binding	of	this	class	to	the	
needs	 of	 a	 socialist	 economy	 which	 required	 simultaneous	 ideological	
socialization.	In	these	processes,	ideology	went	through	changes	which	had	
severe	consequences	for	the	development	of	administration.
4.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1917
The	background	to	the	building	of	the	state	at	the	local	level	was	the	work	
achieved	by	 the	 short	 lived	 legacy	of	 the	Provisional	 government,	which	
started	 after	 the	 February	 Revolution	 in	 191	 and	 represented	 the	 last	
attempt	to	raise	the	role	of	self-government.	For	six	months	the	government	
had	worked	on	numerous	changes	in	the	law	at	enormous	speed.	It	had	to	
balance	between	social	pressures	and	the	influence	of	inherited	institutions	
and	 their	 attitudes.	 A	 general	 right	 of	 voting	 was	 passed	 and	 the	 town	
governments	were	made	more	independent	bodies	whose	members	could	
no	 longer	 belong	 to	 state	 service.	 (Orlovsky	 199:	 100–101,	 Giltsenko	
1996.)	
The	main	challenge	was	building	a	coherent	structure	at	all	levels	without	
administrative	parallelism	and	ambiguous	command	relationships	between	
central	ministries	and	the	provinces.	 In	addition	the	Ministry	of	Interior	
intended	 to	 replace	 the	 administrative	 culture	 of	 the	 former	 regime	 by	
quickly	building	new	 institutions	and	methods	according	 to	 the	popular	
demands	of	legal	consciousness	(pravosoznanie)	which	had	emerged	from	
the	19th	century	reforms.	(Orlovsky	199:102,105.)The	zemstvos	and	towns	
governments	 were	 supposed	 to	 absorb	 the	 police	 and	 administrative	
authorities	of	the	central	bureaucracy.	The	civil	governors	were	replaced	by	
commissars	who	 came	 from	 a	 zemstvo	 background	 and	where	 to	 act	 as	
links	 between	 the	 street	 level	 and	 the	 government.	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
changes,	as	an	attempt	to	separate	powers,	a	law	was	passed	calling	for	the	
creation	 of	 administrative	 courts	 which	 would	 have	 dealt	 with	 conflicts	
between	 the	 state,	 self-government	 institutions,	 individual	 citizens	 and	
various	 public	 organizations.	 (Orlovsky	 199:104,	 106–112.)	This	 would	
have	meant	the	possible	beginning	of	a	profound	progress	in	the	citizen-
state	 relationship	 which,	 along	 with	 the	 1906	 Constitution,	 could	 have	
created	legal	control	of	the	administration´s	work.	
The	 October	 revolution	 stopped	 these	 processes.	 State	 building	 was	
started	on	an	ideological	basis	as	a	result	of	which	the	Communist	party	
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organizations	acquiring	the	role	of	administration.	State	building	consisted	
of	at	least	three	processes:	1.	Creating	formal	legislative	and	decision	making	
order	which	positioned	the	local	level	in	the	state	system,	2.	Bureaucratization	
of	the	party	and	tying	it	to	the	parallel	centralized	administrative	system,	3.	
Building	a	system	of	information	gathering/control,	diversifying	adminis-
trative	organs	and	developing	legal	thinking.	In	these	processes	the	building	
of	a	centralized	government	took	its	form.	In	practice,	the	first	two	processes	
were	interlocked	from	the	start.	The	third	set	of	processes	followed	primarily	
as	practical	demands.	
4.2.1 The Legislative Foundation of the State and the 
Bureaucratization of the Party
The	 revolutionary	 transition	 was	 led	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 People´s	
Comissariats,	 the	Sovnarkom	(Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov),	which	 took	
over	 the	 work	 of	 cabinet	 with	 practically	 absolute	 power.	 It	 had	 been	
formulated	officially	by	the	decree	which	established	the	body	as	a	collegiate.	
(Rigby	199:	3.)	The	Council	worked	as	the	early	government	with	a	high	
decree	of	 spontaneity	 and	 constant	 changes	of	 persons.	At	 the	 local	 and	
even	 ministerial	 levels,	 continuity	 of	 personnel,	 routines	 and	 structures	
was,	however,	obvious.	The	Sovnarkom	set	about	its	task	with	the	intent	of	
making	as	good	a	use	of	the	old	structures	as	possible.	Further	more,	Lenin	
saw	it	vital	to	use	the	skills	and	experience	of	the	old	staff	to	maintain	the	
functioning	 of	 the	 state.	 Effectiveness	 being	 the	 primary	 interest	 of	 the	
revolutionary	 leadership,	 the	 keeping	 in	 motion	 of	 the	 old	 structures	
became	its	preoccupation.	(Rigby	199.)	
Each	 commissar	 acted	 as	 a	 chairman	 of	 a	 commission	 (later	 boards/
kollegii)	which	brought	 an	element	of	 collective	decision	making	 into	 the	
developing	 ministries.	 The	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “Council	 of	 the	 People´s	
Commissars”	was	meant	to	separate	the	leadership	from	the	terminology	of	
the	old	government	by	emphasizing	its	revolutionary	and	socialist	democratic	
appeal.	The	latter	innovation	was	not	an	accident	or	a	minor	factor	in	the	
early	days	of	the	transition.	In	fact	the	language	changes	were	considered	a	
prelude	to	the	actual	changes	in	ways	of	working.	(Rigby	199:	6.)
Shumilov	 (1999)	has	constructed	a	 case	of	Petrozavodsk	and	Karelian	
revolutionary	local	government	development	from	191	on.	It	shows	that	
the	 institutionalization	 of	 local	 administration	 in	 the	 provinces	 did	 not	
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happen	overnight,	nor	was	it	centrally	guided	at	all	turns.	(Shumilov	1999:	
0.)	In	fact,	the	left	wing	political	forces	which	participated	in	the	process	
seemed	have	a	 rather	 large	 space	 for	 regional	 and	 local	decision	making	
within	the	limits	of	the	general	political	orientation.	
As	 the	 power	 in	 the	 provincial	 centers	 was	 passed	 to	 the	 Bolshevik	
soviets,	 these,	 in	many	 cases,	 set	 up	 their	 own	Councils	 of	 the	 People´s	
Commissars	which	in	some	cases	did	not	even	accept	the	authority	of	the	
leadership	working	in	the	renamed	capital	of	Petrograd.	As	an	example,	the	
city	of	Moscow	still	had	its	own	local	Sovnarkom	when	the	Soviet	central	
government	moved	there	in	March	191.	These	two	structures	were	then	
assimilated	after	some	effort.	(Rigby	199:	9.)
In	Karelia,	the	October	revolution	was	met	with	mixed	feelings	depending	
on	which	school	of	political	thought	a	person	represented.	The	revolution	
meant	a	radicalization	of	the	composition	of	those	taking	part	in	local	and	
regional	decision	making.	In	the	Olonetsky	region	this	group	included	the	
regional	soviet,	 the	Murmansk	railroad	committee	and	representatives	of	
the	soldiers´committees	of	the	Petrozavodsk	garrison.	Power	in	Petrograd	
was	given	to	the	Military-revolutionary	committee	of	the	Petrograd	soviet	
and	 the	Karelian	regional	decision	makers	 followed	the	center	by	stating	
their	solidarity	to	the	new	government.	At	the	same	time,	it	announced	that	
it	would	initiate	the	establishment	of	authority	in	the	localities	according	to	
a	plan	which	took	the	form	of	a	“Decree	on	the	organization	of	state	power	
in	the	Olonetsky	region”.	(Shumilov	1999:	4–5.)
Risks	presented	themselves	mainly	in	three	forms.	First	was	the	reluctance	
from	the	part	of	many	old	civil	 servants	 to	work	 for	 the	new	 leadership,	
which	 the	 Bolsheviks	 saw	 as	 sabotage.	The	 second	 had	 to	 do	 with	 the	
organization	of	control	bodies	outside	the	normal	bureaucracy	or	soviets.	
Rigby	 has	 described	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 new	 Soviet	 central	
bureaucracy	through	three	stages.	First,	the	people´s	commissars	with	the	
help	 of	 only	 a	 handful	 of	 assistants	 set	 up	 their	 offices	 in	 the	 Smolny	
(administrative	 building	 in	 Petrograd),	 from	 which	 they	 build	 contacts	
with	their	respective	ministries.	Second,	the	commissars	moved	into	their	
ministerial	 locations	 while	 leaving	 their	 staff	 in	 the	 Smolny.	 Lastly	 the	
commissariat	staff	moved	to	the	ministries	and	these	two	structures,	one	
old	 and	 historic,	 the	 other	 new	 and	 revolutionary,	 began	 to	merge.	The	
officials	 of	 the	 old	ministries	 rejected	 their	 legitimacy	 and	 either	 simply	
refused	to	work,	or	failed	deliberately	to	implement	decisions	and	prevented	
information	from	reaching	the	commissars.	(Rigby	199:	40,	44–45.)
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The	primary	reaction	of	the	Bolshevik	leadership	to	the	risks	involved	in	
this	situation	was	an	attempt	to	quickly	establish	control	over	the	finances	
of	 the	 state	 by	working	with	 those	 former	 imperial	 state	 officials	 of	 the	
Treasury	Department	who	were	cooperative.	These	administrators	worked	
out	budgeting	procedures	which	financed	the	work	of	the	Sovnarkom	and	
the	commissariats.	(Rigby	199:	45.)	Getting	financing	quickly	in	order	was	
naturally	important	for	the	credibility	of	Bolshevik	authority.	
After	 the	financial	order	had	been	established,	 the	Soviet	 government	
could	 start	 handling	 the	 resistance	 to	 the	 changes.	 Along	 with	 the	
information	war	which	was	waged	on	all	fronts	(work	places,	offices	and	in	
the	media),	the	new	leadership	made	decisions	which	lowered	the	salaries	
of	 the	 top	officials	 and	 raised	 those	 in	 the	 lower	 ranks.	The	 commissars	
themselves	received	500	rubles	a	month	which	was	roughly	the	equal	of	the	
salary	earned	by	a	skilled	worker	at	the	time.	(Rigby	199:	44.)	
The	 city	Duma of	Petrograd	 and	particularly	 its	Committee	of	Public	
Safety	was	an	active	point	of	resistance	which	continued	to	exist	along	with	
the	new	soviet.	They	paid	the	salaries	of	imperial	time	officials	a	month	or	
two	in	advance	to	safeguard	them	from	the	threat	of	sacking	by	the	Bolshevik	
government.	When	the	new	leadership	abolished	The	Petrograd	Duma	and	
either	sacked	or	arrested	actively	resistant	senior	officials,	it	also	effectively	
undermined	the	junior	level	resistance.	Lenin´s	dispersal	of	the	Constituent	
Assembly	in	December	191	was	the	last	straw	to	the	imperial	officials	who	
had	no	option	but	to	accept	the	transition	of	political	power.	(Rigby	199:	
44,	46.)	
A	 third	 risk	 involved	 in	 the	 early	 days	was	 the	 lack	 of	 clear	 decision	
making	 hierarchy	 in	 the	 provinces.	The	 local	 level	 enjoyed	 considerable	
autonomy	in	the	beginning	which	also	meant	that	operational	procedures	
were	 weakly	 regularized	 and	 jurisdictions	 unclear.	This	 posed	 a	 serious	
immediate	risk	to	the	party´s	independence	and	strength.	Although	most	
Duma	 and	zemstvo	 organizations	 disappeared,	 the	 party	 faced	 challenge	
from	the	soviets	which	acquired	roles	in	decision	making.	This	paradox	is	
explained	 by	 the	 fact	 that	many	 party	members	 filed	 into	 the	 soviets	 to	
fulfill	the	“all	power	to	the	soviets”	idea,	or	as	an	attempt	to	staff	them	with	
party	members.	Other	 local	organizations	 such	as	military-revolutionary	
councils,	local	Cheka,	committees	of	the	poor	and	state	bodies	complicated	
the	picture.	On	top	of	all,	the	party´s	authority	was	not	well	received	by	
all	members	of	the	population,	particularly	in	the	rural	areas.	(Gill	1990:	
33–34.)
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In	 Karelia,	 the	 Olonetsky	 regional	 soviet	 of	 soldier	 and	 peasant	
representatives	 emerged	 in	 191	 as	 the	 authoritative	 new	 representative	
body.	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Petrozavodsk	 worked	 the	 executive	
committee	of	the	workers	and	officials	of	the	Murmansk	railroad,	as	well	as	
the	executive	committee	of	different	non-governmental	town	organizations,	
co-operatives	and	the	town	duma and	zemstvo.	The	executive	committee	of	
the	 latter	 group	 functioned	 in	 connection	 with	 the	 regional	 soviet.	The	
committees	of	soldiers	established	their	rule	in	the	Petrozavodsk	garrison	
and	guard	for	the	Murmansk	railroad.	(Shumilov	1999:	0–2.)	
The	Karelian	Olonetsky	 regional	 soviet	 tried	 to	answer	 the	 immediate	
risks	with	the	above	mentioned	decree	which	stated	that	all	power	which	
had	previously	belonged	to	the	regional	commissar	was	transferred	to	the	
soviet.	The	soviet	could	give	obligatory	decisions	 to	maintain	civil	order,	
security	 and	 economic	 development,	 and	 to	 use	 the	 locally	 garrisoned	
military	 to	 achieve	 these	 ends.	 It	had	 the	 right	 to	 arrest	without	 a	 court	
order	and	detain	for	a	period	of	one	month	people	who	were	considered	
dangerous	 to	 the	 state	building	process.	 It	 could	also	 release	 earlier	 civil	
servants	 and	 replace	 them	 with	 personnel	 chosen	 by	 the	 soviet.	 The	
institutionalization	of	Bolshevik	authority	in	the	Karelian	example	seems	to	
have	taken	place	quite	fast	after	191.	According	to	Shumilov´s	assessment,	
it	also	created	a	self-government	organ	at	first	which	was,	within	its	political	
composition,	a	democratic	elected	body.	Discussion	was	allowed	and	staff	
could	be	changed,	all	of	which	increased	its	authority	among	the	population	
and	real	power	in	the	localities.	(Shumilov	1999:	5,	92.)
But	the	state	building	effort	at	the	center	soon	affected	the	localities.	In	
the	Constitution	of	191,	the	changes	from	autonomous	soviets	to	a	party	
led	central	hierarchy	and	policy	planning	were	evident.	The	new	town	level	
was	given	a	coordinator´s	role	in	the	system	of	state	authority.	The	soviets	
were	elected	by	open	ballot	at	work	places.	They	had	their	origins	in	towns	
and	naval	units,	from	which	they	progressed	to	the	rural	areas.	(Rigby	199:	
160.)
The	 local	 soviets	 executed	 the	 decision	 of	 higher	 soviets	 and	 state	
administration	organs	and	were	given	the	right	to	decide	matters	of	purely	
local	importance	for	their	given	territory.	Territorially	the	state	was	divided	
into	 several	 administrative	 levels	 of	 village	 (volost´),	 districts	 (uezd),	
province	 (guberniia)	 and	 regional	 (oblast´)	 levels	 which	 made	 up	 the	
republics.	In	these	regional	levels	were	the	territorial	Congresses	of	Soviets	
which	controlled	the	local	soviets	under	their	jurisdiction.	City	soviets	were	
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represented	both	at	the	province	and	oblast levels	and	in	case	of	the	small	
towns	of	less	than	10.000	at	the	disctrict level.	All	congresses	elected	their	
executive	 committees	which	were	 accountable	 to	 them.	 (Constitution	 of	
191,	paragraph	10:	section	53,	55.)
Local	 soviets	 were	 composed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 one	 deputy	 per	 1.000	
inhabitants	for	the	term	of	three	months	and	were	required	to	meet	at	least	
once	a	week.	Day	to	day	work	was	organized	by	the	Executive	committee	
whose	members	were	chosen	among	the	Soviet	deputies	on	the	basis	of	one	
member	per	50	deputies.	(Constitution	of	191,	paragraph	11:	5–59.)	The	
budgetary	Law	 incorporated	 in	 the	Constitution,	gave	 the	 local	 soviets	a	
right	to	appeal	for	credits	which	were	allotted	by	the	appropriate	People´s	
Commissariat	out	of	State	Treasury	Funds.	Budgets	at	the	local	level	were	
supposed	to	be	drawn	every	six	months	for	the	approval	of	higher	regional	
congresses.	The	final	decision	maker	over	local	budgets	was	then	the	All-
Russian	 Central	 executive	 committee	 and	 the	 Council	 of	 People´s	
Commissars.	(Constitution	of	191.)
The	 191	 directive	 from	 the	 Commissariat	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	 gave	 a	
specific	order	that	the	soviets	carry	out	all	the	decisions	of	the	central	power	
and	adopt	measures	to	notify	the	population	of	changes.	Included	in	their	
tasks	were	also	the	carrying	out	confiscations,	imposition	of	fines,	effecting	
arrests,	disbanding	social	organizations	and	reporting	to	the	center	on	all	
important	 local	 events.	 (The	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	
191	in	McAuley	199:	14.)
Economic	problems	penetrated	 the	 integration	of	 the	new	culture	at	all	
levels.	In	Karelia,	for	instance,	the	soviets	at	first	had	to	start	working	without	
any	 central	 government	 financing.	 This	 made	 them	 resort	 to	 levying	
emergency	taxes	and	payments,	and	compulsory	orders,	all	to	the	grievance	
of	the	already	suffering	people.	The	early	confusion	and	violence,	including	
the	 civil	 war,	 took	 several	 years.	 It	 was	 not	 until	 1923	 that	 the	 Karelian	
autonomic	socialist	republic	was	officially	established.	(Shumilov	1999:	92.)
The	new	local	administration	was	organized	on	a	territorial,	rather	than	
self-government	basis.	It	was	composed	of	a	locally	elected	representative	
body	 and	 an	 operative	 commissariat	 administration	 at	 the	 regional	 and	
local	 levels.	Decision	making	was	 to	be	 administratively	holistic.	 Ideally,	
both	 the	 local	 level	 economic	 and	 social	 information	 gathering	 by	 the	
soviets,	 and	 the	 commissariat	 task/service	 specific	 execution	of	 centrally	
gathered	and	processed	information,	met	in	the	structures.	In	this	way,	the	
foundation	of	institutional	totalitarism	was	established.	
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The	new	191	Constitution	of	the	RSFSR	united	Soviet	democracy	and	
individual	 dictatorship	 in	 a	 new	 hierarchial	 structure	 which	 had,	 as	 its	
practical	 head	 of	 state	 authority	 the	 All-Russian	 Central	 Executive	
Committee.	 It	 comprised	all	 authority:	 legislative,	 executive	and	 judicial.	
(Constitution	of	191,	paragraph	:	section	31.).	The	All-Russian	Central	
Executive	Committee	examined	and	approved	all	draft	decrees	and	other	
proposals,	and	issued	its	own	decrees.	It	also	appointed	the	Council	of	the	
People´s	Commissars	 for	 the	 general	 administration	of	 the	 country.	The	
administration-government,	 the	Council	 of	 the	 People´s	Commissariats,	
consisted	of	1	line	administrations	in	which	the	Commissariat	consulted	a	
board	 of	 advisors	 but	 made	 personal	 decisions.	 (Constitution	 of	 191,	
paragraph	:	section	43,	45.)	
The	 interlocking	 of	 different	 state	 functions	 in	 the	 same	 people	 was	
sealed	by	section	36	of	the	Constitution.	This	directed	that	the	members	of	
the	All-Russian	Central	Executive	Committee	either	work	 in	 the	various	
departments	of	the	People´s	Commissariats	or	carry	out	special	commissions	
of	 the	 committee.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	members	 of	 the	 All-Russian	 Central	
Executive	Committee	assumed	the	role	of	politicians	 (legislators),	 judges	
and	administrators	of	operational	planning	and	execution.
The	components	of	the	territorially	organized	administrative	totalitarism	
were	mediated	via	the	following	1924	and	1936	fundamental	laws.	The	main	
structure	of	the	Soviet	government	in	the	1930´s	is	shown	in	the	annex	C	
which	 is	 how	 I	 illustrate	 the	 structural	 arrangements	 during	 the	 studied	
period.	This	illustration	also	shows	how	the	main	structures	had	changed	
compared	to	the	tsarist	period.	
The	1924	Constitution	of	the	USSR	proclaimed	as	the	supreme	authority	
the	Congress	of	Soviets,	which	was	composed	of	the	Federal	Soviet	and	the	
Soviet	of	Nationalities.	Delegates	were	chosen	among	city	and	town	soviets	
according	to	a	proportionality	of	1	delegate	to	25.000	electors	and	among	
oblast	Congresses	of	Soviets	according	to	a	proportionality	of	1	delegate	to	
125.000	 inhabitants.	 Elections	were	held	 in	 the	provincial	Congresses	 of	
Soviets.	 Since	 the	Congress	was	 legally	 required	 to	meet	 once	 a	 year,	 its	
Central	Executive	Committee	(CEC)	acted	as	the	legislative	motor	of	the	
society.	Between	its	sessions	(normally	three	times	a	year)	the	legislative,	
executive	and	general	administrative	authority	was	constitutionally	in	the	
hands	 of	 its	 21	 member	 Presidium.	 The	 Central	 Executive	 Committee	
ordered	the	legislative	and	administrative	work	and	defined	the	sphere	of	
activity	of	 its	Presidium	and	the	Council	of	 the	People´s	Commissariats.	
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(The	Soviet	of	1924,	paragraph	III:	sections	–10,	paragraph	IV:	1,	21,	26.)	
In	 this	role,	 the	CEC	acted	as	 the	government	and	 legislator	at	 the	same	
time.	
Executive	authority	of	the	state	was	arranged	through	the	Council	of	the	
People´s	Commissars	which	was	 the	administrative	organ	of	 the	Central	
Executive	Committee.	At	the	union	level	it	included	10	line	commissariats.	
Their	 republican	 level	was	based	on	 the	 commissariat´s	 sector	of	 affairs.	
Those	which	dealt	with	purely	external	matters	 (Foreign	Affairs,	Foreign	
Commerce,	 Ways	 and	 Communications,	 Postal	 and	 Telegraph	 services,	
Military	 and	 Naval	 Affairs)	 had	 their	 delegates	 at	 the	 republican	 level	
directly	 subordinated	 to	 the	 respective	 Commissars	 at	 the	 central	 level.	
Internal	matters,	however,	were	organized	on	a	 territorial	basis	 in	which	
each	commissariat	had	its	People´s	commissar	of	the	Republic.	Commissars	
at	the	central	level	worked	under	the	chairmanship	of	the	commissar	in	a	
collegiate	 whose	 members	 were	 chosen	 by	 the	 Council	 of	 the	 People´s	
Commissars.	 Decision	 making	 authority	 was	 constitutionally	 personal	
within	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 commissariat.	 (The	 Soviet	Constitution	 of	 1924,	
paragraph	VIII:	sections	49–5.)	
Structural	diversification	was	based	on	different	types	of	control	needs	
which	meant	that	certain	commissariats	existed	only	at	the	republican	level.	
The	Commissariat	 for	 Justice,	 Public	Health	 and	 Social	Welfare	 did	 not	
have	 a	 counterpart	 at	 the	 center.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Commissariats	 for	
Supplies,	Finances,	Labor	and	the	Inspectorate	of	Workers	and	Peasants	of	
the	 member	 republics	 executed	 the	 orders	 of	 the	 Central	 Executive	
Committee	while	being	hierarchially	 subordinate	 to	 the	 republican	 level.	
(The	Soviet	Constitution	of	1924,	paragraph	X	:	sections	6,	6.)
Legislatively,	 the	1924	Constitution	meant	a	highly	complex	system	of	
control	relations	but	 lacked	clear	constitutional	 jurisdictions.	On	the	one	
hand,	there	existed	the	formal	role	of	the	Congress	of	Soviets	as	the	supreme	
legislator,	as	all	legislation	(all	decrees,	codes	and	acts)	was	approved	by	the	
Council	 of	 Soviets	 and	Council	 of	Nationalities	 brought	 to	 them	by	 the	
Presidium	 of	 the	 CEC,	 the	 Council	 of	 People´s	 Commissars,	 different	
Commissariats,	the	Central	Executive	committees	of	the	republics,	as	well	
as	by	its	own	members.	At	the	same	time,	the	CEC	also	acted	as	the	controller	
of	all	legislative	work,	with	the	right	to	suspend	or	abrogate	legislation	of	its	
Presidium,	the	Congress	of	Soviets	and	Central	Executive	Committees	of	
republics,	and	all	other	organs	throughout	the	state.	All	legislation	defining	
the	 general	 rules	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 life,	 or	 making	 substantial	
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changes	to	practices	of	public	organs,	were	to	be	submitted	for	the	approval	
of	the	CEC.	Between	its	sessions,	the	Presidium	assumed	the	role	of	both	
legislative	and	administrative	leadership	with	the	same	right	to	suspend	or	
abrogate	the	orders	of	the	Commissariats,	both	at	the	central	and	republican	
level.	Furthermore,	the	Presidium	promulgated	all	legislation	and	approved	
projects	of	legislation	from	the	Council	of	Commissariats	and	from	different	
authorities	across	the	country.	The	commissariats	in	this	chain	also	had	the	
right	to	publish	legislative	acts	and	decisions	and	examine	lower	level	acts	
and	decisions.	(The	Soviet	Constitution	of	1924.)
From	the	point	of	view	of	 local	administration,	 the	1924	Constitution	
leaves	a	big	question	mark.	It	in	no	way	defines	the	role	of	the	local	level	
except	as	an	elective	organ	 for	 the	Congress	of	Soviets	of	 the	USSR.	The	
hierarchy	 and	 authority	 relations	 of	 republican	 and	 local	 level,	were	 not	
written	 into	 the	 Constitution.	 This	 left	 the	 practical	 administrative	
organization	of	towns	outside	the	constitutional	limits,	dependant	on	the	
lower	level	legislation	and	administrative	commands.	
By	the	time	of	Stalin´s	1936	speech	on	the	draft	Constitution,	the	situation	
had	developed	so,	that	centralization	needed	a	solid	legal	basis.	In	the	1936	
Constitution,	 territorial	 divisions	 of	 administration	 were	 kept	 intact	 for	
reasons	of	clarity	and	control	in	order	to	avoid	what	Stalin	called	“tireless	
recarving”	of	territories	and	regions.	Similarly,	he	underlined	the	need	to	
put	an	end	to	the	number	of	legislative	bodies	which	made	laws	unstable.	
(Stalin	 2002.)	This	 marked	 the	 official	 recognition	 of	 the	 centralization	
process	 and	 was	 consolidated	 as	 a	 key	 objective	 of	 administrative	
development.
The	191	Constitution	had	 formally	placed	 the	commissars	under	 the	
authority	of	the	party´s	CEC	which	was	itself	responsible	for	the	Congress	
of	 Soviets,	 representing	 the	 local	 level	 of	 the	 country.	 After	 the	 Sixth	
Congress	 of	 the	 Soviets	 (which	 approved	 the	 first	 Constitution)	 met	 in	
191,	the	congresses	began	to	meet	annually.	In	this	sense,	they	were	not	
parliamentary	 organizations,	 yet	 they	had	more	 than	 a	mere	 ceremonial	
role.	The	authority,	as	well	as	the	actual	institutional	power	of	the	Sovnarkom,	
was	 emphasized	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 CEC	 became	 primarily	 a	 place	 for	
political	debates.	The	work	of	 the	Sovnarkom	was	characterized	by	 large	
attendances	where	every	People´s	commissar	was	assisted	by	a	board	and	
various	central	agencies.	Sovnarkom	staff	and	lower	level	representatives	of	
Commissariats	also	attended	meetings,	giving	their	reports	and	taking	part	
in	the	discussion.	(Berman	1963:	30–33,	Gill	1990:	54,	Rigby	199:	161.)
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In	terms	of	 the	administrative	 ideology	of	change	for	which	one	basic	
ground	purpose	had	been	the	dictatorship	of	the	proletariat,	the	power	of	
the	Sovnarkom	meant	several	things.	As	the	other	parties	and	non-partisan	
persons	 taking	part	 in	 the	decision	making	 lost	 their	 effective	 say	 in	 the	
development	of	the	state,	the	proletariat	was	legitimately	represented	only	
by	the	Communist	party.	The	party	assumed	the	rights	of	dictatorship.	Thus	
the	Sovnarkom	which	made	the	policies	governed	their	execution	through	
the	soviets	and	in	the	name	of	the	proletariat.	(Comp.	Rigby	199:	162.)
These	developments	had	two	consequences.	First	of	all,	the	actual	power	
of	the	executive	(Lenin)	grew	in	a	situation	which	required	strong	control.	
Second,	two	executive	bodies	were	created:	the	Small	Council	of	People´s	
Commissariats	 (Malyi Sovnarkom)	 in	 191	 and	 the	 Labor	 and	 Defense	
Council	 (STO)	 in	191.	The	 former	acquired	much	of	 the	 real	 executive	
authority	of	its	parent	organization.	It	was	responsible	for	supervising	the	
implementation	of	government	decisions	officially	made	by	the	Commis-
sariats	and	government	agencies.	The	Labor	and	Defense	Council	took	over	
national	 economic	 planning	 and	 control	 over	 its	 execution.	A	 system	of	
planning	 hierarchy	 responsibilities	 was	 established	 down	 to	 the	 level	 of	
enterprise.	 Private	 trade	 of	 consumer	 goods	 was	 prohibited	 along	 with	
inheritance.	Ration	cards	for	commodity	distribution	and	general	compul-
sory	labor	were	installed.	In	1921,	a	new	State	General	Planning	Commission,	
Gosplan,	 was	 established	 and	 attached	 to	 the	 STO	 which	 appointed	 its	
officials.	(Berman	1963:	30–3,	Gill	1990:	54.)
Immediately	after	 the	 revolution,	 the	Sovnarkom	had	been	a	 constant	
battle	 ground	 for	 the	 Left	 Srs	 (Social	 Democracts),	 Mencheviks	 and	
Bolsheviks,	 who	 still	 shared	 power.	 Examples	 of	 the	 policy	 and	 power	
battles	included	disputes	over	the	structure	and	control	of	local	government	
bodies	 between	 different	 commissariats	 (Internal	 Affairs	 and	 Local	
Government).	When	the	Left	Srs	withdraw	from	the	Sovnarkom	in	191,	
single	party	rule	remained	the	permanent	element	of	Soviet	political	and	
administrative	decision	making.	(Rigby	199:	29.)
Later	(from	1920	on),	when	the	role	of	the	party	in	daily	decision	making	
was	more	firmly	 institutionalized,	 the	party	began	 to	 involve	 itself	more	
and	more	in	the	economic	questions	of	the	country.	(Rigby	199:	16.)	The	
separation	of	economic	questions	into	their	own	administrative	organization,	
intensified	 the	 diversification	 (see	 next	 chapter	 4.2.2.)	 of	 administrative	
organizations	 which,	 in	 time,	 continued	 to	 reduce	 the	 meaning	 of	
independent	local	decision	making.	
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Even	as	 the	structural	changes	centralized	major	policy	and	legislative	
decision	making	almost	from	the	start,	the	role	of	the	party	organization	
(also	at	the	local	level)	grew	as	a	side	effect	of	the	institutional	conflict	in	the	
center	between	 the	CEC	and	 the	Sovnarkom.	During	 the	drafting	of	 the	
Constitution	there	was	a	battle	between	those	advocating	local	empowerment	
and	federalism,	and	those	who	favored	a	strong	state	and	discipline	in	one	
republic.	The	growth	of	local	organization	was	connected	with	the	use	of	
the	 lower	 level	 soviets	 and	 particularly	 their	 executive	 committees	 as	
avenues	through	which	the	Sovnarkom	executed	its	decisions.	The	provincial	
organs	of	the	old	ministries	through	which	the	Sovnarkom	was	suppose	to	
run	 the	 country	 were	 not	 an	 effective	 system	 for	 this	 purpose.	 The	
Sovnarkom	had	to	rely	on	the	assistance	and	cooperation	of	the	new	local	
government	 organs.	The	CEC	which	 led	 the	 local	 executive	 committees,	
could	use	both	institutional	authority	and	party	discipline	to	manage	things	
at	the	local	level.	(Rigby	199:	16–169.)
The	Civil	War	presented	itself	as	a	period	of	risk	to	the	authority	of	the	
local	 soviets.	 During	 the	 course	 of	 the	 war	 their	 image	 changed	 from	
ineffective	 local	 organs	 to	 much	 needed	 frameworks	 for	 the	 “socialist	
legality”	(see	chapter	4.2.2)	as	a	means	of	reconstruction.	Since	the	threat	to	
the	 Bolshevik	 leadership	 was	 acute,	 the	 government	 began	 to	 use	 the	
administrative	 channels,	 mostly	 those	 of	 the	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	
Internal	Affairs,	to	guide	the	local	level.	The	soviets	themselves	were	unable	
to	effectively	meet	the	challenges	of	the	time	period,	and	the	government	
began	to	rely	more	on	the	Cheka,	 the	Revolutionary-Military	Committee	
and	the	Food	Supplies	Commissariat	which	all	had	direct	control	over	their	
local	offices.	For	instance,	the	Moscow	city	Soviet	plenum	started	to	gather	
more	 for	 ceremonial	 occasions	 and	 to	 hear	 reports	 from	 the	 Soviet	
leadership.(Rigby	199:	10–13,	14,	Sakwa	19:	14.)
In	this	situation	the	central	government	was	in	effect	left	without	a	well	
functioning	network	at	the	local	level.	As	a	side	effect	of	the	power	vacuum	
a	door	opened	to	local	party	committees	in	the	localities.	This	new	power	
became	permanent	even	though	the	Presidium	of	the	CEC	started	to	gain	
prominence	in	the	establishment	of	Soviet	rule	in	the	new	territories	and	
new	legal	acts	after	1919	strengthened	the	soviets	as	a	part	of	the	channel	
between	the	center	and	other	levels.	(Rigby	199:	14.)	
The	Eighth	Congress	of	Soviets	in	1920	made	the	Presidium	membership	
a	full-time	position	and	broadened	its	formal	authority.	It	could	revoke	the	
decisions	of	the	Sovnarkom	and	mediate	conflicts	between	central	and	local	
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government	bodies.	Yet,	as	the	actual	power	of	the	Sovnarkom	declined,	the	
beneficiary	 was	 the	 party	 central	 organization,	 the	 Political	 Bureau	
(Politburo)	 and	 the	 Organizational	 Bureau	 (Orgburo)	 of	 the	 Central	
Committee	which	were	established	by	the	Eighth	Congress.	(Rigby	199:	
15–16.)	Looking	at	the	bureaucratization	process	of	the	party	structures	
into	a	parallel	decision	making	organization,	 it	 is	possible	 to	view	it	as	a	
side-effect	of	the	institutional	power	sharing	of	the	top	authorities.	At	the	
same	 time,	 this	would	undermine	 the	most	directly	 ideological	 elements	
involved	 in	 the	building	of	 administrative	 culture.	Of	 these	 information,	
leadership	 and	 personnel	 stand	 out	 in	 particular	 as	 parameters	 in	 the	
development	of	the	system.	
After	 the	 revolution	 a	 new	 elite	 formation	 was	 needed.	The	 political	
decision	making	elite	included	members	of	the	central	party	organs	which	
were	 linked	with	 the	 lower	 level	 through	party	congress.	The	unplanned	
growth	of	governing	organs	and	the	fluidity	of	links	were	not	just	risks	of	
the	 revolution	 but	 also	 partially	 preferred	 by	 the	 elite	 to	 avoid	firm	 and	
binding	boundaries.	(Gill	1990:	51.)
As	 the	recruitment	of	new	party	members	did	not	 result	 in	 the	direct	
growth	of	control	in	the	country,	a	parallel	control	organization	principle	
was	created.	In	part,	the	parallelism	was	a	result	of	the	transitional	personnel	
questions.	The	 army	which	 had	 been	 vital	 for	 the	 success	 of	 Revolution	
became	the	testing	ground	for	the	new	government.	Since	the	officials	of	
the	tsarist	regime	were	necessary,	a	system	of	control	had	to	be	developed	
to	 ensure	 the	 loyalty	 of	 the	 huge	 army	 apparatus.	 This	 so	 called	 “war	
commissar	system”	was	under	party	control	and	provided	the	foundation	
for	the	practical	implementation	of	the	principle.	(Susiluoto	194:	19.)	
As	 important	 was	 the	 organizational	 factor	 involved.	The	 ideological	
guidance	 of	 the	new	 state	 had	 to	 be	 resolved	 in	 a	manner	which	would	
institutionalize	and	secure	the	party´s	authority.	The	task	of	implementing	
the	 party´s	 will	 in	 concrete	matters	 was	 primarily	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 state	
organs.	The	Central	Executive	Committee	was	to	a	differing	degree	involved	
in	governmental	decision	making	but	at	the	local	level	the	Communists	in	
the	 soviets	 worked	 according	 to	 CEC	 and	 Sovnarkom	 legal	 acts	 and	
instructions.	(Rigby	199:	1–1.)
The	Politburo	and	the	Orgburo	formalized,	at	the	central	level,	contacts	
between	the	Party	and	the	executive	side.	Added	to	this	were	the	several	
departments	 which	 appeared	 under	 the	 Central	 Committee	 Secretary.	
These	had	corresponding	departments	at	the	provincial	and	town	levels	in	
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which	 the	 full-time	party	 secretaries	 became	prominent	political	 leaders	
and	links	to	the	center.	(Rigby	199:	11.)	The	bureaucratization	coincided	
with	the	growing	practical	pressures	for	more	efficient	work	of	the	soviets	
which	led	to	a	centralization	process	at	all	 levels	and,	as	a	side	effect,	the	
decline	 in	democratic	practices.	 In	Moscow,	 for	 instance,	which	was	as	a	
major	city	with	city	district	soviets,	the	city	Soviet	had	decided	already	in	
191	 that	 the	 districts	 were	 directly	 subordinated	 to	 the	 city	 executive	
committee.	So	in	effect	the	districts	were	administrative	organs	for	the	city	
soviet.	(Sakwa	19:	16.)
The	bureaucratization	of	the	party	paradoxically	built	the	ground	for	the	
realization	of	Soviet	socialism	and	individual	dictatorship	at	the	same	time.	
From	the	outset	the	need	was	to	build	more	effective	connections	between	
the	 center	 and	 the	 localities,	 which	 was	 done	 with	 the	 help	 of	 Central	
Committee	 instructors	 sent	 to	 the	 provinces.	 The	 Central	 Executive	
Committeeprovided	funds	for	their	salaries	and	in	1920	the	CEC	started	to	
operate	financing	for	party	organs	outside	of	the	Commissariat	of	Internal	
Affairs.	This,	 together	with	 the	 even	more	 significant	 party	 instructions,	
created	a	centralized	system	of	personnel	control.	The	Eighth	Party	Congress	
Resolution	 demanded	 strict	 adherence	 to	 CEC	 decision	 making	 about	
personnel	 in	 which	 there	 would	 be	 “struggle	 against	 any	 localism	 or	
separatism”.	Bureaucracy	was	being	tackled	by	demanding	that	all	members	
of	soviets	take	part	in	administrative	work	and	more	people	be	drawn	into	
administration	to	avoid	a	bureaucratic	caste	being	born	(Sakwa	19:	14).	
Further	more,	a	 system	of	 rotation	was	created	which	 the	CEC	regularly	
reassigned	party	workers	from	one	field	of	work	to	another	and	different	
locations	 in	the	name	of	effectiveness.	The	personnel	question	was	taken	
seriously	 from	 the	beginning.	 In	1920	 the	CEC	was	making	about	1.000	
appointments	 per	 month.	 These	 were	 still	 mainly	 “mobilisations”	 but	
already	the	next	year´s	records	had	improved	so	that	the	process	was	more	
individual	and	accurate.	(Rigby	199:	10,	15.)
In	1919	the	above	example	of	Moscow	city	Soviet	reorganized	its	work	by	
reducing	the	size	of	its	20	collegia	while	in	some	departments	and	districts	
of	the	city,	collegia	were	abolished	completely.	Centralization	continued	in	
the	decision	to	manage	the	Soviet	through	a	general	management	committee	
which	answered	only	to	the	Presidium	of	the	Soviet.	Departments	were	at	
the	same	time	further	centralized.	In	the	districts	the	heads	of	the	executive	
committees	of	the	district	soviets	assumed	control	and	leadership	over	the	
work.	Sakwa	has	contended	that	the	one-man	rule	was	in	this	way	introduced	
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into	the	civilian	administration	before	the	economic	administration.	(Sakwa	
19:	15.)
The	culmination	of	all	these	directives	was	the	CEC	1920	specific	demand	
that	all	party	members	in	soviets	and	their	executive	committees	need	to	
subordinate	 their	decisions	 to	 the	 local	party	 centers.	 (Rigby	199:	11.)	
This	 parallel	 control	 organization	 (which	 was	 not	 specified	 in	 the	
Constitution)	 set	 the	 actual	 legal	 and	 policy	 limits	 for	 administrative	
decision	making.	It	was	most	notable	in	the	area	of	personnel	policy	through	
which	the	daily	connection	was	built.	When	the	elections	of	party	secretaries	
eventually	lost	their	meaning,	as	well	as	the	power	of	plenary	sessions	over	
executive	bodies,	political	power	became	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	
local	 party	 secretaries	 or	 the	 executive	 organs	 (Gill	 1990:	 3).	Thus	 the	
political	 administration	 was	 connected	 with	 the	 representational	
administration	very	early	on	in	the	transition	process.	
This	was	already	noticed	officially	by	the	3rd	general	meeting	of	soviets	in	
May	1925	which	criticized	the	soviets´	role	as	being	that	of	governmental	
agencies	 registering	 already	final	 decisions	 and	 the	non	 stop	 addition	of	
members	into	the	executive	committees.	The	motions	brought	about	in	the	
meetings	of	soviets	were	mostly	informatory	or	regulatory	type	accounts	of	
activities.	The	cultural	role	of	the	soviets	in	the	course	of	state	development	
evolved	from	providing	power	for	the	working	people	through	its	leading	
layer	to	providing	power	through	party-state	functionaries	after	the	1930´s.	
(Korzhikhina	1992.)
Personnel	policy	was	united	with	party	political	control	in	the	elaborate	
nomenklatura system	which	was	officially	established	 in	1923	 (Sungurov	
199:4).	In	this	system,	those	state	posts	both	in	administrative	organs	and	
social	organizations	which	were	considered	meaningful	enough	were	filled	
by	 candidates	 who	 had	 been	 previously	 selected,	 recommended	 and	
confirmed	 by	 a	 party	 committee	 from	 the	 district	 committee	 (town	
committee)	to	the	Central	committee.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	25.)
The	 list	 of	 official	 posts	 in	 the	 nomenklatura	 was	 not	 fixed.	 It	 was	
examined	every	year	and	the	number	of	official	posts	it	included	changed	
annually.	There	were	in	fact	two	main	lists	(no	1	and	no	2).	The	first	was	for	
decisions	made	 solely	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 regulating	 the	Politburo	 of	 the	
party	Central	 committee.	 In	addition	 it	 included	elected	posts	 for	which	
candidates	 were	 confirmed	 by	 the	 Central	 committee.	 The	 second	 list	
consisted	of	post	which	required	the	confirmation	of	a	special	organizational	
inspection	department	of	the	Central	committee.	Lists	of	names	for	a	third	
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group	 not	 belonging	 to	 either	 of	 the	 previous	 lists	 were	 to	 be	 prepared	
according	to	confirmation	of	the	same	department	of	Central	committee.	
This	list	appeared	from	1925	on	and	it	was	called	“agency	nomenklatura”.	
(Korzhikhina	 1995:	 25,	 Sungurov	 199:	 4.)	 In	 1930,	 a	 handbook	of	 the	
nomenklatura was	 issued.	 It	 included	 a	 detailed	 characterization	 of	 the	
duties	of	the	civil	servants.	(Edeen	1960:	26.)
The	most	important	effect	of	the	nomenklatura	structure	was	that	it	was	
a	closed	system.	The	general	public	was	officially	not	informed	about	it.	The	
responsibilities	 of	 functionaries	 and	 their	 privileges	 were	 not	 public	
information.	 From	 1932	 on,	 the	 lists	 of	 office	 posts	 and	 persons	 having	
these	positions	became	a	state	secret.	(Sungurov	199:	4.)
In	 addition	 to	 the	 nomenklatura,	 the	 general	 personnel	 policy	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union	 also	 created	 new	 employment	 reward	 policies	 which	were	
consolidated	in	laws	and	directives.	Originally	these	were	meant	to	reflect	
the	transitional	nature	of	the	system	by	changing	and	replacing	personnel.	
The	creation	of	a	new	system	of	recruitment,	advancement	and	payment	
was,	 of	 course,	 one	of	 the	 essential	 tools	 as	well	 as	 goals	 of	 the	 socialist	
government.	 The	 policies	 were	 enacted	 in	 four	 different	 areas:	 salary,	
housing,	 education	 and	 titles.	The	first	 one	 to	 change	was	 the	 system	of	
salaries	 and	 associated	 financial	 benefits.	As	Héléne	Carrére	 d´Encausse	
(190)	has	pointed	out,	the	model	in	matters	concerning	salary	and	other	
benefits	was	the	Paris	commune	where	blue	collar	workers	received	better	
salaries	than	public	functionaries.	In	191	(Nov.	1th)	a	decree	fixed	a	ceiling	
for the	 salary	 of	managers	 and	officials.	Only	 one	 room	per	 person	was	
allowed.	(Carrére	d´Encausse	190:	1.)	
The	initial	equality	was	soon	replaced,	bit	by	bit,	with	new	orders	which	
created	a	new	system	of	ranks	and	advantages	connected	with	them.	The	
starting	point	in	the	creation	of	new	reward	system	was	the	food-rationing	
measures	 which	 were	 already	 used	 in	 191.	 Insufficient	 goods	 were	
distributed	according	to	social	and	utilitarian	criteria	in	which	the	worker	
had	the	first	place.	Utilitarian	needs	soon	added	different	types	of	specialist	
to	 the	 group	 of	 favored.	 Doctors	 and	 nurses	 were	 granted	 special	 food	
rations	in	1919.	As	the	administration	needed	professionals	and	competent	
workers,	it	was	necessary	to	increase	their	salary	and	other	incentives.	In	
1920	blue-	and	white-	collar	workers involved	in	dangerous	activities,	and	
non-manual	 workers	 with	 exceptional	 qualifications	 received	 similar	
rewards.	(Carrére	d´Encausse	190:20.) The	parallel	control	principle	which	
created	a	body	of	party	functionaries	contributed	to	this	development.	
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Rigby	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 “the	 capacity	 to	 reward	 loyal	 service	 by	
promotion	 and	 to	 reassign	 ‘awkward’	 Communists	 to	 less	 sensitive	
positions	did	more	than	anything	else	to	transform	the	party	itself	into	a	
passive	 instrument	 of	 a	 disciplined	 officialdom	 and	 politically	 disarm	
internal	party	critics	of	the	ruling	oligarchy.”	In	1920	the	CEC	instructed	
that	local	staff	of	central	government	agencies	could	not	be	transferred	to	
another	 area	 without	 its	 approval.	 Internal	 transfers	 inside	 an	
administrative	area	required	the	approval	of	its	party	committee.	Junior	
staff	were	appointed	by	the	Central	Committee	Records	and	Assignment	
Department,	 while	 senior	 posts	 were	 filled	 by	 the	 Secretariat	 or	 the	
Orgburo.	Disputes	over	appointments	could	be	appealed	to	higher	levels.	
(Rigby	199:	15.)	In	Moscow,	the	party	control	of	appointments	in	the	
representational	administration	and	in	the	soviet	began	as	early	as	191.	
Here	it	was	decided	by	the	Moscow	party	committee	that	all	responsible	
posts	 in	 the	 city	 and	 district	 soviets	 were	 to	 be	 made	 with	 a	 party	
committee,	and	that	agendas	needed	to	be	pre-examined	by	the	committee	
(Sakwa	19:	14).	
The	centralization	raised	a	great	deal	of	discussion	during	the	first	years	
after	the	revolution.	There	was	criticism	over	the	interference	of	the	center	
in	local	soviet	work,	as	well	as	about	the	division	of	labor	which	the	tsarist	
specialist	were	seen	to	represent.	“Bureaucratism”	was	also	discussed	in	the	
press	which	printed	accounts	of	administrative	frustration.	In	Moscow	an	
example	was	the	issuing	of	travel	permits	to	its	inhabitants	which	required	
queueing	 to	 get	 needed	 documents	 from	 different	 departments	 of	 the	
Commission	for	the	Evacuation	of	Moscow.	(Sakwa	19:	192.)
The	case	of	Moscow	is	interesting	in	the	sense	that	in	the	capital	the	signs	
of	new	state	building	were	most	evident.	By	191	there	were	4.000 people	
working	in	the	local	offices	and	by	May	1919	the	number	had	increased	to	
9.000.	Office	workers	made	up	31	percent	of	 the	employed.	The	district	
soviet	staff	increased	simultaneously.	The	growth	of	administrative	workers	
meant	practical	problems	in	terms	of	housing,	for	instance.	In	1920	a	plan	
was	 made	 to	 transfer	 10.000	 of	 the	 200.000	 Moscow	 office	 workers to	
Petrograd.	(Sakwa	19:	191–193.)	This	plan	was	not	realized	but	it	is	telling	
of	the	side-effects	of	risk	planning.	
The	 administrative	 workers	 did	 not	 only	 grow	 in	 numbers.	 Internal	
differentiation	soon	began	within	this	large	group,	both	as	a	modification	of	
the	historical	rank	system	and	rewards	attached	to	 it.	The	administrative	
benefit	system	served	to	consolidate	loyalty	through	long	term	incentives.	
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Hélène	Carrère	d´Encausse	has	detected	four	social	groups	which	had	
already	been	formed	by	the	early	1920´s	as	a	result	of	new	elite	development.	
The	specialists	were	openly	rewarded	because	of	their	socialist	status.	Party,	
state	 and	 police	 officials	 had	 controlled	 salaries	 based	 on	 comparative	
worker	salaries	but	were	compensated	with	distribution	of	 food,	housing	
and	transportation.	The	army	had	a	better	than	average	pay,	a	good	pension	
system,	 educational	 privileges,	 special	 stores	 and	 housing.	 The	 creative	
intelligentsia	could	achieve	housing,	special	food	rations,	travel	opportunities	
and	 prizes,	 along	 with	 substantial	 sums	 of	 money.	 (Carrère	 d´Encausse	
190:	23.)
In	the	30´s	a	hierarchy	of	labor	emerged	in	which	bonuses	were	granted	
to	particular	factories	to	reward	efficiency,	output	or	savings.	The	highest	
paid	received	the	largest	bonuses.	In	the	administrative	spheres,	a	web	of	
closed	 stores	was	 established	which	multiplied	and	diversified	with	 the	
growth	of	 the	bureaucracy.	 In	some	cases	 these	stores	were	 truly	secret	
benefits	whose	location	was	known	only	to	the	those	with	permits	to	use	
them.	At	other	time,	ordinary	shops	had	a	special	counter	in	which	orders	
could	be	placed	by	the	privileged	without	having	to	queue.	In	1930,	a	new	
type	of	store	was	created,	a	foreign	currency	store	which	also	served	those	
who	had	access	to	traveling	and	foreign	contacts.	For	political	functionaries,	
a	 type	of	bonus	system	was	also	developed	 in	 the	 form	of	envelopes	of	
money	 from	 the	 20´s	 on.	This	 enabled	 them	 to	 shop	 in	 Soviet	 luxury	
stores	 which	 were	 outside	 the	 rationing	 system.	 (Carrére	 d´Encausse	
190:	30–31.)
Housing	was	another	source	of	differentiation	in	the	social	system	of	the	
society.	The	rents	of	the	privileged	(army,	police,	state	and	party	officials)	
were	equal	or	 lower	than	those	of	 the	workers	even	though	these	groups	
had	 private	 apartments.	 The	 workers	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 lived	 often	 in	
kommunalkas	where	 they	had	one	private	 room	and	 shared	kitchen	 and	
toilet	 facilities	 with	 other	 inhabitants.	 From	 1932	 on,	 free	 lodging	 was	
granted	 to	 those	 who	 had	 given	 the	 state	 exceptional	 service.	 (Carrére	
d´Encausse	190:	33.)
The	third	aspect	of	rewarding	citizens	was	access	to	education.	In	191	a	
decree	proclaimed	the	right	to	general	education	and	firstly	set	a	quota	system	
to	 advance	 admission	 of	 workers	 to	 their	 own	 institutions	 (Rabfak	 –	 a	
preparatory	 course	 leading	 to	 higher	 education)	while	 entering	 university	
level	 education	 was	 made	 difficult	 for	 other	 elements	 of	 society.	 Soon	 it	
became	apparent	that	education	was	an	essential	privilege	for	those	who	were	
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politically	most	 reliable	and	 suitable	 for	general	public	work.	 In	 the	20’s	 a	
system	of	quotas	gave	party	organizations,	the	Komsomol and	the	unions	the	
right	to	advance	their	members’	higher	education.	In	1926,	the	children	of	the	
so	 called	 creative	 intelligentsia	 (academicians,	 writers,	 artists,	 lawyers,	
doctors,	researchers	and	so	on)	were	given	a	quota	of	places	in	the	universities	
of	the	Russian	Federal	Republic.	(Carrére	d’	Encausse	190:	25.)
In	addition	to	these	elements	of	rewards,	a	fourth	one,	more	symbolic	
but	at	the	same	time	closely	connected	with	the	previously	mentioned	ones,	
was	 formed.	This	 was	 the	 creation	 of	 socialist	 titles	 which	 replaced	 the	
tsarist	 symbols	 and	 ranks.	The	first	of	 such	 titles	was	 the	Hero	of	Labor	
(192)	which	brought	to	its	owner	retirement	pay,	housing	and	exemption	
from	taxes.	A	more	easily	obtained	title	was	the	Red	Banner	of	Labor	(192)	
which	gave	less	concrete	benefits	and	was	often	awarded	to	entire	factories.	
In	the	1930’	s	titles	of	Hero	of	the	Soviet	Union,	Hero	of	Socialist	Labor	to	
the	Order	of	Lenin	and	the	Red	Banner	were	added.	In	the	army	existed	the	
Order	 of	 the	 Red	 Star.	 Benefits	 to	 these	 orders	 were	 hierarchial	 and	
diversified.	(Carrére	d’	Encausse	190:	3.)
In	his	1936	speech	to	the	th	Congress	of	the	Soviets,	Stalin	had	touched	
upon	the	issue	of	a	working	intelligentsia.	He	described	it	as	having	never	
been	a	class,	but	a	stratum	which	recruits	 its	members	from	peasant	and	
working	 classes.	 In	 addition	 he	 stressed	 that	 even	 in	 case	 the	 recruited	
persons	did	not	have	these	backgrounds,	the	intelligentsia	would	remain	a	
stratum	and	not	 a	 class	 in	 the	 socialist	 sense	of	 the	word.	 (Stalin	 2002.)	
With	this	type	of	a	reasoning,	the	policies	which	created	incentives	in	forms	
of	 privileges	were	 legitimized	 for	 not	 being	 antagonistic	 to	 specific	 class	
interests.	The	political	legitimation	for	administrative	action	which	in	fact	
changed	 the	 original	 revolutionary	 ideals	was	 thus	 institutionalized	 as	 a	
part	of	the	discourse	of	the	society.	In	this	discourse,	the	elite	and	its	leader	
told	the	majority	how	the	interpretive	context	had	changed.	
The	structural	changes	were	mediated	by	the	administration	at	all	levels	
of	 the	 system	 toward	 a	 professionally	 specialized,	 politically	 guided	 (in	
parallel	 as	 a	 double	 administration),	 socially	 homogenized,	 yet	 very	
hierarchical	system.	The	hierarchical	nature	of	the	system	in	all	 its	major	
aspects	 (economic	 planning	 system,	 leadership,	 personnel	 policies,	 rule	
making)	was	 a	 side-effect	 of	 the	 control	 and	 effective	 guidance	 problem	
which	was	central	to	the	political	change	ideology	of	administration.	The	
results	 of	 this	 mediation	 process	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 new	 culture	 of	
administration	formed	during	the	institutionalization	stage	of	transition.	
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4.2.2 Information Gathering, Control, Socialist Law and the 
Diversification of Institutions 
One	of	the	main	social	goals	of	the	revolution	had	been	to	transform	the	
peasant	population	into	either	industrial	workers	or	collective	farm	workers	
whose	production	would	 feed	 the	urban	dwellers.	The	 countryside	went	
through	a	major	transformation	during	the	civil	war	when	an	earlier	influx	
of	 towns	 people,	 fleeing	 the	 hunger	 and	 unemployment,	 entered	 the	
countryside	disturbing	its	social	traditions	and	order.	Moscow,	for	instance,	
had	lost	40	percent	of	its	191	population	by	the	year	1920.	One	consequence	
felt	in	the	rural	communities	was	the	break	up	of	the	extended	family.	The	
younger	generation	tried	to	continue	farming	under	the	new	conditions	but	
the	number	of	failures	grew.	This	prompted	a	migration	to	the	cities	which	
in	the	twenties	were	struggling	with	housing	and	employment	problems.	
The	migration	of	 former	peasants	 to	 towns	also	changed	the	 town	social	
hierarchies.	Newcomers	living	on	the	outskirts	of	the	towns	were	inferior	to	
the	more	urban	skilled	workers.	(Hoffmann	199:	114–199.)	This	was	the	
situation	into	which	the	new	administration	needed	to	be	fitted.	
In	 the	 new	 administrative	 ideology,	 controlling	 land	 use	 and	 indus-
trialization	 to	 modernize	 the	 country	 were	 connected	 within	 adminis-
tration	in	two	ways.	First	of	all,	land	was	socialized	and	its	use	needed	to	
be	 reorganized	 for	 efficiency.	 This	 required	 the	 controlling	 of	 work	
processes	and	results.	Economical	control	was	highly	political	work	and	it	
required	trusted	organizers.	Second,	industrialization	meant	that	a	growing	
group	 of	 people	 were	 rooted	 out	 from	 the	 village	 and	 provincial	 town	
environments	in	which	they	had	been	born	and	brought	into	bigger	cities	
in	which	the	condition	for	their	survival	needed	to	be	quickly	arranged.	
Third,	as	money	did	not	have	its	previous	position	in	the	society,	the	state	
had	to	arrange	a	wide	range	of	services	for	its	citizens.	All	these	developments	
required	 efficient	 administration	which	was	 specialized	 into	 new	 areas.	
These	goals	had	several	implications	for	the	development	of	administrative	
culture.	
Information	gathering	coincided	with	the	need	to	control	its	content	in	
the	 public.	 The	 new	 language	 was	 the	 language	 of	 the	 collectivization.	
Socialist	writers	were	required	to	understand	the	socialist	content	of	party	
decisions	and	the	pronouncements	of	comrade	Stalin.	The	aim	of	course	
was	 to	 create	 a	 manner	 of	 speech	 which	 was	 nonthreatening	 to	 state	
authority.	 (Gorham	2000:	149.)	Censorship	of	any	written	public	writing	
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was	established	as	a	state	administrative	function	in	1922	in	the	organization	
of	Head	administration	for	literature	and	publishing	(Glavnoe	upravlenie	po 
delam literatury i izdatel´stva)	(Pietiläinen	1994:	31).	
The	new	Head	administration	was	under	the	People´s	Commissariat	of	
Education	 and	 its	 local	 organs	 under	 the	 provincial	 departments	 of	
education.	The	main	ideological	purpose	was	to	find	and	stop	all	agitation	
against	 the	 new	 state,	 the	 revealing	 of	 military	 secrets	 and	 to	 stop	 the	
“dissemination	of	 false	 information”	and	material	having	a	pornographic	
character.	(Regulations	of	the	Glavlit 1922	in	Sakwa	1999:	135.)
For	 the	 administration	 then,	 a	 new	 environment	 for	 accumulating,	
processing	 and	 executing	 information	 was	 being	 created.	 The	 chosen	
policies	were	most	acutely	directed	to	the	stabilization	of	political	control.	
A	clash	of	cultures	was	not	allowed	and	was	to	be	avoided	by	the	elimination	
of	any	signs	of	acculturation.	
The	practical	needs	of	the	revolution	led	to	a	new	interpretation	of	a	local	
level	democracy.	From	the	early	1920´s	on,	developing	the	state	took	the	
form	 of	 building	 of	 an	 administrative-command	 system.	 This	 was	 the	
practical	 application	 of	 soviet-style	 democracy	 on	 the	 executive	 side	 to	
provide	for	class	economic	needs.	The	main	social	reason	for	the	need	of	
stricter	guidance	was	the	educational	and	political	level	of	the	population	
and	 “democracy	 of	 meetings”,	 which	 both	 led	 to	 an	 inability	 to	 make	
progress	 in	legislative	work	and	accept	party	decisions.	As	was	described	
earlier,	 the	 civil	 war	 further	 undermined	 democracy	 and	 lowered	 the	
activity	of	the	soviets.	Politically,	the	one	party	principle	which	took	effect	
in	the	early	1920´s,	effectively	killed	the	self-government	idea	which	was	
originally	incorporated	in	them.	(Korzhikhina	1995:1–1.)
The	building	of	the	administrative-command	system	was	connected	to	a	
new	 system	 of	 information	 gathering.	 This	 was	 first	 used	 to	 prevent	
opposition	forces	from	gaining	more	power,	and	then	as	an	organization	of	
routine	social,	economic	and	political	information	gathering	upon	which	
strategic	 political	 planning	 was	 based.	The	 building	 of	 this	 information	
gathering	system	started	officially	in	1921	with	an	order	from	the	head	of	
the	secret	police.	According	to	this	order	all	local	and	county	secret	police	
organs	were	obliged	to	report	on	the	political	developments	in	their	own	
area.	(“Sovershenno sekretno”,	Liubianka-Stalinu	o	polozhenii	v	strane,	tom	
1,	chast	1:	40,	2001.)
Essential	to	the	system	was	that	it	was	given	to	internal	security	forces	
(secret	 police	GPU,	 then	KGB,	 presently	 FSB)	which	 set	 up	 their	 own	
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links	to	all	local	communities.	The	other	feature	was	that	this	system	was	
parallel	but	at	the	same	time	separate	from	the	developing	administrative	
information	procedure,	which	was	 a	more	 “open”	 and	 routine	decision	
making	process	in	terms	of	its	documentation	and	reporting.	The	meaning	
of	 political	 information	 gathering	 resided	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 gave	 the	
leadership	a	rather	accurate	idea	about	what	people	thought,	i.e.	what	the	
sentiments	in	the	provinces	in	fact	were.	In	this	sense,	political	information	
gathering	 replaced	 open	 political	 discourse	 even	within	 the	 party	 as	 a	
means	 to	find	out	what	 reactions	and	 ideas	 lay	 in	different	parts	of	 the	
country.	 “Top	 secret”	 (sovershenno sekretno)	 reports	 constituted	 a	 vital	
part	of	policy	development	which,	in	this	way,	also	rendered	it	partially	
outside	the	control	of	official	representative	organs	and	even	administrative	
bodies.	
The	 building	 of	 an	 administrative	 command	 system	 resulted	 in	
considerable	growth	of	the	apparatus	itself	in	terms	of	new	organs	during	
the	20´s	and	30´s.	This	was	done	in	two	separate	but	parallel	ways	which	
can	be	called	multiplication	and	diversification.	The	first	concerned	adding	
the	new	people´s	commissariats	(narodnye kommissariaty, narkomaty)	and	
their	all-federal	structures	 into	the	state	apparatus	by	breaking	down	old	
structures	and	building	two	or	three	new	ones	in	its	place.	This	development	
took	 place	most	 of	 all	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 national	 economy.	The	 second	
development	concerned	the	social-cultural	administration	of	the	country.	
In	these	fields	there	was	a	simultaneous	effort	to	centralize	previously	lower	
level	administrative	organs	and	reduce	them	to	highly	specialized	but	more	
easily	controlled	units.	The	all-union	administration	of	scientific	institutions	
(1926),	higher	education	(1932),	health	care	(1936)	and	arts	(1936),	among	
others,	 was	 established	 during	 this	 period.	 All	 together	 60	 different	
ministerial	 level	 all-union	 organs	 were	 established	 between	 1920–1940.	
(Korzhikhina	1995:	22,	32–41.)
State	level	development	at	the	early	stages	of	the	transition	meant	building	
a	 new	 governing	 culture	 partially	 based	 on	 the	 old	 structures.	 Those	
commissariats	which	had	a	predecessor	in	the	previous	system	continued	at	
first	within	their	former	structures.	The	new	one,	such	as	commissariat	of	
Public	Health	had	to	be	built	from	the	start.	State	governing	organs	of	the	
time	could	be	categorized	into	four	groups:	
1.	 professional	 industry	 units	 (otraslevye)	 which	 were	 government	
branch	 agencies	 of	 their	 specific	 commissariats.	 Examples	 were	
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Forest	 administration	 (Commissariat	 of	 Agriculture),	 Sea	 trans-
portation	administration	and	Railway	administration	(Commissariat	
of	Transport).	
2.	 functional	(funktsional´nye)	units	which	represented	a	multitude	of	
different	organizations.	Examples	were	financial,	planning,	technical	
and	legal	departments.	
3.	 product	specific	(po vidam produktsii)	units,	of	which	examples	were	
Head	administrations	of	Salt	and	Tea	in	the	Commissariat	of	Food	
Supply	(BCHX).
4.	 general	 management/service	 (obshchie obsluzhivaiushchie)	 units	
which	appeared	in	all	government	organizations	in	large	numbers.	
These	 included	 for	 example	general	 administration,	 statistical	 and	
library	departments	of	 administrative	organizations.	 (Korzhikhina	
1995:	36.)
Typical	of	the	system´s	internal	logic	(i.e.	a	multilevel	structure	and	narrowly	
specialized	 responsibilities)	 is	 the	 example	 of	 the	 Commissariat	 of	
Transportation	which	 included	 the	Central	 administration	 of	 rail	 roads.	
The	central	administration	had	the	Department	of	machinery,	which	had	a	
department	 unit	 of	 locomotives.	 Inside	 of	 the	 department	 unit	 was	 the	
unit´s	 division	 of	 transportation.	 The	 republican	 and	 local	 level	
administrative	 organs	 followed	 the	 same	 pattern	 in	 their	 organizational	
development.	(Korzhikhina	1995:3.)
The	 third	 development	 was	 the	 functional	 separation	 of	 different	
bureaucratic	fields	into	political,	representational	and	economical,	the	latter	
becoming	 the	 core	 of	 the	 administrative	 system.	 The	 local	 level	 was	
obviously	affected	by	these	structural	changes	of	the	central	government.	
Besides	 the	 Cheka,	 in	 December	 191	 the	 National	 Economic	 Counsil	
(NEC	–	Vserossiiskii Sovet Narodnogo Khoziaistva/VSNKh)	was	established.	
Its	tasks	included	the	preparation	of	norms	and	plans	for	economic	life	in	
the	 country,	 co-ordination	 of	 the	 local	 and	 central	 regulating	 organs	
(committees	on	fuel,	metals,	transport,	food	supply	et.c.)	and	the	integration	
of	workers´	 control	movement	 into	 the	 industry	which	 ensured	 that	 the	
worker	 organizations	 which	 participated	 in	 the	 running	 of	 industry	
exercised	their	power	according	to	the	Sovnarkom	policies.	The	decisions	
of	 the	new	organ	were	 binding	 on	 local	 soviets	which	were	 to	 act	 as	 its	
agents.	 (CEC	 Chairman	 Sverdov	 and	 Sovnarkom	 Chairman	 Ulianov	
[Lenin]	in	191	in	McAuley	195:	231,	Rigby	199:	50–51.)
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The	economic	administration	was	first	organized	according	to	a	regional	
principle	 in	which	the	National	Economic	Council	headed	a	structure	of	
different	regional	and	local	economic	councils.	The	majority	of	enterprises	
were	 subordinated	 to	 the	 local	 organs.	The	 need	 to	 have	 more	 sectoral	
coordination	 led	 to	 a	 creation	 of	 trusts	 between	 enterprises	 of	 the	 same	
field.	When	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 trusts	 formed	 by	 big	 and	 centrally	 led	
enterprises	grew,	the	need	for	sectoral	administration	inside	the	economics	
administration	grew.	The	economic	people´s	commissariats,	created	from	
1932	on,	institutionalized	this	change.	(Tolonen	196:	339–340.)
The	criticism	within	the	various	socialist	factions	during	these	processes	
was	 mostly	 directed	 to	 the	 developing	 system´s	 own	 defects	 and	 not	
towards	the	culture	of	the	past.	Power	was	seen	to	have	moved	too	far	from	
the	 local	 soviets	 to	 the	center	which	gave	birth	 to	conflicts	between	 the	
soviets	and	the	commissariats.	The	answer	was	the	intensification	of	party	
control.	An	important	practical	tool	for	both	growing	party	guidance	and	
mobilization	of	citizens	in	state	affairs	was	the	People´s	Commissariat	of	
State	Control	(Goskontrol´)	which	had	been	established	in	191.	It	was	a	
reformed	former	Tsarist	office	of	State	Control.	In	the	city	of	Moscow,	a	
city	 department	 of	 state	 control	 was	 formed	 in	 the	 same	 year	 by	 the	
presidium	of	the	city	Soviet.	The	inspection	was	carried	out	mainly	through	
the	city	district	soviets	which	had	traditionally	good	links	with	the	factories.	
The	worker	 inspection	was	meant	 to	be	 a	way	 to	 combat	bureucratism.	
(Sakwa	 19:	 196–19.)	 It	 was	 meant	 to	 reduce	 the	 actual	 power	 of	
officialdom	 in	 work	 places	 by	 exposing	 it	 to	 outside	 examination	 and	
popular	will.	At	the	same	time	the	intention	was	to	secure	the	grass	roots	
influence	of	the	party.	
Stalin	 as	 the	 commissar	 for	 the	Goskontrol, drew	up	plans	 to	 involve	
more	 public	 participation	 in	 the	ministry´s	 work	 in	 1919.	 Yet	 concerns	
about	 a	 possible	 opposition	 being	 born	 in	 the	 work	 place	 inspection	
structures	 partially	 led	 to	 a	 reorganization	 of	 worker	 control	 in	 1920.	
Control	 organs	 were	 integrated	 into	 a	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	
Workers´and	 Peasants´Inspection	 (Rabkrin).	 The	 worker	 inspection	
members	 were	 to	 be	 elected	 and	 local	 Rabkrin	 departments	 were	 to	 be	
formed	under	the	city	district	(raion)	soviets	and	subordinate	to	the	soviet.	
Its	duty	was	 to	 investigate	all	administrative	and	economic	bodies	at	 the	
local	level,	with	the	exception	of	the	Cheka.	Most	inspectors	were	workers	
and	the	Rabkrin	structure	was	a	way	of	advancement	into	state	and	party	
bodies	for	many.	In	this	way,	as	Richard	Sakwa	has	pointed	out,	the	battle	
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against	bureaucratism	was	eclipsed	by	the	very	need	to	staff	the	inspection	
bureaucracy	itself.	(Sakwa	19:	19–199.)
From	mid	20´s	on	the	idea	of	control	within	the	administrative	command	
system	was	implemented	in	the	major	growth	of	the	executive	side	of	state	
apparatus	(note,	for	example,	the	growth	of	the	CEC	apparatus	described	
earlier	 in	 chapter	 4.2.1),	 particularly	 that	 part	 concerned	 with	 the	
compulsory	 administration:	 People´s	 Commissariat	 of	 Internal	 Affairs	
(Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del – NKVD),	different	types	of	control	
organizations	 (financial,	 health,	 planning	 and	 so	 on).	 All	 these	 control	
organizations	were	centralized	and	operated	throughout	the	Soviet	Union,	
independent	of	the	soviets.	Administrative	control	was	carried	out	by	the	
People´s	Committee	of	Internal	Affairs	of	the	Soviet	Union,	established	in	
1934.	(Korzhihina	1995:	22–23.)
The	 second	 reaction	 by	 the	 Bolshevik	 government	 to	 the	 risks	 of	
resistance	and	inefficiency	was	the	creation	of	“security-political	control”	
organizations	to	strengthen	Bolshevik	hold	of	the	country.	The	structure,	
which	combined	both	 in	 the	beginning	of	 the	 transition	period,	was	 the	
Military-Revolutionary	Committee	(MRC	–	Voenno-revoliutsionnyi komitet)	
which	had	captured	power	in	the	capital.	It	can	be	described	as	a	government	
inside	 the	 new	 government	 because	 of	 its	 wide	 role	 in	 the	 control	 and	
guidance	of	the	new	Soviet	administration.	(Rigby	199:	14.)
The	Military-Revolutionary	Committee	was	important	to	the	creation	of	
the	Soviet	administration	culture	because	it	represented	a	political	control	
organization	operating	outside	of	the	legally	authoritative	main	structures.	
In	 this	 sense	 it	was	 the	first	 formation	of	power	 through	which	 the	 later	
developed	principle	of	party/administration	union	emerged.	As	Rigby	has	
documented,	it	contained	of	groups	of	commissars	and	representatives	of	
other	 institutions	 whose	 first	 problem	 was	 to	 win	 authority	 from	 the	
minority	 socialists	 in	 the	 Central	 Executive	 Committee	 and	 secure	 the	
loyalty	 of	 supporters	 to	 its	 own	 instructions.	 Military	 and	 other	 power	
connections	 were	 used	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 commands	 of	 the	MRC	were	
listened	to.	In	principle	the	commissars	of	the	MRC	were	supposed	to	stay	
out	of	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ministries.	In	reality	though,	the	MRC	gave	
them	 instruction	 about	 countering	 sabotage	 and	 the	 recruitment	 of	
personnel.	(Rigby	199:	15–16.)	
The	MRC	was	also	involved	in	more	general	management	of	the	country	
since	it	took	part	in	the	distribution	of	fuel,	winter	footwear	and	clothing.	
An	 important	part	of	 its	 role	was	 the	control	of	 the	press	by	supervising	
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their	writing	and	taking	necessary	action.	In	Petrograd	the	MRC	involved	
itself	in	local	government	decision	making	by,	for	example,	issuing	permits	
to	live	in	the	capital	and	travel	by	train.	(Rigby	199:	1.)
Lenin	had	supported	an	idea	in	which	local	decision	making	served	in	the	
role	of	a	voluntary	supporter	of	the	unity	of	the	state.	Administrative	unity	
quickly	 replaced	 this	 goal.	 Lenin	quotes	Engels	who	 thought	 that	 perfect	
local	self-government	happens	through	administrators	who	are	elected	in	a	
general	election	and	this	meant	the	abolishment	of	all	state	appointed	local	
and	 county	 positions.	 (Lenin	 196,	 19.)	 As	 previously	 mentioned,	 the	
Soviets	at	the	local	level	were	in	fact	very	active	in	different	matters	at	first,	
without	 even	waiting	 for	 instructions	 from	 the	central	government.	Only	
foreign	affairs	were	beyond	their	decision	making.	(Hazard	196:	100–101.)	
An	important	example	is	that	of	the	military-revolutionary	committees	set	
up	in	provincial	towns	and	administrative	districts.	These	were	important	
for	the	creation	of	stronger	Bolshevik	presence	in	the	provinces.	The	example	
which	 the	 Petrograd	 MRC	 set	 was	 important	 for	 the	 inspiration	 and	
coordination	of	these	bodies.	(Rigby	199:	1.)	
For	the	lower	level,	a	major	concern	was	that	of	the	demands	from	above,	
which	were	non-specific	and	ideological.	Their	practical	fulfillment	was	left	
open,	since	purposes	themselves	were	more	 important	 for	the	 leadership	
than	translation	to	procedures.	(Gill	1990:	3.)The	improvisation,	structural	
fluidity	and	ad hoc	adaptation	to	different	situations	by	the	MRC	bodies	led	
to	 new	 organizational	 risks.	 When	 the	 more	 established	 governmental	
organizations	 started	 to	work	 in	 a	more	organized	and	efficient	manner,	
parallel	organization	and	duplication	in	decision	making	also	began	to	raise	
criticism.	 The	 structures	 of	 Military-revolutionary	 committees	 were	
abolished	on	December	5th,	191.	(Rigby	199:	20–21.)
The	 remaining	 acute	 problems	 of	 possible	 counter-revolution	 and	
resistance	opened	the	door	to	Dzerzhinskii´s	proposal	for	a	special	organ	
concentrating	on	combating	counter-revolution.	A	result	was	the	birth	of	
the	 All-Russian	 Extraordinary	 Commission	 for	 Combating	 Counter-
Revolution,	 Speculation	 and	 Sabotage	 (the	 VeCheka/	 Vserossiiskaia 
Chrezvychainaia Komissiia po Bor´be s	 Kontr-revoliutsiei, Spekuliatsiei i 
Sabotazhem	 ).	The	Military-Revolutionary	 Committees	 had	 served	 their	
role	which	Rigby	has	defined	as	“a	structural	coupling	device	linking	two	
successive	political	systems”.	(Rigby	199:	20–21.)
The	 duties	 of	 the	VeCheka were	 impressive.	 It	 had	 to	 investigate	 and	
nullify	 all	 possible	 counter-revolutionary	 acts	 and	 attempt	 of	 sabotage,	
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conduct	preliminary	investigations	and	bring	the	suspects	to	Revolutionary	
Tribunals.	 The	 Commission	 was	 divided	 into	 sections	 of	 information,	
organization	of	work,	and	fighting.	Practical	measures	which	were	dictated	
by	Lenin	in	his	order,	included	publication	of	the	names	of	the	enemies	of	
the	 people,	 confiscation	 of	 cards	 and	 imprisonment.	 (Lenin	 191	 in	
McAuley	199:	12.)
The	VeCheka	became	a	controlling	organ	over	the	local	Chekas	which	
for	instance	in	Moscow	was	divided	into	district	Chekas.	An	institutional	
border	was	being	erected	when	the	Moscow	city	Cheka was	instructed	to	
concentrate	on	the	battle	within	organizations,	against	bribery,	banditry	and	
other	economic	crimes.	The	revolutionary	tribunals	took	over	the	counter-
revolutionary	work	and	sentencing	of	people.	(Sakwa	19:	12–13.)
The	institutionalization	of	counter-revolutionary	measures	in	the	Cheka	
soon	 led	 to	 a	 Sovnarkom	 decision	 to	 use	 terror	 as	 a	 governing	 policy.	
People´s	 Commissar	 of	 Justice	 Kursky	 gave	 an	 order	 in	 191	 in	 which	
concentration	 camps,	 executions	 of	 White	 Guard	 members	 and	 other	
adversaries	 and	 publication	 of	 names	 were	 to	 be	 used.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	
number	of	arrested	persons	 in	 the	same	year	was	4.34,	and	0.662	the	
following	year.	Between	191–1919,	42	%	of	all	arrested	persons	were	freed	
without	consequence,	nearly	11%	were	sent	to	forced	labor,	2%	to	prisons	
and	nearly	%	to	concentration	camps.	Between	191–1919,	.06	persons	
were	 executed	 for	 counter-revolution,	 632	 for	 crime	 of	 office,	 21	 for	
speculation	 and	1.204	 for	 crime.	 (People´s	Commissar	of	 Justice	Kursky	
191	and	Cheka	weekly	bulletin	1920	in	McAuley	199:	16–1.)	
In	the	early	developments,	the	bureaucratization	of	the	party	work	(i.e.	
the	need	to	involve	and	infiltrate	the	administration	to	make	it	work	for	the	
new	purposes),	institutionalization	of	the	new	political	order	inside	the	old	
structures	(i.e.	changes	in	personnel	and	decision	making	style)	and	control	
of	risks	(i.e.	resistance	by	political	opponents,	counter-revolutionary	plans)	
involved	in	the	transition,	all	came	together.	The	Cheka	in	this	sense	can	be	
seen	as	a	side-effect	of	the	revolution	itself.	It	can	be	understood	as	inevitable	
in	the	conditions	of	civil	war,	yet	its	creation	was	also	a	political	child	of	the	
transitional	MRC.	
The	 growing	 system	 required	 relience	 on	 inspection	 as	 a	 method	 of	
control.	Inspection	required	a	network	of	personal	agents,	instructors	and	
caretakers.	They	were	used	as	a	source	of	authority	in	different	parts	of	the	
country	in	the	solving	of	practical	problems.	This	was	a	practice	adopted	by	
the	 Bolshevik	 government	 as	 an	 inheritance	 from	 tsarist	 times.	 In	 the	
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Ministry	of	Interior	organization,	a	special	cadre	of	volunteers	worked	on	
the	organization	of	political	leadership	for	the	new	local	institutions.
New	 Economic	 Policy	 (NEP)	 replaced	 the	 early	 policies	 on	 law	 and	
economics.	The	 testing	 ground	 for	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 the	
ideology	came	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	first	five	year	plan	which	was	 formally	
adopted	 in	 1929.	The	main	 feature	 of	 planning	 and	 government	 policy	
became	speed.	The	targets	of	the	first	five	year	plan	affected	system	building	
by	setting	limits	too	high.	Labor	productivity,	costs	and	yields	had	ambitious	
targets	 if	 the	national	 income	was	 to	be	 sharply	 increased.	The	planners	
were	 at	 the	 same	 time	 under	 high	 political	 pressure,	 fearing	 punitive	
measures,	if	they	did	not	comply	with	the	idealistic	goals.	Bukharin,	Rykov	
and	 Tomsky	were	 examples	 of	 names	who	 dared	 to	 openly	 criticize	 the	
ambitious	version	and	personally	suggested	a	more	modest	plan	along	with	
a	two-year	plan	for	agriculture.	(Lewin	1995:	95–99.)
The	 first	 five	 year	 plan	 coincided	 with	 the	 development	 of	 Stalinist	
leadership.	Stalin´s	ideas	of slowly	reforming	the	peasantry,	its	psychology	
and	production	in	the	spirit	of	collectivism	which	was	for	him	a	prequisite	
for	the	destruction	of	classes,	were	in	line	with	the	Leninist	ideals	of	contra-
individualism.	 Four	 issues	 come	 together	 in	 192	 in	 his	 writings	 about	
industrialization	of	the	country	and	the	right	wing	within	the	Communist	
party:	contra-individualism,	legal	relativism,	the	grain	problem	and	rapid	
technological	 evolution	of	 the	whole	 society.	Neither	 any	of	 these	 issues	
alone,	nor	the	general	governing	logic	developing	in	connection	with	them,	
can	be	understood	without	considering	them	together	in	the	context	used	
by	Stalin	in	his	pronounced	political	goal.	Instead	of	a	separate	policy	on	
any	particular	issue,	the	governing	logic	linked	ideas	together	in	a	seemingly	
inescapable	manner.	The	basic	cultural	tendency	behind	the	rationalization	
is	heavily	concentrated	on	power	and	on	the	force	needed	to	secure	it.	This	
is	 often	 done	without	 the	 explicit	 referral	 to	 either	 of	 the	 elements.	The	
rationalization	used	by	Stalin	in	his	writing	about	the	situation	of	agriculture	
offers	a	prime	example	of	this	logic.
At	 the	 level	 of	 state	 building	 the	 major	 change	 took	 place	 when	 the	
administration	 turned	 from	acting	as	 the	keeper	of	order	 to	 that	of	 total	
economical	 provider	 with	 no	 alternatives.	 For	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	
citizens	this	meant	that	control	took	on	a	different	type	of	form.	While	the	
Tsar´s	 administration	 could	be	 characterized	 as	 taking	 the	 form	of	 local	
police,	the	new	local	administration	took	the	form	of	economic	controller/
provider,	 a	 role	 which	 was	 secured	 by	 political	 inspection.	 The	 Soviet	
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administration	at	the	local	level	in	this	sense,	took	on	a	role	of	all	powerful	
decision	maker	from	whom	there	was	no	escape.	Escape	would	have	meant	
exclusion	from	society.	
The	practical	relationship	of	political	decision	making	and	law	had	been	
in	development	 since	 the	early	days	of	 the	revolution.	The	speech	which	
Stalin	gave	in	1936	can	be	seen	as	the	culmination	of	a	process	of	legitimation	
of	political	decision	making	 and	administrative	 action	on	 legal	 grounds.	
Administration	 and	 law	 were	 used	 as	 instruments	 of	 education	 and	
elimination	of	opposition	 in	several	ways.	 Ideologically,	melting	 together	
the	concept	of	class	struggle	and	state	building	through	their	relationship	
with	 law	 was	 paramount.	 Law	 as	 an	 independent	 area	 of	 state	 lost	 this	
meaning.	Legal	rhetoric	was	instead	used	in	the	building	of	dictatorship.	
Originally,	the	first	issue	concerning	law	were	connected	with	property	
rights.	In	Lenin´s	view	it	was	not	possible	to	see	that	people,	immediately	
on	being	freed	from	capitalism,	would	learn	to	work	for	the	society	without	
any	 legal	norms.	Moreover,	 this	was	not	 even	 economically	possible.	 In	
this	situation	the	capitalist	norms	would	not	have	been	replaced	and	the	
state	would	 continue	 to	be	needed	as	 a	protector	of	 socialized	property	
ownership	which	guaranteed	equality	 in	work	and	in	the	distribution	of	
products.	Before	the	higher	stage	of	communist	society	could	be	reached,	
the	 strictest	 kind	of	 control	 of	work	 and	 consumption	 from	 the	part	 of	
society	and	state	were	needed.	It	was	important	that	this	control	should	be	
executed	by	the	armed	workers´	state	and	not	by	a	state	of	civil	servants.	
(Lenin	196:	213–215.)	
Firstly,	the	early	state	building	brought	along	the	use	of	provisional	order	
organizations	 both	 at	 the	 central	 and	 municipal	 levels.	 Some	 had	 been	
paramilitary	 organizations	 for	 revolution,	 others	 helped	 the	 local	
government	 in	practical	 political-economic	 tasks	 such	 as	 confiscation	of	
surplus	from	private	farmers.	Others	still	participated	in	civil	war	in	aid	of	
the	 military.	 Among	 these	 organizations,	 was	 a	 practice	 of	 naming	
authorities	and	commissars	of	central	organs	with	provisional	powers	for	
special	and	temporary	tasks.	For	the	specific	purpose	of	strengthening	the	
Soviet	power,	these	authorities	acted	in	place	of	ordinary,	constitutionally	
based	organizations.	(Korzhikhina	1995:3.)
In	 practice	 this	 led	 to	 the	 decree	 of	 Court	 in	 191	 which	 abruptly	
proclaimed	the	end	of	courts,	the	prosecutor´s	offices	and	the	advocacy	and	
the	 installment	 of	 a	 new	 organization	 of	 revolutionary	 justice	 (Bowring	
2000).	The	first	years	of	this	experimentation	meant	the	coexistence	of	old	
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laws	 and	 revolutionary	 lawyers	 with	 new	 decrees	 and	 institutions.	 The	
decisions	 reached	 at	 the	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 were	 dependent	 on	 the	
arbitrary	 “revolutionary	 legal	 consciousness”	 when	 laws	 did	 not	 exists,	
otherwise	they	were	politically	incorrect	or	in	conflict	with	each	other.	This	
period	of	legal	nihilism	led	to	the	factual	breakdown	of	the	legal	system.	
The	new	legal	policy	was	connected	to	localism	through	the	establishment	
of	a	system	for	settling	disputes	without	state	 intervention	in	cases	of	no	
larger	danger	to	the	community.	The	organization	in	which	the	idea	was	to	
be	tested	was	the	People´s	Court	(Act	of	191)	which	tried	all	other	cases	
except	 political	 ones.	 The	 selection	 of	 judges	 was	 made	 from	 a	 list	 of	
nominees	prepared	by	the	city	executive	committees,	and	confirmed	by	a	
general	meeting	of	the	borough	soviet.	In	villages,	nominations	were	made	
by	executive	committees	of	village	soviets	and	actual	selection	by	the	higher	
county	soviet	executive	committee.	Important	for	the	legal	culture	was	the	
denial	 of	professional	 advocacy	 as	 an	 inalienable	 right	of	 the	 individual.	
Particularly	 harmful	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 individual	 rights	 was	 the	
possibility	of	denying	the	presence	of	attorney	in	preliminary	investigations	
if	 the	 court	 felt	 that	his	 presence	might	hinder	 the	finding	of	 true	 facts.	
(Hazard	1960:	9,	51.)
Secondly,	 moral	 and	 legal	 relativism	 was,	 in	 this	 practical	 measure,	
equated	with	the	principle	of	dialecticism	which	meant	looking	at	practical	
choices	in	terms	of	the	conditions	set	by	time	and	place.	The	connection	
between	 the	 developments	 in	 the	 rural	 Russia	 and	 in	 theoretical	 and	
practical	formulations	of	Soviet	law	in	the	20´s	can	be	drawn	between	the	
reasons	Stalin,	in	the	same	July	192	writing,	gave	to	the	use	of	the	so	called	
“special	measures”	which	had	been	used	to	forcibly	collect	grain	from	the	
countryside.	Stalin´s	dialectical	reasoning	was	based	on	the	huge	deficiency	
in	the	grain	stocks	which	would	have	resulted	in	serious	national	economic	
crisis,	 hunger	 in	 the	 army	 and	 in	 the	 cities.	 In	 Stalin´s	 assesment,	 the	
Bolshevik	 government	 could	 neither	 use	 market	 manipulation	 to	 bring	
down	 the	 “kulak´s	 prices”,	 nor	 did	 it	 have	 the	 foreign	 currency	 reserves	
needed	to	buy	grain	from	outside.	Both	situations	might	have	prevented	the	
repressive	measures	which	 –	 expressly	 underlined	 by	 Stalin	 –	 should	 be	
avoided	 in	 the	 future	by	 taking	care	of	 the	principle issues.	 (Stalin	1951:	
191–192.)
The	 combination	 of	 decentralized	 legislative	 authority	 and	 growing	
centralization	of	political	power	–	which	legitimized	random	use	of	coercive	
force	against	the	population	–	led	to	the	erosion	of	trust	between	state	and	
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citizenry.	 Most	 poignantly	 it	 effected	 the	 justice	 system	 –	 which	 in	
democratic	societies	is	the	last	independent	control	against	administrative	
power.	This	control	ceased	to	exist.	The	status	of	a	law	was	also	quite	prone	
to	 bureau	 regulations	 and	 even	 party	 decisions	 (from	 the	 Politburo	 to	
regional	committees).	It	was	thus	impossible	to	talk	about	the	priority	of	
laws	 in	 such	 a	 flood	 of	 different	 types	 of	 legislative	 acts.	 (Korzhikhina	
1995:	1.)	
The	political	needs	of	the	leadership	in	directing	social	development	led	
to	the	internal	war	against	elements	inside	society	which	were	considered	
detrimental	to	the	success	of	revolution.	As	a	result,	legal	procedures	were	
politicized	 and	 norms	 simplified.	 Eugene	Huskey	 has	 named	 the	 period	
from	 192–1932	 “naked	 instrumentalism”	 in	 which	 law	 was	 embraced	
when	it	was	needed	in	the	campaigns	of	collectivization,	industrialization	
or	social	re-education.	When	law	was	not	in	line	with	the	leadership´s	goals,	
it	 was	 eliminated.	 In	 the	 administration	 this	 led	 to	 confusion	 in	 which	
officials	looked	for	political	signals	and	used	revolutionary	instincts	in	place	
of	legal	norms.	(Huskey	1992.)
The	collectivization	of	agriculture	began	in	1929.	The	implication	of	this	
was	the	brutal	dispossession	of	peasants	as	an	administrative	process.	The	
26	million	 productive	 household	 units	 which	 had	 existed	 in	 1929	 were	
replaced	with	235.000	collective	farms	by	193.	This	enabled	the	feeding	of	
towns	where	 the	new	working	 class	was	growing	on	 the	 surplus	derived	
from	the	changed	structures.	More	importantly,	the	violence	crushed	any	
possible	criticism	and	counter-revolutionary	activity	in	the	vast	countryside.	
Power	was	established	in	the	urban	centers	where	the	population	rose	from	
2.1	million	in	1929	to	63.1	million	in	1940.	Terror	was	used	not	as	tool	of	
social	change	but	as	a	deliberate	method	of	governance.	(Lane	1996:	41.)	
The	Supreme	Court	of	Russian	Federation	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics	
was	 created	 in	 1922	 by	 the	 Decree	 “On	 the	 Judicial	 System”.	 This	 was	
followed	by	the	adoption	of	Civil	and	Criminal	codes.	People´s	judges	were	
elected	and	could	be	dismissed	by	the	local	authorities.	(Bowring	2000	:2.)	
By	the	mid-1930´s	the	restoration	of	legal	structures	was	taking	place	and	a	
1932	decree	on	revolutionary	legality	was	passed.	It	was	symptomatic	of	the	
structural	weakness	which	had	appeared	 in	 the	devolution	of	 legal	order	
and	decision	making.	There	was	a	need	to	fight	localism	and	departmentalism	
in	favor	of	central	control.	The	state	again	had	an	interest	in	using	the	law	
as	a	consolidation	of	its	authority	both	at	home	and	abroad.	Theoretically,	
law	 in	 the	 state	 building	 process	 received	 new	meaning	 in	 the	 ideas	 of	
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A.	Vyshinski,	who	saw	the	effective	use	and	perfection	of	capitalist	science	
and	culture	(including	law)	as	responsibilities.(Huskey	1992.)	
The	development	of	the	role	and	functions	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	is	
telling	of	 the	structuration	process	which	 took	place	 in	one	organization	
between	191	and	the	end	of	the	1930´s.	The	prosecutor´s	office	was	first	
abolished	in	191	and	its	functions	were	replaced	with	the	earlier	mentioned	
new	legal	organizations.	By	1922	the	Bolshevik	government	had	decided	to	
re-establish	the	prosecutor´s	office	and	it	was	given	wide	authority	besides	
purely	 prosecutorial	 functions.	 The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 was	 made	
independent	 of	 local	 and	 regional	 authorities	 and	 it	 was	 to	 supervise	
administration	and	citizenry.	In	192	the	prosecutor´s	office	took	care	of	an	
impressive	list	of	matters:	the	review	and	appeal	of	civil	and	criminal	cases,	
the	 supervision	 of	 prisons,	 prisoner	 complaints,	 parole	 and	 release,	
supervision	of	the	police	and	secret	police,	juvenile	commissions	and	of	the	
courts.	In	addition,	the	prosecutor´s	office	supervised	the	administration´s	
work	and	enterprises	at	all	levels.	In	the	1930´s	this	list	was	supplemented	
with	the	task	of	investigating	the	execution	of	party	policies	which	preceded	
its	 involvement	 in	 the	 repression	 which	 commenced	 at	 the	 close	 of	 the	
1930´s.	(Smith	199:	350.)
The	 courts	 were	made	 subordinate	 to	 administrative-party	 organs	 and	
many	questions	continued	to	be	decided	outside	of	the	court	system.	During	
the	peak	of	the	repression	period,	the	three	institution	collective	(the	so	called	
troek)	made	up	of	the	first	secretary	of	the	party	committee	in	question,	the	
head	of	the	state	security	organ	NKVD	and	the	prosecutor´s	office,	was	used	
to	enact	rulings,	including	capital	punishment.	(Sungurov	199:	3.)
One	of	the	most	interesting	aspects	of	the	work	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	
was	 its	 involvement	 in	 the	 economic	 decision	 making	 within	 the	
administrative	market.	As	 a	 supervisor	 of	 legality	 it	 took	 part	 in	matters	
which	were	purely	organizational	such	as	advising	factories	about	production	
or	farms	about	grain	harvest.	(Smith	199:	350.)	The	work	of	the	prosecutor´s	
office,	in	other	words,	extended	far	beyond	legal	matters	alone	or	what	might	
be	seen	as	 the	boundaries	of	 the	 legal	profession.	Also	the	triple	role	of	a	
participant	 in	 both	 investigation	 and	prosecution	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
supervising	the	courts,	made	the	prosecutor´s	office	the	heart	of	the	 legal	
culture	and	a	powerful	influence	in	the	administrative	market.	
The	mediation	of	ongoing	political	and	economic	changes	in	the	country	
were	formalized	in	the	Constitution	of	1936.	The	report	of	Stalin	to	the	th	
Congress	of	the	Soviets	in	November	the	same	year	gives	an	idea	of	how	the	
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fundamental	 law	 was	 to	 be	 viewed	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 a	 basis	 of	
administrative	state	building.	Stalin	brought	up	two	issues.
Firstly,	 the	 transitional	 character	 of	 the	 state	 was	 emphasized	 by	 the	
statement	 that	 the	 fundamental	 law	was	 a	 proclamation	 of	 those	 things	
which	 (according	 to	 the	 leadership)	 had	 already	 been	 achieved,	 not	 a	
program	which	was	to	set	the	goals	for	the	future.	Stalin	underlined	that	the	
qualities	of	a	future	state	of	full	communism	could	not	be	included	in	the	
fundamental	 law,	only	 those	 features	of	 the	society	which	had	materially	
been	changed.	Secondly,	he	stated	that	the	Constitution	was	not	a	code	of	
laws	 and	 does	 not	 preclude	 routine	 legislative	 work	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	
legislative	 bodes.	 (Stalin	 2002.)	This	 formulation	 for	 the	meaning	 of	 the	
Constitution	 is	 interesting	 for	 the	 development	 of	 legal	 thinking	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union.	As	law	itself	was	transitional,	and	its	application	instrumental,	
there	 could	 be	 no	 fixed	 legal	 standards	 for	 the	 assessment	 of	 future	
developments.	 As	 the	 Constitution	was	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 proclamation	 of	
already	achieved	changes	and	not	a	document	enlisting	basic	principles	of	
the	 society,	 then	 it	 could	 not	 be	 directly	 used	 as	 a	 standard	 for	 future	
development.	The	main	use	became	a	comparison	of	future	developments	
with	the	already	documented	changes	to	check	whether	the	state	had	kept	
its	proclaimed	standards.	
During	 the	 reign	 of	 Stalin,	 the	 interpretive	 lense	 through	 which	 the	
Constitution	 could	 be	 read	 was	 institutionalized	 via	 various	 legal,	
administrative	and	political	methods.	The	most	striking	case	is	the	freedoms	
of	 citizens	 which	 are	 listed	 in	 the	 articles	 124–126	 of	 the	 Constitution.	
Formally,	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 political	 change	 ideology,	 the	
interpretive	context	meant	most	of	all	the	class	based	interest	analysis	of	all	
situations.	 In	practice,	 according	 to	 the	Constitution,	 “the	 interest	of	 the	
working	 people”	 were	 represented	 by	 the	 highest	 political	 organs	 in	
accordance	with	the	idea	of	a	centralized	democracy.	Article	49	stated	that	
the	presidium	of	the	Supreme	Soviet,	which	had	exclusive	legislative	power,	
interpreted	the	laws	of	the	USSR	in	operation.	This	right	was	compounded	
by	the	double	hierarchy	of	the	party	system,	the	actual	relationship	of	which	
with	state	organs	was	not	stated	in	the	Constitution.	The	only	mention	of	
the	one	party	system	was	in	article	141	which	stated	the	Communist	party	
as	the	only	party	organization	allowed	to	nominate	candidates	in	elections.	
(1936	Constitution	of	the	USSR.)
Moreover,	democratic	liberties	were	seen	as	being	guaranteed	with	the	
economic	rights	of	the	majority	of	people.	According	to	the	political	change	
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ideology,	democracy	was	in	essence	the	material	resources	given	to	people	
by	the	state.	This	meant	at	the	formal	and	practical	level	a	new	relationship	
between	the	administration	and	the	administered.	The	concept	of	law	was	a	
fundamental	element	in	this	change.	It	legitimized	the	idea	of	administration	
as	an	economy	serving	the	needs	of	the	peasantry	(and	workers)	as a class.	
The	concept	of	individual	rights	as	something	inalienable	to	their	holders	
did	not	belong	to	this	thinking.	
From	 the	 administration´s	 perspective,	 repression	 served	 at	 least	 two	
purposes	in	the	development	of	state	building.	First,	it	was	legitimized	by	
the	intention	to	speed	up	the	colossal	demographic	and	economic	changes	
needed	for	modernization	and	socialist	economy.	The	internal	migration	
moved	former	peasants	to	towns	and	cities,	bringing	with	them	new	social	
requirements.	 This	 transition	 of	 social	 life	 also	 exposed	 them	 to	 other	
factors	 important	 to	 the	 new	 state	 building	 project:	 symbolics	 and	
propaganda.	(Makarenko	199:	12.)	
Second,	repression	was	meant	to	create	an	atmosphere	of	monopoly	over	
ideological	interpretation.	This	monopoly	was	held	by	the	party	and	then	
by	Stalin	himself.	Looking	at	the	transition	from	a	party	held	monopoly	to	
a	one	man	dictatorship	offers	a	chance	to	understand	some	elements	of	the	
Soviet	administrative	culture	of	the	time.	
Repression	of	the	party	elite	began	with	the	assassination	of	Kirov,	after	
which	the	two	major	cities	of	Moscow	and	Leningrad	became	the	targets	of	
the	“cleaning”	of	party	hierarchies.	The	most	extensive	terror	was	used	in	
193.	Public	court	sessions	began	to	be	used	as	a	means	of	removing	political	
opponents	for	educational	purposes.	(Makarenko	199:	232.)	
The	 state	 imposed	 terror	 on	 party	 members	 was	 carried	 out	 by	 the	
prosecutors´	investigators	who	had	free	hands	in	the	methods	used	against	
those	 suspected.	 Repression	 was	 organized	 according	 to	 plans	 in	 which	
control	numbers	were	given	to	oblast	and	lower	level	executive	committees.	
The	identification	of	those	who	became	suspected	and	accused	was	generally	
random	and	the	system	had	an	internal	disloyalty	in	which	there	was	no	
guarantee	of	anyone´s	personal	safety.	(Makarenko	199:	233–234.)	
Repression	served	state	building	by	making	the	ideology	of	administrative	
change	non-political.	Through	the	massive	intimidation	of	party	members,	
opposition	and	independent	political	activity	became	impossible.	The	party	
as	a	platform	for	the	growth	of	democratic	culture	in	the	new	society	was	
ruined.	 Its	members	 became	 alienated	 from	 each	 other	 in	 a	meaningful	
political	sense,	which	served	their	integration	into	the	state	machinery.	At	
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the	same	time,	Stalin	himself	remained	officially	the	head	of	the	party,	and	
not	the	state	apparatus.	Legitimation	of	the	regime	was	possible	since	the	
political	ideology,	as	the	only	source	of	authority	and	now	interpreted	by	
one	man,	became	concentrated	on	crushing	the	opposition	and	strengthening	
the	leader´s	power.
4.3 The Administrative Culture in the 1930´s: 
Political Totalitarianism in All-State Planning of 
Local Administration
Three	 processes	 can	 be	 discerned	 in	 the	 revolutionary	 administrative	
transition	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 local	 administration.	 First,	 the	
organizational-bureaucratic	process	(“rational	reasons”)	in	which	demands	
arising	 from	 objective	 tasks	 guided	 the	 building	 of	 new	 structures.	The	
main	objective	reason	was	the	vastness	of	the	country	which	required	a	big	
administration	to	replace	the	market	economy	in	providing	services	for	the	
population.	This	meant	both	specialization	and	centralization	at	the	same	
time.	New	hierarchies	were	needed	 to	 implement	administrative	policies	
across	the	country.	
Second,	the	political-ideological	process	(“irrational	reasons”)	in	which	
power	 concerns	 produced	 different	 types	 of	 control	 and	 repression	
mechanisms.	 Lenin´s	 socialism	 was	 both	 vague	 organizationally	 and	
strict	in	terms	of	political	control.	In	reality,	the	separation	between	the	
“rational”	 organizational-bureaucratic	 and	 the	 “irrational”	 political-
ideological	processes	is	artificial.	Some	of	the	organizational-bureaucratic	
choices	were	in	fact	made	according	to	control	needs	which	were	at	least	
partially	political.	Risks	were	mostly	created	because	at	the	bottom	of	the	
thinking	 was	 a	 deep	 suspicion	 of	 any	 spontaneous	 political	 or	 social	
decision	 making	 which	 would	 have	 led	 to	 undesirable	 administrative	
developments.	
The	third	process	could	be	a	called	historical-authority	process.	In	Russia,	
officialdom	had	come	from	the	throne	which	was	represented	by	the	central	
government.	Federalist	ambitions	or	 traditions	did	not	exist	 since	Russia	
had	been	a	monolithic	 state	 (comp.	Rowney	199:	).	Logically,	 forcing	
order	violently	on	people	was	justified.	Trust	which	is	central	to	a	rule	of	
law	 state,	was	 secondary	 to	 the	 interests	of	 the	new	 transitional	 socialist	
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state.	Authority	continued	to	be	personal	and	dictatorial.	Final	authority	–	
even	at	local	level	–	was	above	and	beyond	the	law.
Separating	 these	 processes	 helps	 to	 understand	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	
meaning	of	local	soviets	and	the	worker-peasant	activism	which	took	place	
quite	soon	after	the	initial	structural	arrangements.	As	has	been	shown	in	
this	work	earlier,	the	local	level	presented	both	a	possibility	and	a	huge	risk	
for	the	new	Soviet	leadership.	Local	activism	was	first	needed	to	spread	the	
revolution	 to	 the	 provinces,	 but	 soon	 it	 also	 needed	 to	 be	 guided	 in	 an	
effective	manner	to	control	these	same	geographical	areas.	
The	 ideological	 purposes	 of	 administrative	 change	 were	 channelled	
through	 three	 avenues.	 First	 of	 these	 had	 to	 do	with	 the	 changes	 of	 the	
administrative	market	as	a	result	of	new	decision	making	hierarchies.	This	
development	 included	 changes	 aimed	 at	 creating	 uniform	 command	
structures	 for	 implementation	 and	 information	 gathering.	 The	 second	
development	 had	 to	 do	 with	 the	 personnel´s	 educational	 background,	
general	 preparedness	 and	 consolidation	 of	 loyalty.	 The	 third	 was	 the	
institutionalization	of	Soviet	legal	culture.	In	this	development	there	were	
changes	which	used	administration	and	law	as	instruments	for	education	
and	elimination	of	the	opposition,	and	changes	in	legal	principles	and	with	
organizational	models	underlining	control,	accountability	and	discipline.	
These	 developments	 together	 resulted	 in	 the	 integration	 of	 the	 party,	
executive	 administration	 and	 economical	 institutions.	 A	 result	 was	 the	
bureaucratization	of	political	thinking	(comp.	Makarenko	199)	in	which	
both	the	“irrational”	and	“rational”	came	together.	Makarenko	has	shown	
that	in	Stalin´s	reign	this	psychology	meant	that	any	policy	was	taken	as	the	
action	of	the	highest	leadership	and	not	as	a	result	of	objective	factors	or	
tendencies	and	relations	in	the	society	(Makarenko	199:	4,	).	But	the	
bureaucratic	thinking	was	also	“rational”	as	a	result	of	the	sheer	need	for	
effective	leadership	and	execution	of	orders.	Sakwa	(19)	has	contended	
that	the	original	ideology	of	Lenin	meant	a	commune	state	through	which	
the	 workers	 (in	 other	 words	 the	 soviets)	 could	 control	 elements	 of	 the	
dictatorship	 of	 the	 proletariat.	 Bureaucratization,	 however,	 meant	 that	
political	power	was	in	the	party	apparatus,	the	military-economic	system	
was	 separated	 from	the	 soviets,	 and	 laws	 fractured	 the	 soviets	 internally.	
(Sakwa	19:	165.)
Changes	in	the	structures	meant	the	organization	of	administrative	work	
on	a	territorial	basis.	Inside	territories	a	unified	structure	of	decision	making	
hierarchy	was	built	in	all	areas	of	the	new	state.	A	parallel	control	organization	
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was	created	in	which	the	administrative	market	at	the	local	level	was	divided	
into	political-administrative	(soviet-administration)	and	party	structures.	
The	local	administrative	structures	were,	in	time,	multiplied	and	diversified	
through	the	growth	of	the	sectoral/ministerial	administration	which	had	its	
own	local	agencies.	Institutionally	this	created	a	complicated	local	system	
in	which	the	party´s	political	dominance	was	intensified.	
The	economy	changed	from	developing	town	trade	to	a	system	of	total	
economy.	 The	 administration	 did	 not	 exist	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 state	 but	
encompassed	 it.	The	 transitional	 state	 was	 not	 an	 arbitrator	 of	 different	
social	 and	 economic	 interests	 or	mere	 provider	 of	 order.	 It	 became	 the	
economy	by	sucking	 in	all	 functions	which	had	earlier	been	provided	by	
individuals	 and	 organizations	 in	 capitalist	markets.	 Because	 the	 socialist	
government	 emphasized	 economic	 growth,	 “non-political”	 led	 to	 the	
concentration	on	numbers	as	goals.	Meeting	the	requirements	of	existing	
plans	 and	 making	 higher	 quantity	 plans	 became	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	
administrative	initiatives.	In	this	sense,	the	goals	and	tasks	of	administration	
went	through	a	major	change.	A	by-product	was	the	lack	of	concentration	
on	service	 itself.	The	client	remained	unimportant	with	neither	 legal	nor	
practical	protection.	
Economic	planning	and	the	role	of	the	local	level	administration	became	
legally	connected	through	property	rights.	Harold	Berman	has	shown	that	
property	rights	existed	not	so	much	to	protect	ownership	but	to	protect	and	
direct	the	administration	of	the	property	on	behalf	of	the	socialist	economy.	
Administration	in	this	sense	was	less	than	full	ownership	but	more	than	the	
giving	of	orders.	(Berman	1963.)	The	administration	channelled	economic	
control	 positions	 which	 became	 the	 venue	 for	 receiving	 rights	 in	 the	
society.
At	the	same	time,	economic	decisions	needed	to	be	supervised	closely	by	
the	party	structures.	The	party	both	guided	and	made	the	final	decision	in	
the	administrative	market.	For	this,	a	double	bureaucratic	organization	was	
needed.	Double	bureaucracy	became	connected	with	the	concept	of	Soviet	
democratism.	
The	double	bureaucratic	structure	which	the	Soviet	system	created	was	a	
clear	change	from	anything	that	had	existed	in	the	old	tsarist	administrative	
culture.	It	was	mainly	directed	to	enabling	the	guidance	of	a	total	economy	
in	which	the	administration	served	as	the	society.	The	party	took	the	role	of	
political	and	practical	decision	making	at	all	levels	of	hierarchy.	The	soviets	
and	 the	 town	 executive	 committees	 were	 de-politicized	 in	 this	 manner.	
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Because	of	the	one-party	parallel	decision	making,	the	political	specialists	
became	 strong	 and	 weakened	 other	 platforms	 for	 political	 decision	
making.	
The	 structural	 changes	 led	 to	 new	 external	 relations.	 If	 in	 the	 tsarist	
system	 the	 town	 administrations	 had	 consisted	 of	 the	 town	 people	
representing	 different	 occupational	 groups,	 the	most	 important	 external	
relationship	was	now	that	with	the	party	representatives.	Formally	the	party	
included	in	itself	different	types	of	occupational	and	social	groups,	but	the	
distinctions	could	only	be	technical	matters	involving	“pure”	(non-political,	
non-economical)	 organizational	 facts.	This,	 in	 fact,	 is	 reminiscent	of	 the	
“non-political”	 mandate	 of	 the	 tsarist	 town	 governments.	 Actual	 policy	
remained	outside	the	decision	making	at	the	lowest	level.	
Relations	 between	 the	 citizenry	 and	 administrators	 changed.	 The	
politically	 controlled	 and	 legally	 alternating	 decision	 making	 meant	
transferring	those	individual	client	rights	which	had	began	to	develop	in	
the	 tsarist	 culture	 to	Bolshevik	organizations.	Formally,	 all	organizations	
and	individuals	were	meant	to	have	a	same	identity	of	interest.	The	individual	
in	this	process	was	dependent	on	the	changing	policies	of	authorities	whose	
actions	were	not	based	on	reliable	law.	The	tradition	of	resignation	of	the	
population	before	the	powerful	administration	(shielded	and	used	by	the	
party,	 the	 new	 elite)	 and	 distrust	 of	 the	 courts,	 continued	 without	
interruption	after	the	revolution.	
Initially,	avoiding	a	closed,	hierarchical	and	elite-run	administration	was	
one	of	the	key	issues	of	state	building	for	Lenin.	“Bureaucratic”	became	one	
of	 those	 concepts	 which	were	 attached	 to	 the	 old	 administration	which	
represented	a	vaguely	defined	combination	of	titles,	ranks,	privileges	and	
cultural	distance	to	the	ordinary	people.	Rowney	(199)	points	out	how	the	
link	to	the	new	culture	was	done	by	filling	the	vacant	posts	mainly	from	
people	of	the	lower	classes	who	began	to	assume	new	roles	in	office	work.	
The	revolutionary	administration	was	 in	 this	 sense	at	once	both	old	and	
new.	(Rowney	199:	12.)	The	change	was	not	easy	for	those	having	for	the	
first	time	real	decision	making	power,	yet	were	being	politically	guided	by	a	
warring	party.	
The	most	striking	case	of	mediation	took	place	in	the	field	of	law.	Berman	
describes	Lenin´s	thinking	as	being	in	line	with	the	traditional	European	
legal	 positivism	 which	 considers	 all	 laws	 to	 be	 commands	 of	 sovereign	
power.	As	a	continuation	of	 this	 cultural	 element,	Lenin	built	 an	 idea	of	
socialist	government	which	gave	orders	and	punishments	in	the	interest	of	
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the	majority	–	the	proletariat	which	it	represented.	(Berman	1963:	25.)	The	
legitimation	 of	 political	 decision	making	 and	 administrative	 action	with	
law created	the	authority	of	the	dictatorship.	This	logic	of	legal	culture	was	
descriptive	 of	 the	 state-individual	 dichotomy	 of	 the	 new	 order.	 Where	
estates	had	previously	 regulated	 the	possibilities	 for	 individuals,	 the	new	
social	culture	of	socialist	communality	saw	the	individual	as	secondary	to	
the	social	interests	of	the	organization.	The	position	of	lawyers	had	changed	
from	independent	practitioners	to	“assistants	of	judges”.	A	lawyer´s	interests	
should	have	been	fully	subordinated	to	the	state	policy	in	whatever	way	was	
necessary.	 The	 same	 relationship	 was	 to	 be	 extended	 to	 other	 purely	
administrative	bodies	which	also	settled	different	types	of	disputes.	(Hazard	
1960:	46.)	
Administrative	rules	and	commands	replaced	civil	 law,	and	citizens	in	
growing	numbers	sought	help	in	bureaucratic	agencies	instead	of	courts.	In	
a	risk	society,	the	army	and	secret	police	dominated	criminal	law.	Special	
revolutionary	 tribunals	 handled	 crimes	 against	 the	 new	 state	 and	 its	
property	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 individual	 qualities	 of	 cases	 and	 by	 the	 earlier	
mentioned	 revolutionary	 consciousness.	 Defendant´s	 rights	 were	 nearly	
eliminated	 by	 the	 end	of	 1919.	Culturally	 the	 revolution	had	 achieved	 a	
form	of	legal	anarchy	dominated	by	the	secret	police.	(Huskey	1992:	24–25,	
Berman	1963:	31.)
	In	the	transition	process,	law	was	used	to	change	the	economic	system,	
which	replaced	capitalist	law	concepts	of	ownership.	Legal	nihilism	of	street	
corner	justice	was	replaced	by	analysis	of	appropriate	legal	theories	which	
would	support	economic	relations.	Dictatorship	was,	however,	a	side-effect	
of	not	only	the	legal	thinking	of	the	early	days.	It	was	also	a	result	of	the	
party	bureaucratization	process	which	changed	the	commune	state	(comp.	
Sakwa	19)	to	a	one-party	administrative	system.	In	this	sense,	the	tsarist	
practice	of	autocratic	power	above	the	law	was	continued	in	the	Bolshevik	
administration.	
Even	as	 law	was	used	to	sustain	 the	state,	 this	relationship	was	 in	 fact	
rather	weak	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	structuration	process.	The	reason	
for	this	was	the	role	of	the	party	which	was	above	law	and	inside	the	state	as	
an	inalienable	organism	affecting	everything.	The	party	had	first	broken	the	
connection	of	law	and	state	with	legal	nihilism	and	repression	which	was	
administrative	 and	 “illegal”	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Then	 it	 had	 rebuilt	 the	
connection	 by	 positivist	 legalism	 in	 which	 the	 letter	 of	 the	 law	 was	
interpreted	 in	 a	 mechanistic	 manner.	 Civil	 law	 concentrated	 on	 new	
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economic	relations.	Legal	reform	and	political	administrative	goals	became	
inseparable.	
Emergency	 regulation	 was	 used	 in	 consolidation	 of	 the	 command-
economic	 system.	 It	 included	 a	 collection	 of	 principles	 and	methods	 of	
governance	based	on	massive	 repression	which	were	both	 court	ordered	
and	 extralegal.	The	 state	 of	 emergency	 became	 “a	 way	 of	 life”	 the	main	
justification	for	which	was	the	need	for	rapid	industrialization.	The	state	of	
emergency	 was	 created	 through	 the	 use	 of	 politically	 and	 economically	
motivated	legislative	interpretation	in	administrative	decision	making.	The	
peak	 of	 the	 legislation	 particularly	 favorable	 to	 arbitrary	 and	 repressive	
decision	making	was	1930–1932.	In	that	period	party	decisions	were	made	
concerning	 the	 collectivization	 and	 liquidation	 of	 farm	 owner	 peasants.	
Included	 were	 also	 the	 decrees	 of	 the	 Central	 committee	 about	 general	
farming	tax	(1930)	and	the	taxation	of	farm	owing	peasants	(1930).	In	1932,	
the	Criminal	code	was	changed	to	include	harsher	punishments	for	crimes	
which	were	considered	risks	to	economic	development.	The	term	“enemy	of	
people”	 appeared,	 and	 the	 development	 culminated	 in	 the	 1934	Central	
committee	 law	on	 terrorist	 acts.	The	 inquiry	 into	 such	 crimes	 could	not	
proceed	longer	than	10	days,	the	hearing	was	conducted	without	the	parties	
present,	 all	 rights	 of	 appeal	 and	petitions	 for	 clemency	were	denied	 and	
sentences	were	carried	out	immediately.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	19–20.)
These	 developments	 meant	 transferring	 those	 individual	 client	 rights	
which	 had	 began	 to	 develop	 in	 the	 tsarist	 culture	 to	 the	 new	 Soviet	
institutions.	The	individual	in	this	process	was	dependent	on	the	policies	of	
authorities	whose	actions	were	not	based	on	reliable	law.	The	resignation	of	
the	population	before	 the	administration	 (now	shielded	and	used	by	 the	
party,	the	new	elite)	and	distrust	of	the	courts	became	fixed.	
From	the	point	of	view	of	the	rule	of	law,	the	soviet	legal	tradition	created	
different	norms	of	selective	implementation	and	formalism.	This	formalism	
was	 born	 as	 a	 side-effect	 of	 the	 state-society	 relationship	 in	which	 final	
mediators	were	not	independent	legal	institutions.	Law	had	lost	its	authority	
over	 the	party	which	was	beyond	 legal	 control.	 In	 this	way	 the	previous	
situation	 where	 the	 law	 depended	 upon	 the	 ruler´s	 personal	 discretion	
continued.	Before	the	revolution	this	personal	legality	had	been	delegated	
to	the	appropriate	local	officials	of	the	Tsar.	In	the	Soviet	system	personal	
(dictatorial)	 legality	 was	 delegated	 to	 the	 party	 officials.	 This	 cannot,	
however,	be	considered	a	failure	of	the	legal	reform	since	its	aims	were	the	
opposite	of	 the	 liberal-democratic	 ideal,	which	 stresses	 the	 separation	of	
 The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1917–1938
11
powers.	The	devolution	of	 law	into	an	instrument	of	both	administrative	
mechanism	and	political	 control	 supported	 the	creation	of	 a	 state	which	
represented	the	society.	
Law	 was	 a	 secondary	 tool	 for	 the	 maintanence	 of	 social	 order.	 The	
primary	tool	was	repression	and	the	threat	of	it.	The	law	did	not	exist,	as	
such,	in	the	same	way	that	freedom	was	not	possible	on	an	individual	basis	
outside	the	needs	of	the	revolution.	There	was	no	moral	foundation	for	law	
which	would	have	been	above	the	state´s	needs.	Law	served	the	primary,	
“spiritual”	tool	for	state	building	which	occurred	in	the	bureaucratization	of	
the	party.	The	party´s	legitimation	came	from	the	revolutionary	texts	where	
it	had	been	given	the	status	of	an	advancer	of	socialist	development	toward	
communism.	 In	 this	 sense	 it	 was	 quite	 understandable	 that	 courts	were	
used	as	a	means	of	political	control.	This	was	compounded	by	the	fact	that	
the	 prosecutor´s	 office	 which	 investigated,	 prosecuted	 and	 generally	
supervised	 the	 administrative	 decision	 making,	 including	 economical	
matters,	 also	 guided	 the	 courts.	The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 in	 this	 manner	
became	 more	 than	 just	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 legal	 system.	 Its	 authority	 was	
extended	to	political-organizational	matters	to	help	steer	the	country	into	
rapid	economical	growth.	
The	 party	 could	 not	 rely	 on	 open	 parliamentary	 legislative	 processes.	
Instead,	a	vanguard	of	“elders”	protected	the	inheritance	(i.e.	the	communist	
future)	of	the	population.	Coerciveness	for	the	good	of	the	society	took	the	
place	of	democratic	legitimation.	Administration	needed	personnel	willing	
to	adopt	limited	but	still	critical	official	roles	for	the	legitimation	of	the	new	
structures.	For	this	reason,	liberal	personnel	policies	were	not	possible.	At	
an	 organizational	 level,	 seniority	 and	 authority	 which	 had	 been	 the	
cornerstones	 of	 tsarist	 administration	were	no	 longer	 connected	 to	 each	
other	(see	Rowney	199:	29).	New	types	of	recruitment,	advancement	and	
reward	policies	were	required.	During	the	Stalin	era,	fragility	of	positions	
and	 upward	mobility	 became	 central	 to	 the	 administrative	 culture.	New	
avenues	opened	up	to	loyal	persons.	At	the	same	time,	democratic	political	
control	of	personnel	policies	was	not	possible,	 as	 rules	depended	on	 the	
supreme	authority.	
Recruiting	 people	 from	 previously	 excluded	 groups	 into	 the	 decision	
making	 apparatus	 was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 the	 decentralization	 of	 actual	
information	gathering.	Lenin	wanted	citizens	to	take	turns	at	local	offices	
but	he	wanted	the	central	government	 to	decide	 the	principles	on	which	
tasks	rested.	In	transition	civil	servants	from	the	old	system	were	needed	
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even	though	Lenin	tried	to	replace	them	as	fast	as	new	personnel	could	be	
trained.	Transition	happened	most	 thoroughly	 in	 the	exchange	of	power	
positions	 and	 role	 of	 different	 social	 classes	 inside	 the	 Russian	 society.	
(Hazard	 196:	 9–99,	 Rowney	 199:	 12.)	 A	 new	 “suitable	 background”	
appeared	 and	 those	 with	 wrong	 credentials	 saw	 their	 world	 and	 their	
possibilities	 to	 function	 in	 the	new	 society	 disappear.	At	 the	 same	 time,	
though,	a	large	number	of	persons	of	worker	and	peasant	origin	were	raised	
to	leading	posts	(Edeen	1960:	24).
Repression	was	used	as	an	administrative	method	for	the	consolidation	
of	 political	 order	 in	 three	waves:	 1929–1933	 during	which	 “a	 revolution	
from	above”	was	implemented	in	order	to	destroy	the	kulak	society;	193–
193	when	an	attempt	to	destroy	all	possible	opposition	to	Stalin´s	personal	
power	was	in	motion;	and	in	the	1940´s	and	1950´s	when	the	administrative-
command	 system	 was	 consolidated	 in	 the	 administrative	 culture	 of	 the	
state.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	21.)	Terror	was	not	a	side	method	of	propaganda	
and	discipline	gone	over	board,	it	was	a	method	of	state	building.	But	it	can	
be	considered	as	a	side-effect	of	administrative	control	needs.	
Stalinism	was	the	culmination	of	the	bureaucratic	and	political	control	
tendencies	 inside	 the	 administration.	 In	 Stalinism,	 political	 dictatorship	
was	transformed	into	a	bureaucratic	culture	in	which	a	general	obligation	
to	inform,	categories	of	enemies,	harmful	behavior	against	the	state	and	a	
de-politicized	 party	 decision	 making	 process	 were	 consolidated	 as	 the	
ground	“rules”	which	guided	policy	more	than	objective	statements	in	laws.	
A	side-effect	was	the	substitution	of	open	social	discussion	with	secrecy.	It	
is	debatable	whether	 the	 transition	 failed	 in	 its	 original	purposes	 in	 this	
sense	 or	 not.	 The	 romantic	 view	 of	 grass	 roots	 activism	 was	 already	
disregarded	by	Lenin.	However,	 the	worst	 sides	of	 tsarist	 bureaucratism,	
which	was	the	object	of	criticism	by	the	Bolsheviks,	was	not	eradicated	by	
the	transition.	
Stalin´s	administrative	policy	was	not	arbitrary	in	its	political	justification	
for	the	use	of	repression	in	state	building.	There	was	no	principle	objection	
to	either	the	use	of	these	methods,	nor	on	the	avoidance	of	their	use.	Special	
measures	according	to	Stalin	could	and	should	be	used	in	conditions	when	
there	“are	no	other	useful	means	to	maneuver.	Special	measures	are	needless	
and	harmful	in	other	conditions,	in	which	we	have	other,	flexible	actions	
for	maneuvers	in	the	markets.”(Stalin	1951.)	In	addition	Stalin	used	Lenin´s	
writing	which	had	underlined	the	need	to	protect	the	poorest	section	of	the	
peasantry	against	its	enemies	with	practicality	instead	of	general	phrases.	
 The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure, 1917–1938
13
(Stalin	1951:	19,	192.)	Stalin´s	reasoning	can	be	connected	with	the	“elastic	
organization”	concept	developed	by	Lenin	in	the	revolutionary	years.	The	
removal	of	the	means	of	production from	the	owner	class	into	the	hands	of	
the	 state	which	 represented	 the	 society	was	 not	 the	 same	 as	 equality.	 In	
Lenin´s	assessment	the	capitalist	society´s	equal	 justice	meant	 the	use	of	
the	same	measurements	for	different	types	of	people	who	were	not	equal	or	
similar	 in	 their	 needs.	 Problems	 of	 distribution	 and	 justice	 would	 also	
appear	in	the	beginning	of	the	communist	state	as	long	as	distribution	was	
based	on	work.	(Stalin	1951:	211–212.)
Repression	 was	 interestingly	 connected	 with	 other	 areas	 in	 the	
instutionalization	 of	 administrative	 culture.	 As	 Carrère	 d´Encausse	 has	
pointed	out,	essential	to	Stalinist	administration	was	the	fragility	of	positions	
and	privileges.	The	purges	began	in	192	and	continued	till	the	end	of	the	
1930´s.	Stalin	abolished	the	immunity	of	the	party.	The	side-effect	of	the	
purges	was	the	constant	renewal	of	managers	and	officials	at	all	levels	which	
assured	upward	mobility	in	the	society	and	in	the	administrative	hierarchies.	
(Carrère	d´Encausse	190:	39.)	 In	 this	way,	 those	 loyal	 to	 the	 leadership	
could	assume	new	roles	and	more	forward	in	their	personal	 lives.	At	the	
same	time	stability,	which	is	essential	to	a	rule	of	law	society,	was	lacking.	
The	political	system	became	highly	personalized.	
The	 control	 of	 development	 in	 all	 the	major	 state	 building	 elements:	
administration	structures,	 law	and	 legal	 thinking	and	personnel	policies,	
required	language	purification.	This	was	essential	to	the	legitimation	of	the	
repressive	administration.	It	was	by	no	means	a	simple	 task	 in	the	social	
environment	of	 the	1920´s	when	 the	 educational	 level	of	 the	population	
was	still	low.	It	was	the	task	of	the	revolution	to	make	“them”	“us”.	The	state	
had	to	dominate	discussion	in	the	society	by	creating	an	image	of	stable	and	
comprehensive	 language	 which	 represented	 credible	 authority.	 Maxim	
Gorgy	echoed	these	needs	in	his	discussions	about	the	national	language	of	
the	new	Soviet	state,	which	would	reflect	the	Stalinist	doctrine	of	“socialism	
in	one	country”.	He	wished	for	the	“people	of	Russian	villages	and	towns	to	
be	transformed	into	a	new	tribe	of	literate,	reasonable,	hearty	people”.	The	
writer	 linked	style	of	 language	with	politics	representing	the	authority	of	
the	state.	In	other	words	there	was	“a	direct	correlation	between	literacy	in	
language	 and	 ideological	 literacy”.	 Similarly,	 regional	 and	 class	 speech	
differences	 (portrayed	 in	 literature)	were	 expressions	of	 populism	which	
separated	peasants	from	that	which	they	should	be.	(Gorham	2000:	133–
14.)
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Language	 effected	 laws	 and	 administrative	 decisions.	 Law	 remained	 a	
weak	 instrument,	 since	 it	was	 interpreted	 through	 orders	 from	different	
levels	of	decision	making	and	wider	policies	which	could	be	written	into	
law	were	not	open	 to	discussion	at	 the	administrative	organization	 level.	
This	effect	was	compounded	by	the	general	flow	of	information,	which	was	
restricted	and	agitative.	The	new	language	was	distant	from	the	population	
because	 it	 required	 learning	 new	 types	 of	 expressions	 and	 avoidance	 of	
wrong	ones.	If	in	the	tsarist	system	the	peasant	who	became	town	dwellers	
did	not	read	and	write,	the	socialist	citizen	could	only	read	and	write	what	
the	political	situation	allowed.	Censorship	continued	to	keep	administration	
beyond	the	real	control	of	the	citizens.	
For	administrative	culture	and	the	development	of	the	professional	ethos	
of	 the	 new	 soviet	 administrators,	 particularly	 those	 who	 were	 in	 direct	
contact	 with	 the	 population,	 language	 purification	 was	 not	 of	 minor	
importance.	It	constituted	a	major	part	in	the	socialization	of	the	society.	It	
also	meant,	 that	 the	 information	upon	which	 the	 daily	work	was	 based,	
became	limited	in	its	content	and	the	personal	power	of	administrators	to	
use	information	in	the	development	of	their	work	was	difficult.	The	language	
purification	process,	as	a	larger	cultural	development,	helped	to	consolidate	
the	command-economy	administration.	Language	protected	the	adminis-
tration	from	open	criticism.
In	terms	of	its	over	all	communication	style,	the	Soviet	administration	
went	 through	 a	 change	 from	 a	 revolutionary	 communication	 to	 a	
bureaucratic	 one.	 In	 revolutionary	 or	 totalitarian	 communication,	 total	
control	and	“communalization”	of	communication	are	attempted	and	as	a	
result,	accuracy	of	transmission,	speed,	the	impact	upon	the	recipient	and	
feedback	are	deliberately	denigrated.	In	the	bureaucratic	communication,	
the	 administration	 is	 more	 open	 but	 highly	 structured	 and	 vertically	
organized.	 Communication	 serves	 as	 a	 socialization	 function	 to	 replace	
terror.	Structured	communications	along	 formal	channels,	guided	by	 the	
elite,	 provide	 workers	 with	 the	 details	 needed	 in	 their	 tasks.	 Informal	
communication	and	habits	are	tolerated	to	a	certain	degree	as	unavoidable.	
(Comp.	Sternheimer	193:	135.)	
Together	with	language	purification	different	codes	for	secrecy	expanded	
and	mushroomed	both	in	the	official	structures	and	in	the	society	generally.	
Secrecy	 was	 evident	 in	 citizen	 behavior	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 organizational	
behavior	inside	the	different	sectors	of	administration.	Categories	for	state	
secrets	 and	 agency	 secrets	 (administrative	 secrets	 of	 a	 particular	 organi-
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zation)	 developed	with	 consequences	 for	 decision	making	 authority	 and	
actual	power	(Makarenko	199).	At	the	same	time,	this	need	for	restricted	
behavior	 in	 the	manifestation	 of	 information	 required	 a	 system	 of	 non-
public	information	gathering	which	enhanced	the	authority	and	power	of	
intelligence	organizations	and	served	to	widen	their	scope	of	activity.	The	
centrally	led	intelligence	work	in	the	localities	was	a	major	part	of	policy	
decision	making	 (see	 “Sovershenno	 Sekretno”	 2001,	 tom	 1,	 chasti	 1–2).	
Language	also	effectively	separated	different	levels	of	administration	from	
each	other.	
Formalism	 had	many	 direct	 consequences	 in	 the	 client-administrator	
relationship.	 First	 of	 all	 the	 client,	 as	 a	 person,	 did	 not	 have	 individual	
rights.	He	had	these	most	of	all	as	a	member	of	a	social	group,	whether	this	
be	work	place,	trade	union,	party	organization	or	professional	group.	The	
social	organization	which	he	belonged	to	protected	his	material	well-being	
and	thus,	according	to	the	pattern	of	thought;	his	rights	as	a	Soviet	citizen.	
The	administrator	on	the	other	hand,	was	most	of	all	responsible	to	the	plan	
which	he	had	to	fulfill.	At	the	same	time	the	hierarchy	inside	organizations,	
the	 diversification	 of	 the	 work	 and	multiplication	 of	 institutions,	 led	 to	
organizational	cultures	which	relied	on	orders	and	directors	deciding	even	
small	matters.	The	new	lower	level	administrators	in	the	Soviet	state	were	
dependent	on	the	higher	levels	at	least	as	much	as	had	been	their	predecessors	
in	the	tsarist	town	administrations.	
Organization	 building	 led	 to	 task	 diversification	 and	 multiplication	
which,	along	with	the	new	administrative	roles	attached	to	them,	required	
armies	of	specialists.	Control	required	that	no	one	should	have	too	much	of	
a	 decision	making	 power.	 Responsibility	was	 diluted.	 Specialists	 formed	
new	ranks	which	replaced	the	old	tsarist	ones.	Specialists	and	exceptional	
individuals	represented	the	ideological	purposes	of	the	new	state	and	where	
thus	 justifiably	 eligible	 for	 the	 high	 posts	 in	 the	 hierarchy,	 with	 the	
accompanying	material	rewards.	Material	rewards	(housing,	special	food)	
and	educational	advantages	continued	to	be	incentives	for	being	useful	for	
the	state.	
When	 these	new	practices	were	 institutionalized,	particularly	 through	
the	nomenklatura	system,	they	were	transformed	into	a	fixed	organization	
of	 status.	 As	 centralized	 control	 was	 also	 institutionalized	 through	 the	
command-economic	 planning	 and	 the	 party	 became	 an	 administrative	
“arbitration	court”,	the	representational	political	organs	lost	power	(if	not	
formal	 authority)	 to	 the	 technocratic,	 specialized	 executive	 side.	 At	 the	
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same	time	policy	making	was	centralized,	formally	political	and	executed	
by	the	ministerial	channels	 through	decisions	and	orders.	The	municipal	
level	did	not	take	part	in	it.	
An	administrative	market	(Kordonskii	2001)	assumed	new	qualities	in	
the	 socialist	 transition.	 Political	 (party),	 economical	 (administration	 of	
economical	institutions	and	production)	and	administrative	(governmental	
and	judicial)	sectors	were	united	in	the	planning	system,	but	separated	in	
their	political	power	which	belonged	mostly	–	although	not	totally	–	to	the	
party	structures.	(Comp.	Richard	Sakwa	19:	165.)	Public	policies	became	
“administrative”	professional	issues.	The	judicial	sector	was	made	a	branch	
of	the	administration	which	the	party	guided.	The	effect	of	the	de-politicized	
society	 was	 that	 the	 administrative	 (governmental)	 sector	 used	 political	
language	and	symbolism	in	a	formal	manner.	
One	 of	 these	 side-effects	 of	 the	 representational	 organs	 diminishing	
power	 was	 that	 hierarchical	 structures	 became	 strong	 and	 rational-legal	
authority	was	formally	in	place.	At	the	same	time,	the	party	system	took	the	
place	of	traditional	social	systems	by	being	outside	the	core	of	administrative	
structures.	 (Comp.	 Peters	 194.)	 This	 way,	 independent	 administrative	
authority	based	on	law	was	diminished	and	assumed	a	formalistic	character,	
one	which	 in	 fact	has	been	 typical	 for	developing	 countries.	The	 second	
side-effect	was	 the	 elimination	 of	 independent	 social	 activism.	The	 civil	
society	was	incorporated	either	into	the	administrative	structures	or	into	
the	party.	
Sakwa	 (19)	 has	 contended	 that	 where	Western	 writers	 usually	 see	
party	control	as	the	reason	for	the	qualitative	transformation	of	bureaucracy	
from	servant	to	master,	the	Bolsheviks	of	the	time	saw	that	bureaucratism	
was	born	when	the	administration	escaped	the	party	will	and	took	on	a	life	
of	its	own.	The	party	tried	to	control	both	the	bureaucracy	of	administrative	
processes	 themselves	 and	 the	 bureaucratization	 of	 the	 political	 process,	
while	 staying	 formally	 outside	 of	 the	 state	 administration.	 (Sakwa	 19:	
190.)	Bureaucratization	hid	the	traditional	Russian	and	other	local	orders	
of	importance.	These	developments	started	to	lay	roots	quite	soon	after	the	
revolution	in	the	1920´s	and	effected	local	administration	decision	making	
for	the	decades	to	come.	
At	 an	 organizational	 level	 a	 transition	 to	 a	 phenomenon	 called	
“vedomstvennost‘	 “or	 “a	 culture	 of	 governmental	 agencies”	 took	 place.	 It	
meant	a	development	in	which	separate,	specialized	ministries	(narkomats)	
operated	 both	 as	 administrative	 organs	 of	 government	 and	 as	 economic	
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institutions.	As	their	resources	grew	and	the	companies	and	other	economic	
institutions	under	 their	guidance	multiplied,	 they	began	 to	nurture	 their	
own	interests	in	the	execution	of	plans.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	23.)	This	created	
an	 office	 culture	 which	 paradoxically	 became	 contradictory	 to	 central	
planning,	thus	creating	a	risk	for	the	whole	system.	
The	command-economy	resulted	in	a	development	toward	technocracy	
in	which	there	was	a	steep	division	of	 labor	and	authoritative	power	was	
vested	in	those	who	had	knowledge	about	specific	professional	issues.	As	a	
side	 effect	 of	 the	 specialization,	 the	 specific	 areas	 of	 responsibility	 often	
became	more	 limited.	 Technocratic	 expertise	was	 combined	with	 a	 new	
system	of	parallel	organization	in	which	the	party	and	administration	were	
unified.	Thus	the	specialists	did	not	have	a	wider	control	of	the	development	
in	their	fields.	The	party	took	a	role	above	society,	which	led	to	its	leadership	
in	 localities	having	authority	above	the	 law.	This	was	the	 legal	and	social	
result	of	the	parallel,	extra	legal	control	function	of	the	party.	The	guardian	
role	of	 the	party	 taught	 the	non-party	organs	 to	 turn	to	 it	 in	all	possible	
questions,	 including	 economic	 ones.	 Changes	 and	 initiatives	 concerning	
plans	were	decided	in	the	party	and	not	in	the	soviet.	The	Politburo	gave	the	
out	the	fundamental	regulation	in	these	matters.	The	workers	in	localities	
were	educated	by	circulars	giving	them	advice	on	the	content	of	their	work,	
its	form	and	rituals.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	24.)	In	comparison	with	the	tsarist	
professionals	 in	 local	 communities	 and	 towns,	 the	new	Soviet	 specialists	
were	tightly	incorporated	into	the	structures	of	the	state.
Behind	the	administrative	elite	formation	were	social	reasons	which	can	
be	understood	from	the	point	of	view	of	revolutionary	change	itself.	As	has	
been	pointed	out	before,	the	revolution	was	very	successful	in	implementing	
the	exchange	of	class	roles.	In	this,	employment	in	the	growing	bureaucracy	
was	one	of	the	most	effective	ways	of	social	advancement.	(Rowney	199:	
14.)	The	1920´s	were	a	time	for	promotion	for	workers	and	peasants	who	
moved	directly	to	positions	of	state	authority.	The	lack	of	training	presented	
problems	for	new	decision	makers.	A	high	turnover	rate	was	typical	since	
newly	promoted	workers	 replaced	 those	who	had	 just	 assumed	work.	 In	
time,	 it	 became	 necessary	 for	 the	 Soviet	 government	 to	 reward	 persons	
whose	abilities	and	political	loyalty	were	necessary	for	the	building	of	the	
administration.	(Carrére	d´Encausse	190:	26.)
The	building	of	 administrative	 reward	 systems,	which	were	needed	 to	
ensure	loyalty	and	incentive,	had	several	side-effects	in	the	transformation	
of	 the	 administrative	 culture.	 It	 is	 also	one	of	 the	most	 striking	 cases	 of	
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structural	change	(in	this	case	personnel	removals	and	promotions)	which	
was	 contradictory	 and	 ineffective	 for	 transitional	 purposes	 and	 caused	
unintended	 effects.	 In	 this	 case,	 new	 long	 term	 risks	 arose	 for	 the	
administrative	system	in	two	ways.
The	first	creation	of	new	long	term	risks	was	made	by	linking	together	
employment	 position	 and	 deficit	 material	 conditions.	 Sungurov	 has	
concluded	that	the	main	difference	between	the	tsarist	table	of	ranks	and	
the	 nomenklatura system	was	 that	 the	 latter	was	 a	 closed,	 secret	 system	
(Sungurov	199:	4).	In	comparison	the	table	of	ranks	was	a	public,	legally	
regulated	organization	of	positions	and	tasks.	
The	second	way	 in	which	new	long	term	risks	were	created	was	 in	 the	
recruitment	system.	Social	differentiation	was	intensified	by	developments	
in	 the	field	of	higher	education.	As	 the	party	organization	members	were	
given	 a	 preference	 over	 others,	 this	 right	 in	 fact	 assumed	 a	 “hereditary”	
nature.	In	1923–24,	children	of	soldiers	and	army	political	cadres	were	given	
similar	 preference	 as	 workers	 and	 peasants.	 Next	 in	 1926,	 the	 creative	
intelligentsia	was	given	a	quota	of	places	in	the	universities	of	the	Russian	
Federal	Republic.	By	the	1930´s	a	third	of	students	in	Russian	universities	
had	a	working-class	or	peasant	background.	(Carrère	d´Encausse	190:25.)
The	reward	practices	and	the	nomenklatura	recruitment	and	advancement	
system	had	several	side-effects	for	the	administrative	culture.	Firstly,	they	
institutionalized	a	very	unitary	recruitment,	promotion	and	rewards	system	
at	 all	 levels	 of	 the	 country.	 This	 further	 strengthened,	 socially	 and	
psychologically,	the	centralization	of	the	structures.	Local	decision	making	
lost	its	meaning	in	the	forms	of	established	culture.	The	party	itself	became	
divided	into	an	“inner”	and	an	“outer”	parts	of	which	the	former	(Sungurov	
199:	4),	the	nomenklatura,	was	more	important	for	power	relations	than	
geographical	considerations.	
Secondly,	 the	 original	 equality	 ideal	 was	 replaced	 with	 a	 vanguard	
thinking	 in	 which	 socialist	 individual	 heroism	 became	 an	 ideological	
symbol.	 According	 to	 Carrère	 d´Encausse´s	 analysis,	 the	 effectiveness	
which	Stakhanovism	had	first	come	to	represent	opened	a	path	to	privileges	
for	individuals	of	the	working	class,	not	to	the	whole	class	itself.	The	Stalinist	
society	became	one	dominated	by	the	“best”	whose	abilities	and	commitment	
justified	their	extraordinary	position.	(Carrère	d´Encausse	190:	39.)
Together,	all	of	this	meant	that	the	practical	conditions	in	fact	brought	
out	 a	 different	 type	 of	 government	 culture	 to	 that	 which	 Lenin	 had	
envisioned.	 Rotations	 and	 general	 politically	 based	 management	
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(internalized	habits)	were	replaced	by	institution	specialization	and	highly	
regulated	tasks	which	in	their	specificity	and	limited	personal	power	became	
non-political.	Past	 experience	 and	organizational	history	were	no	 longer	
useful,	but	instead	a	hindrance	to	rapid	socialization	and	development.	At	
an	 organizational	 level,	 seniority	 and	 authority	 which	 had	 been	 the	
cornerstones	 of	 tsarist	 administration	were	no	 longer	 connected	 to	 each	
other	(see	Rowney	199:	29).
The	nomenklatura system	which	 effected	both	 the	 leadership	 and	 the	
personnel,	was	an	answer	to	both	the	social	and	political	needs	of	this	de-
politicized	 government.	 It	 confirmed	 the	 change	 of	 social	 position:	 the	
formation	of	 a	new	 type	of	 politically	 correct	 elite	which	was	under	 the	
inspection	and	approval	of	the	party.	It	also	gave	loyal	supporters	a	possibility	
to	assume	a	position	which	only	the	revolution	could	give	them.	New	social	
opportunities	arose	for	members	of	the	peasant	class.	
At	the	same	time,	the	nomenklatura	system	was	a	reactionary	vehicle.	It	
replaced	 the	old	 rank	and	 title	hierarchy	of	 the	Tsars.	 Similarities	 in	 the	
qualities	 which	were	 again	 required	 from	 those	who	wished	 to	 advance	
their	 individual	 careers	 in	 socialism	 were	 striking:	 political	 correctness,	
good	connections	 to	 the	elite	 (party)	and	an	eye	 for	 the	 social	game.	As	
before	when	the	autocratic	legitimation	for	the	Tsar´s	power	sustained	the	
19th	century	civil	service	culture,	the	inevitable	undemocratic	quality	of	the	
socialist	system	was	explained	by	the	need	for	control,	organically	linked	
with	democratic	centralism.	Once	again	 the	majority	of	citizens	were,	 in	
reality,	left	outside	of	the	elite.	The	administration	at	the	localities	represented	
the	elite	who	chose	their	leaders	from	among	their	own	ranks.
To summarize,	 this	 chapter	 has	 analyzed	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 totalitarian	
administrative	culture	at	the	local	level	in	191–193.	The	results	show	that	
the	 structuration	process	produced	an	administrative	 culture	 the	 core	of	
which	remained	essentially	same	compared	to	the	tsarist	system.	This	meant	
that:	1)	final	authority	continued	to	be	beyond	and	above	the	law	(in	the	
party);	 2)	 local	 administration	 was	 non-political	 (concentration	 on	
quantity);	3)	administrative	procedures	based	on	trust	between	organizations	
and	citizens	were	not	created	(no	rule	of	 law	or	 legal	protection);	4)	 law	
remained	weak	(formalism);	and	5)	bureacratic	language	and	secrecy	were	
used	 (separation	 of	 different	 administrative	 levels	 and	 actors	 from	 each	
other).	
The	main	difference	compared	to	the	tsarist	period	was	the	creation	of	
personnel	 policies	 (based	 on	 education)	 which	 incorporated	 the	 civil	
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servants	tightly	into	the	state	structures.	New	avenues	openned	to	previously	
excluded	groups.	
The	dictatorial	qualities,	which	could	also	be	found	in	the	tsarist	system,	
were	 intensified	 because	 of	 risks	 to	 the	 revolution	 itself	 (civil	 war,	 great	
economic	 difficulties,	 political	 opposition).	 As	 a	 result,	 wide	 terror	 was	
used	as	a	side-effect	of	administrative	control	needs.	As	before,	the	main	
side-effect	of	the	system	can	also	be	attributed	to	the	lack	of	separation	of	
powers.	 The	 most	 important	 side-effect	 was	 the	 bureaucratization	 of	
political	 thinking.	 Power	 remained	 highly	 elitist,	 rational-legal	 authority	
was	formally	in	place	and	hierarchical	structures	strong.	
The	next	chapter	shows	how	the	perestroika	policies	tried	to	reform	these	
qualities	and	in	doing	so,	lay	roots	to	the	falling	down	of	the	Soviet	governing	
system.	
11
5 The Transition of Administrative 
Culture, 1986–1991
This	chapter	describes	the	perestroika	ideology	from	the	point	of	view	of	
administrative	change;	the	subsequent	structural	changes;	and	the	resulting	
dysfunctions	 in	 the	 bargaining	 system	which	made	 up	 the	 core	 of	 local	
administrative	culture.	I	will	show	how	the	perestroika	policies	of	adminis-
trative	 reform	 were	 negated	 by	 the	 existing	 dysfunctions	 of	 the	 Soviet	
system	and	how	new	risks	to	this	system	were	born	in	the	process.	
5.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 
Change: Harmonizing Official and Unofficial 
Cultures 
Mikhail	Gorbachev	became	the	head	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	a	situation	were	
the	 planning	 system	had	 reached	 its	 cultural	maturity	 and	was	 showing	
different	 types	of	dysfunctions.	Looking	at	 the	Soviet	administration	 is	a	
complex	task	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	liberal-democratic	conception	of	
administrative	systems.	This	is	because	the	executive	bureaucracy	which	is	
the	 focus	 of	 this	 study,	 made	 up	 only	 a	 portion	 of	 what	 can	 be	 called	
administration	in	the	Soviet	system.	Instead,	the	mature	Soviet	system	of	
administration	can	be	divided	into	four	sectors	of	parallel	hierarchies	which	
functioned	together	in	a	type	of	administrative	market	(Simon	Kordonskii	
2000).	 Further	 more	 this	 market	 had	 social,	 structural	 and	 functional	
aspects	which	all	influenced	the	transition	of	administrative	culture	during	
the	perestroika	reforms.
The	task	of	changing	local	administrative	decision	making	involved	more	
than	just	giving	the	local	level	a	legally	stronger	role.	The	administration,	in	
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spite	of	its	highly	regulated	role	as	the	provider	of	services,	was	in	reality	
affected	by	the	power	struggles	and	bargaining	of	different	elites	which	all	
had	 their	 stakes	 in	 the	 practical	 execution	 of	 centrally	 decided	 policy	
programs.	The	mature	Soviet	system	proceeding	the	perestroika	period	was	
based	on	a	 communication	 system	reminiscent	of	 the	pluralist	model	 in	
which	much	information	flowed	within	laterally	related	groups,	providing	
a	 basis	 for	 informal	 coalitions.	 Participation	 was	 allowed	 in	 official	
administrative	 communication	 through	 regulated	 channels,	 such	 as	
complaint	 books	 and	 legislative	 inquiries.(Sternheimer	 193:	 13–13.)	
Gordon	Smith	has	described	the	method	of	influencing	as	being	primarily	
“administrative”	 instead	 of	 openly	 political.	 A	 certain	 kind	 of	 “practical	
localism”can	be	seen	in	the	way	the	local	bureaucrats	worked	as	influential,	
sometimes	semi-autonomous	participants	in	the	decision	making	process.	
Their	professional	identity	was	important	to	them	and	they	also	represented	
their	specific	clientele.	(Smith	190.)
Between	them	these	hierarchies	or	branches	of	decision	making,	which	
were	present	in	all	levels	of	the	state	(central,	republican,	regional	and	local)	
together	formed	the	arena	where	decisions	for	each	geographical	area	were	
made.	For	an	understanding	of	the	Soviet	administrative	culture	it	would	
therefore	 be	 misleading	 to	 simply	 talk	 about	 the	 city	 administration	 in	
terms	of	the	work	of	the	executive	committees	of	the	local	soviets.	Instead,	
the	work	of	the	executive	committees	can	be	understood	by	looking	at	what	
their	functional	role	was	in	the	totality	of	the	administrative	market.	
Simon	Kordonskii	(2000)	has	indentified	the	following	separate	decision	
making	branches	in	the	governmental	system	of	the	USSR:	administrative	
(economical,	 productive),	 political,	 representational	 and	 control.	 The	
administrative	branch	included	institutions	and	official	positions	connected	
with	industry,	agriculture	and	services.	Besides	the	enterprises	and	service	
producers,	 this	branch	also	 included	(state	government)	branch	agencies	
involved	in	the	direct	leadership	of	a	particular	sector	of	the	economy,	and	
planning	agencies	 in	charge	of	 the	coordination	and	planning	work.	The	
first	group	was	the	most	influential	because	it	was	in	many	respects	a	direct	
extension	of	the	all-union	ministries	and	received	both	its	directives	and	
money	from	the	top.	Planning	agencies	were	for	the	most	part	also	in	this	
position,	but	still	not	completely	out	of	the	reach	of	local	soviets.	(Kordonskii	
2000,	Sternheimer	190:	4–5.)	
The	political	branch	included	the	party	structure.	The	representational	
branch	included	the	elected	soviets	and	their	executive	committees,	as	well	
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as	 control	 agencies	 used	 by	 the	 executive	 committee	 to	 oversee	 the	
development	and	execution	of	its	decisions.	This	latter	group	and	additional	
agencies	which	 serviced	 and	 coordinated	 the	work	 of	 all	 others	were	 in	
local	control	and	funded	by	the	communities.	The	control	branch	included	
administrative	 inspection	 organizations,	 the	 prosecutors	 and	 the	 courts.	
(Kordonskii	2000,	Sternheimer	190:	4–5.)
In	terms	of	conceptualization	of	this	web	of	decision	making	hierarchies,	
I	 have	 chosen	 to	 call	 all	 of	 the	 earlier	 mentioned	 branches	 together	 “a	
government”	and	separate	out	in	it	sub-systems	which	I	call	administrations.	
The	main	 features	 of	 the	 Soviet	 government	 structure	 in	 the	perestroika 
period	 are	 shown	 in	 annex	D	which	 is	my	 illustration	of	 the	 system.	 In	
annex	D	one	can	also	see	 the	changes	comprared	 to	 the	 structure	 in	 the	
1930´s	(shown	in	annex	C).
I	have	renamed	“the	administrative	branch”	referred	 to	by	Kordonskii	
“the	economic	administration”.	In	light	of	the	running	of	local	communities,	
the	production	and	service	organizations	were	a	central	part	of	 the	 local	
administration.	 Furthermore	 their	 staff	 also	 participated	 in	 the	 decision	
making	for	localities	and	their	servicing.
The	 functional	back	bone	of	 the	whole	 administrative	 system	was	 the	
creation	 and	 execution	 of	 plans	 in	 which	 all	 sectors	 of	 administration	
participated.	In	this	central	planning	system,	which	involved	all	aspects	of	
sociel	life,	the	economy	was	based	on	the	center	allocating	funds	to	different	
areas	on	the	basis	of	its	plans	for	equal	development	of	richer	and	poorer	
areas.	Planning	essentially	meant	that	the	system	had	to	decide	the	economic	
needs	of	 the	people	by	way	of	political	decision	making.	In	the economic 
administration resources	were	 allocated	 through	 central	 coordination	 by	
Gosplan	(the	state	planning	organization)	to	ministries	to	fulfill	their	plans	
which	were	then	carried	out	by	factories	and	enterprises.	Technically	this	
meant	linking	each	economic	unit	at	all	levels	of	society	to	one	system	of	
accounting.	 In	 the	 formal	 structural	 sense,	 the	 local	 level	 was	 a	 direct	
extension	of	the	ministry	in	each	category	of	questions.	The	main	practical	
aim	of	 economic	units	was	 to	achieve	 the	yearly	 control	numbers	of	 the	
state	plan	(Sutela	193:49).	This	was	essential	both	to	the	official	rules	and	
unofficial	administrative	norms	because	the	primary	goal	was	not	selling	
products	in	the	market	or	developing	services	suited	for	and	decided	by	the	
local	population,	but	keeping	to	quotas.	
Since	 the	 1960´s,	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 economic	 administration´s	
independence	 was	 allowed	 by	 increasing	 the	 output	 volume	 that	 the	
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economic	 units	 could	 sell	 by	 themselves.	 In	 actuality	 the	materials	 and	
products	 were	 bartered	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	 The	 economic	
autonomy	of	 enterprises	was	 subordinated	 to	 the	 implementation	of	 the	
plan	because	it	still	defined	the	real	flows.	Bartering	in	the	administrative	
market	mainly	supplemented	and	reinforced	the	allocation	of	resources.	In	
addition	 to	 this,	 the	 autonomy	 of	 the	 economic	 administration	 was	
determined	by	local	personal	relations	in	the	market,	particularly	with	the	
local	party	leadership.	(Freinkman	199:	1.)
Even	as	the	former	Soviet	Union	was	formally	federal,	“localism”	was	
mainly	achieved	by	decisions	as	to	which	part	of	the	country	a	particular	
sector	 of	 production,	 or	 a	 singular	 factor	 would	 be	 located.	 Different	
parts	 of	 the	 federal	 state	 served	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 economy	which	
directed	 their	 general	 cultural	 development.(Jacobs	 193:	 6–,	 Sakwa	
1990:	152.)	Kirkow	has	pointed	out	that	since	the	ministries	dominated	
territorial	 planning,	 the	 industrial	 structure	of	 local	 and	 regional	 units	
was	one	of	 the	most	 important	single	 factors	determining	their	budget.	
For	the	turn	over	of	tax	and	payment	from	profits	in	the	local	budget,	the	
number,	 size	 and	 jurisdiction	of	 enterprises	 in	 a	 certain	 area	was	 vital.	
(Kirkow	199:	35.)
The	local	budget´s	income	came	mainly	from	two	sources.	First	was	the	
legally	 secured	(zakreplennyi)	 income	which	came	 from	 local	enterprises	
(including	municipal	services	and	enterprises),	local	taxes	and	payments,	
income	 tax	 on	 cooperatives	 and	 public	 organizations,	 and	 payments	 for	
legal	services	such	as	the	notary.	Second	was	the	regulated	(regulirovannyi)	
income	 which	 came	 from	 federal	 revenues,	 tax	 of	 the	 population	 and	
republican	enterprise	profits	which	were	collected	annually	in	the	area	of	
the	 soviet.	 In	 addition,	 the	 local	 level	was	helped	 to	meet	 its	obligations	
with	 subventions,	 categorical	 grants	 (dotatsii)	 for	 specific	 projects	 and	
general	financing	(sredstva)	to	cover	joint	programs	of	the	center	and	the	
republics.	(Kirkow	199:	36–3.)
Expenditures	of	the	local	budgets	were	mostly	used	to	finance	the	social	
and	cultural	sphere.	Most	of	the	money	went	on	housing	repair	and	public	
works	(cleaning,	parks	and	such).	Yet	the	local	level	managed	only	about	
one-third	of	 the	housing	sector	 in	 its	area	since,	 in	 the	Russian	republic,	
almost	3/4	belonged	to	ministries	and	enterprises.	Local	budget	spending	
on	territorial	industry	and	agriculture	was	only	5	and	10	%	respectively.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 a	 large	 part	 of	 the	 social	 and	 cultural	 services	were	 also	
financed	by	work	organizations.	(Kirkow	199:	3.)
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The	Soviet	local	government,	as	a	part	of	the representative administration	
of	the	planning	system,	meant	the	soviet	which	was	made	up	of	two	organs.	
The	first	was	 the	 elected	 soviet	 (council)	of	deputies	 and	 the	 second	 the	
executive	committee	which	worked	as	the	head	of	the	municipal	adminis-
tration.	The	 most	 important	 task	 for	 the	 local	 soviets	 was	 supervising,	
monitoring	 and	 reporting	 responsibilities	 through	 deputies,	 standing	
committees	 and	 finance	 departments.	Control	 over	 the	 non-subordinate	
enterprises	 in	the	area	was	mostly	 formal	and	varied	with	the	soviet,	 the	
power	of	 the	sectoral	ministry	 in	question,	and	the	 issues	at	hand.	Local	
soviets	managed	retail	trade,	dining,	entertainment	and	other	educational	
and	cultural	facilities.	Services	included	road	repair,	medical	care	and	day	
care.	Area	and	labor	planning,	and	a	wide	range	of	services	were,	however,	
also	the	responsibility	of	the	local	enterprises	which	led	to	authority	conflict	
in	 coordination.	 In	 fact,	 the	 implementation	 of	 decisions	was	 left	 to	 the	
executive	committee	and	the	party	organization.	(Kirkow	199:	40.)
The	chairman	of	the	executive	committee,	who	acted	as	a	mayor,	had	the	
highest	 authority.	 Behind	 him	 were	 the	 first	 vice-chairman,	 other	 vice-
chairmen	 and	 the	 head	 of	 the	 executive	 committee	 administration,	who	
were	full-time	city	employees.	Executive	committees	included	key	municipal	
department	heads,	along	with	representatives	of	the	city	party	committee,	
and	important	non-city	agencies.	According	to	the	Soviet	law,	the	session	of	
the	soviet	had	the	right	to	decide	the	most	important	questions	such	as	the	
city	 budget,	 adoption	 of	 the	 plans	 for	 the	 city-run	 enterprises,	 issuing	
ordinances,	election	of	the	executive	committee,	and	approve	its	nominations	
for	 heads	 of	 departments.	 Between	 sessions,	 however,	 the	 executive	
committees	governed	the	municipality	by	implementing	the	law,	directing	
departments	that	operated	municipal	enterprises,	allocating	land,	guiding	
sub-committees	of	the	city	soviet	and	by	receiving	complaints	from	citizens.	
Besides	these	bodies	for	decision	making	there	were	also	numerous	standing	
commissions	 of	 the	 soviets,	 electoral	 commissions,	 street	 and	 house	
committees	 and	 so	 on,	 which	 mobilized	 the	 citizens	 of	 a	 certain	 area.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	46,	Taubman	193:	35–36,	Sakwa	1990:153.)
In	principle	the	system	of	soviets	meant	the	involvement	of	a	large	group	
of	citizens	in	the	state´s	decision	making	via	a	structure	of	elected	councils	
and	their	executive	committees.	The	principle	of	dual	subordination	meant	
that	all	departments	of	executive	committees	which	ran	the	daily	adminis-
trative	tasks	for	their	area,	were	accountable	to	both	their	respective	soviet	
and	to	the	higher	executive	committees	and	ministries	which	had	the	right	to	
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set	aside	the	decisions	of	the	lower	organs.	For	instance,	the	local	budget	was	
formulated	by	the	local	department	of	finance	of	the	municipal	government.	
Under	dual	subordination	though,	this	department	was	also	controlled	by	the	
Ministry	of	Finance.	(Sakwa	1990:	153,	Hammer	196:	13.)	
The	role	of	town	executive	committees	was	limited	by	the	fact	that	the	
economic	administration	was	so	important	to	the	organization	of	practical	
welfare.	In	many	towns,	large	factories	had	the	responsibility	of	taking	care	
of	the	local	welfare	services.	Towns	were	built	for	the	factory	and	survived	
with	it	as	it	was	usually	the	employer	for	a	great	deal	of	families.	As	Harri	
Melin	 (199)	 has	 pointed	 out,	 factory	 managers	 were	 important	 local	
leaders	 who	 had	 power	 even	 over	 the	 production	 and	 allocation	 of	
apartments	and	holidays	(Melin	199:	142).	This	had	a	strong	impact	on	the	
cultural	consciousness	of	people	in	the	area.	Belonging	to	a	community	was	
made	stronger	by	this	dependency	both	financially	and	socially.
The	local	executive	committees	coordinated	the	functional	departments	
of	 enterprises	 and	 organizations,	 controlled	 their	 work,	 and	 financed	 it	
when	these	organizations	were	under	their	subordination.	For	actual	power,	
the	executive	committees	needed	the	cooperation	of	the	branch	enterprise	
directors	 to	 negotiate	 the	 amount	 and	 distribution	 of	 resources	 in	 their	
administrative	 area.	 The	 position	 of	 the	 executive	 committees	 in	 the	
administrative	 market	 was	 structurally	 weak.	 Although	 it	 was	 also	 an	
economic	body	which	took	care	of	immediate	socio-economic	matters,	it	
did	not	possess	the	effective	means	to	demand	anything.	(Kordonskii	2000:	
9,	Kuznetsov199:	193.)	
In	effect,	instead	of	being	the	leaders	of	the	totality	of	local	administration,	
the	executive	committees	were	players	in	the	local	administrative	market	in	
which	 a	 specific	 “arbitration	 system”	 balanced	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 different	
administrations.	The	ceremonial	role	of	the	Soviet	in	this	market	is	natural	
in	the	sense	that	it	did	not	really	possess	an	authoritatively	strong	place	in	
the	arbitration	process.	Yet	this	arbitration	activity	could	well	be	defined	as	
the	core	of	 the	mature	Soviet	administrative	culture.	Theodor	Friedgut´s	
case	study	of	emigre	Soviet	citizens´	perceptions	of	their	local	government,	
which	was	published	in	193,	corresponds	with	this	picture.	The	mayor	was	
the	 key	 public	 official	 who	 was	 used	 for	 approving	 and	 appealing	 for	
citizens´requests.	The	 Soviet	members	were	 in	 fact	 seen	 as	 representing	
most	of	the	qualities	which	were	required	from	a	good	Soviet	representative.	
Citizens	 turned	 to	 executive	 committee	 members	 and	 to	 heads	 of	
departments	with	requests	concerning	mostly	housing,	services,	pensions	
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and	 work.	 In	 addition,	 complaints	 were	 made	 against	 the	 bureaucrats	
themselves.	 Yet	 there	was	 also	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 local	 representatives	 being	
inefficient	 as	 a	 source	 of	 problem	 solving,	 preferring	 friends	 and	 family	
instead.	(Friedgut	193:	112–124.)	
The	 usefulness	 or	 ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 representative	 administration	
was	closely	linked	with	the	role	of	the	Communist	party	in	the	local	level.	
The	party,	which	was	the political administration,	had	the	same	structure	at	
all	levels	of	territorial	government:	first	a	party	congress	which	chose	among	
its	delegates	a	committee	(or	assembly)	and	which	represented	all	members	
of	a	certain	geographical	area.	The	committee	delegated	its	authority	to	an	
executive	board	(buro),	which	was	headed	by	the	first	secretary	of	the	area	
secretariat	of	the	Communist	party.	He	was	followed	by	other	secretaries	of	
the	party,	heads	of	party	administration	in	the	area,	their	vice-heads	and	
the	 party	 instructors	 of	 the	 geographical	 area.	 The	 party	 coordinated	
relations	between	all	 the	other	administrations	 in	 the	municipality	while	
the	executive	committee	of	the	soviet	oversaw	the	actual	daily	execution	of	
decisions.	 In	other	words,	 the	party	created	 the	policy	and	 the	executive	
committee	 was	 in	 charge	 of	 its	 practical	 execution.	 (Kordonskii	 2000,	
Hammer	196.)	In	this	sense,	the	sometimes	expressed	idea	that	the	soviet	
government	did	not	have	a	policy	making	process,	or	make	policy	in	the	
first	place,	is	not	quite	accurate.	
Both	the	town	party	committee,	the	Gorkom	(gorodskoi komitet)	and	the	
executive	committee	of	the	town	soviet	had	a	place	in	the	planning	of	long	
term	 actions.	 Furthermore,	 the	 party	 had	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	
management	of	the	economic	administration	through	party	members	who	
worked	 in	 factories	 and	 service	 organizations	 regardless	 of	 the	 formal	
subordination.	Through	these	links	the	party	enforced	national	policies	at	
the	local	level	(i.e.	party	intervention,	podmena,	with	local	state	functions)	
(Kirkow	 199:	 39).	 This	 link	 was	 not	 merely	 practical.	 It	 followed	 a	
fundamental	principle	of	territorial-production	systems	which,	along	with	
the	 concept	 of	 democratic	 centralism,	 created	 the	 basis	 for	 functional	
organization.	(Kordonskii	2000:	4,	Hammer	196:	1.)	
The	 territorial-production	 system	 principle	 meant	 that	 each	 party	
member	 belonged	 to	 a	 primary	 party	 organization	 associated	 with	 a	
workplace.	This	organization,	which	usually	met	once	a	month	and	whose	
average	size	was	around	40	members,	linked	the	party	to	the	rest	of	society.	
The	primary	organization	had	several	functions.	First	of	all	it	was	engaged	
in	ideological	work	which	depended	on	the	workplace	in	question.	Second,	
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it	served	as	a	channel	for	political	information	with	the	help	of	members	
specializing	 in	 its	distribution	 (politinformatory).	Third,	 it	monitored	 the	
workplace	to	prevent	authority	 leakage.	In	other	words	a	situation	where	
the	management	started	using	organizational	resources	and	goals	for	other	
than	 their	 original	 purposes.	 Fourth,	 it	 elected	 the	 town	 party	 congress	
which	then	chose	the	town	party	committee.	(Hammer	196:	1–3.)
The	official	 communication	between	different	 levels	 of	 administration	
was	almost	completely	in	the	hands	of	the	party.	This	included	both	vertical	
communication	 between	 different	 levels	 of	 power	 and	 the	 horizontal	
communication	between	the	subjects	of	each	level.	The	Communist	party´s	
political	power	and	control	had	a	strange	reverse	effect	of	“depolitization”.	
When	all	organs	of	decision	making	and	civil	activity	had	the	same	identity	
and	interest,	there	could	be	no	real	social	or	political	differences.	Conflicts	
were	seen	as	technical	and	departmental,	administrative	or	“bureaucratic”.	
Much	of	 the	actual	decision	making	was	out	of	 the	direct	 control	of	 the	
local	 level	 such	 as	 all-union	 enterprises,	 research	 institutions,	 much	 of	
heavy	 industry,	 defence	 establishments	 and	 the	 railways.	The	municipal	
government	was	also	restricted	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 could	not	 raise	 taxes.	
(Sternheimer	193:	155,	Sokolov	1995.)
The	party	used	a	considerable	amount	of	synergy	as	a	basis	for	its	decision	
making	 and	 control	 power,	 without	 being	 formally	 inside	 the	 other	
bureaucracies.	 It	 is	 also	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 the	 party	 was	 the	 super	
administration	which	delegated	tasks	to	other	institutions.	Each	workplace	
had	 its	 leaders	of	workers	among	 those	who	were	party	members.	These	
communists	were	 also	 typically	 elected	members	 of	 the	 representational	
administration.	In	this	sense,	the	work	place	level	can	be	considered	as	the	
lowest	functional	step	in	the	party	nomenklatura.	(Kordonskii	2000:	5.)
The	merger	of	the	political	and	economical	was	structurally	the	clearest	
in	the	case	of	those	factories	which	had	the	status	of	republican	or	all-state	
organizations.	There	the	workplace	party	organization	was	integrated	into	
factory	 organization	 as	 a	 part	 of	 the	 sectoral	 (in	 this	 case	 economic)	
administration.	It	represented	the	territorial	aspect	of	the	management.	In	
the	 cases	of	 the	most	 important	 economic	agencies	 at	 the	 local	 level	 the	
verticality	was	the	strongest.	These	dealt	with	matters	of	finance,	construction	
(especially	housing)	 and	planning.	Decisions	were	 in	 fact	made	by	non-
elected	officials	from	higher	territorial	level.	(Smith	190:	6.)
Functionally,	the	local	and	the	center	were	united	at	the	central	level	in	
two	 ways.	 First,	 in	 the	 paid	 professional	 staff	 agency	 serving	 the	 party	
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Politburo,	which	operated	 through	 the	primary	party	organizations.	The	
central	bureaucracy	of	the	Politburo	supervised	all	of	the	Soviet	government,	
just	the	same	as	the	local	and	regional	did	in	their	respective	areas.	It	was	a	
controlling	and	guidance	organization	which	was	not	to	take	the	place	of	
executive	 institutions.	 Most	 of	 all,	 its	 role	 was	 to	 gather	 and	 process	
information	to	give	the	leadership	an	informed	view	on	the	developments	
in	 the	 country.	 It	 also	 gave	 directives	 downward	 to	 the	 party	members.	
(Hammer	196:	9.)
The	second	functional	connection	took	place	in	the	bureaucracy	of	the	
Central	Committee	which	meant	 about	 twenty	 administrative	 organs	 or	
departments.	 Each	 department	 supervised	 one	 or	 more	 ministries,	
government	 agencies	 or	 public	 organizations.	This	 supervision	 included	
control	of	appointments	through	the	nomenklatura	system	of	official	name	
list-appointments	 by	 different	 level	 party	 committees	 and	 collecting	
information	through	primary	organizations	about	their	parent	organization.	
A	placement	both	in	the	sectoral	and	territorial	administrations	could	only	
be	 achieved	 by	 people	 who	met	 the	 party	 requirements	 for	 cadres.	The	
competition	for	open	posts	was	always	in	the	hands	of	the	party	organizations.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	.)	In	this	manner	the	Soviet	bureaucrat	was	a	client	of	
the	nomenklatura	system	which	provided	an	effective	channel	for	the	party	
to	control	all	important	ideas	all	the	way	to	the	local	level	(Arvidsson	1992:	
12).The	 party´s	 organizational	 work	 department,	 for	 instance,	 was	
responsible	 for	 the	appointments	 at	 territorial	 levels,	 the	Komsomol	and	
the	trade	unions.	(Hammer	196:	92–93.)	In	this	way	the	basis	of	personnel	
policy	in	the	administration	was	outside	of	general	law.	
Analogous	 political	 and	 general	 administrative	 (economic	 and	
representative)	 systems	 existed	 at	 each	 level	 of	 the	 administration.	The	
party	 system	 was	 headed	 by	 a	 first	 secretary	 who	 had	 from	 2–4	 vice-
secretaries	 for	 ideological,	 organizational,	 industrial	 and	 farming	 issues.	
Similar	to	the	structure	of	the	executive	committees,	the	party	elected	1–2	
department	heads	of	city	party	committee	who	were	in	charge	of	ideological	
and	 organizational	 matters.	 In	 addition	 the	 city	 committee	 included	 a	
representative	of	the	district	organization	and	line	members	of	the	party.	
(Sungurov	199:	61.)
The	secretaries	of	town	level	party	organizations	oversaw	the	integration	
of	 economic	 operations	 in	 the	 industries	 through	 line	 directors.	 The	
opinions	 of	 the	 town	 party	 secretaries	 were	 taken	 into	 account	 by	 the	
executive	committees	at	 the	regional	 level	 to	appoint	the	management	of	
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any	 factory	 or	 service	 organization.	This	 meant	 that	 all	 decision	 about	
personnel	policy	were	in	fact	made	at	the	regional	level.	This	third	level	of	
party	 hierarchy	 was	 formed	 by	 the	 functionaries	 of	 the	 regional	 party	
organizations.	The	 nomenklatura of	 the	 regional	 level	 also	 included	 the	
directors	of	the	economical	administration.	(Kordonskii	2000:	6,	Hammer	
196:	4.)
In	fact	the	administrative	market	itself	was	divided	into	yet	smaller	parts	
of	power	holders	who	had	better	channels	for	effecting	the	end	result	than	
others.	Sungurov	(199)	has	shown	how	the	party	functioned	in	the	parallel	
double	administration	space	to	produce	an	alternative	or	complementing	
report	from	different	parts	of	the	country	to	the	Communist	party	Central	
Committee.	Although	the	economic	administration	collected	information	
for	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 five	 year	 plans	 through	 the	 line	 ministries	 and	
processed	 it	 in	 the	 Gosplan,	 the	 Communist	 party	 Central	 Committee	
departments	had	 their	own	proposals	and	analysis	which	considered	 the	
interests	 of	 the	 party	 nomenklatura	 and	 regional	 power	 groups.	 The	
territorial	 (oblast	 and	 republic)	 planning	 followed	 the	 same	 pattern:	
economic	 reports	 and	 suggestions	 came	 from	 the	 executive	 committee	
heads	 of	 the	 elected	 organs	 to	 the	Gosplan,	 and	 reports	 from	 the	 oblast	
party	committee	heads	to	the	party´s	Central	Committee.	(Sungurov	199:	
49.)	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 hierarchy	 inside	 the	 political	 administration	 itself	
influenced	the	decision	making	concerning	all	of	society.	The	inner	party	
and	 the	 outer	 party	 (Sungurov	 199)	 represented	 the	 political	 and	 the	
economical	sides	of	administration	with	the	former	having	the	most	power	
at	all	levels.
The	key	center	for	bargaining	at	the	local	level	was	in	fact	the	oblast	level	
of	the	party	organization	(comp.	for	instance	Nystén-Haarala	2001:0).	At	
this	level,	there	existed	three	bodies:	the	congress	(assembly),	the	committee	
and	 the	 party	 buro.	 The	 town	 level	 elected	 delegates	 to	 this	 level.	 The	
regional	committee	which	was	thus	formed	by	these	delegates	elected	the	
regional	 party	 committee,	 the	 obkom (oblast´noi komitet),	 which	 was	
headed	by	the	regional	party	buro	of	about	ten	members.	Included	in	this	
organization	were	the	first	secretary	of	the	regional	party	organization	and	
the	chairman	of	the	regional	executive	committee.	The	buro	was	critical	to	
the	 administrative	 market	 because	 it	 had	 the	 authority	 to	 supervise	 all	
activities	of	the	region.	This	was	a	considerably	larger	responsibility	than	
the	regional	executive	committee	had.	The	party	leaders	mediated	many	of	
the	competing	 institutional	conflicts	of	 interest	 since	 influential	heads	of	
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key	regional	administrations	and	organizations	were,	as	a	rule,	represented	
in	the	oblast party	committee	(obkom).	Gordon	Smith	uses	the	terms	“elite	
pluralism”,	 “bureaucratic	 pluralism”	 and	 “participatory	 bureaucracy”	 to	
describe	 this	 phenomenon.	 The	 buro	 was	 in	 fact	 responsible	 for	 the	
mobilization	 of	 regional	 resources	 to	 fulfill	 the	 target	 figures	 set	 in	 the	
central	plan.	(Hammer	196:	4,	Smith	190:	–9.)
The	administrative	market	in	which	the	execution	of	the	plan	took	place	
made	the	city	planning	a	political	process	in	which	many	municipal	planners	
could	 effectively	 influence	 neither	 the	 non-city	 sector	 nor	 their	 own.	
Compartmentalization	and	centralization	hardened	competition.	As	a	side	
effect	of	the	budget	process,	co-operation	for	soviet	and	non-soviet	agencies	
was	difficult.	The	main	administrative	issue	in	this	market	became	access	to	
resources	and	the	ability	to	distribute	them.	Formally,	this	depended	on	the	
status	of	 actors	within	 the	official	 structures	 of	 authority.	 In	 the	market,	
however,	the	actual	power	of	different	actors	also	depended	on	a	variety	of	
factors	 which	 contributed	 to	 their	 actual	 status.	Thus,	 for	 instance,	 the	
resources	of	the	economic	administration	were	distributed	by	the	factory	
directors,	 along	 with	 local	 executive	 committee	 heads,	 workers	 of	 party	
committee	and	higher	branch	organizations.	(Kordonskii	2000:	1,	Kivinen	
199:	124,	Taubman	193:	1.)	
According	to	Stephen	Sternheimer´s	case	study	the	knowledge	required	
for	the	success	of	bargaining	by	economic	operators	in	the	market	depended	
upon	 the	 knowledge	 of	 alternative	 allocation	 patterns	 available	 to	 one´s	
superiors,	 independent	 contacts	 with	 suppliers	 and	 the	 span	 of	 control	
which	the	superior	body	had.	Inaccurate	information	was	deliberately	sent	
upward.	 The	 plan	 was	 seen	 as	 setting	 unrealistic	 deadlines,	 unable	 to	
coordinate	 demand	 and	 sources	 for	 materials,	 and	 unable	 to	 allocate	
adequate	 premises	 and	 workloads.	 Rigid	 planning	 style,	 and	 not	 the	
administrative	structures	 themselves,	were	seen	as	causing	 the	problems.	
(Sternheimer	193:	140–142.)
At	the	local	level,	Simon	Kordonskii	has	distinguished	five	actor	groups	
who	 had	 their	 specific	 social	 position	within	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 influence.	
These	 were	 workers	 and	 holders	 of	 similar	 status	 (for	 instance	 junior	
researchers	 and	 line	 administration	 officials),	 line	 directors,	 functional	
specialists,	 vice-directors	 of	 organizations	 and	 directors	 of	 local	 organi-
zations	 (who	 belonged	 to	 the	 nomenklatura	 of	 the	Communist	 party	 in	
their	area).	The	functional	groups	were	universal	because	relations	between	
different	groups	were	similar	 in	spite	of	 the	field	of	activity	(for	example	
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agriculture	 or	 science).	 The	 administrative	 importance,	 however,	 did	
depended	on	the	line	of	activity	in	the	sense	that	the	status	of	the	military-
industrial	sector	workers	was	much	higher	than	that	of	the	workers	in	an	
provincial	organization	subordinated	to	a	republican	ministry	of	culture,	
for	 instance.	 (Kordonskii	 2000:	 2,	 Kivinen	 199:	 126.)	 The	 local	 and	
regional	administrative	markets	had	a	significant	meaning	for	the	creation	
of	budgets,	since	the	political	power	of	the	political	administration	at	these	
levels	 and	 their	 relations	 with	 the	 industry	 managers	 with	 higher	
subordination,	played	 a	 role	 in	 the	way	 the	 local	 budget	was	 structured.	
(Kirkow	199:	35.)
In	 practice	 “local”	 in	 this	 decision	making	 culture	meant,	 on	 the	 one	
hand	 the	 highly	 personalized	 (but	 unofficial)	 power	 of	 well	 positioned	
individuals	who	represented	the	interest	of	their	organizations	as	influential	
semi-autonomous	power-brokers.	On	the	other	hand,	the	social	rules	of	the	
game	meant	the	use	of	the	local	party	connection	to	get	the	needed	results	
in	decisions	of	local	importance.	For	instance,	the	city	could	ask	the	party	
committee	to	help	if	it	needed	something	and	higher	administrative	bodies	
declined	 the	 request.	 (Piskotin	 1993:4.)	The	main	 structuring	 of	 power	
shares	was	mostly	done	inside	the	party	itself.	One	of	the	main	problems	for	
the	 local	 party	 here,	 was	 its	 lack	 of	 influence	 on	 the	 ministries	 which	
managed	municipally	located	enterprises.	(Kirkow	199:	40.)	
Sungurov	(199)	has	described	how	the	vertical	hierarchy	in	the	party	
nomenklatura system	was	such	that	a	party	instructor	or	the	secretary	of	
the	regional	committee	could,	in	fact,	give	orders	to	the	director	of	a	factory	
within	his	 jurisdiction.	 In	case	he	clearly	breached	his	 limits,	 the	 factory	
director	could	in	turn	use	the	hierarchy	of	his	line	economic	administration	
to	reach	the	department	of	Central	Party	Committee,	which	could	influence	
the	local	party	official.	(Sungurov	199:	62.)
The	local	level	was	a	coordinator	of	the	implementation	of	legislation	
given	to	it	by	higher	state	organs.	According	to	the	Constitution	(which	
had	supreme	legal	force	in	letter)	laws	came	from	the	Supreme	Soviet.	The	
Council	of	Ministers	(the	government)	could	issue	decisions	and	decrees	
which	were	 based	 on	 laws	 and	 supported	 their	 implementation.	These	
legal	 acts	 were	 binding	 troughout	 the	 USSR.	 (The	 Constitution	 of	 the	
USSR	19:	articles	15,	16.)	In	addition	to	this,	the	Council	of	Ministries	
issued	 joint	decrees	with	 the	Communist	party	 central	 committee	 (van	
der	Berg	1992:	153).	The	19	Constitution	does	not	recognize	such	acts	
explicitly.	In	this	way,	in	fact,	 legislative	acts	which	directly	affected	the	
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whole	executive	bureaucracy	were	issued	outside	of	the	official	legislative	
process.	
The	political	administration	was	important	for	the	actual	norm	hierarchy	
of	 the	 state.	 The	 main	 foundations	 of	 daily	 legal	 authority	 were	 the	
instruction	of	 the	Central	Committee	and	 the	Council	of	Ministers	who	
also	 issued	 joint	 decrees	 (postanovlenie).	Of	 these	 the	 latter	 acted	 as	 the	
legally	legitimate	source,	while	the	party	ensured	its	execution.	Actual	laws	
which	 the	 representative	 organs	 of	 the	 country	 passed	 were	 of	 minor	
importance	or	merely	decorative.	The	decisions	of	concrete	administrative	
organs	 in	 the	different	administrations	of	 the	 state	were	more	 important	
than	laws.	Limits	of	jurisdiction,	actual	tasks	and	the	expertise	requirement	
of	administrators	were	set	by	the	instructions	of	the	coordinating	political	
bureaucracy.	The	party	instructions	were,	in	this	manner,	sub-laws	of	the	
state	of	which	many	were	non-public	and	access	to	them	depended	on	the	
level	of	an	administrator.	(Sungurov	199:62–63,	66.)
Party	membership	required	that	party	members	followed	the	orders	of	
the	local	party	office,	even	when	they	contradicted	state	or	organizational	
policy.	This	 type	 of	 control	 was	 the	most	 intense	 in	 case	 of	 the	 control	
branch	(the	courts	and	the	prosecutor´s	office).	Yet,	at	the	same	time	as	the	
party	made	the	policies	of	other	organizations,	or	at	least	had	the	final	say	
in	their	content,	it	did	not	carry	them	out.	This	gave	the	party	an	ideological	
upper	hand	in	case	of	administrative	dysfunctions.	The	other	administrations	
were,	in	fact,	quite	often	criticized	in	the	Soviet	press	and	by	the	political	
leadership	for	being	“bureaucratic”	and	stalling	the	development	of	society.	
Inertia,	lack	of	initiative	and	waste	could	be	attacked,	because	the	party	was	
never	at	fault.	(Kordonskii	2000:	4,	Hammer	196:	11.)	
A	 career	 in	 political	 administration	 was	 particularly	 tempting	 for	
persons	of	a	more	humble	background,	 such	as	 the	youth	of	worker	or	
peasant	families	whose	opportunities	to	enter	prestigious	universities	and	
have	successful	careers	were	otherwise	more	restricted.	In	this	sense,	the	
party	offered	a	 channel	 for	upward	mobility,	 although	a	 less	 stable	one	
than	 in	 the	 representational	 administration,	 for	 instance.	 The	 Soviet	
ministries,	for	example,	were	professional	organizations	where	employees	
easily	spent	their	whole	working	careers.	In	contrast,	the	first	secretaries	
of	 oblasts	 were	 intentionally	 transferred	 from	 one	 place	 to	 another	 to	
avoid	 them	 representing	 regional	 or	 local	 interests.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	
regional	 party	 leaders	 were	 also	 members	 of	 the	 Communist	 party´s	
Central	Committee	affected	their	sense	of	identity.	Their	status	was	that	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
194
as	the	“eyes	of	Moscow”	on	the	region	which	they	represented.	(Hammer	
196:	9,	13–139.)
Besides	the	prestige	the	position	bestowed	an	individual	in	the	system,	
his	 or	 her	 placement	 in	 the	 inter-organizational	 hierarchy	 meant	 more	
concrete	benefits.	The	real	level	of	a	wage	was	not	dependent	on	the	quality	
or	quantity	of	work	but	on	the	norms	set	by	the	agreement	of	employment.	
The	legal	benefits	accorded	to	the	workforce	were	distributed	and	monitored	
by	specialists	of	cadre	policy	in	the	work	organizations,	such	as	work	force	
departments,	planning	departments,	departments	of	work	and	salary.	The	
functionaries	in	these	departments	decided	who,	in	what	order	and	to	what	
extent,	received	apartments,	vacations,	bonuses,	discounts	and	so	on.	The	
main	areas	of	their	work	were	administrative	orders	and	instructions	which	
determined	the	rules	for	decision	making.	(Kordonskii	2000:	2.)
In	addition	to	this,	a	person´s	living	standard	depended	on	the	oppor-
tunity	 to	unofficially	use	 the	organization´s	resources.	“Natural”space	 for	
corruption	and	favoritism	was	created	and	its	importance	grew	because	of	
a	deficits	of	goods.	Most	basic	services	were	produced	outside	of	the	price	
system	for	direct	consumption	which,	in	the	Western	sense,	made	them	a	
substitute	 for	 direct	 welfare.	 Housing	 was	 allocated	 to	 employees	 of	
enterprises	and	holiday	resorts	could	be	visited	according	to	the	quotas	in	
their	plans.	This	type	of	economic	administrative	distribution	system	meant	
that	money	did	not	have	the	same	position	that	it	had	in	Western	societies.	
(Lane	1992:	30.)	Economic	matters	which	were	directly	connected	with	the	
basic	social	well	being	of	the	population	had	become	administrative.	The	
citizens,	in	turn,	considered	them	to	be	the	state´s	responsibility.	
Informal	ways	to	elicit	better	input	from	one´s	subordinates	were	seen	
an	 important	 factor	 in	 Stephen	 Sternheimer´s	 case	 study.	 Greater	
cooperation	and	effort	 could	be	 expected	 in	 exchange	 for	 extra	 vacation	
days,	extra	paid	free	time,	unreported	salary	bonuses	and	so	on.	(Sternheimer	
193:	143.)	In	this	sense,	those	having	any	type	of	decision	making	power	
in	 the	system	also	depended	on	 the	 informal	practices.	Further	more,	 in	
contrast	 to	the	typical	Western	situation,	 the	prime	motive	was,	 in	many	
cases,	a	fear	of	failure	rather	than	a	desire	to	enrich	oneself	(Sternheimer	
193:	155).
The	informal,	yet	institutionalized	practices	of	the	Soviet	administration	
were	connected	with	the	blat-phenomenon	of	mutual	assistance	captured	
by	the	popular	expression	“the	shops	are	empty	but	the	fridges	are	full”	(see	
Ledeneva	2000:322).	Here,	an	important	unofficial	role	in	the	arbitration	of	
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goods	 and	 services	 was	 played	 by	 middlemen	 (blatnye)	 who	 could	 be	
secretaries	of	directors	or	secretaries	of	party	organizations,	 for	 instance.	
These	were	individuals	who	possessed	knowledge	of	what	people	to	use	in	
different	 situations	 to	 achieve	 a	 desired	 goal.	They	 could	 point	 out	 the	
conditions	in	which	exchange	of	material	benefits	or	statuses	could	be	done	
satisfactorily	for	all	parties	concerned.	Conflicts	between	different	groups	
in	 the	 hierarchy	 were	 solved	 by	 the	 leadership	 from	 a	 higher	 level	 of	
administration.	In	this	way,	the	leadership	also	took	upon	itself	the	role	of	
an	outside	higher	arbitrator	who	could	decide	which	actions	were	tolerated	
and	which	led	to	sanctions	legal	or	otherwise.	(Kordonskii	2000:	3.)
Ledeneva	has	contended	that	blat	and	other	informal	practices	sustained	
formal	 institutions	 of	 the	 economy,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	 the	
formal	rules	and	principles	to	be	observed	as	legitimate.	Informal	mutual	
assistance	was	 a	way	 of	 securing	 civil	 rights	 in	 the	 political	 and	 control	
bureaucracies.	 (Ledeneva	 2000:	 322–323.)	 Zinoviev	 has	 called	 these	
practices	and	ways	of	thinking	“the	communal	behavior”	which	created	an	
additional	 social	 risk.	 It	 was	 consciously	 learned	 as	 a	 set	 of	 social	 skills	
which	allowed	the	person	to	maintain	and	better	his	position.	There	were	
many	 instances	 of	 trivial	 communal	 behavior	 but	 also	 some	 which	
determined	the	nature	of	the	society.	Moreover,	communal	behavior	became	
natural	and	habitual,	“innocent”.	People	developed	a	survival	mechanism	in	
which	 life	 became	 a	 system	 of	 mutual	 benefit	 and	 assistance	 and/or	
competition.	(Zinoviev	1991:	6.)	
An	example	of	how	the	unofficial	and	the	official	were	connected	in	the	
daily	 administrative	 work	 was	 the	 use	 of	 written	 official	 documents	 to	
secure	the	decisions	and	promises	made	in	personal	phone	calls	between	
members	of	a	social	network.	The	telephone	was	the	key	channel	through	
which	 things	 were	 done	 in	 time	 and	 as	 wanted.	 Yet	 these	 business	 like	
informal	 networks	 required	 that	 decisions	 were	 legalized	 through	
documentation.	 Mere	 oral	 communication	 was	 not	 enough	 to	 secure	
decisions	in	the	administration.	(Sternheimer	193:	149.)
The	social	system	of	the	administrative	market	at	the	local	level	created	a	
permanent	dysfunction	in	terms	of	political	guidance.	As	a	response	to	the	
economic	and	social	rigidity	which	the	planning	system	had	created,	 the	
administrative	 market	 paradoxically	 further	 strengthened	 the	 inertia	 of	
society.	Soviet	society	was	full	of	activity	at	the	local	level	but	much	of	this	
energy	was	directed	to	surviving	and	benefitting	from	the	existing	system	
instead	of	creating	new	forms	of	economical	and	cultural	growth.
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A	document	of	the	Central	Committee	from	195	had	listed	the	problems:	
“	…	In	the	apparatus,	bureaucracy,	red	tape,	indifference	to	citizens,	callous	
attitudes,	rudeness,	superciliousness	and	procastination	in	dealing	with	the	
citizens´complaints	 and	 requests	–	 common	 ills	 among	Soviet	officials	–	
needed	to	be	replaced	by	feelings	of	responsibility,	personal	modesty	and	
concern	for	human	beings	and	there	must	be	a	permanent	persistent	and	
obstinate	struggle	against	the	evils	of	bureaucratism.”	(Hill	193:	19.)
These	hopes	were	in	contradiction	with	the	reality	of	placing	ideological	
suitability	above	the	quality	of	work.	In	order	to	keep	the	social	balance,	
everyone	received	more	or	less	the	same	salary	and	benefits	in	spite	of	actual	
contribution.(Sungurov	199:	6.)	Informal	practices	and	ways	of	thought	
connected	with	them	produced	an	atmosphere	in	which	the	responsibility	
connected	with	a	formal	position	was	not	rigidly	fixed.	As	people	understood	
that	 success	 and	plain	 comfortable	 life	 required	more	 than	 just	 input	 in	
their	formal	job	tasks,	a	cycle	of	poor	work	culture	was	created.	Zinovjev	
has	concluded	that	the	co-operation	needed	meant	that	individuals	(both	
administrators	 and	 others)	 shifted	 unpleasant	 tasks	 which	 were	 their	
responsibility	 on	 the	 shoulders	 of	 other.	 His	 critical	 view	 is	 that	 “the	
boorishness	 and	 capricious	 behavior	 of	 functionaries,	 important	 or	
otherwise,	the	coarseness	of	shop	assistants,	the	arbitrariness	of	the	militia	
(…),	the	endless	red	tape;	all	these	are	not	minor	defects,	but	the	essence	of	
the	whole	matter.”	(Zinoviev	1991:	6,	3.)
The	 social	 system	 which	 was	 created	 in	 part	 by	 the	 effects	 of	 the	
nomenklatura culture,	 and	 partly	 by	 the	 overall	 legal	 position	 of	 the	
administrators,	returned	these	effects	to	the	routine	work	of	the	organizations.	
There	was	no	symmetry	between	power	and	responsibility,	which	made	it	
difficult	 for	 the	 officials	 to	 work	 independently.	 The	 concentration	 of	
authority	and	power	in	the	upper	hierarchies	made	the	official´s	role	diffuse	
and	rather	weak.	The	absence	of	effective	social	control	(on	the	part	of	free	
civil	society)	and	strict	secrecy	also	tended	to	weaken	the	official´s	specific	
requirements.	(Fogelklou	in	Bidrag	till	ostatsforskringen	190:9.)
Paradoxically,	lack	of	initiative	was	at	least	partially	connected	with	the	
need	 for	political	control	and	 the	subsequent	 legal	 sanctions.	The control 
administration	had	a	significant	impact	on	the	reproduction	of	the	soviet	
administrative	culture.	It	included	different	types	of	institutional	forms	and	
authority	limits.	
Parallel	to	the	formal	control	line	of	the	economic	(vedomstvennyi)	and	
representative	 administrations	 (obshchestvennyi)	 there	 existed	 a	 special	
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non-state	control	agency	 in	 the	 form	of	a	social	organization	whose	task	
was	to	control	the	execution	of	the	plan.	This	people´s	control	organization	
inspected	 possible	 problems	 in	 the	 making	 of	 products	 within	 its	 own	
jurisdiction.	The	 jurisdiction	was	 in	 reality	 limited	 by	 the	 consideration	
given	to	the	interests	of	responsible	parties	belonging	to	the	nomenklatura.	
The	usefulness	of	the	control	organization	became	evident	when	the	official	
administrative	line	was	not	for	some	reason	effective	or	appropriate.	Most	
persons	breached	administrative	rules	in	some	way	and	in	these	cases	the	
people´s	control	could	be	called	in	to	collect	evidence	which	could	be	passed	
either	to	the	party	organs	or	to	the	prosecutor.	(Sungurov	199:	69.)	
The	core	of	the	control	administration	was	in	many	ways	the	office	of	the	
prosecutor,	the	prokuratura.	The	prosecutor´s	office	had	a	triple	role	in	the	
mature	soviet	system.	It	acted	as	the	investigator	with	the	militia,	prosecutor	
in	the	court	and	inspector	of	administration	in	its	own	right.	The	prosecutors	
were	meant	to	ensure	the	uniformity	of	law	in	all	parts	of	the	country.	They	
acted	 as	 the	 agents	 of	 central	 government,	 looking	 after	 the	 lower	 level	
administration.	 For	 this	 reason	 the	 prosecutor´s	 office	 the was	 not	
accountable	to	republican	or	regional	governments.	It	is	important	to	note	
that	one	of	the	control	mechanisms	of	the	party	over	other	administrative	
structures	was	the	use	of	the	prosecutor´s	office.	Although	the	prosecutors	
had	a	strict	vertical	hierarchy	this	did	not	mean	that	they	too	were	in	reality	
under	the	double	control	of	the	parallel	political	administration.	(Sungurov	
199:	1,	Hammer	196:	10.)
The	prosecutors	had	a	the	upper	hand	in	the	court	proceedings	where	
the	accused	was	not	an	equal	partner	in	a	legal	debate.	In	fact	the	judges	
usually	acted	as	partners	of	the	prosecution	(Jordan	2000:	194).	The	accused	
party´s	 position	 was	 also	 weak	 because	 the	 prosecutor	 had	 the	 right	 to	
appeal	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 court	 in	 case	 he	 found	 them	 unsatisfactory.	
Through	the	party	control	he	could	affect	the	decision	making	of	the	judges.	
This	led	to	a	cycle	of	negative	court	rulings.	(Sungurov	199:	5.)
The	 general	 administrative	 supervision	 by	 prosecutors	 was	 met	 with	
mixed	feelings	because	in	many	cases	it	was	seen	as	the	interference	into	
administrative	matters	by	directors	and	officials	of	the	local	bureaucracies.	
Yet,	the	close	ties	which	the	prosecutor´s	office	had	with	the	party	–	or	the	
close	monitoring	of	its	policies	by	the	party	–	meant	that	it	needed	to	be	
obeyed.	After	196	its	activities	shifted	to	the	economic	side,	to	theft	of	state	
property,	misrepresentation	of	fulfilling	the	plan´s	targets	and	substandard	
production.	 It	 was	 usual	 for	 prosecutors	 to	 call	 factory	 and	 kolkhoz	
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managers	to	voice	their	“concerns”	over	plan	fulfillment	at	the	request	of	
the	political	bureaucracy.	(Smith	199:	351.)
At	the	economic	organizational	level,	control	was	further	more	executed	
through	the	so	called	first	departments	of	organizations	which	were	officially	
responsible	 for	 professional	 secrecy	 and	 who	 also	 observed	 the	 general	
climate	in	the	organization.	The	department	was	usually	headed	by	a	reserve	
officer	of	the	state	security	service	(gosbezopasnost´)	which	in	this	manner	
linked	it	with	the	intelligence	gathering.	(Sungurov	199:	1.)
The	 practices	 of	 information	 use	 in	 decision	 making	 enforced	 the	
dysfunctions	 in	 all	 of	 the	 bureaucracies.	 Information	 about	 economic	
questions	 was	 channeled	 through	 the	 State	 Statistical	 Committee	
(Goskomstat)	which	collected	all	statistical	information	from	the	sectoral	
ministries	and	regional	organizations	throughout	the	country.	All	primary	
accounting	and	financial	reporting	by	both	the	economic	and	representational	
administrations,	 deadlines	 for	 submitting	 them,	 addresses	 of	 submission	
and	general	instructions	for	the	process	were	confirmed	by	the	Goskomstat.	
It	checked	the	accuracy	of	 the	received	 information	and	 if	a	discrepancy	
was	 found	 between	 its	 own	 data	 and	 that	 of	 another	 agency,	 its	 own	
information	was	preferred.	(Eydelman	199:	0.)	
The	lack	of	ready	and	easily	available	technical	information	made	elected	
officials	helpless	in	many	questions,	particularly	when	professionalism	and	
specialization	became	dominant	cultural	traits	in	the	Brezhnev	era.	From	
the	citizen´s	point	of	view,	the	local	representative	administration	culture	
became	one	of	mostly	 tradition	and	mobilization	with	 little	meaning	 for	
policy	guidance.	The	legal	rights	of	the	soviets	fell	below	their	actual	powers.	
(Sokolov	1995:	155.)	The	environmental	relations	of	executive	committees	
thus,	were	routinized	with	 little	flexibility	 to	enact	changes	reflecting	 the	
motions	of	 the	 “outside”	 (citizens	of	no	connections	 to	 the	party	 and	 its	
nomenklatura,	“the	insiders”).	The	language	of	administration	became	one	
of	“plan”	for	the	citizen.	
According	 to	 Hough	 (1990)	 there	 were	 two	 mechanisms	 of	 local	
administrative	 work	 which	 were,	 in	 principle	 structurally	 designed	 to	
ensure	administrative	accountability	but	which	 in	practice,	did	not	work	
very	well.	The	first	was	a	periodic	response	by	a	department	head	to	either	
the	soviet	or	its	executive	committee,	the	second	a	legislative	inquiry	by	the	
soviet	into	an	agency´s	operations	or	policies.	The	problem	of	the	response	
was	that	it	did	not	show	the	obstacles	of	concrete	operations	of	department	
but	 relied	on	economic	 statistics	or	profiles	of	general	 conditions,	which	
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were	rhetorical	safeguards	for	the	organizations.	Most	people	making	them	
were	 themselves	 members	 of	 the	 (party)	 elite	 (e.g.	 employees	 of	
administrative	 organs,	 factory	 directors,	 party	 officials	 and	 so	 on).	 In	
addition	they	usually	dealt	with	production	organizations	such	as	enterprises	
or	collective	farms	and	not	with	the	administration.	(Hough	1990:	–9.)
Institutionally,	 the	 language	 of	 administration	 was	 embodied	 in	 the	
Goskomstat.	The	Goskomstat	had	an	important	general	role	in	the	guidance	
of	 the	 top	 leadership	 because	 it	 gave	 them	 regular	 bulletins,	 topical	
information,	analyses	and	reports.	Quarterly	and	annual	information	was	
more	 comprehensive	 and	 included	 elements	 of	 analysis	 of	 the	 country´s	
socio-economic	development,	and	criticism	of	the	plan´s	fulfillment.	The	
focus	of	criticism	was	in	these	cases	a	ministry	or	agency,	such	as	Gosplan	
or	Gosstroi.	The	party	 and	 the	 representational	 administration	were	not	
criticized.	(Eydelman	199:	1.)
The	non-publicness	of	information,	which	was	wide	in	the	instructions	
of	 the	political	 administration,	was	duplicated	 in	 the	 line	ministries	 and	
central	administrative	organs.	The	Goskomstat	gave	its	information	to	the	
leadership	with	the	classifications	of	“top	secret”	or	“secret”.	These	contained	
information	 which	 could	 not	 be	made	 open	 to	 the	 public.	 Examples	 of	
secret	material	were	data	on	production	and	stock	of	strategic	raw	materials,	
performance	of	particular	branches	of	nonferrous	metallurgy,	the	chemical	
and	petrochemical	industries,	and	some	machine-building.	The	information	
which	 was	 given	 to	 the	 Soviet	 leadership	 contained	 data	 about	 serious	
breaches	of	production	and	labor	discipline,	leading	to	accidents	and	major	
economic	losses,	grave	violations	of	financial	discipline,	monetary	problems	
and	other	negative	information	which	was	not	open	to	the	Soviet	media	to	
publish.	 Top	 secret	 and	 secret	 analysis	 contained	 information	 about	 the	
socio-economic	 situation	 of	 the	 country	 with	 criticism	 of	 the	 negative	
developments,	or	statistical	information	about	economic	facts	which	grew	
worse	from	year	to	year.	(Eydelman	199:	2.)
The	main	criteria	for	the	classification	system	(top	secret/secret/only	for	
official	use)	was	whether	it	was	possible	to	determine	with	a	piece	of	data	or	
analysis	the	country´s	military	potential	and	volume	of	strategic	resources,	
or	uncover	negative	processes	discrediting	the	socialist	system.	A	collection	
of	 state	 level	 organizations	 (for	 instance	 the	Ministry	 of	 Defense,	 KGB,	
Gosplan)	 formed	 a	 commission	 which	 determined	 the	 classification	 of	
documents.	The	distribution	of	the	material	was	also	carefully	recorded	in	
a	list	showing	the	type	of	material,	 its	official	classification,	organizations	
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which	had	received	copies,	and	date	and	number	of	copies	sent.	(Eydelman	
199:	3.)
Information	was	linked	to	the	concept	of	freedom,	just	as	in	the	present	
liberal-democratic	 thinking.	 This	 concept,	 however,	 was	 not	 based	 on	
qualities	 arising	 from	 individual	 requirements	 for	 self-expression	 and	
fulfilment.	Freedom	in	the	soviet	language	meant	the	ability	of	a	person	to	
function	according	to	goals	and	self-interest	within	“objective	necessities”.	
A	free	person´s	responsibility	was	to	use	his	knowledge	and	understanding	
for	the	progress	of	society.	Progress	of	society	meant	freedom	for	those	who	
followed	 the	historical	development	of	Soviet	 society	and	understood	 its	
ideals.	There	was	thus	no	“general”	freedom.	(Pietiläinen	1994:	30–31.)	In	
this	 type	of	 society,	 the	 information	which	could	be	made	public	and	 its	
interpretation	 needed	 to	 be	 tightly	 controlled.	This	 was	 due	 to	 the	 ever	
present	 danger	 of	 “generalism”,	 unpolitical,	 revisionist	 and	 unideological	
thinking	penetrating	 the	 texts.	This	 risk	 applied	whether	 they	be	media,	
cultural,	scientific	or	administrative	information	sources.	
The	 use	 of	 information	was	 linked	 to	 the	 social	 roles	 inside	 different	
administrations.	Kordonskii	has	described	three	ideal	types	of	social	actors	
which	could	be	found	in	all	organizations	and	which	did	not	correspond	to	
the	official	social	groupings	of	workers,	peasants	and	administrative	workers	
(officialdom).	He	states	that	the	use	of	propaganda	and	repressive	sanctions	
gave	 birth	 to	 these	 unofficial,	 folklore	 sub-characters	 of	 Soviet	 citizens.	
Within	 all	 official	 groups	 (classes	 and	 strata)	 there	 were	 people	 who	
belonged	 to	 the	 unofficial	 ideal	 types.	 In	 daily	 life	 people	 changed	 their	
roles	 situationally	 by	 switching	 language	 dialects	 from	one	 ideal	 type	 to	
another.	(Kordonskii	2000:	162,	164.)	
The	first	of	these	groups	and	administratively	the	most	powerful	was	
the	“functionaries”	of	the	socialist	system.	These	were	people	who	mostly	
saw	 themselves	 through	 the	 space	 and	 time	 organization	 of	 the	 state.	
Their	personal	realities	were	structured	by	the	economic	plans	and	official	
festivities	of	the	state	which	took	place	in	proper	physical	spaces.	There	
were	 regional	 and	 line	 hierarchies	 which	 separated	 a	 capital	 city	
functionary	from	one	living	in	a	small	community	on	the	periphery.	Yet,	
both	had	a	clear	understanding	of	their	place	in	the	world.	(Kordonskii	
2000:	163.)
The	“bourgeois”	group	represented	the	ordinary	people,	 the	everyday-
man	living	the	main	stream	socialist	lifestyle.	Work	was	most	of	all	a	means	
to	a	normal	socialist	consumption	(apartment,	food,	clothes,	holidays	and	
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so	on)	and	politics	were	to	a	large	part	outside	of	their	reality.	In	contrast,	
the	“dissidents”	tried	to	form	individual	lifestyles	outside	the	mainstream.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	163.)
Understanding	 the	organizational	culture	depended	upon	 the	use	and	
interpretation	of	the	dialects	of	each	group.	The	social	mobility	and	career	
prospects	 required	 the	 ability	 to	 use	 dialects	 properly.	 The	 level	 of	
administration	also	affected	the	language	and	“genre”	of	social	roles	inside	
the	administrative	unit.	(Kordonskii	2000:	165.)	The	soviet	citizen	in	other	
words	filtered	his	interpretation	of	situations,	such	as	official	statements	or	
orders	of	the	administration,	through	a	complex	array	of	social	codes	from	
official	to	street	level	and	even	the	anti-social	dissident	level.	
To	 understand	 the	 products	 of	 administrative	 culture	 such	 as	 official	
party	and	administrative	texts,	it	is	helpful	to	use	Kordonskii´s	classification	
of	 behavioral	 forms	 which	 all	 groups	 had.	 In	 other	 words	 there	 were	
functional,	 every-man	 and	 dissident	 behavior	 within	 all	 groups.	 For	
instance,	 the	 functional	 products	 of	 the	 “functionary”	 group	 included	
official	documents,	while	letters	to	the	press,	complaints	to	administration,	
informing	the	KGB	and	party	organizations	were	the	functional	products	
of	 the	 the	“bourgeois”	everyday-man.	Dissident	behavior	by	members	of	
the	 “functionary”	 group	 included	 revealing	 public	 statements	 and	
performance,	while	the	“bourgeois”	behavior	of	this	group	included	gossip	
and	anecdotes	of	party	and	administrative	 life.	The	dissident	behavior	of	
the	 “dissident”	 group	 meant	 the	 “language	 of	 truth”,	 the	 concrete	
manifestation	 of	 which	 included	 self-made	 publications	 (samizdat).	
(Kordonskii	2000:	169.)
Kordonskii	(2000)	has	described	the	repressive	sanctions	as	an	attempt	
to	 diminish	 the	 cleavage	 between	 the	 latent	 and	 the	 official,	 normative	
social	 systems	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	The	 methods	 chosen	 were	
ideologically	legitimated	as	“a	fight	against	the	petty	bourgeois	attitudes”	or	
criticism	 of	 bureaucratic	 officialdom.	 As	 a	 result	 dissident	 individuals	
almost	completely	disappeared	in	small	and	mid-level	towns	in	the	Soviet	
Union.	(Kordonskii	2000:	16.)
If	one	accepts	Kordonskii´s	classification	of	social	roles	and	corresponding	
dialects	 and	 behavior,	 then	 one	 would	 have	 to	 look	 at	 the	 meaning	 of	
different	 written	 rules,	 legal	 documents	 and	 instructions	 in	 the	 Soviet	
Union	through	this	interpretation.	Administrative	work	was	the	combination	
of	multilayered	regulation	at	 the	 institutional	 level	on	one	hand,	and	the	
strong	separation	of	“official”	and	everyday	space	for	interpretation	on	the	
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other.	This	also	explains	why	propaganda	and	the	fear	of	repressive	sanctions	
remained	so	vital	for	control.	
The	analysis	of	the	Soviet	media	and	its	requirements	is	illuminating	also	
for	 administrative	 information	 gathering	 and	 its	 meaning.	 Officially,	 in	
Soviet	society,	all	 type	of	information	was	supposed	to	work	together	for	
the	same	goal.	In	particular,	the	press	was	an	important	source	of	opinion	
making	 in	 voicing	 the	 official	 programs,	 policies	 and	 evaluations	 by	 the	
leadership.	Since	 its	role	 in	the	cultural	reproduction	of	socialism	was	to	
provide	an	avenue	of	opinion	expression	for	the	population	and	constructive	
criticism	of	the	economical	and	representational	administrations,	it	was	in	
fact	an	institutional	agent	in	the	decision	making	process.	The	press	served	
as	 a	 channel	 for	 everyday-man´s	 functional	 (officially	 accepted	 and	
politically	correct)	behavior.	
The	reasons	for	the	official	role	of	the	press	in	the	reproduction	of	the	
administrative	culture	were	already	contained	within	the	definitions	of	its	
basic	 working	 principles.	 Among	 its	 main	 principles	 were	 party	 views,	
ideology,	truthfulness,	as	well	as	mass	orientation,	democracy,	objectivity.	
In	 the	 perestroika	 era	 humanism	 (which	meant	 a	 general	 orientation	 of	
working	 toward	 “the	 good	 of	 people”	 and	 openness)	 was	 elevated	 in	
importance.	(Pietiläinen	1994:	19,	2.)
In	the	official	language,	the	party	view	was	expressed	in	the	ability	of	a	
person	to	“orientate	in	concrete	conditions	so	that	the	practical	fulfilment	
of	the	party	line	would	not	present	its	real	goals	in	a	bad	light”.	This	naturally	
required	 that	 any	 a	 socially	 important	 actor	 such	 as	 a	 journalist	 (or	 an	
administrator)	understood	the	concept	of	class	struggle	and	the	role	of	the	
communist	party	in	it.	It	required	“	an	obligation	to	interpret	all	internal	
and	 foreign	policy,	 economical,	 cultural	 and	 social	phenomena	 from	 the	
point	of	view	of	the	party”.	Truthfulness	was	connected	with	the	difference	
in	interpretation	of	the	Russian	words	pravda (truth)	which	refers	to	truth	
as	 the	 right	 interpretation,	 and	 with	 the	 word	 istina	 (truth)	 which	 is	
connected	with	material,	objective	reality.	Truthfulness	in	soviet	ideology	
and	practice	meant	matter-of-fact	objectivity	in	the	handling	of	one´s	work.	
Realism	was	a	logical	consequence	of	truthfulness.	It	meant	that	facts	did	
not	 need	 to	 be	 only	 truthfully	 expressed	 but	 also	 analyzed	 in	 order	 “to	
distinguish	 from	 the	present	 task	 those	which	 can	be	 solved	only	 in	 the	
future.”	(Pietiläinen	1994:	21–24.)
In	 correspondence	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 democratic	 centralism,	 the	
ability	to	criticize	the	party	committee	of	a	municipal	area	was	reserved	for	
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the	higher	administrative	level	party	committee	and	its	press.	It	was	not	for	
the	local	soviet	or	media.	Critique	was	meant	to	be	constructive	from	the	
point	of	view	of	improving	the	existing	socialist	system.	Neither	could	it	be	
directed	at	single	administrators	–	although	it	could	be	concerned	with	the	
over	all	control	of	the	direction	of	state	affairs.	(Pietiläinen	1994:	22,	26.)	
Local	ideas	needed	to	be	approved	at	the	higher	level	which	exercised	wide	
discretion.	Because	of	the	centralized	restricted	access	to	information,	the	
right	of	citizens	to	take	part	in	the	handling	of	state	affairs	through	the	press	
was	limited.
As	in	its	relationship	with	law	which	was	steered	toward	the	sustainment,	
consolidation	 and	 building	 of	 a	 nomenklatura	 led	 life,	 the	 state	 had	 a	
utilitarian	 relationship	 with	 information.	 For	 administrative	 culture	 this	
had	meant	that	even	such	information	which	would	have	been	vital	for	the	
well	being	of	citizens	was	not	disclosed.	In	many	cases	this	 led	to	poorly	
planned	and	executed	decisions	which	were	also	costly.	The	central	power	
(which	 was	 represented	 in	 the	 administration	 throughout	 the	 country)	
became	 the	 only	 official	 subject	 and	 discussant,	 and	 thus	 did	 not	 have	
anyone	to	exchange	information	with	(Pietiläinen	1994:	59).
In	actuality	the	soviet	administration	consisted	of	layers	of	non-public	
information:	 the	 nomenklatura	 system	 in	 itself,	 non-public	 party	
instructions	and	classified	line	decisions	of	the	central	administration.	This	
system	of	information	classification	coincided	with	the	organizational	non-
written	rules	of	the	administrative	market.	In	this	system	the	overpowering	
political	administration	linked	different	administrations	to	an	information	
storage	system.	
Even	technically,	the	local	level	in	this	information	storage	system	was	
not	 able	 to	 rely	 on	 information	which	would	have	 allowed	 it	 to	 actually	
predict	future	economic	developments.	Besides,	such	activity	was	beyond	
the	role	of	the	local	bureaucracies.	Although	the	local	level	actually	provided	
the	 information	 though	 the	 vertical	 line	 of	 information	 processing,	 its	
potential	to	form	a	realistic	general	opinion	about	the	whole	country	was	
limited	by	the	central	policy	on	information.	
Finally,	 along	 with	 the	 media,	 the	 court	 system	 had	 a	 very	 different	
formal	 position	 and	 role	 than	 that	 in	 the	 liberal-democratic	model.	The	
court	 system	 was	 incorporated	 structurally	 into	 the	 representative	
administration.	The	court	had	a	less	significant	direct	control	impact	on	the	
creation	of	administrative	culture	than	it	has	in	liberal-democratic	countries.	
Sungurov	 has	 described	 how	 many	 civil	 organizational	 conflicts	 where	
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resolved	 outside	 of	 the	 court	 system	 within	 the	 administrative	 hierarchy	
either	by	the	supervisor	in	charge,	or	if	they	involved	different	organizations,	
by	 the	 state	 arbitration	 system.	The	same	was	with	cases	of	work	disputes	
which	were	first	evaluated	by	a	special	commission,	and	then	if	needed	by	the	
trade	union.	The	court	system	was	reserved	for	criminal	cases,	although	even	
a	part	of	these	were	decided	by	the	militia	directly.	(Sungurov	199:	3.)
Legal	 protection	meant	 different	 things	 for	 different	 individuals	 in	 the	
Soviet	 system.	The	nomenklatura	was	above	 the	court	 system	save	 for	 the	
most	serious	crimes.	The	political	bureaucracy	acted	as	the	investigator	and	
court	through	its	own	control	structures	in	these	cases.	The	sanctions	which	
the	party	used	were	often	either	party	disciplinary	acts	or	 in	more	serious	
cases,	 transfers	 to	 another	 place	 of	 work.	 For	 ordinary	 party	 members,	
criminal	 cases	 usually	 meant	 an	 expulsion	 from	 the	 party,	 after	 which	 a	
person	went	through	the	court	system	without	the	protection	of	this	status.	
The	party	did	not	wait	for	the	court	ruling	on	criminal	cases,	expulsion	took	
place	as	a	result	of	criminal	prosecution	itself.	(Sungurov	199:	3–4.)
The	independence	of	the	court	system	and	workers	in	the	legal	profession	
at	the	courts,	was	also	limited	by	the	fact	that	the	selection	of	judges	and	
their	tenure	depended	on	party	nomination	and	that	a	judge	worked	only	
for	2–4	years	at	a	time.	The	candidates	where	officially	named	by	the	legal	
departments	of	 the	 executive	 committees	of	 the	 soviets	 in	question	who	
were	also	in	charge	of	the	work	in	the	courts.	At	the	same	time,	the	parallel	
department	of	the	political	administration	confirmed	these	candidates.	In	
addition	to	these	formal	restraints,	the	life	and	career	prospects	of	a	judge	
was	depended	upon	party	decision	making	just	like	every	one	else´s.	How	
fast	and	where	he	received	an	apartment,	whether	there	was	room	for	his	
child	in	the	day	care	center	close	to	home,	and	all	practical	daily	matters	
depended	 on	 having	 good	 relations	 with	 the	 administrators	 within	 the	
executive	and	party	committees	of	the	town.	(Sungurov	199:	5.)	
At	the	beginning	of	the	Gorbachev	led	reform	period	during	195–196,	
the	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	 took	 the	 form	 of	 a	 “speeding	 of	
development”	(uskorenie)	the	central	administrative	purpose	of	which	was	
the	elevation	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	socialist	system.	Ideologically	the	
concepts	of	discipline	and	intensification	were	used	as	key	words	along	with	
glasnost which	 represented	 “socialist	 pluralism”	 in	 thinking	 and	 public	
media.	(Walker	1993:	–.)
Mikhail	Gorbachev	approached	the	Soviet	administrative	culture	of	with	
a	program	in	which	the	cornerstones	were	the	concepts	of	perestroika	and	
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glasnost.	The	glasnost	era	can	well	be	described	as	an	attempt	to	revive	the	
local	level	decision	making	culture	through	structural	changes.	In	fact,	the	
term	“self-government”	was	rarely	in	use	before	195	in	the	Soviet	Union.	
(Lapteva	1996:	31.)	
The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	 concentrated	 on	 the	
reformation	 of	 the	 economic	 administration.	 The	 primary	 manifest	
purposes	of	reform	were:	
•	 Adding	to	the	efficiency	of	centralized	economic	decision	making,	
while	at	the	same	time	ridding	the	center	of	its	interference	with	the	
operative	management	of	lower	hierarchies.
•	 Widening	 the	 independence	 of	 economic	 units	 and	 their	
responsibility	over	results	by	making	their	pay	depend	upon	results.	
•	 Bettering	the	systems	of	pricing,	financing	and	credits,	and	creating	
systems	of	incentives.
•	 Developing	work	place	discipline.
•	 Glasnost	in	information.
•	 Democratization	of	the	administration	by	adding	local	control	and	
transparency.
•	 Securing	the	best	combination	of	different	hierarchies	and	sectoral	
divisions	of	administration.
•	 Reviving	legal	consciousness/	socialist	law-based	society.
(Materialy	 XXVII	 S´ezda	 Kommunisticheskoi	 Partii	 Sovetskovo	 Soiuza	
196:	33–34,	Walker	1993.)
Essentially	the	purposes	can	be	seen	as	a	modified	version	of	the	traditional	
Soviet	leadership´s	attempt	to	eradicate	the	cleavage	between	real	cultures	
(for	 instance	 Kordonskii´s	 ideal	 type	 behavior)	 and	 official	 (normative)	
ones.	The	change	in	the	administrative	ideology	mostly	took	place	in	the	
content	 of	 the	 methods	 used.	 The	 replacement	 of	 old	 definitions	 in	
propaganda	and	relaxation	of	repressive	sanctions	in	political	matters	were	
aimed	to	create	a	new	atmosphere	were	problems	could	be	faced	through	
local	initiative.
	The	economic	goals	were	connected	with	the	situation	dominating	all	
areas	of	Soviet	society.	The	plan	and	the	system	of	information	collection	
had	structurally	consolidated	a	rational	aspect	to	the	Soviet	administration.	
The	plan	however	had	come	to	have	a	much	wider	social	meaning.	One	of	
its	main	side-effects	was	to	nurture	a	sense	of	limited	responsibility	as	an	
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accepted	standard	for	achievement.	Harri	Melin	(199)	has	described	the	
plan	 as	 a	matter	 of	 fact	 law	which	was	 taken	 for	 granted	 by	 production	
management.	The	management	was	willing	 to	go	a	 long	way	 to	get	 their	
factory	its	bonuses	for	meeting	the	plan´s	targets.	(Melin	199:	141.)	The	
manager´s	main	task	was	ensuring	financial	help	from	the	ministries	and	
timely	deliveries	from	suppliers.	As	the	management	did	not	have	cash	flow	
rights	(rights	to	control	the	money	going	in	and	coming	out	of	the	business	
or	 activity),	 work	 became	 more	 administratively	 routine	 than	 business	
building.	As	a	side-effect,	maintenance	and	cost	control	did	not	have	a	high	
priority.	(Boycko,	Schleifer	and	Vishny	1994:	3.)
In	his	 speech	 to	 the	XXVII	Party	conference	on	25.2.196	Gorbachev	
underlined	the	need	to	give	up	the	historical	outlook	on	former	achievements	
in	the	party	program	and	concentrate	instead	on	questions	of	quality	as	a	
key	to	progress.	The	need	to	meet	the	goals	of	social	programs	could	not	be	
met	without	a	new	outlook	on	the	growth	of	the	economy.	This	meant	first	
of	 all	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 investment	 and	 structural	 policies.	 In	
Gorbachev´s	view,	attention	should	have	been	moved	from	the	quantity	of	
production	 to	 its	 quality,	 and	 from	 expansion	 of	 resources	 to	 their	
reorganization.	 In	 this	attempt,	 the	machine	building	 industry	played	an	
important	 role	 because	 in	 it,	 fundamental	 scientific-technical	 ideas	
materialized.	 Automation	 in	 production	 was	 a	 key	 element	 in	 the	
development	 of	 efficiency.	 (Materialy	XXVII	 S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	
Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196:	93,	24–26.)
As	 the	 primary	 purpose	 of	 the	 reform,	Gorbachev	 raised	 solving	 the	
food	 production	 problem.	 In	 this	 field	 particularly	 he	 saw	 the	 need	 to	
concentrate	on	new	ways	of	management,	wider	independence	of	collective	
farms	and	their	corresponding	new	responsibilities.	Prioritizing	those	areas	
of	production	which	were	crucial	in	funding	would	give	opportunities	to	
the	 stable	 development	 of	 agriculture.	 Raising	 the	 self-consciousness	 of	
farms	over	these	questions	would	have	in,	Gorbachev´s	ideology,	been	the	
creative	 adaptation	 of	 Lenin´s	 principle	 on	 food	 tax.	 (Materialy	 XXVII	
S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196:	30–32.)
Rhetorically	 the	 development	 of	 the	 new	 interpretations	 of	 doctrine	
introduced	the	concept	of	self-government	by	the	people	(Materialy	XXVII	
S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196	:	55).	This	was	
not	a	minor	aspect	of	Gorbachev´s	reform	thinking.	The	self-government	
by	 local	 communities	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 political	 guidance	 based	 on	
democratic	centralism.	Centralism	was	meant	to	ensure	the	protection	and	
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growth	of	socialist	society	in	which	all	interests	would	be	equal	and	harmful	
separatism	could	not	 lay	 roots	 in	any	area	of	 the	country.	 “Too	much	of	
localness”	was	deemed	to	be	antagonistic	to	the	general	well	being	of	people.	
Guidance	over	these	rules	thus	emphasized	the	need	to	follow	the	hierarchy	
in	every	decision.	The	 intent	was	 to	exercise	power	 in	 the	 interest	of	 the	
whole	society	so	as	to	avoid	“a	vulgar	democracy”	which	hid	anti-social	acts	
and	demagogy.	Structurally	a	socialist	society	could	not	mean	a	combination	
of	 autonomous	 production	 communes	 because	 these	 would	 have	
undermined	the	purposes	of	the	whole	socialist	economy.	Culturally	this	
led	to	the	avoidance	of	being	“too	different”,	in	other	words	seeking	excessive	
local	freedom.	(Afanas´ev	191:191–192.)
Gorbachev	threw	away	the	idea	that	local	activeness	would	automatically	
mean	risks	for	the	Soviet	state.	Instead,	he	underlined	the	active	role	of	local	
soviets	in	the	decision	making	of	daily	services	and	criticized	the	center	for	
controlling	matters	which	it	could	not	see	from	far	away.	He	furthermore	
introduced	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 interrelations	 between	 different	 enterprises	
and	 the	 local	 soviet	 needed	 to	 be	 re-examined.	The	 cooperation	 of	 the	
soviet,	particularly	its	permanent	commissions,	and	the	executive	committee	
also	needed	to	be	made	more	effective	by	demanding	that	the	executive	side	
took	the	proposals	of	the	soviets	seriously.	In	addition,	Gorbachev	suggested	
that	different	social	organizations	would	be	more	intensely	involved	in	the	
decision	making	of	the	soviets	by	activating	member	participation	in	the	
development	of	proposals.	 (Materialy	XXVII	S´ezda	Kommunisticheskoi	
Partii	Sovetskogo	Soiuza	196:	55–5.)	
Yet,	as	Giulietto	Chiesa	(1995)	has	pointed	out,	it	is	important	to	notice	
that	 the	 transition	 ideology	 which	 Gorbachev	 initiated,	 was	 a	 defining	
moment	 that	marked	a	withdrawal	 from	the	 ideological	 explanations	of	
the	earlier	times.	In	essence,	the	perestroika	policies	represented	an	attempt	
to	de-stalinize	the	system	for	the	second	time	–	after	Khrushchev	–	at	a	
deeper	level.	(Chiesa	1995:	36,	39.)	Here,	however,	it	becomes	important	
to	make	 a	distinction	between	doctrine	 and	 ideology.	The	doctrine,	 the	
core	values	of	 the	political	 ideology	were	not	 to	be	 touched.	Only	 their	
ideological	interpretation	was	to	be	re-examined	for	the	needed	strategic	
choices.
Mikhail	Gorbachev´s	policies	were	steered	more	toward	activating	the	
local	level	decision	making	by	waking	up	a	passive	citizenship	than	creating	
“general	freedom”.	The	flow	of	a	new	type	of	information	and	opening	of	
discussion	 on	many	 social	 issues	 not	 dealt	 with	 before,	 set	 in	motion	 a	
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process	in	which	there	appeared	not	only	a	growing	awareness	of	choices	
and	undaunted	behavior	from	ordinary	Soviet	citizens,	but	competing	ideas	
inside	the	ruling	elite.	This	led	to	the	government	seeking	support	from	the	
grass	roots	(Pietiläinen	1994:64).	For	administration	this	meant	the	starting	
point	of	changes	in	which	its	role	would	be	under	constant	re-evaluation	
even	as	its	planning,	decision	making	and	execution	of	decisions	were	still	
shielded	by	the	party´s	position.
The	central	theme	of	the	program	of	the	XXVII	Party	Congress	in	196	
which	was	presented	by	Mikhail	Gorbachev,	was	the	further	development	
of	 unsatisfactorily	 developed	 socialist	 democracy.	 The	 work	 of	 soviets,	
unions,	 the	 Komsomol and	 different	work	 collectives	was	mentioned	 as	
important	for	speeding	up	this	process.	Glasnost was	marketed	to	mean	the	
revival	 of	 the	 Leninist	 activism	 which	 denounced	 the	 earlier	 line	 of	
“government	being	a	privilege	of	a	narrow	group	of	professionals”.	Still,	the	
doctrine	of	democratic	centralism	and	the	party	as	the	leader	of	the	society	
were	 initially	 kept	 intact.	The	 emphasis	 was	 on	 ensuring	 that	 the	 local	
soviets	could	in	fact	govern	their	geographical	area,	and	be	interested	in	the	
results	of	 those	 local	 enterprises	which	were	at	 the	 same	 time	under	 the	
direction	of	higher	organs	within	the	hierarchy.	(Materialy	XXVII	S´ezda	
Kommunisticheskoi	 Partii	 Sovetskogo	 Soiuza	 196:	 55–56.)	 This	
contradiction	created	a	risk	from	the	outset.
Glasnost	 was	 connected	 to	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 later	
representational	administrations	with	the	party	position	intact.	Gorbachev	
wished	to	create	an	atmosphere	were	the	circulation	of	accurate	information	
was	 possible	 by	 relaxing	 censorship	 and	 political	 control	 of	 the	 media,	
science	and	culture.	The	purpose	was	to	increase	more	accurate	information	
about	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 system	 in	 the	 decision	making	 organs	 and	
subject	at	least	a	part	of	this	decision	making	to	public	evaluation.	Officials	
would	then	become	more	accountable	for	their	actions	and	ordinary	citizens	
would	have	 the	courage	 to	point	out	misconduct	and	shortcomings.	The	
citizen,	in	other	words,	would	have	a	new	sense	of	dignity	in	the	society.	
(Walker	1993:	110–111.)	
The	nomenklatura	was	in	essence	the	inner	party	–	the	people	who	were	
in	a	position	to	make	decisions	and	advance	through	the	system.	This	elite	
was	 in	 a	 paradoxical	 situation.	While	 it	 received	 a	 secured	 position	 and	
much	better	future	opportunities	than	those	who	were	not	chosen	to	the	
lists	of	appointments,	it	was	also	much	more	controlled.	Yet	the	party	was	
instrumental	in	everyone´s	life,	regardless	of	membership.	Receiving	a	trip	
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abroad,	 decisions	 about	 apartments,	 decorations,	 and	many	 other	 issues	
demanded	an	assessment	from	the	person´s	work	place	which	was	signed	
by	the	organization	leadership,	party	secretary	and	union	leader.	(Sungurov	
199:	46.)	Glasnost created	a	risk	of	negative	information	leakage	about	this	
system	while	perestroika	started	to	destabilize	the	economical	bargaining	
in	the	administrative	market.	
Glasnost was	 an	 attack	 on	 the	 secretive	 and	 protective	 information	
atmosphere	 in	 the	 government.	 Yet	 it	 was	 strategically	 included	 in	 the	
definition	of	pravda (truth	in	the	functional	sense	as	right	interpretation).	
Glasnost	was	officially	interpreted	to	be	the	new	basic	norm	of	Soviet	life	
which	 included	not	only	publicness	 and	accessibility	of	 information,	but	
the	 quantity	 of	 well-informed	 citizens.	The	 activeness	 of	 the	 soviets	 in	
informing	a	wide	group	of	people	of	important	matters	was	stressed.	The	
political	justification	of	for	the	distribution	of	information	was	the	definition	
of	pravda,	another	basic	tenant	of	the	Communist	ideology.	Yet	this	time,	it	
became	closer	than	before	to	the	actual	objective	truth	(istina)	by	underlining	
the	 functional	 necessity	 to	 know	 about	 threats	 to	 people´s	 daily	 lives.	
(Bezuglov	&	Kriazhkov	19:	,10.)	
The	 other	 tenant	 which	 was	 officially	 underlined	 in	 the	 political	
legitimation	of	glasnost	in	administrative	decision	making,	was	the	Soviet	
Constitution.	The	right	 to	be	 informed	was	found	to	be	protected	by	the	
Constitution	and,	furthermore,	it	was	seen	as	contributing	a	legal	basis	for	
the	 further	development	of	 glasnost.	The	generality	of	 the	 constitutional	
text	was	now	interpreted	to	support	other	laws	widening	the	citizens´activity.	
(Bezuglov	&	Kriazhkov	19:	3.)
Since	19/9,	the	political	ideology	started	to	emphasize	features	which	
Rachel	Walker	 has	named	 “the	 political	 revolution	 from	above”	 (Walker	
1993).	These	ideas	were	ignated	at	the	19th	Party	Conference	in	June	19	
where	a	political	program	of	change	was	adopted	formally.	In	essence	it	was	
full	frontal	ideological	attack	against	the	administrative	command	system	
as	 it	 existed	 in	 the	 Soviet	Union.	A	new	aspect	 in	Gorbachev´s	political	
thinking	was	the	idea	of	learning	from	the	practice	of	other	countries	which	
had	 liberal-democratic	 traditions.	This	meant	 advancing	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	
introducing	 a	 system	 of	 checks	 and	 balances	 and	 holding	 competitive	
elections	to	secure	accountability	and	prevent	the	abuse	of	power.	A	new	
concept	of	 “socialist	 law-based	 state”	was	 founded.	The	aim	was	 a	 social	
contract	in	which	individuals	rights	were	respected	and	the	administration-
party	was	under	legal	control	(Shelley	1992:	6).	For	the	administration,	the	
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new	modification	of	the	reform	ideology	had	economic,	institutional	and	
legal	purposes.
The	concept	of	a	law-based	state	assumed	that	there	could	be	independence	
of	 control	 organizations	 in	 the	 system	 of	 an	 administrative	market.	The	
hierarchy	 of	 decision	makers	 to	which	 this	 new	 idea	was	most	 essential	
included	 the	 chairman	of	 the	 committee	 for	people´s	 control,	 the	oblast 
prosecutor	 and	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 regional	 court,	 heads	 of	 inspection	
subordinate	to	the	republican	level,	and	the	heads	of	inspection	subordinate	
to	 the	 regional	 level	 (including	 municipal	 inspectorates	 and	 courts).	
(Kordonskii	2000:	41.)	
The	administrative	law	practices	in	the	Soviet	Union	had	several	problems	
regarding	rule	of	law	administration.	The	first	example	was	the	hierarchy	of	
norms	which	depended	on	the	“market	rules”	of	the	bureaucracies	at	the	
local	and	regional	levels.	
The	second	problem	was	the	official	and	functional	role	of	the	prosecutor´s	
office	which	had	a	multitude	of	important	tasks.The	prosecutors	had	in	fact	
worked	quite	intensively	in	advancing	citizens	complaints	against	adminis-
trative	actions.	Complaints	had	been	raised	against	decisions	about	housing,	
pensions	 and	 other	 social	 services.	They	 also	 included	 infringements	 by	
officials	 of	 citizens´labor	 rights	 and	 illegal	 impositions	 of	 administrative	
fines.	Yet	 there	were	 several	 problems	 associated	with	 this	 institution	 in	
terms	of	legal	protection.	The	first	was	the	prosecutor´s	absolute	discretion	
to	either	drop	or	pursue	the	investigation	of	the	matter.	The	second	was	that	
the	citizens´	option	to	advance	their	rights	was	retrospective.	Citizens	were	
not	 an	 active	 party	 in	 the	 development	 of	 conditions	 which	 underlined	
their	role	as	subjects	of	the	state.	Third,	since	the	party	was	closely	involved	
in	the	policy	guidance	of	the	prosecutors,	citizens	were	not	likely	to	seek	
redress	in	cases	which	resulted	in	open	conflict	with	the	party	bureaucracy.	
Fourth,	 the	prosecutor´s	office	was	often	most	 interested	 in	 issues	which	
coincided	with	the	state´s	interests,	particularly	economic	ones.	Individual	
rights	as	such	were	not	considered.	(Smith	199:	353.)	
The	historically	burdened	position	of	the	supra-legal	prosecutors	and	the	
view	 that	 political	 positions	 override	 law,	made	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	
rule-of-law	state	as	an	ideological	tool	quite	bold.	As	Hammer	has	pointed	
out,	“the	Soviet	citizens	[had]	developed	some	sense	that,	if	they	obeyed	the	
law,	the	law	would	leave	them	alone”	(Hammer	196:	12).	The	administrative	
market	mechanisms	had	however,	also	developed	a	critical	survival	instinct	
which	required	some	law	breaking	by	way	of	mutual	understanding.	Legality	
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as	 a	 social	 goal	 was	 thus	 something	 that	 was	 contrary	 to	 the	 social	
functionality	of	the	prevailing	culture.	This	was	not	a	matter	of	“illegality”	
as	such,	it	was	merely	a	side	effect	of	the	lack	of	the	separation	of	powers.	
Even	 as	 laws	 did	 exist,	 their	 interpretation	 could	 not	 be	 tested	 in	 an	
independent	court	outside	the	reach	of	the	party.	There	was	no	civil	society	
discussing	the	content	of	legislation	and	its	implications	for	the	population	
since	the	non-party	organizations	did	not	officially	exist.	Social	activism,	if	
it	can	be	called	such,	was	confined	within	the	building	of	networks	of	family,	
friends	and	colleagues	against	daily	difficulties.	This	further	strengthened	
the	social	control	of	the	party	in	terms	of	the	administrative	identity	of	the	
executive	 bureaucracy.	 For	 administrators	 this	 simultaneously	 meant	 a	
double	identity	of	professional	expertise	without	the	independence	usually	
attached	 to	 such	positions.	There	was	 limited	personal	 responsibility	 for	
policy	 issues	 since	 the	 workplace	 was	 not	 the	 primary	 place	 for	 such	
planning.	 Unintentionally,	 this	 intensified	 the	 need	 for	 monitoring	 and	
direct	control.	
Questions	 of	 legality	 collided	with	 the	 administrative	market	 in	which	
state	institutions,	formal	hierarchies	and	relations	in	them	were	mostly	non-
independent	 civil	 service	 elements	 which	 sustained	 one´s	 position	 in	 it.	
Instead	of	underlining	 laws	 and	 their	 execution	 in	 the	Soviet	 system,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 see	 the	 administrative	 logic	 as	 one	 in	 which	 actors	 in	 the	
administrative	market	operated	so	as	to	be	able	to	redistribute	the	resources	
produced	 by	 enterprises	more	 or	 less	 satisfactorily	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 the	
functioning	of	society.	Structural	conflicts	concerning	competence	of	different	
levels	of	actors	were	submitted	to	higher	soviet	and	party	committees,	rather	
than	to	the	courts.	(Lapteva	1996:	319,	comp.	Kordonskii	2000:	9.)
Both	 at	 the	 rhetorical	 and	 institutional	 level	 the	 ideological	 return	 to	
“socialist	roots”	was	 inperfect.	This	was	to	be	done	via	strenghtening	the	
role	of	the	soviets	at	the	local	level	as	legislators,	administrative	organs	of	
self-government	 and	 bodies	 overseeing	 the	 local	 work	 of	 state	 organs.	
Legislative	power	was	to	be	transferred	from	the	party	structure	(which	had	
become	administrative	by	nature)	to	the	soviets	and	to	establish	relations	of	
accountability	 and	 oversight	 between	 legislative	 and	 executive	 bodies.	
Economically,	 the	 new	 purposes	 included	 more	 industrial	 democracy	
which	would	empower	workers	 to	elect	 their	management	and	 influence	
decision	making.	Legally,	it	became	important	to	lay	the	foundation	for	the	
idea	of	the	rule	of	law	by	way	of	constitutional	change	and	reform	of	the	
legal	system.	(Walker	1993:	119–122.)
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The	 ideological	 development	 which	 Gorbachev	 initiated	 reached	 its	
peak	during	 199–1990	 in	 the	 acceptance	 of	 freer	 elections	 at	 the	 local	
level.	Ideologically	this	period	can	be	called	“the	revolution	from	below”	
(Walker	1993).	During	this	period	the	most	significant	issue	became	that	
of	 elections	 to	 supreme	 and	 local	 soviets	 and	 the	 effective	 abolition	 of	
democratic	 centralism.	 It	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 eventually	 the	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change	 was	 most	 dramatic	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 political	
administration.	The	local	representative	administration	was	given	special	
attention	in	the	ideological	reform	programs.	At	the	same	time	the	party	
became	 the	 primary	 target	 of	 reforms	 because	 this	 was	 central	 for	 the	
needed	political	and	economic	changes	to	take	place.	Yet,	Gorbachev	did	
not	 address	 the	 party	 directly.	 He	 talked	 about	 the	 side-effects	 of	 the	
administrative	 market	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 economic	 and	 representative	
administrations	and	even	the	control	administration,	but	the	party	as	such	
was	not	 touched.	Yet	 it	was	evident	 that	none	of	 the	wanted	purposes	–	
glasnost	of	opinion,	rule	of	law	in	a	socialist	state,	effective	economy	with	
incentives	for	work,	and	local	control	over	important	municipal	matters	–	
were	possible	without	changes	in	the	mechanisms	of	the	party	dominated	
administrative	market.
5.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1986
In	 the economic administration	 perestroika	 attempted	 to	 streamline	 the	
heavy	system.	This	led	to	several	structural	rearrangements:	1)	Concentrating	
more	power	at	the	top	as	an	attempt	to	make	coordination	more	effective.	
This	 was	 mainly	 done	 by	 creating	 bodies	 which	 coordinated	 related	
ministries.	 An	 example	 was	 the	 Bureau	 for	 Machine-Building	 which	
coordinated	 the	 work	 of	 several	 ministries.	 2)	 Reducing	 the	 number	 of	
ministries	through	mergers	of	related	ministries	and	through	the	reducing	
of	staff.	An	example	was	the	Gosagroprom	which	was	the	result	of	a	merger	
of	five	agricultural-industrial	ministries.	3)	Reducing	staff	at	the	center.	For	
instance,	the	Gosplan	staff	was	reduced	from	2.650	to	1.095	between	196	
and	 19.	 4)	 Encouraging	 local	 initiative	 of	 which	 an	 example	 was	 the	
passing	of	Law	on	Individual	Labor	Activity	in	196,	which	legalized	small	
scale	private	activity	in	the	service	sectors.	Its	main	effect	was	the	start	of	a	
new	thinking	in	this	field.	Streamlining	the	system,	for	instance,	brought	
formal	 organizational	 changes,	 but	 amounted	mainly	 to	 changing	 party	
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officials	to	new	Gorbachev	appointees.	(Walker	1993:	,	103,	04.)	From	the	
point	of	view	of	the	purposes	of	the	political	ideology	these	changes	were	
attempts	to	alleviate	the	dysfunctions	of	the	old	culture,	instead	of	creating	
a	new	way	of	work.
The	first	strategies	of	perestroika	included	promoting	individual	activity	
in	the	work	places	by	emphasizing	and	re-establishing	professionalism	and	
commitment.	 The	 anti-alcohol	 campaign	 and	 the	 campaign	 against	
unearned	 incomes	used	disciplinary	action	against	drunkenness,	 general	
laziness	and	corruption	at	work.	(Walker	1993:	10.)
Individual	activity	and	ethical	working	behavior	had	been	regulated	by	
the	Code	 of	 Labor.	This	 gave	 the	 labor	 union	 committee	 of	 enterprises,	
administrative	 organizations	 and	 other	 public	 organizations	 the	 right	 to	
propose	the	expulsion	or	removal	of	such	managers	and	directors	who	did	
not	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	labor	contract	but	instead	behaved	
in	a	bureaucratic	manner	and	broke	the	Code	of	Labor.	This	right	by	the	
labor	 union	 had	 been	 exercised	 quite	 widely	 in	 the	 Brezhnev	 era.	 For	
example	between	196–190,	approximately	50.000	officials	were	relieved	
from	their	work.	In	addition,	the	right	to	propose	the	removal	of	an	official	
was	given	 to	 inspectors	of	working	 safety	and	 to	 the	prosecutor´s	office.	
(Stavtseva	&	Nikitinski	194:	2–29.)
In	 addition	 to	 possible	 criminal	 proceedings,	 the	 violation	 of	
“administrative	 responsibility”	 had	 meant	 a	 fine	 of	 a	 particular	 sum	
determined	by	the	law.	(Stavtseva	&	Nikitinski	194:	29.)	The	Gorbachev	
reforms	attempted	to	strengthen	the	labor	market	with	an	essentially	ethical	
campaign	since	the	laws	and	official	punitive	measures	were	not	enough	to	
rid	 the	 economy	 from	 serious	 risks	 brought	 to	 it	 by	 alcoholism	 and	
indifference.	Again,	the	attempt	was	mostly	to	alleviate	the	byproducts	of	
the	administrative	market	in	which	a	type	of	“that	which	one	does	not	see,	
one	does	not	know”	was	a	part	of	the	social	harmony.	
The	falling	living	standards	and	popular	discontents	are	often	confused	
with	the	causes	of	Gorbachev´s	reforms.	Yet	in	the	190´s	and	in	the	early	
190´s	the	Soviet	public	generally	considered	their	lives	essentially	normal.	
For	instance,	Vladimir	Shlapentokh	has	cited	both	the	Goskomstat	statistics	
in	19	and	an	alternative	study	made	by	G.I	Khanin	in	1996	which	both	
show	a	growth	in	personal	consumption	between	195–195.	(Shlapentokh	
199:	31.)	The	fact	that	the	quality	of	products	was	often	not	satisfactory	
was	still	less	important	than	a	possibility	to	provide	one´s	home	with	needed	
equipment.
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In	this	context	the	policy	of	speeding	up	development,	which	took	the	
form	 of	 an	 ambitious	 five-year	 plan	 for	 196–1990,	 was	 critical	 for	 the	
attempt	 at	 state	 building.	 It	 was	 hoped	 to	 attack	 low	 growth	 and	 poor	
productivity.	It	inflated	targets	in	the	hope	that	it	would	activate	people	to	
try	their	best	in	their	work	places.	A	serious	risk	which	arose	as	a	result	was	
that	the	new	five	year	plan	undermined	the	bargaining	process	essential	to	
central	 planning.	The	most	 fundamental	 of	 all	 economic	 changes	which	
affected	the	attainment	of	plan	goals	was	the	break	up	of	the	supply	system.	
This	was	done	by	changing	the	rules	of	enterprise	planning	and	distribution	
of	 the	 output,	 and	 by	 changing	 the	 position	 of	 the	 institutions	 which	
coordinated	 these	 processes,	 along	 Gossnab	 and	 sectoral	 ministries.	
(Freinkman	199:	1.)	
Gosplan,	which	was	in	charge	of	the	administrative	creation	of	the	central	
plan,	and	Gorbachev	did	not	agree	on	the	contents.	This	was	an	additional	
burden	which	raised	the	risk	of	non-compliance	with	central	commands	as	
republics,	different	ministries,	their	departments,	local	factories	and	other	
organizations	in	the	decision	making	chain	tried	to	protect	their	interests.	
As	a	 side-effect	of	 the	ambitious	plan,	which	 involved	 further	 long-term	
institutional	 changes	 and	 economic	 reforms	 introduced	 from	 19	 on,	
economical	dysfunctions	grew.	(Walker	1993:103.)	
The	economical	decline	was	intertwined	in	the	regional	and	local	political	
developments	 in	 several	 ways.	 As	 the	 expansion	 of	 regional	 political	
autonomy	(also	a	result	of	glasnost)	was	allowed,	resources	needed	to	be	
directed	downwards	to	enable	the	party´s	regional	committees	to	coordinate	
matters.	The	stronger	regional	authorities	and	the	large	enterprises	situated	
in	their	geographical	area	often	formed	alliances	which	changed	the	center´s	
position	 in	 planning	 and	 control	 of	 enterprises.	The	 19	 Law	 on	 State	
Enterprise	 made	 the	 directors	 in	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy	 even	 more	
independent	by	making	them	elected	rather	than	appointed.	(Freinkman	
199:	19.)
Freinkman	 (199)	 has	 described	 how	 experienced	 directors	 in	 the	
economic	 administration	 could	 opportunistically	 exploit	 the	 under-
developed	 legal	 conditions	 to	 extract	 profit.	 More	 importantly,	 the	
inconsistent	 implementation	of	economic	reforms	eroded	 the	respect	 for	
authority.	Particularly	serious	for	public	image	were	the	state	quality	control,	
campaign	 against	 unearned	 income	 and	 anti-alcohol	 campaigns.	
Experiments	 which	 were	 intended	 to	 expand	 the	 independence	 of	
enterprises	were	executed	without	the	required	budget	constraints.	This	in	
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turn	raised	the	directors´	expectations	and	increased	political	pressure	to	
have	further	liberalization.	(Freinkman	199:	19.)
As	a	 result	of	 the	 crises	 in	 the	 economy,	 lines	 and	 shortages	were	 the	
everyday	struggle	of	the	soviet	citizens.	This	meant	that	the	consumption	
sector,	vital	for	the	popular	support	of	perestroika,	was	in	serious	trouble.	
Between	 199	 and	 1990	 the	 number	 of	 goods	which	were	 not	 delivered	
according	 to	 the	 state	 plan	 increased	 four	 times	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
many	goods	were	traded	for	others.	As	a	result,	those	areas	which	did	not	
produce	 food	 (particularly	 the	military	 ones)	 suffered	 the	most	 and	 the	
local	authorities	started	 to	pass	 their	own	actions	 in	effort	 to	protect	 the	
interests	of	their	community.	(Lane	1992:	4–50.)	
While	 glasnost	 was	 greeted	with	 enthusiasm	 and	 used	 as	 a	means	 to	
effect	 political	 changes,	 radical	 economic	 changes	 were	 not	 welcomed.	
Radical	 economic	 changed	 would	 have	 been	 accepted	 if	 an	 immediate	
improvement	 in	 life	 was	 possible.	This	 attitude	 was	 not	 changed	 by	 the	
growing	 economical	 difficulties	 of	 the	 perestroika period.	 Even	 in	 1990	
when	the	shortages	of	goods	had	dramatically	increased,	the	idea	of	freeing	
all	 food	 prices	 was	 not	 accepted.	 Only	 about	 half	 accepted	 partial	
deregulation	of	food	prices.	Instead,	a	firmer	general	order	was	hoped	for	
by	many	citizens.	(Shlapentokh	199:	3.)
In	comparison	with	the	streamlining	of	the	system	at	the	top,	the	legal	
changes	 which	 created	 the	 formal	 space	 of	 local	 representational	 and	
economic	 decision	 making	 were	 an	 attempt	 to	 affect	 the	 mechanisms	
sustaining	the	local	administrative	market.	Of	all	 the	legal	changes	made	
during	the	perestroika time,	the	first	truly	meaningful	one	was	enacted	in	
April	1990	as	“A	Law	on	General	Principles	of	Local	Self-Government	and	
Local	Economy	in	the	USSR”	which	for	the	first	time	guaranteed	the	legal	
position	 of	 local	 government	 in	 relation	 to	 municipal	 ownership.	 The	
concept	of	 local	 self-government	was	 founded	 in	 the	 lexicon	of	political	
decision	making	through	the	adoption	of	the	law.	The	practical	tool	for	this	
developing	autonomy	was	 to	be	“communal	property”	which	guaranteed	
that	the	economic	basis	of	municipal	rule	would	consist	of	natural	resources,	
houses	 and	 other	 communal	 property	 from	 which	 income	 could	 be	
collected.	 Relations	with	 companies	 belonging	 to	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
municipality	would	be	based	on	taxation	or	contracts.	Local	taxes	could	be	
decided	 by	 the	 local	 soviet.	This	meant	 that	 the	 localities	 could	 now,	 in	
principle,	make	their	own	budgets.	In	addition,	 foreign	trade	rights	were	
given	to	local	soviets.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	363–364,	Piskotin	1993:	4–9.)	
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Yet,	the	question	of	municipal	ownership	was	not	as	simple	as	the	change	
of	law.	The	party	owned	and	controlled	many	important	municipal	resources	
such	as	buildings	and	newspapers.	The	decision	making	role	of	the	party	in	
the	 affairs	 of	 the	 economic	 sector	maintained	 it	 as	 the	 director	 of	 local	
enterprises,	making	 it	 a	 powerful	 negotiator	 against	 the	 local	 soviets.	 In	
addition,	 the	 local	 soviets	 were	 powerless	 because	 the	 planning	 system	
continued	to	centralize	economic	decision	making.	(Walker	1993:	146.)	
The	rule	of	double	subordination	was	in	this	way	abolished	but	since,	
in	practice,	everything	was	still	state	owned,	the	formal	powers	given	to	
the	 localities	 did	 not	 result	 in	 their	 growing	 autonomy.	 The	 center	
remained	the	actual	decision	maker.	Not	long	after,	a	law	in	October	1990	
reinstalled	 the	 co-subordination	 of	 higher	 and	 lower	 levels	 of	 power.	
(Piskotin	1993:	4–9.)
In	purely	legal	terms,	the	position	of	the representative administration	in	
the	municipalities	was	still	determined	by	the	old	Constitution	of	19.	In	
addition	to	this,	the	regulations	of	the	Communist	party	accepted	in	March	
196	were	 the	 legally	binding	 framework	 for	political	bureaucracy	at	 the	
local	level.	According	to	this	document,	the	Communist	Party	acted	in	the	
frames	of	the	Constitution	to	direct	politically	state	and	social	organizations	
and	to	coordinate	their	work.	The	communists	working	in	these	organizations	
had	the	duty	to	ensure	that	they	fully	followed	their	constitutional	rights	
and	duties,	and	attracted	working	people	into	the	administration	to	decide	
different	 questions.	The	party	 organizations	did	not	 change	 soviet,	 labor	
union,	 cooperative	 or	 other	 social	 organizations,	 or	 allow	 the	mixing	 of	
their	duties	with	 the	party.	 (Ustav	Kommunisticheskoi	Partii	 Sovetskogo	
Soiuza	196:	60–62.)
The	revised	regulations	of	the	party	were	interesting	for	two	reasons.	First	
of	all	that	they	pointed	out	the	supremacy	of	the	Constitution	as	the	basis	for	
legality.	 Secondly	 they	 described	 the	 duties	 of	 party	 members	 to	 act	 as	
supervisors	 and	 controllers	 of	 constitutional	 order	 in	 state	 and	 other	
organizations.	In	purely	legal	terms	this	had	always	been	a	strange	situation	
since	the	party	was	not	mentioned	in	the	Constitution.	It	was	also	strange	in	
the	sense	that	it	continued	a	double	control	system:	one	by	the	party,	the	other	
by	the	prosecutor´s	office.	The	policy	making	and	monitoring	power	of	party	
bureaucracy	in	the	judicial	system	continued	and	seriously	undermined	the	
attempt	to	introduce	rule	of	law	principles	into	institutional	practices.	
Three	 laws	 did	 however	 contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 formal	
decision	making	process	and	authority	structure	in	the	Soviet	Union.	These	
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were	“Changes	and	additions	to	the	Constitution	of	the	USSR”	and	“Election	
of	people´s	representatives”	in	19	and	“Post	of	the	President	of	the	USSR	
and	additions	 to	 the	Constitution	of	USSR”	 in	1990.	As	a	 result	of	 these	
laws,	a	new	hierarchy	of	decision	making	was	created	in	the	highest	state	
government:	president,	Congress	of	People´s	representatives	of	USSR,	the	
Supreme	Soviet	of	USSR,	Council	of	Federation	and	the	Committee	of	State	
Inspection.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	354.)	
Law	making	was	the	work	of	 the	Congress	of	People´s	representatives	
which	was	 composed	 of	 2.250	 representatives	 selected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	
territorial	 system	 of	 selection.	The	 Congress	 convened	 once	 a	 year	 and	
chose	by	secret	ballot	those	who	would	form	the	Supreme	Soviet.	This	was	
a	two	chamber	full	time	working	organ	of	legislative	and	executive	power.	
The	Soviet	had	a	structure	of	commissions,	each	of	which	specialized	in	a	
sector	of	the	economy.	The	composition	of	delegates	in	the	199	Supreme	
Soviet	 was	 the	 following:	 165	 industrial,	 building,	 transportation	 and	
communication	workers,	 9	workers	 of	 farming,	 151	 academic	workers,	
journalists	and	representatives	of	culture,		party	and	soviet	officials.	Of	
these	442	were	men	and	100	women.	Along	with	the	commissions,	there	
were	permanent	committees	which	worked	in	the	structure	of	the	Supreme	
Soviet.	The	 committees	 could	 be	 divided	 into	 sub-committees	 to	 study	
practical	conditions	concerning	some	issue.	In	all,	about	00	representatives	
worked	either	in	the	commissions	or	in	the	committees.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	
356–35.)
In	the	end	of	the	perestroika	period,	in	April	1991,	a	Cabinet	of	Ministers	
was	founded	to	handle	the	government	policy	making	of	the	executive	side.	
Heads	 of	 republics	 could	 take	 part	 in	 its	 work	 with	 a	 voting	 right.	The	
emphasis	 of	 the	 work	 was	 on	 the	 economic	 infrastructure	 of	 the	 state:	
unitary	financial,	credit	and	monetary	policy	 in	all	parts	of	 the	state,	 the	
making	of	the	Union	budget,	all-union	economic	programs	and	energy	and	
transport	systems.	(Korzhikhina	1995:	360.)
The	central	 sectoral	administration	went	 through	a	cultural	 change	of	
strategies	in	the	sense	that	it	was	to	be	the	main	state	wide	structure	through	
which	a	market	economy	was	to	be	introduced	in	the	Soviet	Union.	In	this	
developing	 system	 of	 state	 decision	 making,	 the	 local	 government	 was	
going	 through	 a	 revaluation	 as	 a	 result	 of	 three	 different	 developments	
which	 Vladimir	 Gelman	 has	 named	 “the	 effects	 of	 governmental	
democratization,	federalization	and	diversification”.	These	processes	started	
during	 the	 period	 which,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 allowed	 limited	 political	
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competition	in	local	elections.	Ideologically	the	Communist	party	gave	up	
its	constitutional	role	of	 leadership	of	society	and	replaced	 it	with	a	new	
concept	of	“dominant	force”.	The	elections	were	important	for	the	creation	
of	 electoral	 accountability	 and	 subordination	 of	 local	 bodies	 of	 decision	
making	to	the	public.	(Gelman	199:.)
Along	 with	 the	 change	 away	 from	 the	 one	 mandate	 district	 election	
system,	the	laws	concerning	elections	of	people´s	representatives	brought	
other	changes	along	with	(for	 the	first	 time	since	 the	1936	Constitution)	
unitary	 time	 limits	 of	 five	 years	 for	 the	 work	 of	 higher	 and	 lower	 level	
organizations.	 In	 terms	of	development	 toward	 the	 separation	of	powers	
and	 constitutional	 control	 over	 decision	 making,	 the	 local	 soviets	 were	
given	 the	 authority	 for	 supervision	 of	 other	 state	 organs	 and	 officials	
working	 in	 them.	Thus,	persons	who	were	members	of	 the	parallel	 local	
party	 executive	 committees	 (ispolkom),	 heads	 of	 state	 agencies,	
administration	of	party	executive	committees,	judges,	arbitrators	and	so	on,	
could	 not	 be	 representatives	 in	 the	 local	 soviets	 which	 appointed	 them.	
(Korzhikhina	1995:	363.)
During	the	same	period	The	Declaration	of	Sovereignty	of	the	Russian	
Federation	on	June	2nd	in	1990,	had	laid	down	the	principle	of	the	separation	
of	 powers.	This	meant	 a	 clear	 break	with	 the	Constitution	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union	and	 the	beginning	of	a	 separate	administration	at	all	 levels	of	 the	
government.	In	particular,	the	head	of	the	town	administration,	who	was	in	
direct	 control	 of	 all	 departments	 and	 was	 to	 be	 elected	 by	 the	 local	
population,	became	 important.	The	confusion	over	new	roles	and	power	
struggles	 over	 tactics	made	 the	 new	 heads	 of	 administration	 targets	 for	
criticism.	Different	types	of	conflicts	between	the	local	soviet	and	the	head	
were	typical.	(Sheremet	1993:	92–9.)
The	diversification	of	the	forms	and	practices	of	the	local	level	had	also	
taken	place	as	a	 result	of	both	democratization	and	 federalization.	Local	
soviets	 were	 showing	 different	 types	 of	 ruling	 systems	 already	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	1990´s.	There	were	more	parliamentary	or	mixed	systems	
of	decision	making	and	 the	regional	 legislative	bodies	had	become	more	
autonomous	from	the	party.	These	developments	also	took	different	shapes	
in	different	parts	of	the	country.	(Gelman	199:	90.)	
The	problem	from	the	point	of	view	of	actual	growth	in	representational	
power	was	 that	 the	political	 administration	 retained	 its	position	 in	 local	
affairs.	It	was	in	no	way	in	the	institutional	interests	of	the	party	officials	
and	 those	 who	 held	 nomenklatura positions	 to	 alter	 the	 foundations	 of	
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their	 authority.	The	 local	 government,	 in	 this	 situation,	 became	 one	 of	
intensified	conflicts	between	different	bureaucracies	all	trying	to	effect	the	
future	of	the	municipality	and	their	own	social-economic	interests.	
The	CPSU	(Communist	party)	as	a	nationwide	institution	and	the	glue	
of	 the	administrative	market,	 lost	 the	power	 to	control	and	 integrate	 the	
affairs	of	the	soviets	across	the	USSR.	Factional	fights	inside	the	party	itself	
added	to	the	difficulties	of	state	government.	The	party	had	become	openly	
divided	into	sub-groups	which	advanced	different	policies.	(Walker	1993:	
151.)	As	 a	 result	 of	 the	 different	 elements	which	 changed	 its	 bargaining	
position	in	the	administrative	market,	the	party	consented	to	removing	its	
“leading	role”	from	the	Constitution	in	1990.	Ideologically	and	legally	this	
changed	the	basis	of	the	administrative	market	and	left	the	local	arena	open	
for	new	formations	of	decision	making.	
The	 diversification	 of	 local	 soviet	 work	 was	 connected	 with	 the	
developments	 of	 the	 glasnost	 policy.	 Glasnost was	 important	 for	 the	
administration	 in	 several	ways.	 It	 connected	 the	work	 of	 administration	
with	the	local	media,	which	was	used	as	an	information	channel.	The	more	
open	public	debate	and	access	to	information	led	to	the	development	of	a	
legal	consciousness.	As	a	result	a	norm	hierarchy,	clear	authority	relations	
in	the	administrative	market,	the	development	of	administrative	practices	
and	clearly	sanctioned	limitations	as	to	the	discretion	of	individual	officials	
became	important.	All	of	these	were	addressed	during	the	reform	period.	
(For	instance,	Bezuglov	&	Kriazhkov	19:	41–42.)
The	control administration	was	forced	to	start	its	own	reform	as	the	right	
of	citizens	to	be	informed,	heard	and	receive	information	concerning	their	
cases,	was	an	important	element	in	the	beginning	developments	of	the	rule	of	
law.	The	reform	attempts	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	were	included	into	the	
building	of	administrative	accountability.	A	practical	obstacle	in	of	the	way	of	
social	development	was	 the	 limited	right	of	citizens	 to	challenge	adminis-
trators	 in	 court.	 In	 the	 19	 law,	 only	 individual	 administrators	 could	 be	
taken	to	court	even	though	in	administrative	practice	most	questions	were	
decided	collectively.	A	199	law	introduced	in	1990	gave	citizens	the	right	to	
challenge	 collective	 decisions	 and	 file	 complaints	 against	 both	 individual	
administrators	and	state	organs.	(Shelley	1992:	69,	Jordan	2000:	204.)
The	 prosecutors	 assumed	 a	 new	 role	 as	 a	 side-effect	 of	 the	 authority	
vacuum	developing	at	the	local	level	since	the	1990	elections.	These	elections	
had	brought	along	new	deputies	who,	now	freer	from	party	control,	began	
to	pass	legislation	and	directives	which	sometimes	contradicted	state	laws.	
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The	official	protests	by	prosecutors	in	these	cases	suspended	the	execution	
of	these	normative	acts.	The	prosecutors	became	judges	who	oversaw	the	
legality	of	the	work	of	the	soviets.	In	this	paradoxical	sense,	the	once	feared	
and	resented	body	became	a	defender	of	legal	unity.	(Smith199:352)
Gorbachev´s	 reform	 of	 the	 court	 system	 aimed	 to	 make	 it	 more	
independent	 from	 the	 political	 and	 representational	 administrations.	 A	
199	“Law	on	 the	Status	of	 Judges”	extended	 the	 tenure	of	 judges	 to	 ten	
years.	It	also	made	the	regional	level	soviet	the	selection	organ	in	order	to	
make	 the	 judges	 less	 dependent	 on	 the	 local	 administrators	 on	 social	
benefits.	The	law	established	judicial	qualification	panels	whose	staff	were	
chosen	 in	principle	by	 the	 judges	 themselves.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 though,	
these	changes	did	not	change	the	dependence	of	judges	on	higher	officials	
working	in	the	system.	(Jordan	2000:	199.)	While	the	administrative	market	
still	tried	to	work	on	the	same	basic	principles	as	before,	court	reform	was	
mostly	a	step	indicating	that	the	existing	system	had	dysfunctions.	
Political	and	economical	choices	became	one	and	the	same	in	the	state	
building	of	the	perestroika	period.	The	institutional	challenges	of	reducing	
organizations	 and	 their	 staff,	 changing	 the	 party´s	 position	 in	 the	
administration	 of	 the	 country	 and	 defining	 boundaries	 of	 authority	 and	
discretion;	the	economic	challenges	of	keeping	the	supply	channels	working	
while	diminishing	political	control	of	local	decision	making;	and	developing	
economic	legislation	and	rules,	as	well	as	the	political	challenge	of	losing	
control	of	the	administrative	market,	were	all	the	tasks	of	state	building	in	
the	perestroika	period.	These	began	a	cultural	transition	of	the	administrative	
market	and	created	a	separation	of	previously	unified	entities.
5.3 The Administrative Culture at the End of 
Perestroika: Dysfunctions in Place of Politically 
Controlled Bureaucratic Bargaining 
Perestroika	meant	a	transition	in	which	the	administrator	simultaneously	
the	legal,	ideological	and	material	resources	of	work	while	being	forced	to	
create	 a	 new	 sense	 of	 direction.	 Normally	 exceptional	 adaptation	
mechanisms	to	political	and	economic	instability	became	a	standard	routine	
of	everyday	life	both	inside	and	outside	of	the	work	place.	The	perestroika	
administration	reacted	to	the	risks	produced	by	a	dysfunctional	system.
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The	 attempt	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	 between	 the	 manifest	 and	 latent	
administrative	 cultures	 resulted	 in	 changes	 in	 the	power	 balances	 of	 the	
administrative	 market.	 Kordonskii	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 before	 the	
perestroika	 time,	 the	 traditional	 categories	 of	 authority,	 ownership	 and	
power	did	not	have	a	meaning	in	the	social	stratification	(Kordonskii	2000:	
161)	of	any	part	of	the	market.	Perestroika presented	itself	as	an	attempt	to	
change	the	social	importance	of	the	local	level	actor	groups	in	the	economic	
and	representational	administrations.	
Glasnost made	the	unofficial	dialects	of	language	officially	public.	This	
meant	 that	 gossip,	 hear-say	 and	 myths	 of	 state	 realities	 typical	 of	 the	
dissident	dialect	were	introduced	in	the	state	mass	media.	At	the	same	time	
the	 political	 changes	 institutionalized	 the	 dissident	 personalities.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	12.)These	started	to	have	influence	at	all	levels	of	society	
and	in	all	administrations.	
A	 result	 was	 a	 clash	 of	 power	 holders	 in	 the	 administrative	 market.	
Christopher	Williams	has	identified	three	groups	which	contributed	to	the	
structural	difficulties	of	 the	change:	 the	political	opposition	 forces	 in	 the	
upper	echelons	of	the	party,	the	bureaucratic	opposition	of	the	ministries	
which	were	losing	their	former	role,	and	the	opposition	of	the	enterprise	
directors	 dealing	 with	 shortages	 and	 other	 practical	 problems.	 These	
problems	were	not	made	easier	by	the	public´s	fear	of	unemployment	and	
falling	 living	 standards.(Williams	 1996:10.)	 In	 Simon	 Kordonskii´s	
categories	the	first	two	would	be	from	the	“functionaries”	group,	while	the	
third	group	could	have	included	“ordinary	people”.	In	addition,	he	sees	that	
many	members	of	the	old	soviets	opposed	the	changes	(Kordonskii	2000:	
14),	although	they	were	institutionally	on	the	gaining	side.	
The	 de-stabilization	 of	 the	 administrative	 market	 relations	 was	 an	
unintended	administrative	side-effect	of	perestroika.	A	risk	administration	
culture	 appeared	 in	 all	 of	 the	 four	 administrations.	 Kordonskii	 has	
described	this	as	a	process	in	which	the	legalizing	of	the	unofficial	groups	
and	dialects	neutered	the	meaning	the	official	classes	had	for	administrative	
work	 and	 also	 rendered	 membership	 of	 unofficial	 groups	 unnecessary.	
(Kordonskii	2000:	1.)	Structural	changes	in	state	building	which	led	to	
the	 creation	 of	 a	 risk	 administration	 culture	 can	 be	 grouped	 into	 three	
basic	 categories:	 legal	 authority	 changes	 in	 the	 administrative	 market,	
changes	in	the	supply	system	of	economic	planning,	and	changes	between	
institutions	and	law.	Social	changes	took	place	as	a	result	of	glasnost	and	
work	ethic	reforms.	
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Risks	 were	 created	 because	 the	 economical	 growth	 purposes	 of	 the	
political	ideology	would	have	needed	policies	which	intensified	the	existing	
capabilities	of	the	administrative	market.	In	this	arena,	the	main	incentive	
had	been	political	necessity	from	which	all	else	had	followed.	Necessity	was	
forced	upon	other	actors	in	the	market	by	the	party	at	the	local	and	regional	
levels.	The	political	changes	of	perestroika	combined	with	the	economical	
strategies	that	followed,	broke	this	dependency.	Since	systemic	change	was	
not	 the	 original	 goal	 of	 the	 administrative	 changes,	 the	 reforms	 did	 not	
have	a	clear	institutional	direction.	
In	 comparison	 with	 the	 pre-perestroika	 Soviet	 executive	 committees,	
which	were	a	direct	extension	of	sectoral	economical	administration	and	
were	guided	by	the	political	administration,	 the	new	local	 level	adminis-
tration	was	acquiring	meaning	as	a	legal	participant	in	local	matters.	The	
end	 of	 the	 perestroika/glasnost	 period	 brought	 about	 mostly	 structural	
legal	 changes	 which,	 for	 the	 first	 time,	 gave	 formally	 wider	 political	
participation	rights	for	Soviet	citizens.	
The	executive	committees	of	the	soviets	in	the	municipalities	received	a	
new	 power	 position	 in	 the	 state	 hierarchy	 as	 the	 soviets	 received	 new	
authority.	In	the	legal	changes	and	in	the	elections	which	followed,	the	local	
government	assumed	an	importance	which	it	had	not	had	since	the	early	
years	after	the	191	revolution.	The	soviets	were	given	a	chance	to	influence	
territorial	 development	 and	mayors	 started	 to	 act	 as	 political	 leaders	 in	
their	geographical	areas.	The	diversification	a	and	federalization	processes	
at	the	local	and	regional	levels	broke	the	soviet	tenet	that	all	institutions	had	
fully	similar	 identities.	Regional	concerns	began	to	be	included	in	public	
discussions.	
Yet,	the	position	of	the	local	government	at	the	end	of	the	perestroika/
glasnost	period	was	overwhelmed	by	uncertainty	over	what	should	in	fact	
constitute	the	limits	of	its	actions	in	the	administrative	market.	The	political	
leadership	of	the	country	had	unleashed	the	development	but	was	no	longer	
in	control	of	it.	The	political	calculations	of	political	direction	and	power	
balance	on	one	hand,	and	the	need	to	have	some	economic	policy	unity	on	
the	other	hand	made	the	issue	of	local	government	critical	for	success.	The	
administrative	problems	of	the	Soviet	economy	together	with	diminishing	
financial	 support	 from	 the	 center,	 made	 problem	 solving	 often	 too	
demanding	for	the	local	level.	
The	uncertain	authority	relations	were	a	factor	in	the	risks	which	led	to	
the	dramatic	events	at	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s.	Furthermore,	the	local	
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level	did	not	act	in	a	unified	manner.	There	was	institutional	competition	
between	the	representational	administration	and	political	administration.	
The	fight	over	the	fate	of	the	provinces	was	a	major	factor	in	the	attempted	
coup	of	1991.	As	Vladimir	Gelman	has	shown,	the	reversal	of	the	rule	of	
double	subordination	created	much	legal	confusion	at	the	local	level.	This	
had	 been	 done	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 correct	 the	 situation	 which	 was	 evident	
everywhere	 after	 the	 local	 elections.	 The	 normative	 regulation	 of	 the	
decision	making	organs	was	practically	non-existent	and	 the	 soviets	had	
taken	over	 the	authority	of	 the	executive	organs.	The	new	 independence	
from	the	party	meant	 tense	relations	with	 the	regional	party	committees	
which	 lead	 to	 conflicts	 at	 the	 regional	 level.	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	 first	
elections	 for	 the	president	of	Russia,	 as	well	 as	 for	 the	mayors	 (heads	of	
town	administrations)	were	held	in	June	1991.	(Gelman	199:	91–92.)
The	slow	reforms	in	the	political	administration	seriously	impeded	the	
possibility	for	strategically	balanced	changes	in	the	administrative	market.	
The	piece-meal	attempts	at	remedying	the	intensified	dysfunctions	of	the	
Soviet	government	eroded	trust	in	the	authority	of	the	state	as	a	provider	of	
order	and	stability.
Economic	realities	made	planning	in	all	sectors	of	administration	more	
difficult.	The	economic	growth	ideology,	which	had	sustained	the	economic	
administration	 and	 helped	 sustain	 the	 whole	 administrative	 market,	
disappeared.	 Guidance	 of	 administrative	 work	 eroded	 as	 the	 political	
language	and	methods	of	pressure	began	to	change.	New	information,	new	
legal	 and	 economical	 rights	 created	 expectations	 while	 the	 worsening	
services	 in	municipalities	 created	 frustration	 at	 the	 local	 administration	
and	its	officials.	Political	risks	rose	the	same	way	as	in	the	reform	periods	of	
19th	century	Russia	when	the	political	order	of	the	country	was	kept	in	one	
place	for	too	long.	
The	vertical	confusion	of	powers	in	the	administrative	markets	(both	local	
and	 regional)	 greatly	 affected	 the	 transition	 to	 a	market	 economy	 (or	 the	
mixed	economy,	which	was	Gorbachev´s	aim)	by	segmentation	of	the	market	
and	 –	 particularly	 –	 by	 deterring	 foreign	 investment	 in	 Russia.	 Yet	 the	
independence	 of	 the	 local	 level	 created	 negative	 side-effects.	 Particularly	
harsh	was	the	challenge	faced	by	small	and	medium	sized	company	towns.	
Their	industrial	enterprises	were	typically	very	large	and	lines	of	production	
were	 concentrated.	 When	 the	 support	 from	 the	 center	 diminished,	 the	
population	was	faced	with	complex	situations.	Moving	away	was	not	possible,	
because	at	the	time	there	was	no	housing	market.	(Hanson	1993:	20–21.)	
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The	economy	of	the	local	representational	administration	was	having	
risk	 society	 (see	Beck	1996	and	Yanitsky	1999)	 characteristics.	 It	was	 a	
semi-market,	but	without	the	market	controls	or	competition.	In	addition	
guidance	for	the	system	was	only	jus	developing	in	terms	of	its	authority	
and	unclear	 to	 the	 administrators,	who	were	 situated	 in	 the	municipal	
hierarchies.	The	 economic	 changes	 were	 piece-meal	 instead	 of	 system	
wide,	which	led	to	giving	new	rights	to	institutions	and	areas	inside	the	
old	 planning	 system.	 The	 concept	 of	 communal	 property	 gave	 the	
municipalities	a	chance	to	have	some	autonomy.	Decision	making	rights	
about	local	taxes	and	foreign	trade	raised	expectations	both	administratively	
and	politically.	Theoretically	these	were	radical	changes	from	the	past.	In	
reality	 though,	municipal	budgets	depended	upon	 the	planning	 system	
and	 the	 party	 owned	 and	 controlled	many	municipal	 resources	 which	
made	autonomous	economic	decision	making	in	the	localities	difficult,	if	
not	impossible.	
It	is	not	possible	to	say	that	the	Gorbachev	reforms	did	not	try	to	manage	
the	change	in	the	basic	mechanisms	at	the	local	level.	More	than	anything	
else,	this	became	the	case	when	Gorbachev	tried	to	introduce	the	rule	of	
law	ideas.	Paradoxically,	legality	became	a	political	tool	for	change.	Law	was	
again	used	 in	 the	reformation	of	 the	state	 instead	of	 its	normal	 role	as	a	
guarantor	of	its	institutions.	The	idea	that	the	Constitution	was	a	measure	
of	administrative	work	appeared	in	the	Gorbachev	years.	
Perestroika	meant	 a	 rupture	 in	 the	 administrative	 culture	 in	 terms	 of	
client	relationship	in	a	manner	which	had	not	been	possible	before.	Glasnost 
set	in	a	motion	the	diversification	of	the	administration´s	clientele	on	the	
basis	of	political,	 social,	 ethnic	 and	other	 characteristics	which	was	 later	
reflected	most	vividly	at	the	regional	 level	 in	the	90´s.	From	the	point	of	
view	of	 administrative	 law,	 this	 period	 encouraged	 the	use	of	 individual	
legal	consciousness,	although	 the	practical	area	 for	 its	use	was	still	 to	be	
born.	Law	became	a	tool	for	political	changes,	instead	of	being	a	conservative	
force	 in	 the	 service	 of	 the	 state	 (Shelley	 1992:	 64).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	
development	after	the	191	October	Revolution	were	repeated	in	the	reverse	
order.	The	first	step	in	the	perestroika era	program	was	reminiscent	of	the	
first	 Russian	 Constitution	 of	 1906	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 basic	 pillar	 of	
government	was	left	in	tact.	In	this	case	it	was	defined	as	a	“socialist	rule	of	
law	state”	which	aimed	to	create	a	space	for	human	rights	and	a	party	which	
was	legally	controlled.	In	reality,	the	individual	remained	subordinate	to	the	
economical	and	political	interests	of	the	state.	At	the	same	time	the	widening	
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of	 political	 power	 in	 the	 local	 soviets	 meant	 new	 challenges	 for	 the	
administration.	 The	 prosecutors	 assumed	 new	 transitional	 roles	 as	
supervisors	of	legal	unity	within	the	municipalities.
The	attempt	to	create	rule	of	law	in	the	socialist	system	as	it	existed	in	the	
economical	conditions	of	Soviet	Union	was	 intertwined	with	 the	general	
reformation	 problems.	 First	 there	 was	 the	 avalanche	 of	 sub-laws	 and	
organizational	instructions	which	in	fact	were	more	important	than	federal	
laws	in	the	daily	execution	of	policies.	Second	there	was	the	immaturity	of	
the	idea	that	individual	rights	as	such	would	have	to	be	considered	over	all	
other	 considerations.	 This	 in	 turn	 would	 have	 required	 a	 solid	 norm	
hierarchy	in	which	state	laws	are	put	before	local	and	organizational	rules.	
(Comp.	Entin	1992:	360.)
Transitionally,	rule	of	law	ideas	contradicted	democratic	centralism	and	
thus	the	basis	of	the	party´s	existence	in	its	former	role.	The	reforms	tried	
to	modernize	norm	creation	to	give	the	local	level	a	chance	to	be	heard	in	
the	process.	Yet,	in	the	Soviet	system,	any	kind	of	reform	was	possible	only	
from	the	top	(Pursiainen	2001:	).	Democratic	centralism	and	new	local	
activeness	together	produced	new	risks	in	the	society.	The	answer,	which	
was	the	application	of	rule	of	law	ideas,	was	not	genuinely	possible	in	the	
soviet	administrative	market.	The	processes	of	 the	administrative	market	
dominated	 actual	decision	making	because	 law	was	 a	weak	 tool	 and	 the	
courts	 were	 confined	 to	 working	 under	 ministerial	 supervision.	 As	 a	
consequence,	new	risks	arose	in	the	form	of	institutional	fighting	inside	the	
representational	 and	 political	 bureaucracies	 and	 between	 them.	 Legal	
changes	thus	contributed	to	the	economic	declined	and	vice versa.	A	cycle	
of	transition	was	created.	Gorbachev´s	policies	did	not	attempt,	nor	could	
they	have,	to	change	these	relations	at	a	more	fundamental	level.	
Stephen	Whitefield	has	written	an	extensive	analysis	of	the	ministerial	
system	 in	 the	Soviet	Union	and	 its	 effect	on	 the	perestroika	policies.	He	
stresses	the	fact	that	the	roots	of	the	perestroika	development	problems	lay	
most	of	all	in	the	power	of	the	central	ministries	which	had	depolitized	the	
system	and	made	other	actors	in	the	administrative	market	close	to	obsolete	
in	terms	of	real	power.	The	earlier	reforms	had	always	met	with	institutional	
cultural	resistance	from	the	ministry	officials.	For	instance	in	the	190´s	the	
ministries	could	not	be	motivated	to	draw	plans	which	would	have	included	
inter-branch	considerations.	On	the	contrary,	ministerial	officials	learned	
to	 use	 the	 structural	weaknesses	 of	 the	 system	 to	 their	 own	 benefit	 and	
independence.	(Whitefield	1993:	0–1.)
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The	 power	 of	 the	 party,	 in	 Whitefield´s	 view,	 was	 weak	 in	 terms	 of	
economical	planning,	execution	of	decisions	at	the	local	level	and	even	in	
personnel	policy.	The	main	criteria	in	the	assessment	of	one´s	achievements	
was	 reaching	 the	 targets	 which	 were	 set	 by	 the	 ministry	 led	 economic	
system.	Ministerial	inefficiency	in	developing	its	own	working	mechanisms	
became	evident	in	the	lack	of	interest	in	using	computers	at	work.	Whitefield	
states	 that	 the	 operational	 control	 of	 state	 property	 gave	 the	ministerial	
officials	the	rights	of	property	owners.	Inside	the	ministerial	departments,	
a	 one	 man	 decision	 making	 culture	 reigned	 while	 the	 functional	
administrations	sought	to	transfer	all	decisions	to	the	top	to	reduce	their	
own	responsibilities.	The	office	became	a	maximising	unit	because	income	
(real	and	corrupt)	depended	upon	finding	the	point	of	maximal	gain	in	the	
public´s	 demand	 curve.	 (Whitefield	 1993:	 2–95,	 105.)	 Whitefield´s	
assessment	is	that	these	structural	features	were	a	major	part	of	the	obstacle	
to	change.	On	top	of	making	the	party	subordinate	to	powerful	ministries,	
laws	were,	 in	the	hierarchy	of	 legal	acts,	 less	meaningful	than	ministerial	
orders	 and	 instruction	 which	 were	 obligatory	 at	 the	 republican	 level.	
Ministries	in	Moscow	and	their	local	branches	often	duplicated	paper	work.	
The	republican	level	did	not	have	a	clear	position.	(Whitefield	1993:	122.)
Socially,	the	creation	of	local	norms	was	seen	important	for	the	glasnost	
program	in	the	sense	that	the	soviets	could	have,	in	principle,	created	rules	
benefitting	all-union	or	republican	levels	in	the	future.	At	the	same	time,	
the	 local	 legislation	could	not	surpass	 the	need	for	a	unified	direction	of	
glasnost	and	maximal	central	regulation.	The	risk	was	a	serious	diversification	
of	the	work	of	the	soviets	which	could	have	passed	decisions	going	against	
the	existing	state	laws.	Elements	of	the	glasnost	policy,	such	as	principles	of	
information	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 citizens´	 rights	 from	 any	 subjective	
expression	 in	 this	 matter,	 would	 not	 have	 developed	 well.	 (Bezuglov	 &	
Kriazhkov	19:	40–41.)	Thus	two	vital	elements	of	the	transitional	process	
–	the	need	for	legal	unity	and	local	initiative	–	frustratingly	worked	against	
one	 other	 producing	 new	 risks.	 Similar	 problems	 had	 been	 faced	 at	 the	
beginning	of	the	20th	century	by	the	Provisional	government	in	its	attempt	
to	bring	legislative	order	into	Russian	communities.	
An	example	of	how	these	processes	affected	professional	behavior	and	
through	 it	 affected	 the	 implementation	of	 changes	 is	 the	 situation	of	 the	
prosecutors	in	the	perestroika	period.	While	the	prosecutors	assumed	new	
tasks	in	the	supervision	of	unity	of	the	municipal	legality,	their	frustration	
was	 increasing.	A	 survey	of	prosecutors	 in	199	 revealed	 that	many	had	
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wanted	the	KGB	and	the	party	to	also	be	under	their	supervision.	They	also	
wished	 to	 have	 more	 financial	 resources	 and	 complained	 about	 the	
diminishing	prestige	of	the	institution.	As	an	answer	to	the	new	risks	which	
the	prosecutors	were	feeling,	many	had	started	to	create	their	own	agendas	
since	the	party	control	had	become	more	relaxed.	(Smith	199:	353.)	Yet,	it	
must	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 perestroika	 period	 did	 initiate	 a	 process	 toward	
accountability	 in	 this	 institution.	 It	 became	 a	 conservative	 tool	 for	
administrative	change.	
From	early	on,	though,	the	real	change	in	terms	of	administrative	culture	
took	place	in	the	area	of	information	and	language.	These	led	to	the	way	in	
which	laws	and	administrative	implementation	were	viewed	in	society.	The	
relaxed	 censorship	 brought	 along	 stories	 in	 the	 media	 which	 aroused	
discussions	and	activated	citizens	to	voice	their	most	visible	local	concerns.	
The	media´s	role	in	the	development	of	a	general	legal	culture	was	vital.	As	
the	publicity	revealed	cases	of	misconduct	and	discussion	about	them	was	
possible,	the	administration	was	no	longer	able	to	rely	on	the	party	to	shelter	
them	from	accountability.	(Shelley	1992:	2.)	
One	of	the	main	differences	in	the	transition	of	administrative	culture	in	
the	perestroika	years	was	the	appearance	“localism”	in	terms	of	recognizing	
different	types	of	clientele	more	acutely	than	before	when	the	harmony	of	
different	 ethnic,	 religious	 and	 cultural	 groups	 was	 officially	 underlined.	
Gorbachev´s	visits	to	different	part	of	the	country	and	the	popular	street	
and	work	place	meetings	of	 the	 time	underlined	 this	 effect.	The	varying	
social	problems	of	different	areas	of	the	country	could	and	were	brought	up.	
Even	if	the	clients	of	administration	were	still	only	recipients	waiting	for	the	
solution	 from	 the	 top	 leadership,	 they	 had	 acquired	 a	 voice.	 As	 the	 top	
political	leadership	gave	the	citizens	the	right	for	criticism,	the	administration	
was	forced	to	face	the	discontent	as	the	economic	conditions	became	more	
difficult.	
Perestroika	created	both	the	frustration	and	the	channel	for	the	expression	
of	the	mistrust	of	the	population	towards	the	administrative	work.	Included	
in	this	cultural	shock	was	the	question	of	occupational	and	salary	interests.	
In	 the	 perestroika	 years,	 many	 once	 prestigious	 occupations	 lost	 their	
appeal	because	of	the	financial	crises	and	central	government´s	inability	to	
pay	decent	salaries	on	time.	Organizationally	the	cultural	elements	of	the	
nomenklatura,	political	elite	decision	making	and	symbolic	communication	
remained.	The	tasks	and	goals	of	the	administration	did	not	change	during	
perestroika.	The	organizational	structure	of	the	Soviet	society	remained	the	
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same	till	the	rupture	of	1991.	A	side-effect	of	the	side-effects	took	over	the	
political	process	when	mistrust	grew	and	was	voiced	more	openly	as	a	result	
of	glasnost.	
Glasnost	as	a	policy	of	public-expression	and	information	gathering	was	
connected	 with	 the	 way	 Soviet	 citizens	 viewed	 their	 life	 and	 the	 life	 of	
“others”.	 As	 a	 strategic	 policy	 it	 was	 meant	 to	 create	 a	 more	 objective	
discussion	in	which	the	leadership	would	get	information	about	society	
directly	from	the	people.	Yet	together	with	the	economical	and	political	
decisions,	 this	 situation	 produced	 a	 particularly	 powerful	 side-effect.	
Kordonskii	has	described	the	perestroika	period	as	an	transition	towards	
the	legalization	of	dissident	thinking	(Kordonskii	2000).	That	which	used	
to	 be	 outside	 of	 the	 official	 language	 and	 working	 methods,	 became	
accepted.	
Perestroika	included	promoting	individual	activity	by	emphasizing	and	
re-establishing	professionalism	and	commitment	in	all	work	places.	Main	
practical	methods	in	achieving	these	ends	were	disciplinary	actions	against	
drunkenness,	general	laziness	and	corruption	in	the	work	place.	The	policies	
chosen	 to	 advance	 the	 reforms	 were	 the	 earlier	 described	 anti-alcohol	
campaign	 and	 campaign	 against	 unearned	 incomes.	 (Walker	 1993:	 10.)	
The	 anti-alcohol	 campaign	 led	 to	 a	 drastic	 falling	 of	 state	 incomes	 and	
economic	problems	in	wine	producing	territories.	In	this	sense	it	intensified	
the	economic	decline.	
The	anti-alcohol	campaigns	and	the	campaign	against	unearned	incomes	
repeated	well-intentioned	administrative	disciplinary	actions	in	the	Soviet	
tradition.	Their	influence	on	actual	practices	is	difficult	to	assess.	The	most	
visible	result	was	the	more	open	discussion	about	the	dysfunctions	of	work	
culture	 such	as	drunkenness,	 laziness	and	corruption.	Ethical	 campaigns	
coincided	with	the	general	policy	of	glasnost.	
The	 perception	which	 people	 had	 about	 the	 surrounding	 society	 and	
their	 own	 personal	 well	 being	 in	 retrospect,	 constituted	 one	 of	 the	
fundamental	 factors	 which	 effected	 the	 adaptation	 of	 Soviet	 citizens	 to	
structural	changes.	Inability	to	take	this	factor	into	consideration	led	to	a	
major	 risk	 for	 the	 leadership.	 A	 type	 of	 political	 fallacy	 had	 already	
developed	in	the	perestroika	years,	which	led	to	a	feeling	for	a	major	cultural	
change.	 Overlooked	 was	 the	 possibility	 that	 even	 when	 the	 so	 called	
objective	factors	(macroeconomic	indicators)	showed	different,	people	can	
be	quite	satisfied	with	their	lives.	This	was	(and	to	an	extent	continues	to	be)	
a	problem,	particularly	in	the	foreign	advice	given	to	changing	societies.
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Even	as	the	ideology	before	Gorbachev´s	time	had	been	eroding	through	
latent	 criticism	and	complaints	 about	daily	problems	at	work	places,	 the	
ideology	in	certain	ways	still	had	a	powerful	cultural	meaning	for	the	Soviet	
citizens.	 Soviet	 patriotism,	 the	 social	 and	moral	 supremacy	 of	 socialism	
over	capitalist	way	of	life,	the	Communist	party	as	the	leader	of	society	and	
the	Soviet	foreign	policies	enjoyed	wide	support.	The	stability	and	security	
of	life	for	ordinary	workers	was	considered	to	compensate	for	the	luxuries	
of	Western	consumption.	The	lack	of	open	discussion	and	information	in	
the	mass	media	made	many	Soviet	citizens	 think	 that	 the	problems	 they	
faced	were	specific	only	to	their	city	or	region.	It	was	in	fact	a	method	of	the	
official	 language	 to	 label	 negative	 aspects	 and	 occurrences	 as	 “atypical”.	
Even	as	many	citizens	disliked	a	particular	local	official	or	administrative	
organization	for	deficiencies	in	their	lives,	they	usually	did	not	start	assessing	
the	whole	system	based	on	these	facts.	As	an	example	of	the	meaning	of	this	
attitude	to	life	is	the	fact	that	even	people	who	had	emigrated	to	the	USA	in	
the	 late	190´s	gave	surprising	survey	answers	about	their	satisfaction	in	
the	 Soviet	 Union.	 Of	 those	 studied	 in	 one	 such	 survey,	 59	%	 had	 been	
satisfied	with	their	living	standards	in	their	former	country,	and	only	14%	
were	very	dissatisfied.	(Shlapentokh	199:	34–35.)	
As	in	the	case	of	the	earlier,	revolutionary	and	Stalinist	post-revolutionary	
administration,	the	basis	of	the	mature	Soviet	administrative	culture	can	be	
divided	into	“rational”	organizational	aspects	and	“irrational”	ideologically	
born	political	control	aspects.	The	perestroika/glasnost	period	can	be	seen	
as	a	 too	short	and	politically	 ineffective	 time	 to	have	changed	any	major	
part	of	the	mature	social	system	of	the	Soviet	administration.	The	practical	
components	of	its	administrative	culture	stayed	to	a	very	large	part	intact.	
Whitefield´s	 study	states	 that	 in	 fact	 the	ministries	 ran	 the	Soviet	Union	
and	did	not	pay	much	attention	to	party	resolutions	concerning	their	work.	
The	ministerial	power	over	material	resources	allowed	them	to	determine	
the	rules	of	the	society	and	the	position	of	those	who	were	nominally	in	the	
position	 of	 supervising	 the	 administration.	 The	 party	 personnel	 in	
Whitefield´s	assessment	obtained	access	to	the	influence	of	the	ministries	
through	appointments.	The	economic	power	took	over	and	dominated	the	
political	sphere	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	was	“ministerialized”.	(Whitefield	
1993:	123–129.)
Walker	has	named	the	last	period	“crises	management”	which	took	place	
between	1990–1991	until	 the	 collapse	of	 the	Soviet	Union.	 Ideologically,	
this	 period	 was	 already	 mostly	 tactical	 maneuvering	 because	 time	 was	
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running	out.	It	did,	however,	mean	the	establishment	of	the	institution	of	
executive	president	which	changed	the	power	structure	at	the	top.	In	essence	
it	was	an	attempt	to	re-centralize	power	and	stop	the	fragmentation	of	the	
state.	 Also,	 it	 answered	 to	 the	 call	 by	 many	 people	 to	 have	 stronger	
government.	The	perestroika	reforms	had	shown	the	difficulty	of	establishing	
democracy	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 because	 of	 structural-political	 reasons	
(Pursiainen	2001:	6).
The	 lack	 of	 a	 new	 Constitution	 became	more	 evident	 now,	 since	 the	
authority	 relations	between	different	power	 centers	 and	decision	makers	
was	unclear.	Glasnost	 had	meant	 that	 it	was	more	difficult	 for	 the	party	
bureaucracy	to	get	away	with	clearly	illegal	activities.	The	popular	election,	
the	 new	 authority	 position	 and	 attempts	 to	 install	 rule	 of	 law	 into	 the	
decision	making	system	undermined	the	party´s	ability	to	plant	represen-
tatives	in	the	soviets	and	produced	a	new	risk	in	the	form	of	growing	desires	
for	republican	autonomy.	(Walker	1993:	9–90,	15.)	
The	diversification	of	the	forms	and	practices	of	 local	government	is	a	
particularly	important	phenomenon	for	the	cultural	aspects	of	local	decision	
making.	It	is	important	to	notice	how	fast	the	structural	changes	led	to	the	
adaptation	of	 the	 local	 level	with	various	 forms	of	 tactics	previously	not	
possible.	 In	 a	 way	 the	 perestroika	 period	 achieved	 its	 primary	 goal	 by	
leading	to	the	realization	that	old	methods	of	decision	making	and	work	
did	not	function	in	the	flood	of	actual	problems.	The	grass	roots	of	decision	
making	were	activated.	The	need	for	modernization	in	the	way	information	
was	gathered,	processed	and	its	distribution	controlled	by	the	administration	
became	evident	in	the	perestroika	time.	The	general	view	which	the	public	
now	formed	about	work	as	a	process	and	as	a	fundamental	element	of	social	
life	became	one	of	disillusionment.	Glasnost meant	that	the	administration	
became	a	target	for	non-party	controlled	interest	and	criticism.	At	the	same	
time,	the	administrators	themselves	began	to	change	their	outlook	on	their	
life	and	roles	as	civil	servants.
The	 usefulness	 of	 the	 local	 level	 for	 the	 larger	 communities	 was	 an	
example	of	the	revivalist	idealism	of	the	early	glasnost	years.	From	a	more	
practical	point	of	view,	it	can	be	said	that	the	stress	on	state	regulation	was	
an	attempt	at	keeping	the	developments	in	some	sort	of	order	which	would	
not	upset	the	central	economic	planning	system.	The	local	Soviet	was	meant	
to	be	most	of	all	an	executioner	of	the	unified	party	policy	and	a	mobilizer	
of	 the	people	 to	 take	a	more	active	role	 in	 the	 local	affairs.	The	practical	
program	 for	 the	 soviets	 included	 the	 activation	 of	 open	 doors	meetings	
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between	elected	officials	and	the	inhabitants	at	the	local	level	and	the	right	
of	the	citizens	to	receive	more	information	about	the	work	of	the	soviets	in	
form	of	a	language	that	would	be	easier	for	them	to	understand.	Socially,	
the	role	of	the	mass	media	was	strengthened	and	it	started	to	have	a	new	
type	of	influence	on	administration.	The	major	change	was	the	relationship	
of	the	political	leadership	with	media	which	went	through	a	visible	change	
in	 the	 perestroika	 period	 and	 forced	 the	 administration	 to	 consider	 the	
possibility	of	public	accountability	outside	the	party	system.	This	possibility	
to	discuss	choices	publicly	had	a	permanent	effect	on	the	way	administration	
was	viewed	and	the	way	it	began	to	see	its	own	work.	
The	economic	decline	meant	 that	 the	daily	practices	of	administrative	
organs	at	 the	 local	 level	were	simply	trying	to	adapt	to	reduced	finances.	
Together	with	the	confusing	political	guidance	–	or	lack	of	it	–	from	the	top,	
this	created	an	urgent	need	for	local	action	and	a	severe	inability	to	act	on	
it.	The	administrative	culture	became	that	of	intensified	dysfunctions	which	
the	old	administrative	market	was	able	to	use	to	sustain	balance	of	interests	
but	in	which	the	new	situation	became	an	obstacle	to	change.	One	of	the	
side-effects	 of	 this	 was	 the	 transformation	 of	 blat	 relations	 to	 a	 more	
traditional	form	of	corruption	(comp.	Ledeneva	2000).	While	the	party	was	
simply	 withering	 away,	 the	 economy	 was	 heading	 toward	 a	 total	
transformation	of	its	basis.	The	administration	was	stranded	in	a	political	
and	economic	vacuum	with	old	laws	and	without	new	guidance.	The	culture	
became	an	ideal	type	of	risk	administration.	
Ideologically,	there	was	a	shift	of	power	balance	from	the	political	(party)	
to	the	representational	(soviet)	side,	and	formally	there	was	a	new	authority	
position	in	municipal	decision	making.	But	 in	terms	of	actual	power	the	
new	laws	and	elections	gave	the	soviets,	they	mostly	set	the	earlier	partners	
of	 the	 administrative	 market	 against	 each	 other.	 As	 Walker	 (1993)	 has	
pointed	out,	the	political	and	managerial	inexperience	of	the	new	deputies	
and	a	 lack	of	 local	political	program	resulted	 in	 inefficiency	and	 incom-
petence.	Political	wrestling	took	the	place	of	market	negotiations	as	a	side-
effect	of	new	local	freedom.	
According	to	Stephen	Whitefield´s	1993	study,	the	major	side-effect	of	
the	 Soviet	 system	 of	 party	 bureaucratization	 was	 that	 the	 economy,	
represented	by	the	ministries,	took	over	politics	all	together.	Ministerialized	
decision	making	in	this	sense	would	be	an	unwanted	consequence	of	the	
party	 losing	 its	 power	 to	 the	 administration.	Kirkow	has	 also	 concluded	
that	one	of	the	main	problems	for	the	local	party,	was	its	lack	of	influence	
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on	the	ministries	which	managed	municipally	located	enterprises	(Kirkow	
199:	40).	If,	however,	one	sees	the	bureucratization	of	the	party	as	a	goal	of	
the	 Soviet	 system	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 the	 growth	 of	 the	 power	 of	 the	
administration	is	not	a	failure	in	itself.	The	party	did	not	lose	its	political	
power	because	it	economized	its	politics	quite	soon.	More	likely	the	problem	
then	would	be	in	the	way	the	interests	of	economized	party	politics	and	the	
bureaucratized	economy	were	run	by	the	party	members.	The	coordination	
of	different	interests	was	not	done	effectively	by	the	party	system.
I	 agree	with	Whitefield´s	 conclusion	 that	 in	 the	process	 of	 building	 a	
state	in	which	administration	would	no	longer	bridge	goverment,	society	
and	economy,	the	building	process	was	complicated	by	the	disputes	of	the	
executive	apparatus	and	by	the	response	of	the	legislators	to	the	economic	
difficulties	 of	 the	 transition	 (Whitefield	 1993:25).	 This	 existing	
administrative	market	meant	that	the	perestroika	period	did	not	affect	the	
changes	 in	 the	 administrative	 behavior	 because	 there	 was	 not	 enough	
structural	support	for	the	birth	of	municipal	administration	in	the	liberal-
democratic	 sense	 of	 the	 word.	 It	 did,	 however, intensify	 bureaucratic	
competition	 at	 the	 local	 level	 because	 the	 economic	possibilities	became	
unpredictable	 and	 scarce.	 The	 dysfunctions	 together	 with	 the	 right	 to	
criticize,	led	to	gradual	shifts	in	the	power	basis	at	the	local	level.	
What	 did	 change	 drastically,	 however,	 was	 the	 attitude	 toward	 state	
authority	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 rapid	 economical	 decline	 and	 the	 changing	
policies	 of	 the	 political	 leadership.	A	major	 factor	 in	 the	 risk	 producing	
cycle	of	the	perestroika years	was	the	wasting	of	the	 loyalty	of	the	Soviet	
citizens	 to	 the	 state	 as	 a	 resource	 for	 the	 reforms.	The	 structures	which	
sustained	 this	 loyalty	 were	 diminished	 or	 even	 destroyed	 which	 led	 to	
massive	 disillusionment.	 The	 disillusionment	 was	 not	 a	 result	 of	 an	
ideological	collapse.	It	is	probably	quite	safe	to	say	that	many	Soviet	people	
did	not	feel	that	their	life,	from	their	individual	point	of	view,	was	bad.	The	
state	essentially	had	their	support	as	along	as	it	provided	basic	services	in	a	
predictable	manner.	During	the	perestroika period	these	services	were	cut	
down	and	their	delivery	became	unreliable	as	a	result	of	the	break	up	of	the	
supply	system.	The	state	which	was	the	object	of	Soviet	patriotism,	lost	its	
status.	Patriotism	sought	new	avenues	in	the	form	of	localism,	regionalism	
and	 separatism.	 The	 diminishing	 loyalty	 toward	 the	 state	 deterred	
economical	and	cultural	changes.	Administration	became	one	of	the	main	
targets	of	criticism	through	which	a	general	disbelief	and	wearing	out	was	
projected.	Trust	in	the	administrative	changes	was	wasted.
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To summarize,	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 new	 culture	 shows	 that	 perestroika	
policies	were	reactions	to	the	risks	created	by	a	dysfunctional	Soviet	system.	
The	attempt	to	bridge	the	gap	between	the	official	(manifest)	and	unofficial	
(latent)	administrative	cultures	resulted	in	changes	in	the	power	balance	of	
the	Soviet	administrative	market.	An	analogy	between	the	191	revolution	
and	perestroika	can	be	drawn	because	both	changed	the	social	importance	
of	 local	 level	 actor	 groups	 in	 the	 economic	 and	 representational	
administrations.	 The	 success	 of	 glasnost	 (new	 client	 relations)	 was	
paradoxically	pushing	society	in	a	direction	which	it	was	institutionally	not	
prepared	to	face.	In	this	sense,	the	perestroika period	resembled	early	20th	
century	Russia.	
The	analysis	of	the	perestroika	policies	shows	how	the	de-stabilization	of	
the	administrative	market	relations	was	an	unintended	side-effect.	A	risk	
administration	culture	was	created	in	the	Soviet	government.	Since	systemic	
change	was	not	the	original	goal	of	administrative	change,	the	reforms	did	
not	have	a	clear	institutional	direction.	This	led	to	uncertainty	in	authority	
relations	which	greatly	affected	the	following	transition,	as	the	next	chapter	
shows.	
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6 The Transition of Administrative 
Culture Since 1991
This	 chapter	 describes	 the	 development	 of	 administrative	 thinking	 since	
1991;	 structural	 changes	 which	 created	 a	 new	 local	 level;	 and	 the	
administrative	 culture	 which	 has	 been	 in	 creation	 since	 the	 1993	
Constitution.	The	chapter	includes	a	case	study	part	from	the	Murmansk	
city	administration,	the	material	for	which	was	collected	in	1993	and	2000.	
The	analysis	of	the	new	local	administration	culture	relies	on	the	Murmansk	
study	as	an	example	of	the	present	situation.	
    
 
6.1 The Political Ideology of Administrative 
Change: From Regionalism to Conservative 
Constitutionalism in Local Administration
In	1991	 there	 existed	 rather	 loose,	 and	quickly	 formed	programs	 for	 the	
leading	political	forces,	who	were	trying	to	place	themselves	on	the	political	
map	of	the	rapidly	changing	state.	Since	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	
the	party	structure	of	Russia	has	eluded	strict	borders	and	steady	programs.	
The	present	Russian	parties	are	mostly	a	collection	of	coalitions	where	more	
or	 less	similarly	thinking	personalities	have	a	common	figurehead.	These	
coalitions	have	most	of	all	been	formed	to	gain	popular	support	in	immediate	
elections.	Instead	of	permanent	programs,	the	coalitions	of	the	early	1990´s	
can	 be	 categorized	 as	 representing	 broad	 views	 towards	 the	 reformist	
policies	taken	in	the	early	transition	period.	
One	way	of	looking	at	the	political	picture	after	the	1991	coup	attempt	is	
to	see	it	through	the	traditional	slavophiles-westernizers	division.	The	first	
group	 would	 include	 those	 forces	 which	 were	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 “eastern”	
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autocratic	governing	tradition,	while	the	second	group	would	include	those	
forces	in	favor	of	Western	liberal	reforms	in	government.	(Comp.	Campbell	
1992:	210.)	In	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s	ideas	about	the	“Russian	historical	
peculiarity”	or	“Russia´s	own	traditional	way”	were	one	side	of	the	debate	
about	Russia´s	 future	as	 a	 state.	Yet,	 these	discussions	were	not	 logically	
connected	 to	 the	 way	 different	 political	 groups	 viewed	 administrative	
culture.	 Individuals	 and	 political	 groups	 involved	 in	 government	 and	
administration	 had	 unlikely	 political	 goals	 in	 terms	 of	 developing	
administration	(comp.Campbell	1992).	
It	is	possible	to	categorize	the	political	coalitions	of	the	1990´s	in	several	
ways,	both	by	party	group	lines	or	according	to	the	general	political	ideas	
they	represent.	In	general	it	can	be	said	that	the	great	majority	of	political	
groups	 have	 supported	 the	 integration	 toward	 the	 liberal-democratic	
structures	of	the	West,	 in	which	the	state	and	society	are	in	separate	and	
legally	 bounded	 areas.	 The	 main	 distinctions	 regarding	 their	 views	 on	
administrative	reform	concern	its	impact	upon	the	strength	of	the	state	in	
terms	of	guidance,	control	and	leadership.	In	this	respect	at	least	five	main	
groups	can	be	found	(comp.	this	list	for	instance	with	Koval	et.	al	1991).	
The	first	is	“the	liberal	constitutional	state”	group,	which	includes	some	
social	 democratic	 thinking.	 It	 has	 advocated	 changes	 from	 below,	 anti-
communism,	 maintaining	 the	 welfare	 state	 more	 effectively,	 economic	
reform	toward	a	legally	controlled	market,	rule	of	law	administration	and	
anti-authoritarian	leadership	to	take	a	civil	society	to	the	negotiation	table.
The	second	group	is	“the	neoliberal	state”	group	(the	“Gaidarian	line”)	
which	advocates	shrinking	the	state	sector	and	the	advancement	of	private	
business	 instead	 of	 social	 welfare.	The	 administrative	 reform	 ideas	 have	
included	 a	major	 restructuring	 of	 the	 central	 apparatus,	 tax	 and	 export	
policy	reforms.	Included	in	this	group	were	the	early	liberals	who	advocated	
a	new	constitutional	basis	for	the	country,	court	and	prison	system	reforms	
and	direct	elections	for	president.	
The	 third	 group	 is	 “the	 conservative	 authoritarian	 state”	 group.	They	
have	supported	gradual	and	incremental	reform	of	the	earlier	system	from	
above	with	the	help	of	a	strong	center	and	presidential	system	of	government,	
state	 ownership	 of	 property	 being	 the	 economic	 priority.	 Logically	 this	
group	has	opposed	the	liberal-economic	reforms	and	advocated	wide	state	
programs	in	all	sectors	of	the	economy,	giving	priority	to	social	welfare	in	a	
mixed	economy	where	private	(mainly	small	scale)	entrepreneurship	was	to	
be	 allowed.	Of	 these	 coalitions,	 the	Communist	 party	 has	 remained	 the	
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only	nationally	important	force	throughout	the	1990´s.	It	had	a	ready	model	
of	 organization	 and	 programs	 which	 were	 not	 dependent	 on	 a	 singular	
figure	head.	The	ideas	of	rule	of	 law	state	and	civil	society	were	officially	
declared	 the	 aims	 of	 state	 building	 by	 the	 party	 in	 1990,	 but	 it	 remains	
unclear	what	the	interpretation	of	these	would	mean	in	the	tradition	of	the	
party.
The	fourth	group	is	“the	nationalist	state”	group,	the	most	notable	example	
of	which	has	been	the	Liberal-democratic	party	of	Vladimir	Zhirinovsky.	It	
supported	regional	independence	in	the	beginning	of	the	90´s	and	originally	
advocated	 a	 free	market	 with	 the	 state	 having	 a	 coordinator´s	 role.	 It	 is	
unclear	what	the	actual	meaning	of	nationalism	is	in	this	line.	Most	of	all,	it	
can	be	said	to	represent	one	type	of	a	populist	movement	whose	practical	
aim	is	to	attract	attention	to	different	issues	and	stay	in	parliament.
The	 fifth	 group,	 and	 the	 only	 group	which	 has	 been	 in	 constant	 flux	
compared	to	the	relative	stability	of	the	other	four,	is	what	I	would	call	“the	
legal	 reformist	 state”	 group.	 Since	 the	mid	 1990´s	 the	 conservative	 legal	
reformist	state	line	has	been	characterized	by	the	use	of	a	leading	figurehead.	
Examples	 of	 these	 loose	 coalitions	 are	 “Our	 home	 is	 Russia”	 by	 Viktor	
Chernomyrdin	in	1995	and	“Fatherland-	All	Russia”	by	Iurii	Luzhkov	and	
Evgenii	Primakov	in	1999.	President	Putin´s	campaign	coalition	can	also	
be	seen	in	this	group.
The	main	change	which	happened	within	this	group	is	connected	with	
the	 internal	 political	 confusion	 of	 the	 regionalization	 period	 in	 Russia.	
President	Eltsin´s	initial	liberal	reformist	policies	led	to	a	quick	shift	toward	
elitist	 (regionally	 authoritarian)	 political	 decision	 making	 in	 which	
leadership	was	settled	among	the	ruling	elite.	
As	a	reaction	to	the	political	and	economic	risks	created	by	the	early	and	
mid-1990´s,	this	group	has	since	represented	a	collection	of	ideas,	which	
have	stressed	the	need	for	a	strong	state,	central	administrative	control	and	
legislative	certainty.	The	political	legitimation	has	been	the	strengthening	of	
constitutional	 order	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 Russia,	 paradoxically	 sometimes	 by	
bending	 some	 of	 its	 own	 rules	 when	 necessary.	The	 state´s	 role	 in	 the	
coordination	of	legal	unity	has	been	raised	as	the	main	administrative	goal.	
Social	 concerns	 have	 again	 been	 raised,	 even	 as	 the	 economic	 side	 has	
received	the	main	attention.	Tax	collection	has	become	the	main	economic	
concern.	In	terms	of	economic	reforms,	there	has	been	an	attempt	to	gain	
back	 public	 control	 of	 economic	 development,	 even	 at	 the	 expense	 of	
democratic	processes.	
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It	should	be	noted	that	in	the	early	1991	official	program	papers	of	the	
then	existing	groupings,	 the	actual	role	of	 the	huge	Soviet	apparatus	was	
only	given	a	minor	mention,	or	none	at	all.	The	restructuring	of	the	state	
administration	was	touched	upon	only	by	the	liberal	and	neoliberal	groups	
who	wished	to	simplify	bureaucratic	barriers	 for	 industry	and	individual	
entrepreneurs	wishing	to	export	products.	(See	Koval	et.al	1991.)	
What	have	these	political	 ideas	meant?	At	 least	 they	show	that	 for	the	
most	part	of	the	1990´s	there	was	not	a	politically	thought	out	modernization	
plan	 for	 the	 state	 administration.	 The	 ideas	 of	 administrative	 change	
appeared	most	of	all	as	a	result	of	the	political	and	economic	fight	and	risks	
which	 were	 produced	 in	 this	 process.	 As	 Campbell	 has	 shown,	 in	 the	
beginning	of	the	1990´s	the	main	divisive	political	issue	among	the	different	
political	 blocks	 became	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 executive	 branch at	 all	
levels	of	 the	government	(Campbell	1992:	211).	State	and	administration	
became	important,	above	all,	as	a	means	to	order.
This	practical	battle	for	the	course	of	administration	went	on	in	a	situation	
where	 two	 major	 and	 parallel	 developments	 of	 society	 took	 place.	The	
social,	political	 and	economic	goals	were	 in	many	ways	 conflicting.	Two	
competing	 versions	 of	 social	 change	 existed:	 the	 drafting	 of	 the	 first	
Constitution	and	 the	privatization	program.	One	of	 the	 reasons	why	 the	
Constitution	project	can	be	named	as	a	political	change	program	is	that	it	
represented	 the	 only	 serious	 official	 and	 concerted	 alternative	 vision	 to	
privatization.	The	 latter	 was	 a	 foreign	 model	 in	 which	 the	 government	
would	adapt	to	the	changed	economic	conditions	of	the	society.	
But	the	choice	between	the	Constitution	and	privatization	program	has	
more	 meaning	 than	 that.	 There	 was	 a	 competition	 for	 political	 power	
between	the	government	and	the	Duma	which	were	trying	to	sort	out	the	
balance	 of	 the	 future	 state.	The	Constitution	was	 the	 first	 time	 that	 the	
citizens	took	a	direct	part	(even	if	only	formally)	in	the	adoption	of	central	
legislation.	Thus	the	Constitution	signifies	both	at	the	formal	legal	and	at	a	
symbolic	level	the	creation	of	a	new	state	–	by the people.	The	privatization	
program	on	the	other	hand	was	a	continuation	of	the	tradition	of	revolution	
from	above.
Privatization	 took	 off	 in	 the	middle	 of	 the	 political	 reorganization	 of	
authority	between	different	 institutions	 in	 the	Soviet	 time	administrative	
market.	The	program	became	an	attempt	at	cultural	revolution	in	Russian	
history	based	on	specific	ideas	as	to	the	nature	of	man	and	the	bureaucratic/
political	system	surrounding	him	in	a	society.	The	proclaimed	goal	was	to	
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achieve	irreversible	changes	in	these	social	relations	in	order	to	create	a	new	
way	of	 living	for	the	innately	existing	economic	needs	of	the	people.	The	
basis	 of	 the	 economic	 theory	 was	 founded	 in	 the	 belief	 of	 radical-
authoritarian	change	which	has	been	opposed	by	the	competing	theories	of	
democratic-gradual	reforms.	The	privatization	program	of	Russia	was	built	
not	 so	much	 on	 an	 ideal	 type	 of	 capitalist	 society	 than	 on	 its	 planners´	
assessment	of	the	nature	of	Soviet	society.	This	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	
way	the	state	was	seen	in	the	privatization	policies.	
The	political	goal	of	the	privatization	program	which	began	in	1991	was	
the	replacement	of	the	economic	bureaucracy	with	a	depolitized	economy.	
This	did	not	only	mean	replacing	the	command	system	of	the	party	with	
market	based	relations	in	production	and	services.	Critically,	it	also	meant	
the	creation	of	conditions	where	the	politicians	were	permanently	unable	to	
assume	leadership	in	the	Russian	economy.	(Boycko,	Shleifer	and	Vishny	
1995.)	 Explicitly,	 the	 privatization	 program	 developers	 did	 not	 want	 to	
proceed	from	the	reformation	of	the	existing	bureaucracy.	This	was	because	
even	as	they	acknowledged	the	possibility	of	the	appearance	of	effective	and	
public	 spirited	 bureaucracies,	 particularly	 at	 the	 local	 level	where	 public	
monitoring	is	direct,	this	in	their	view	was	a	very	rare	event.	Instead	they	
viewed	the	bureaucrats	in	Russia	as	people	who	were	filled	with	only	one	
ideology	–	“that	of	enriching	themselves”.	(Boycko	et	al.	1995:56–5.)	The	
ideological	and	theoretical	premis	of	 the	privatization	program,	officially	
aimed	at	building	a	new	foundation	of	society	on	a	growing	new	middle	
class	and	a	greatly	diminished	role	for	the	government.	In	Russian	politics,	
the	Prime	minister	Egor	Gaidar	took	it	upon	himself	and	his	government	to	
push	forward	the	policies	which	would	make	a	return	to	the	Soviet	Union	
difficult	(comp.	Bova	1999:25).	
The	analysis	of	the	program	and	the	following	events	by	the	American	
consultants	 themselves	 seems	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 ideal	 was	 a	 hardened	
version	 of	 the	 British	 privatization	 policies	 of	 the	 190´s.	 Deeper	
considerations	 for	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 cultural,	 social	 or	 political	
adaptations	 needed	 in	 the	 economic	 transition	 where	 intentionally	 left	
outside	and	the	focus	was	instead	the	selection	of	the	basic	requirements	for	
the	beginning	of	markets.	The	shock	therapy	was	meant	to	effect	changes	
before	the	political	opposition	of	it	could	organize	itself	to	reverse	them.	
The	contradiction	between	 the	privatization	program	perceptions	 and	
the	 new	 Constitution	 was	 sharp.	 The	 Constitution	 had	 two	 objectives:	
institution-building	and	legal	reform	(Sharlet	1999:2).	It	set	up	practical	
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tasks	for	both	the	state	and	subject	levels.	These	reflect	the	constitutional	
aim	of	making	the	Russian	state	a	social	state	in	which	authorities	should	
provide	the	citizens	with	different	types	of	services,	most	of	which	can	be	
given	at	the	local	levels.	These	services	include	the	organization	of	citizens´	
right	 to	 housing,	 free	medical	 care,	 social	 protection	 of	 different	 citizen	
groups	and	education	at	different	levels.	(Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	
1993:	40–41.)	
The	Constitution	also	builds	a	foundation	for	the	creation	of	a	rule	of	law	
state	 which	 has	 clearly	 regulated	 separate	 jurisdictions	 for	 different	
authorities	and	protection	of	individuals´	human	and	civil	rights,	including	
economic	rights.	In	principle	it	is	noteworthy	that	the	Constitution	gives	a	
single	person	the	right	to	take	authorities	to	court	in	cases	of	violations	of	
these	 and	 the	 above	 mentioned	 social	 rights	 (Konstitutsiia	 Rossiiskoi	
Federatsii	1993).	Instead	of	exposing	the	citizens	to	a	way	of	living	without	
the	totalitarian	state,	the	Constitution	sets	up	requirements	for	the	creation	
of	a	new	type	of	trust	between	citizens	and	a	reformist	state.	
Although	 the	 new	 Constitution	 laid	 down	 the	 legal	 structures	 of	 the	
state,	 constitutionalism	as	a	principle	of	administrative	guidance	did	not	
dominate	 Russian	 administration	 for	 some	 time.	 President	 Eltsin´s	
administrative	 ideology	 was	 the	 delegation	 of	 political	 and	 economic	
power	 to	 the	 regions	 in	 order	 to	 neutralize	 political	 opposition	 at	 the	
central	 level.	The	regionalization	period	coincided	with	 the	urgent	need	
for	major	legislative	reforms	and	structural	reorganizations	at	all	levels	of	
society.	As	a	consequence	of	this	choice,	a	multitude	of	side-effects	created	
new	risks.	
In	the	latter	part	of	the	1990´s	and	particularly	after	President	Putin	took	
over,	a	 type	of	“legalism	as	administrative	guidance”	has	bloomed	 in	 the	
official	administrative	ideology.	Instead	of	partisan	political	goals,	there	has	
been	an	attempt	to	assume	a	neutral,	professional	manner	which	underlines	
federal	laws	and	hierarchy	of	norms	in	official	decision	making.	The	other	
notable	effect	has	been	the	ways	organizations	finance	their	work.	The	local	
administration	 has	 begun	 to	 use	 its	 own	 initiative	 to	 find	 partners	 for	
projects	 which	 has	 effected	 the	 logic	 of	 work.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 “the	
dictatorship	of	law”	side	of	this	legalism	has	meant	concentration	on	control	
as	a	means	of	policy	guidance.	Regionalism	has	been	replaced	with	legalism	
which	 requires	 political	 control	 via	 the	 centralization	 of	 policy	making.	
Building	 a	 strong	 and	 effective	 sense	 of	 state	 has	 been	 reinforced	 as	 the	
central	political	purpose	of	changes.	In	this	way,	the	re-enforcement	of	the	
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executive	rule	and	centralized	policy	control	have	again	become	important	
in	the	administrative	ideology.	
In	 the	 course	 of	 the	 1990´s	 changes,	 a	 new	 and	 institutionally	 very	
important	source	of	administrative	ideology	has	emerged	in	the	form	of	the	
international	treaties	which	Russia	has	joined.	The	most	important	of	these	
include	 the	 treaty	of	 the	Council	 of	Europe	 (1993)	 and	 the	Cooperation	
with	 the	 European	Union	 (199).	 Russia´s	 interest	 in	 joining	 the	World	
Trade	 Organization	 has	 also	 played	 an	 important	 part	 in	 legal	 and	
administrative	 change	 processes.	 Legally	 international	 agreements	 take	
precedent	over	national	 law	 in	cases	of	conflict.	By	signing	and	ratifying	
international	agreements,	the	ideas	of	rule	of	law,	a	legally	protected	market	
economy	and	modern	administrative	practices	have	been	strengthened	as	
purposes	of	change.	In	ratifying	the	above	mentioned	treaties,	the	Russian	
Federation	has	officially	accepted	and	committed	its	government	to	work	
toward	the	unification	of	a	common	European	market	(e.g.	dismantling	of	
trade	barriers,	legal	protection	for	enterprises	and	investments	etc.)	and	a	
rule	 of	 law	 state	 (e.g.	 civil	 and	 human	 rights,	 separation	 of	 powers,	
independent	legal	system,	legal	protection	of	citizenry)	and	the	formation	
of	 institutional	 authority	 for	 local	 government.	 Constitutionalism	 as	 an	
ideology	and	these	goals	come	together	as	purposes	of	change.	
For	 the	 local	 administration,	 all	 the	above	mentioned	elements	 in	 the	
administrative	 ideology	 of	 change	 have	most	 of	 all	 meant	 challenges	 of	
modernization,	re-education	and	financing.	The	new	purposes	which	have	
emerged	in	a	very	short	period	of	time	also	provide	the	incentive	for	being	
able	to	affect	local	development	with	legal	and	institutional	tools.	Thus,	at	
the	 level	of	 transitional	purposes,	change	of	administrative	culture	at	 the	
municipal	level	is	a	transformation	process	into	a	more	authoritative	legal	
actor	–	an	administration	in	its	own	right.	
6.2 Structural Changes: State Building Since 1991
State	building	 at	 the	 local	 level	 took	place	within	 three	main	 avenues	of	
development.	Firstly,	the	legislative	and	political	developments	of	the	local	
and	 regional	 institutions	 of	 the	 representative	 administration	 after	 the	
disappearance	of	the	political	administration.	Secondly,	the	major	restruc-
turing	of	the	local	economic	administration.	Thirdly,	the	development	of	the	
Russian	law,	the	control	administration	and	new	international	obligations.	
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These	three	avenues	of	development	came	together	as	the	revised	political	
ideology	of	administrative	change	which	has	taken	shape	under	President	
Putin´s	rule.	Moreover	Putin´s	rule	can	be	seen	as	a	reaction	to	the	risks	
posed	 by	 the	 side-effects	 of	 the	 first	 two	 administrative	 developments.	
Officially,	though,	the	justification	for	the	review	of	the	political	ideology	of	
administrative	change	has	been	the	protection	and	further	advancement	of	
the	third	aspect	of	the	structural	change.
Yet	 legislative	 reforms	 of	 the	 local	 administration	 had	 already	 started	
during	the	perestroika years.	Before	the	adoption	of	the	new	Constitution,	
the	 Law	 on	 Local	 Self-Government	 in	 the	 RSFSR	 adopted	 in	 July	 1991	
defined	the	authority	of	the	local	bodies	in	the	administrative	market.	The	
law	described	local	power	as	belonging	to	local	geographical	entities,	such	
as	cities	and	villages.	Within	their	limits	the	city	soviets	could	adopt	their	
own	rules	of	local	self-government,	which	should	be	registered	by	the	state	
authority	of	the	specific	area,	and	annulled	only	if	their	contradicted	existing	
state	 law.	The	 law	 gave	 superior	 bodies	 (regional	 soviets	 and	 executive	
committees)	as	well	as	the	courts	the	right	to	annul	the	decisions	of	local	
bodies	 in	 case	 these	 contradicted	 the	 laws	of	 the	RSFSR	or	 its	 republics.	
(Piskotin	1993:	9–.)	As	important,	however,	for	the	actual	development	
of	local	level	representative	authority	became	the	political	developments	at	
the	regional	level.	
At	the	regional	level	(oblast)	the	loyalty	of	the	different	regions	in	the	
days	 of	 the	 coup	 to	 the	 legal	 center	 came	 to	 be	 a	 decisive	 factor	 in	 the	
future	 selection	 of	 leaders	 and	 staff.	 Boris	 Eltsin	 decided	 to	 protect	 the	
position	 of	 his	 government	 in	 the	 provinces	with	 the	 decree	 of	August	
1991	 (no.	 5	 “Of	 Some	 Questions	 Concerning	 the	 Functioning	 of	 the	
Executive	 Bodies	 in	 the	 RSFSR”)	 which	 installed	 a	 system	 of	 executive	
vertical	authority	in	regional	decision	making.	The	executive	functions	of	
federal	government	in	the	regions	would	be	led	by	a	head	of	administration	
who	was	to	be	named	by	the	president	with	the	consent	of	the	respective	
Soviet.	A	 following	 law	 installed	 the	 institution	of	 small	 councils	 in	 the	
local	soviets,	continually	working	regional	and	territorial	(oblast and	krai)	
bodies	consisting	of	1/5	of	the	deputies	corpus.	In	an	attempt	to	increase	
the	 professional	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 soviets,	 these	 new	 bodies	 assumed	
most	of	the	authority	the	soviets	had,	excluding	budget	and	staff	decisions.	
Typical	 for	 the	 practical	 relations	 of	 the	 small	 councils	 with	 the	
administration	 was	 that	 some	 of	 the	 same	 people	 were	 found	 in	 them	
(Luchterhandt	1995:	32).
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In	these	developments,	the	“revolutionary”	local	democracy	was	replaced	
by	 the	strengthening	of	 the	executive	office	and	 the	administrative	 inner	
circle	which	surrounded	the	leadership	of	Russian	cities.	The	shift	toward	
one-man	rule	was	 led	by	democratically	elected	reformers	such	as	Eltsin	
himself,	Gavril	Popov	of	Moscow	and	Anatolii	Sobchak	of	St.Petersburg.	
The	political	transition	to	a	new	administration	offers	an	interesting	case	
study	 in	 how	 old	 vocabulary	 become	 useless	 in	 transitions	 and	 how	 its	
traditional	use	leads	to	misunderstandings	and	new	risks.	In	Russia´s	case,	
certain	word	pairs	which	dominated	political	and	economic	discussions	led	
to	international	misunderstanding	of	what	was	meaningful	both	politically	
and	 economically.	 These	 word	 pairs	 included	 at	 least	 the	 following:	
reformist-pluralist,	 communist-autocrat,	 democratic-liberal.	 The	 transi-
tional	developments	made	the	accurate	use	of	these	labels	difficult	mostly	
because	 the	 new	 establishment	 formed	 in	 the	 1990	 elections	 and	 in	 the	
mayoral	 elections	 afterwards,	 and	 which	 was	 officially	 democratic	 and	
reformist,	 included	 persons	 of	 different	 political	 backgrounds	 and	 soon	
advocated	strong	executive	rule	(Campbell	1992:	211–212).	
The	August	coup	of	1991	signified	a	final	 turning	point	 in	 the	center-
regional-local	relations.	In	comparison	with	other	former	socialist	countries,	
former	members	 of	 the	 party	 stayed	 in	 their	 positions,	 even	 though	 the	
formal	 organizational	 guidance	 and	 planning	 system	 was	 gone.	 In	 the	
politically	 turbulent	 times,	 the	 central	 government	 concentrated	 on	
consolidation	of	its	own	political	power	in	the	regions.	The	naming	of	the	
head	of	 administration,	 the	 institution	of	presidential	 representative	 and	
the	tight	control	of	economic	processes	served	the	same	political	purposes	
of	preventing	the	independence	of	regions	and	stopping	the	provinces	from	
siding	 with	 the	 Parliament	 in	 the	 constitutional	 battles	 being	 fought	 in	
Moscow	(Luchterhandt	1995:	32).
The	institution	of	the	presidential	representative	(in	the	territory,	region,	
autonomous	region	and	autonomous	area,	as	well	as	the	cities	of	Moscow	
and	St.Petersburg)	which	was	confirmed	by	the	President	in	1992,	meant	
setting	 up	 an	 office	 of	 supervision	 accountable	 only	 to	 the	 President	
himself.(Sheremet	1993:	103.)	The	main	task	of	the	representative	was	to	
ensure	that	the	local	legislation	was	compatible	with	federal	laws.	He	had	
access	to	local	administration	documents	and	could	also	recommend	the	
dismissal	of	local	officials	who	were	not	in	line	with	the	national	policies.	In	
addition,	he	could	appoint	and	dismiss	department	heads	of	the	local	soviet	
executive	 committees,	 reorganize	 these	 departments	 and	 veto	 their	
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decisions.	 Yet,	 the	 representative	 was	 not	 to	 interfere	 in	 local	 decision	
making	or	issue	orders	for	a	certain	territory.	(Sakwa	1996:12.)	
In	a	 sense	and	 in	comparison	with	 the	Soviet	 system,	 the	presidential	
representative	 replaced	 the	 oblast	 level	 first	 secretary,	 although	 his	
jurisdiction	was	more	limited	and	he	did	not	take	part	in	local	level	decision	
making.	 Similarly	 the	 representative	 supplemented	 the	 authority	 of	 the	
prosecutor´s	office	which	was	to	be	less	political	in	the	future.	Yet	his	post	
was	not	only	 to	be	an	official	controller	of	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	regional	
decisions	 but	 also	 to	 see	 that	 the	 government´s	 economic	 policies	 were	
carried	 through	 in	 the	 intended	 way.	 In	 this	 capacity,	 the	 presidential	
representative	 also	 greatly	 resembled	 the	 commissariats	 performing	 the	
political	supervisory	role	in	the	early	Bolshevik	government.	The	institution	
of	presidential	representative	continued	the	tradition	of	quickly	established	
control	and	guidance	organizations	with	“outside”	functions.	
Resembling	the	191	revolutionary	developments	when	the	Bolshevik	
government	 needed	 both	 the	 old	 structures	 and	 the	 expertise	 of	 tsarist	
officials,	the	new	mayors	needed	the	professionals	of	the	former	executive	
committees	and	the	industrial	managers	of	the	economic	bureaucracy	to	
pursue	changes.	The	political	struggle	which	emerged	in	cities	and	regions	
was	 less	 traditionally	 political	 and	 more	 institutional.	This	 was	 so,	 for	
example,	in	defining	authority	limits,	economic	relations	and	the	political	
guidance	 of	 developments	 between	 institutions,	 rather	 than	 defining	 a	
clear	political	line	of	“democracy”,	“reformist	western	line”	or	other	such	
thing.	 In	 addition,	 the	 picture	 was	 confused	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 persons	
representing	 “anti-western”	 blocks	 and	more	 conservative	 views	 did,	 in	
many	cases,	oppose	 the	strong	executive	rule	 in	 favor	of	elected	organs.	
(Campbell	1992:	212.)
In	 March	 1992,	 just	 before	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 Federative	 Treaty,	 the	
parliament	accepted	a	law	concerning	“The	District,	County	Soviet	and	the	
District,	County	Administration”.	This	ordered	the	double	subordination	of	
the	 regional	 head	 to	 both	 the	 soviet	 and	 President	 of	 Russia,	 and	 the	
subordination	of	the	administration	to	the	soviet	and	head	of	region.	The	
soviet	was	given	a	right	to	appeal	the	decisions	of	the	head	in	a	court	of	law,	
as	well	as	a	possibility	to	ask	the	President	of	the	Constitutional	court	to	
dismiss	the	head	of	administration.	The	head	of	the	administration	on	his	
part	was	given	a	right	to	veto	the	decisions	of	the	soviet	which	were	won	
with	a	simple	majority	of	the	votes.	Conflicts	between	the	two	institutions	
could	be	decided	not	only	by	the	President	or	the	supreme	soviet,	but	also	
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by	 courts.	 (Gelman	 199:	 95.)	This	 decision	was	meant	 to	 help	 ease	 the	
tense	situations	which	had	risen	at	the	time	when	the	regional	heads	were	
still	named	by	the	President.	It	certainly	certainly	lifted	the	weight	of	the	
regional	elected	representatives	as	well	as	the	role	of	the	central	assembly	in	
Moscow.	The	regions	were	thus	brought	more	closely	under	parliamentary	
regulation	and	vertical	control	was	tightened.	
In	 1993	 a	 decree	 was	 passed	 on	 October	 2	 governing	 the	 election	
regulations	and	the	formations	of	legislative	bodies.	The	regions	were	given	
a	right	 to	make	decisions	on	 these	questions	at	 the	regional	 (oblast)	and	
town	 levels	 in	 line	 with	 the	 general	 regulations.	 The	 officials	 from	 the	
administration	 could	 now	 take	 part	 in	 the	 elections,	 and	 stay	 in	 their	
positions	if	elected.	(Gelman	199:	9.)
According	 to	 Vladimir	 Gelman´s	 analysis	 the	 most	 notable	 of	 these	
changes	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 the	 administration	 were	 at	 least	 the	
following:	
•	 the	 right	 to	 combine	 the	 works	 in	 legislative	 and	 administrative	
bodies,
•	 hierarchical	subordination	of	the	executive	power	and	the	inability	
of	 the	 assembly	 to	 control	 the	 personnel	 policy	 of	 the	
administration,
•	 the	reduction	of	the	assembly´s	rights	to	create	legal	norms,
•	 the	inability	of	the	assembly	to	take	sanctions	against	the	heads	of	
regions	[the	governors]	and	the	administration	(Gelman	199:	9).
The	strengthening	of	the	executive´s	role	at	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s	was	
administratively	justified,	similar	to	the	delegation	of	power	to	the	regions.	
It	was	 intended	 to	prevent	 the	 interest	groups	 from	the	old	regime	 from	
sabotaging	the	reforms	and	keeping	the	new	representatives	from	slowing	
down	administrative	efficiency	and	the	building	of	new	institutional	power.	
A	strong	mayor	who	was	directly	elected	was	considered	the	best	way	to	
bring	order	to	the	local	level	and	to	take	needed	action	within	the	budget	
which	the	council	had	decided.	(Campbell	1992:	213–214.)	
The	 early	 years	 of	 the	 1990´s	 gave	 birth	 to	 a	 local	 level	 which	 was	
structurally	 diverse.	 In	 over	 3.000	 local	 governments	 the	 head	 of	 the	
administration	was	also	a	member	of	the	soviet	and,	in	practice,	worked	as	
its	chairman.	An	extreme	case	of	unity	was	in	the	Kaluzhkoi	oblast	where	
all	the	49	heads	of	local	units	were	also	deputies.	(Tsentralnaia	izbiratelnaia	
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komissiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199:	.)	In	effect,	this	new	administrative	
elite	had	much	of	the	same	formal	position	as	members	of	the	representative	
administration	in	the	Soviet	government.
In	these	circumstances,	the	new	Constitution	of	the	Russian	Federation	
was	 accepted	 in	 the	 general	 elections	 in	 December	 1993.	 It	 divides	 the	
federation	into	six	types	of	subjects	of	the	federation:	the	republics,	the	krai	
(territorial	level),	the	regional	level	(oblast),	cities	with	federal	importance,	
autonomous	oblasts	and	autonomous	okrugs	all	of	which	are	equal	subjects	
of	 the	 federation.	 Of	 the	 9	 subjects	 two	 are	 cities	 (Moscow	 and	 St.	
Petersburg)	 in	 which	 the	 administration	 of	 the	 subject	 and	 the	 town	 is	
joined	under	the	governor	who	is	elected	by	direct	vote.	The	status	of	the	
different	subjects	is	specified	by	both	the	Constitution	of	the	federation	and	
by	the	charters	(the	area	ustav)	of	 the	different	subjects	of	 the	federation	
which	 have	 been	 accepted	 by	 representative	 organs	 of	 the	 subject.	The	
change	 in	 the	 status	 of	 a	 particular	 subject	 can	 be	 achieved	 by	 mutual	
agreement	between	the	state	and	the	subject.	On	the	other	hand,	the	borders	
between	two	different	subjects	can	be	changed	by	an	agreement	between	
them	alone.	(Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	1993:	5,	66–6.)	
The	main	features	of	the	government	structure	of	the	Russian	Federation 
are	shown	in	annex	E	which	is	my	illustration	of	the	system.	In	annex	E	one	
can	also	see	that	the	structure	of	the	Russian	government	is	based	on	the	
separation	of	powers	which	is	the	major	difference	in	comparison	to	all	the	
previous	government	structures	(in	annexes	A-D)	in	Russian	history.	The	
government	 includes	 the	 federal	government,	 the	co-operational	or	 joint	
government	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	subjects	of	the	federation,	
and	 the	 local	 self-government.	The	Constitution	 lists	 the	 tasks	 related	 to	
each	category	of	government	which	form	the	real	limits	of	power	in	each	
area	of	government.	The	practical	decision	making	possibilities	of	the	local	
level	in	the	Constitution	is	formulated	more	by	the	description	of	the	joint	
government	level	than	by	its	own	constitutional	outline.	It	is	further	noted	
that	outside	of	 this	 joint	government,	 the	subjects	enjoy	 full	 state	power.	
(Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	1993:2–3.)
The	President	leads	the	executive	side	in	all	parts	of	Russia.	In	this	role	
he	is,	in	very	concrete	terms,	a	decision	maker	in	the	administration	at	all	
levels.	The	President	can	suspend	a	decision	by	a	subject´s	administration	
which	is	in	contradiction	with	the	Constitution	and	the	federal	laws	even	
before	 a	 court	 decision.	The	use	 of	 presidential	 decrees	 (ukazy)	 and	 the	
policy	of	“dictatorship	of	law”	show	that	this	position	is	a	cornerstone	of	the	
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present	Russian	presidency,	although	 it	 involves	aspects	which	can	be	 in	
contradiction	with	 the	 separation	 of	 powers.	The	President	 has	 his	 own	
administration	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 his	 decrees.	
Despite	its	influence	on	legislation,	this	administration	is	not	mentioned	in	
the	Constitution.
In	2004,	further	central	government	reform	took	place.	Before	the	2004	
central	government	reform,	structural	hierarchies	mainly	stayed	the	same	
as	 they	 were	 before	 the	 Constitution.	 Ministries	 are	 director-led	
organizations,	 of	 which	 the	 so-called	 power	 ministries	 (at	 present	 the	
Defense,	 Foreign	 and	 Internal	 Affairs,	 Justice	 and	 Emergency	 situations	
ministries)	together	with	administrations	of	this	group	are	directly	under	
the	leadership	of	the	President.	The	other	ministries	and	agencies	are	led	by	
the	government.	The	2004	central	government	reforms	reduced	the	number	
of	ministries	and	central	committees	and	commission.	Some	of	the	latter	
went	through	a	change	in	status,	such	as	the	Committee	on	Customs	which	
became	 a	 branch	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Economic	 development	 and	 Trade.	
(Ukaz	 prezidenta,	 N	 0649,	 20.4.2004,	 Postonovlenie	 Ministerstva	
ekonomicheskoi	razvitiia	i	torgovly	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	N	1,	6.4.2004.)	
In	daily	work,	the	legal	work	done	by	the	ministries	is	important.	Ministerial	
subordinate	legislation	(regulations	and	instructions)	is	enforced	everywhere	
in	 Russia.	 The	 Supreme	 Constitutional	 Court	 decides	 whether	 the	
regulations	of	a	lower	administrative	body	or	the	ministry	are	right.	
Before	 the	2004	reforms,	 the	 federal	 level	had	a	multitude	of	different	
committees,	 commissions	 and	 federal	 agencies	 which	were	 independent	
expert	organizations	and	which	were	in	existence	during	the	Soviet	period.	
These	 too	 had	 regulative	 power	 in	 their	 respective	 field.	 An	 example	 is	
Gosstandart which	was	a	federal	administration	for	issuing	certificates	of	
approval	and	product	testing.	Its	work	was	regulated	very	loosely	by	federal	
laws	and	it	made	it	own	rules	about	standards	which	are	binding	everywhere	
in	Russia	(Federal´nyi	zakon	o	sertifikatsii	produktsii	i	uslug,	10.6.1993,	No	
5153–1,	Gosudartsvennii	komitet	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	po	standardizatsii	i	
metrologii:	 Pravilo	 po	 provedeniiu	 sertifikatsii	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii,	
utverzdeni	postonovleniem	Gosstandardta	Rossii	ot	10.5.2000,	No	26.)
In	 the	 subjects	 there	 are	 central	 administration	 organs	 and	 agencies	
which	are	 extensions	of	 their	parent	organizations.	 In	 addition	 there	 are	
“joint	administration”	organizations	which,	according	to	the	Constitution,	
are	cooperative	organizations	of	the	subject	and	the	state.	An	example	is	the	
Department	of	 the	Ministry	of	 Internal	Affairs	 in	 the	St.	Petersburg	and	
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Leningrad	 area.	The	 structure	 and	 functions	 of	 these	 organizations	 are	
regulated	via	a	contract	between	the	state	and	the	subject.	
Today	 the	 legislative	 power,	 the	Lower	 (Duma)	 and	Upper	Chambers	
(Federation	Council)	of	the	parliament,	makes	the	core	of	legislative	input	
in	the	Russian	Federation.	The	Federation	Council	plays	an	important	part	
in	monitoring	the	national	budget	and	approving	legislation.	It	has	consisted	
of	regional	governors	and	chairmen	of	assemblies,	and	two	representatives	
from	each	subject	of	the	federation.	As	it	is	not	organized	according	to	party	
lines,	its	political	power	has	rested	on	the	shoulders	of	strong	individuals	
who	 lobby	 regional	 interests.	 In	 this	 sense,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 the	
Federation	Council	has	acted	as	a	stabilizing	force	in	the	state	politics.	At	
the	same	time,	it	has	had	a	right	to	veto	legislation	which	has	in	some	way	
threatened	the	corporate	interests	of	the	regions.	(Sakwa	2000:	24.)
The	 public	 administrations	 of	 the	 federal	 subjects	 have	many	matters	
which	are	decided	upon	jointly	by	the	state	and	the	subjects.	The	federal	
level	enacts	the	basic	legislation	and	the	subjects	add	to	it	its	own	regulations	
in	 accordance	 with	 the	 federal	 laws.	 This	 system	 of	 joint	 government	
includes	a	united	structure	of	executive	power	at	all	levels	of	the	federation.	
At	the	same	time,	the	subjects	can	“outside	of	the	limits	of	joint	government”	
enact	their	own	regulations.	Particularly	important	in	this	sense	is	the	mention	
of	 conflict	 between	 a	 federal	 law	 and	 a	 regulation	 enacted	 by	 the	 subject	
outside	of	the	joint	government.	In	these	situations	the	Constitution	favors	
the	subject´s	decision.	(Konstitutsiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	1993:	6-	.)
In	the	course	of	the	1990´s	and	the	beginning	of	the	new	century	three	
levels	of	legislative	input	have	emerged.	At	the	federal	level	the	Constitution	
and	 federal	 laws	 serve	as	 the	basis	of	 local	decision	making.	Within	 this	
level,	the	ukazes	or	decrees	of	the	President	(which	according	to	law	should	
not	contradict	the	Constitution	or	federal	laws)	form	the	third	important	
source	 of	 normative	 regulation.	 (Dimitrieva	 2000:	 6–2.)	 The	 early	
transition	 period	 in	 particular,	 up	 till	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 present	 1993	
Constitution	when	 normal	 legislative	work	was	 seriously	 disrupted,	 saw	
many	 such	 presidential	 orders	 by	 which	 major	 structural	 changes	 were	
enacted.	
The	Constitution	is	not	exhaustive	in	its	character.	It	is	specified	by	other	
federal	 laws,	of	which	 the	Civil	Code	 is	among	 the	most	 important.	The	
Civil	Code	reveals	for	instance	the	content	of	property	rights.	(Tolonen	and	
Topornin	 2001:19.)	 In	 the	 group	 of	 federal	 laws	 which	 specify	 the	
Constitution	there	are	three	types	of	legislative	acts.	Firstly	there	are	federal	
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laws	of	the	Duma.	Second,	federal	laws	given	by	the	government	(in	totality),	
and	third,	 federal	regulations	which	are	orders	of	a	sectoral	ministry.	All	
have	the	same	authoritative	meaning	in	the	guidance	of	administration.	
At	the	regional	(subject	of	federation)	level,	four	types	of	sources	can	be	
found.	Firstly,	 the	Constitutions	of	 republics	 and	charters	of	other	 lower	
level	subjects	defining	the	meaning	and	jurisdiction	of	local	self-government.	
Second,	 there	 exist	 laws	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 subjects	 concerning	 the	
organization	 of	 local	 self-government,	 which	 are	 followed	 by	 local	
regulations	 about	 the	 most	 important	 legal	 relations	 in	 municipalities.	
Finally,	there	are	the	regulations	of	different	institutions	such	as	the	decisions	
of	 legislative	 assemblies	 of	 republics,	 orders	 of	 heads	of	 administrations,	
and	sentences	of	constitutional	courts	within	the	jurisdiction	of	the	subjects.	
(Dimitrieva	2000:	3–6.)
The	formation	of	new	authority	at	the	regional	and	local	levels	reached	
an	important	stage	in	the	1995	law	on	“The	structuring	of	the	Federation	
Council	 of	 the	 Federal	 Assembly	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation”.	 The	 first	
elections	 for	governors	which	 took	place	 in	 the	 fall-winter	1996	meant	a	
chance	(but	not	without	problems)	for	the	population	to	freely	choose	the	
direction	of	the	subjects.	It	also	gave	the	governors	themselves	a	legitimate	
position	and,	in	principle,	a	role	separate	from	the	appointment	politics	of	
the	 President.	 Their	 relations	 changed	 from	 merely	 administrative	 to	
independently	 political	 with	 the	 emphasis	 on	 regional	 issues.	 (Gelman	
199:	100–101,	Rossiia:	Monitoring,	analiz,	prognoz	1996,	no.	6:15.)	
The	formulation	of	the	nature	of	local	self-government	was	left	open	in	
the	1993	Constitution.	There	is	no	mention	of	the	separation	of	powers	and	
the	local	level	can	itself	freely	decide	the	construction	and	relations	of	its	
decision	making	 powers.	This	 power	 has	 in	 fact	 been	 put	 to	 use	 by	 the	
localities.	 (Shugrina	 199:	 15.)	 In	 this	 sense	 the	Constitution	 treats	 the	
whole	issue	of	the	forms	of	local	operation	as	a	question	of	self-government.	
At	the	same	time,	the	lack	of	essential	legislation,	most	of	all	the	Land	Code,	
have	put	the	local	level	in	a	waiting	position.	The	constitutional	rights	for	
local	decision	making	have	existed	but	the	operational	tools	for	its	full	use	
for	the	benefit	of	the	local	economy	have	not.	
Throughout	the	1990´s	the	position	and	role	of	local	government	have	
been	complicated	by	the	structure	of	the	state	itself.	The	regional	level	has	
exerted	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 influence	 and	 direct	 decision	making	
power	over	communities	in	its	role	as	a	mediator	between	state	and	local	
interests.	At	the	local	level,	the	region	(subject)	has	represented	the	state.	
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One	example	of	the	regional-local	relationship	is	the	question	of	a	suitable	
level	for	self-government.	In	many	cases	actual	self-government	has	been	
established	only	at	the	lowest	level	of	communities	such	as	villages.	Often	
this	decision	is	a	result	of	discussion	and	is	not	based	on	a	law.	This	makes	
its	authoritative	foundation	questionable	and	creates	problems	for	the	legal	
protection	of	the	inhabitants	whose	lives	are	affected.	(Gribanova	2001.)
The	local	government	is	supposed	to	handle	matters	of	local	significance,	
as	well	as	the	administration,	use	and	distribution	of	municipal	land.	The	
local	organs	have	a	right	to	draw	budgets	and	establish	taxes	and	payments	
at	 their	 own	 discretion.	 The	 local	 organs	 can	 be	 given	 particular	 state	
authorities	with	material	and	financial	resources	to	accomplish	given	tasks.	
The	practical	 realization	of	 this	process	will	 then	be	under	 state	 control.	
Moreover,	the	local	government	has	the	right	to	take	its	cases	to	court	and	
to	receive	compensation	for	extra	expenses	incurred	as	a	result	of	the	state´s	
decisions	prohibiting	the	organization	of	self-government	according	to	the	
Constitution	 and	 federal	 laws.	 The	 actions	 and	 decisions	 of	 the	 local	
government	itself	can	also	be	tried	in	a	court	of	law.	In	a	clear	departure	
from	the	Soviet	era	constitutions,	the	Constitution	of	the	present	era	gives	
the	municipalities	a	right	to	own	land	and	natural	resources.	In	addition,	it	
is	 separately	mentioned	 that	 the	 use	 and	 protection	 of	 land	 and	 natural	
resources	 of	 a	 certain	 area	 are	 regarded	 as	 “the	 basis	 of	 existence	 and	
activity”	of	the	people	in	that	area.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	these	
very	issues	also	belong	to	the	competence	of	the	previously	mentioned	joint	
government	of	state	and	the	subjects	of	the	federation.	The	joint	government	
handles	the	decisions	concerning	the	use	of	waters,	land	and	other	natural	
resources,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 administrative	 legislation	 concerning	 ecology.	
(Konstitutsiia	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii	 1993,	 Luchterhandt	 1995:	 35–3,	
Tekoniemi	199:	20.)
The	legal	basis	of	local	government	developed	further	with	the	ratification	
by	the	Russian	Federation	of	the	European	Council	treaty	about	Local	Self-
Government	in	199.	Even	before	this,	the	Federal	Law	on	Local	Government	
(1995)	laid	down	the	rules	for	all	significant	aspects	of	local	level	decision	
making	and	execution.	Within	its	geographical	boundaries,	a	municipality	
has	the	right	to	enact	 its	own	local	 laws	and	rules	 in	accordance	with	its	
own	charter.	In	the	charter	the	following	issues	are	regulated:
•	 definition	 for	 local	 self-government,	 its	 territorial	 and	 legislative	
base,	including	local	constitutions
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•	 rights	of	citizens	to	take	part	in	local	self-government,	direct	forms	
of	participation	of	citizens
•	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 state	 and	 regional	 authorities	 in	 local	 self-
government
•	 organs	of	local	government	and	the	local	officials,	their	responsibility	
and	control.	
•	 financial-economic	base,	state	support.	
(Federal´nyi	 zakon	 ob	 obshchikh	 printsipakh	 organizatsii	 mestnogo	
samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii,	12.	avgusta	1995/26.noiabraia	1996	
i	1.	marta	199.)
A	 federal	 program	 of	 state	 support	 for	 local	 self-government	 was	 also	
launched	the	same	year	with	a	governmental	decree.	Its	aim	was	to	help	the	
transition	 from	 the	 centrally	 led	 system	 to	 a	 more	 independent	 local	
government.	Attention	was	given	to	the	qualifications	of	the	administrative	
work	 force,	 the	 separation	 of	 state	 and	 local	 funds,	 the	 role	 of	 local	
communities	 in	 the	privatization	of	municipal	property	 and	 the	 right	of	
localities	 to	 allocate	 land.	 (Postonovlenie	 o	 federalnoi	 programme	
gosudarstvennoi	 podderzki	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 2.12.1995,	 No	
1251.)	With	both	the	program	and	the	federal	law,	the	state	attempted	to	
secure	the	legal	rights	of	the	much	needed	local	executive.	
The	fact	that	the	local	self-government	was	loosely	regulated	by	federal	
law,	 diversification	 of	 the	 formations	 and	 authorities	 of	 the	 local	 level	
appeared.	 According	 to	 the	 analysis	 made	 by	 the	 Central	 Election	
Commission	of	the	Russian	Federation,	there	were	several	points	in	which	
the	 approximately	 13.300	 (by	 1st	 of	 June	 199)	 local	 governments	 have	
differed	significantly.	These	included:
•	 The	enactment	of	the	charters	which	had	usually	been	done	by	the	
representative	 organ,	 but	 in	 the	 case	 of	 16	 subjects	 by	 way	 of	
referendum	 (for	 instance	 the	 oblast	 of	 Murmansk,Leningrad,	
Arkhangel,	Saratov	and	Sverdlovsk).
•	 The	city	district	level	in	the	bigger	towns	and	cities	of	regional	and	
federal	 significance	has	 in	 some	 cases	had	 its	 own	 legislative	 (e.g.	
Murmansk),	 and	 administrative	 organs	 and	 in	 other	 cases	 a	 city	
district	has	been	subordinated	to	the	elected	mayor.	
•	 The	 heads	 of	 administrations	 have	 either	 been	 elected	 in	 direct	
elections	 or	 chosen	 by	 the	 assembly	 among	 its	members	 (e.g.	 the	
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Novosibirsk,	Saratovsky	and	Smolensky	regions.)	In	59	subjects	the	
mayor	has	been	chosen	in	direct	and	secret	elections,	usually	for	a	
period	of	four	years.
(Tsentral´naia	izbiratel´naia	komissiia	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199:	5–.)
The	 legislature	 in	 some	areas	has	 included	 in	 local	 self-government	only	
major	 cities	 and	 rural	 districts	 (for	 instance	 the	 Ulianovskaia	 and	
Belgorodskaia	 regions)	 and	 smaller	 towns	 and	 villages	 have	 belonged	 to	
the	jurisdiction	of	the	district	administrations.	At	the	other	extreme,	there	
have	been	cases	where	the	big	cities	and	rural	areas	do	not	belong	to	this	
category	at	all.	Instead,	local	self-government	has	been	organized	only	in	
the	small	towns	and	villages	(e.g.	Tatarstan,	Bashkortostan).	(Reznitsenko	
199:166,	Vasiljev	&	Peshin	199.)	The	formulation	of	a	proper	role	for	the	
local	government	has	come	down	to	 the	competition	 for	power	between	
different	levels	to	achieve	the	optimal	balance.	This	had	been	particularly	
important	in	big	cities	such	as	Moscow	and	St.	Petersburg	where	the	state	
and	regional	powers	cannot	compete	with	local	self-government.	(Tsishliaev	
1995.)
At	the	same	time	as	the	local	level	was	restructuring	its	authority	relations,	
the	political	strengthening	of	the	regional	level	by	the	central	authorities	led	
to	 the	 local	 level	 being	more	 acutely	 dependent	 on	 the	 regional	 head	of	
administration.	The	 regional	 development	 is	 in	 fact	 difficult	 to	 separate	
from	the	local	level	during	this	period.	Regional	politics	and	administration,	
“regional	authoritarism”,	in	the	1990´s	have	meant	political	guidance	which	
has	included	at	least	a	part	of	the	following	elements:	the	executive	side	has	
dominated	the	legislature;	informal	contracts	of	mutual	loyalty	have	existed	
between	national	and	regional	authorities	(“the	elite	settlement”);	there	has	
been	 indirect	 control	 of	 the	 regional	media	 by	 the	 executive	 authorities;	
political	opponents	have	been	neutralized	or	their	effect	has	been	limited	in	
the	area;	there	has	been	patronage	of	public	associations	by	the	executive	in	
exchange	for	loyalty.	(Gelman	2000:	23–239.)
The	background	to	the	regional	authoritarism	lay	in	the	federalization	of	
political	 culture.	 This	 has	 created	 different	 types	 of	 new	 regional	 elite	
combinations	 in	different	parts	of	 the	 country.	The	general	development	
was	toward	a	regional	identity	which	placed	the	dependency	on	the	financial,	
economic	 and	 political	 influence	 of	 the	 center.	There	was	 a	 tendency	 to	
build	elite	formations	which	were	not	based	solely	on	political	and	economic	
factors	but	also	on	ideological	and	philosophical	grounds	to	find	common	
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historical	 traditions.	 In	Sergei	Barsilov´s	assessment	this	 led,	 to	a	certain	
degree,	to	the	drawing	nearer	of	the	administrative,	technical	and	intellectual	
elites	who	began	to	feel	that	the	federal	government	represented	more	of	a	
ritual	than	real	power.	The	first	elections	of	governors	meant	the	unification	
of	the	elites	under	one	leadership,	whose	role	is	also	underlined	by	the	fact	
that	administrative	power	takes	priority	over	legislative	or	judicial	power.	
This	was	 compounded	by	 the	 effects	of	 a	 transition	 from	an	 ideology	of	
party-politics	to	an	ideology	of	regional	societies	based	on	local	possibilities.	
(Barsilov	199.)	The	time	of	regional	power	was	a	mixed	blessing	for	the	
local	level.	
This	regional	power	included	two	mechanism	which	affected	the	position	
of	the	local	level.	First	were	the	organizational	measures	which	included	the	
disproportionate	 sharing	 of	 power	 between	 the	 assembly	 and	 the	
administration,	 the	 strong	 nomenklatura	 background	 of	 the	 assembly	
which	 depended	 on	 the	 regional	 leadership,	 and	 the	 election	 of	 the	
municipal	 head	 by	 the	 assembly	 based	 on	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	
administration.	Second,	there	were	the	financial	measures	which	included	
the	continual	dependency	of	the	budget	of	the	municipal	administrations	
on	 the	 budget	 laws	 of	 higher	 levels	 of	 government.	 (Podovzhniaia	 199:	
156.)
The	 regional	 culture	 of	 government	 has	 been	 repeated,	 to	 a	 certain	
degree,	at	the	local	levels,	where	the	organization	of	local	government	puts	
emphasis	on	executive	power	and	one-man	management.	This	makes	the	
mayor	the	single	most	important	public	decision	maker	accompanied	by	a	
comparatively	 weak	 council.	The	 mayor	 also	 performs	 the	 role	 of	 both	
advocate	and	 lobbyist	of	his	community	at	 the	regional	 level	where	state	
funds	have	been	allocated	to	a	large	extent	according	to	its	own	preferences	
influenced	 by	 different	 types	 of	 loyalty	 and	 personal	 relationships.	
(Gribanova	2001.)
The	local	level	has	variously	received	attention	as	a	result	of	the	conflicts	
between	regional	leadership	and	the	federal	authorities.	For	the	raising	of	
their	status	and	advancement	of	common	issues,	the	local	governments	of	
Russia	have	established	several	organizations	for	collaboration	during	the	
90´s.	 As	 a	 co-operation	 forum	 for	 the	 local	 governments,	 a	 Council	 on	
Local	Government	has	served	as	a	channel	to	the	President	of	the	Russian	
Federation	(Sakwa	2000:	2).	However,	the	lack	of	one	strong	organization	
with	state	wide	representation	is	a	problem.	Different	organizations	instead	
compete	 with	 each	 other.	 In	 one	 town	 there	 can	 exist	 two	 or	 three	
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organizations	to	which	only	a	part	of	the	administrative	organs	of	the	town	
belong	 (and	 example	 can	be	 found	 in	 Saint-Petersburg).	There	has	 been	
interest	in	taking	part	in	the	international	organizations	of	the	local	level	
where	common	issues	can	be	more	easily	approached.	(Gribanova	2001.)
The	center	has	tried	to	control	the	growing	power	of	the	governors	in	the	
form	of	dictates	about	regional	economic	policies,	the	raising	of	the	status	
of	 local	 self-government	 and	 by	 strengthening	 the	 positions	 of	 the	
presidential	 representatives.	 Paradoxically	 it	 is	 the	 negative	 phenomena	
that	have	been	brought	to	the	regional	and	local	levels	through	democratic	
elections	 and	 legislation.	 That	 is	 the	 key	 reason	 why	 the	 elements	 of	
censorship	of	publicity,	as	well	as	the	rights	and	freedoms	of	citizens,	the	
supremacy	of	certain	political-economical	groups	with	client	orientations	
operating	outside	 the	elected	organs	and/or	dictating	their	decisions,	 the	
pressure	 on	 the	 opposition	 and	 so	 on,	 have	 not	 disappeared.	 (Gelman	
199:101–102.)	
The	 regionalization	 period,	 although	 essentially	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	
perestroika	 policies	 and	 initially	 backed	 by	 the	 Constitution	 of	 Russian	
Federation,	created	a	multitude	of	side-effects	and	intensified	the	risks	of	
the	society	instead	of	neutralizing	its	most	potent	tendencies.	In	terms	of	
political	risks,	the	side-effects	of	regionalism	created	a	similar	situation	as	
the	early	1990´s	strengthening	of	the	executive	rule.	Both	had	a	legitimate	
and	democratic	basis	which	was	difficult	and	politically	risky	to	overturn.	
For	state	building,	the	side-effects	in	the	legislative	and	political	fields	alone	
where	 harmful.	 In	 addition,	 the	 economic	 changes	 exacerbated	 the	
unwanted	changes.	
In	some	ways,	the	1990´s	meant	a	restructuring	of	the	local	economical	
administration	in	an	even	more	radical	manner	than	in	191.	The	relations	
of	 the	 local	 administrative	market	 and	 the	 center	 were	marked	 by	 the	
sudden	 absence	 of	 the	 Communist	 party	 which	 had	 provided	 a	 link	
between	regional	economic	activity	and	Moscow,	and	a	social	control	of	
conduct.	The	party	was	now	gone	but	the	old	elite	was	still	in	place	with	
its	network	and	power.	The	drastic	change	in	the	authority	relations	of	the	
former	 economic	 administration	 had	 several	 consequences	 for	 state	
building.	
The	political	and	economic	liberalization	in	the	period	1990–1992	gave	
the	 local	 level	 a	 fundamentally	 different	 role.	This	 included	 several	 new	
rights:	 municipal	 ownership,	 more	 independence	 in	 environmental	
monitoring	and	land	issues,	right	to	set	up	enterprises,	take	part	in	financial	
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relations	 and	 have	 foreign	 economic	 contacts.	 In	 addition,	 the	 local	
administrators	 could	 go	 to	 court	 if	 the	 decisions	 of	 higher	 state	 bodies	
violated	the	rights	of	citizens.	
The	creation	of	local	property	began	with	its	separation	from	the	state	
property.	This	was	done	in	1991	with	the	decree	of	the	Supreme	Soviet	of	
Russian	Federation	which	distinguished	properties	of	federal,	republican,	
regional	and	lower	levels.This	decree	followed	the	requirements	of	previous	
laws	on	state	property	(1990)	and	the	privatization	of	state	and	municipal	
properties	 (1991).	 The	 law	 on	 privatization	 of	 municipal	 property	 was	
subsequently	renewed	in	2001.	(Sokolova	2003:	21,	25.)
In	 principle	 there	 existed	 the	 opportunity	 for	 purely	 local	 decision	
making	which	was	separate	from	the	state´s	collective	aim	and	structure.	
The	 actual	 developments	 of	 local	 self-government	 were	 complicated	 by	
many	 practical	 problems,	 one	 of	 which	 was	 the	 financial	 relationship	
between	 the	 local	 level	 and	 the	 regional	 level.	The	 perestroika	 era	 laws	
imposed	 restrictions	 on	 the	 way	 the	 municipal	 soviets	 of	 regionally	
important	 towns	 could	 raise	 funds.	The	 annual	 budgets	 of	 the	 regional	
bodies	 (territories	 and	 regions)	were	 drawn	by	 them	 independently	 and	
approved	by	the	appropriate	soviets,	thus	leaving	the	local	level	outside	of	
this	 decision	 making	 process	 which	 greatly	 affected	 its	 options	 in	 the	
coming	 year.	 One	 conflict	 of	 interest	 issue	 was	 the	 transfer	 of	 old	 state	
property	to	municipal	ownership	which	the	regional	level	had	the	right	to	
check.	 (Piskotin	 1993:	 100.)	Yet	 these	 questions	were	 superceded	 by	 the	
bigger	problems	of	daily	financing	of	services	which	the	population	needed	
more	badly	than	ever.	
Similarly,	with	the	early	limited	attention	to	the	governability	of	the	state,	
taxes	were	 given	 a	 low	priority	 in	 the	 shock	 therapy	period	 of	 the	 early	
1990´s.	The	 return	 to	 the	 realities	 of	 running	 a	 state	 were	 given	 more	
concentration	 after	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 political	 fight	 between	 the	
President	and	the	parliament.	(Easter	2000:	304.)
In	purely	financial	terms,	the	break	down	of	the	planning	organization	
led	to	a	situation	where	the	local	administration	was	left	to	hope	that	the	
regional	administration	would	receive	enough	budget	money	for	it	to	cover	
municipal	services	in	different	parts	of	the	region.	The	developing	federal	
relations	were	reflected	in	the	way	budget	resources	were	given	to	different	
areas	according	 to	 their	“donor”	or	“receiver”	status.	 In	effect,	 this	 status	
depended	on	definitions	of	what	was	included	in	calculations	and	what	was	
left	out	(Sakwa	2000:	1.)	
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An	important	economic	condition	of	independent	decision	making	and	
a	reason	for	the	above	mentioned	alternative	routes	for	the	regional	level	
was	 the	difference	 in	proportion	of	 tax	 revenues	which	 the	 region	could	
retain.	The	differences	have	 been	 seen	 as	 results	 of	 several	 factors.	 First,	
there	were	results	of	the	above	mentioned	negotiations	between	the	region	
and	 a	 ministry	 in	 Moscow.	 Second,	 there	 were	 results	 of	 the	 real	 life	
difference	of	tax	bases	in	the	regions.	Third	there	were	results	of	the	response	
of	the	Ministry	of	Finance	to	the	social	need	and/or	political	“clout”	of	a	
certain	area.	
The	 often	 emphasized	 negotiations	 mean	 that	 the	 outcome	 has	 been	
claimed	to	depend	on	either	the	real	need	of	the	area,	or	the	political	power	
of	the	leadership,	or	the	center´s	will	to	secure	support	in	that	area.	However,	
McAuley	 has	 found	 a	 clear	 link	 between	 actual	 consideration	 for	 social	
concern	and	the	central	governments	decisions	about	redistribution.	The	
relevance	of	plain	political	maneuvering	and	bargaining	skills	at	the	regional	
level	seemed	to	be	secondary,	if	not	losing	their	meaning.	(McAuley	199:	
434.)	In	the	light	of	the	administrative	market	concept,	this	would	not	be	a	
surprising	thing.	For	even	in	the	market	conditions,	the	aim	was	to	benefit	
different	interest	groups	within	a	geographical	area.	
The	 Gaidar	 program	 of	 restructuring	 the	 economic	 market	 was,	 in	
essence,	 the	 following:	 first,	 reducing	 drastically	 the	 state	 expenses	 in	
different	 social	 services	 and	 delegating	 budgetary	 expenses	 to	 the	 lower	
levels	at	regions	and	municipalities.	In	addition,	subsiding	ineffective	state	
industry	 to	 be	 stopped	 and	 firms	 forced	 to	 find	 other	market	 solutions.	
Second,	 revenues	 to	 be	 raised	 by	 selling	 natural	 resources	 in	 the	 world	
market	and	the	state	to	eventually	privatize	these	companies.	In	addition,	
other	state	property	would	be	sold	in	the	general	privatization	campaign.	
Third,	a	creation	of	new	revenue	collection	system	through	the	tax	service	
which	had	been	established	in	1990	would	be	developed.	A	federal	law	“On	
the	Basis	of	 the	Tax	System	of	 the	Russian	Federation”	 in	1992	 listed	the	
rights	and	duties	of	tax	payers	and	the	tax	service.	(Easter	2000:	305–306.)
The	emphasis	shifted	from	the	central	level	to	the	municipalities.	These	
entered	market	conditions	without	a	well-working	capitalized	private	sector	
to	 fund	 public	 expenditure	 on	 such	 important	 services	 as	 construction,	
education	and	culture.	Because	of	 the	 lack	of	organized	 social	 assistance	
routes	in	a	civil	society,	the	local	administrations	were	left	the	take	care	of	
everything	alone.	 (Mitchneck	199:	1002–1003.)The	budgetary	problems	
were	made	difficult	by	the	rising	proportion	of	pensioners,	which	in	rural	
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areas	 can	 be	 as	 high	 as	 45	%	 and	 25%	 in	 small	 towns.	The	 transitional	
economic	difficulties	faced	by	many	of	the	so	called	company	towns	(a	town	
built	mainly	around	one	major	 factory	or	 industrial	plant),	 as	well	 as	by	
agricultural	 enterprises,	 have	 greatly	 increased	 the	 burden	 of	 local	
government.	 In	 the	 Soviet	Union	 both	 of	 these	were	 responsible	 for	 the	
social	services	of	their	workers.	The	municipalities	have	been	faced	with	the	
challenge	of	taking	over	their	functions,	often	without	adequate	financing.	
(Gribanova	2001.)	
As	a	result	of	these	challenges	the	local	level	decision	makers	either	had	
to	attract	outside	funds	or	cut	the	social	programs	(Campbell	1992:	216).	
The	early	 confusion	over	authority	 and	 lack	of	 legal	 guidelines	 led	 to	all	
sorts	of	spontaneous	commercial	activities	and	privatization	on	the	elites´	
terms,	many	times	by	preserving	local	monopolies	(for	instance	collective	
farms).	The	vertical	control	in	some	cases	did	not	work	and	the	governors	
sometimes	distanced	themselves	from	the	central	economic	reforms	while	
the	presidential	 representatives	 could	not	guide	 the	developments	which	
were	largely	in	the	hands	of	regional	elites.	(Hanson	1993:	29–30.)	Moreover,	
as	 Richard	 Sakwa	 has	 noted,	 the	 economic	 reforms	 at	 the	 center	 of	 the	
transition	were	not	carried	out	particularly	successfully	by	local	authorities.	
Instead,	 the	 main	 initiatives	 came	 from	 local	 enterpreneurs	 and	 from	
Eltsin´s	 government	 in	 Moscow.	 (Sakwa	 1996:	 196.)	 Politically	 these	
conditions	 set	 the	 local	 level	 and	 the	 central	 government	 into	 opposing	
positions	and	undermined	support	for	the	transition	itself.	
According	 Beth	 Mitchneck´s	 analysis	 of	 budgetary	 reforms	 of	 local	
government	 in	 Russia	 between	 1991–1995,	 the	 local	 level	 was	 in	 a	
contradictory	 situation	 after	 the	 break	up	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union.	This	was	
when	many	local	and	regional	governments,	after	a	short	period	of	economic	
liberalization,	started	to	use	soviet	fiscal	practices	which	had	broken	down	
during	the	end	of	perestroika.	The	political	liberalization	was	illustrated	by	
the	 fact	 that	 between	 1992	 and	 1993	members	 of	 the	 elected	 assemblies	
reviewed	 the	 planned	 budgets	 and	 often	made	meaningful	 changes	 to	 it	
when	they	did	not	consider	the	budgets	to	meet	the	local	needs.	The	crisis	
of	 1993	 meant,	 however,	 that	 fiscal	 accountability	 was	 lost.	 When	 the	
assemblies	returned	to	work	after	the	elections,	the	culture	of	public	review	
was	 to	 some	 extent	 restored	 but	 without	 the	 financial	 and	 bureaucratic	
foundation	that	had	existed	before.	(Mitchneck	199:	99–1011.)
The	main	obstacles	to	the	working	of	the	Gaidar government	plans	were	
the	governments	inability	to	reduce	costs.	Not	surprisingly	it	was	difficult	
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to	slash	the	wages	of	federal	budgetary	workers	and	close	down	industry	
units	which	 could	 not	 be	 expected	 to	 produce	 profits	 for	 some	 time.	 In	
addition,	 state	 property	 was	 often	 sold	 at	 a	 low	 price	 in	 legally	 unclear	
conditions	which	 raised	 deep	 political	 suspicions	 among	 citizens.	Third,	
and	from	the	administration´s	point	of	view,	the	most	depressing	fact	was	
the	lack	of	a	system	to	collect	taxes.	A	result	of	these	developments	was	that	
free	market	shock	therapy	was	replaced	by	“elite	bargaining”.	(Easter	2000:	
306–30.)
In	 essence	 elite	 bargaining	 meant	 replacing	 formal	 institutions	 and	
bureaucratic	 mechanism	 in	 favor	 of	 negotiations	 between	 agents	 of	 the	
central	government	and	a	new	forming	financial	elite.	In	the	administrative	
market,	 new	mechanisms	 appeared	 in	 the	 negotiations	 of	 the	 economic	
elite:	insider	trading,	debt-swapping	and	short-term	credits.	These	method	
coincided	with	 the	 second	wave	 of	 privatization	 put	 into	 effect	 in	 1995.	
(Easter	2000:	30.)	
For	the	municipalities	and	regions,	the	elite	bargaining	period	coincided	
with	the	signing	of	the	bilateral	treaties	which	were	meant	to	assure	political	
peace	with	the	regions.	For	the	regions,	these	contracts	meant	that	their	tax	
obligations	 to	 the	 central	 authorities	 were	 reduced.	 Some	 regions	 were	
exempt	 from	 paying	 federal	 taxes	 all	 together	 for	 some	 years	 (such	 as	
Tatarstan	 and	 Karelia).	 Debt-swapping	 practices	 were	 accepted	 by	 the	
center	in	a	similar	way.	These	allowed	the	regional	governments	to	make	
arrangements	with	the	industries	of	their	area	in	which	tax	debts	of	firms	
were	pardoned	in	exchange	for	services	they	gave	to	the	region.	An	example	
is	the	building	of	a	distribution	pipeline	by	a	gas	company	to	a	region	as	
happened	in	Sverdlovsk.	At	the	regional	level,	the	dependency	of	budgets	
from	 local	 companies	 has	 sometimes	 been	 considerable,	 for	 instance	 in	
Samara	 the	 Yukos	 oil	 company´s	 taxes	 accounted	 for	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	
regional	budget	in	the	latter	part	of	the	1990´s.	(Easter	2000:	309.)
The	regions	also	became	more	generally	important	as	the	executioners	of	
the	government´s	economic	policies.	The	regions	used	their	right	to	enact	
their	own	administrative	economic	decisions,	 for	 instance	in	the	form	of	
import	and	export	tariffs	(Tekoniemi	199:	24).	For	the	state	sector	in	the	
regions	 it	 was	 politically	 important	 to	 have	 good	 connections	 with	 the	
changing	 prime	 ministers	 of	 the	 time	 in	 order	 to	 secure	 more	 federal	
financing.	In	the	economic	sector	beyond	the	state	budget,	new	economic	
and	 politically	 influential	 elites	 emerged.	 These	 included	 managers	 of	
former	 state	 owned	 enterprises,	 new	 businessmen,	 small	 and	 medium	
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enterprises,	 and	 the	 agrarian	 sector.	 Some	governors	were	very	 active	 in	
economic	policy	making	by	attracting	foreign	investors	into	their	regions	
and	thus	giving	a	boost	to	the	image	of	a	locally	booming	economy.	(Sakwa	
2000:	20–21.)	
Political	and	macroeconomic	changes	did	not	take	place	in	a	vacuum	of	
administrative	culture.	The	market	of	administrative	dependencies	which	
was	broken	down	and	had	been	socially	supported	mainly	by	the	blat	or	
unofficial	network	 traditions,	needed	 to	be	 replaced	with	new	structures	
which	were	only	in	the	making.	Meanwhile,	some	of	the	major	administrative	
decision	 making	 was	 done	 in	 a	 legal	 vacuum.	 This	 resulted	 in	 the	
transformation	of	the	blat element	of	administrative	culture	into	corruption	
of	all	sorts,	and	the	creation	of	very	high	political	risk	in	the	near	future.	
Russian	corruption	in	the	1990´s	was	not	merely	a	continuation	of	the	
Soviet	administrative	market	(blat)	tradition,	nor	was	it	only	a	result	of	the	
economic	crisis.	Corruption	serves	as	a	prime	example	of	the	structuration	
process	 in	 the	 administrative	 culture	 which	 was	 going	 through	 a	major	
transition.	Alena	Ledeneva	has	concluded	that:	“	The	formal	structures	not	
only	 restrict	 but	 also	 enable	 informal	practices,	while	 informal	practices	
not	 only	 subvert	 but	 also	 function	 to	 support	 and	 sustain	 the	 formal	
institutions	 which	 they	 exploit.	 […]	 By	 examining	 the	 role	 of	 informal	
practices	one	may	acquire	a	better	understanding	of	the	nature	of	formal	
systems,	the	continuity	in	their	transformation	and	the	limitations	on	their	
ability	to	change.”	(Ledeneva	2000:	321.)	The	Russian	transition	can	also	be	
understood	as	a	process	in	which	both	an	informal	and	formal	administrative	
market	coexist	and	evolve	together.	(Comp.	Gelman	2000:	229.)	
What	has	blat/corruption	meant	 in	the	 latest	 transition?	At	 the	macro	
level,	 contacts	 and	 their	 unofficial	 (extralegal)	 use	 has	 meant	 creating	
opportunities	 to	 invest.	 Access	 to	 administrative	 decision	 making	 and	
information	is	used	to	provide	a	basis	for	business	and	trading.	Unofficial,	
friendship	 based	 contacts	 can	 be	 used	 in	 situations	 where	 there	 is	
competition	among	bribe	givers.	In	addition,	unofficial	contacts	are	helpful	
in	getting	access	to	a	means	of	making	of	money,	meaning	budget	resources,	
export	licences,	privileged	loans	or	business	information.	Blat	has	logically	
been	most	important	in	tax,	customs,	banking	and	regional	administration.	
(Ledeneva	2000:	324.)	
Administratively,	a	transition	of	practices	took	place	in	the	course	of	the	
1990´s	in	the	use	of	blat.	Ledeneva	has	called	it	“the	monetarisation	of	blat 
practices”.	This	has	meant	that	what	used	to	be	a	traditional	norm	of	using	
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kinship,	friendship	and	collegiality	has	transformed	itself	into	a	market	of	
services	sold	to	the	highest	bidder.	Monetary	transactions	have	entered	the	
world	 of	 unofficial	 practices.	 As	 a	 result,	 what	 used	 to	 be	 a	 matter	 of	
unofficial	 arrangements	 and	 debts	 of	 gratitude,	 became	 direct	 bribery.	
Bribery	 has	 often	 taken	 the	 form	 of	 expensive	 presents	 or	 business/
professional	 opportunities.	 Particularly	 at	 the	macro	 level,	 an	 important	
development	of	corruption	has	been	the	merger	of	state	and	market	sectors	
in	the	so	called	nomenklatura	business	in	which	officials	receive	access	to	
private	 resources.	 At	 the	 local	 and	 regional	 administrative	 levels,	 the	
arrangements	 led	 to	 the	 spread	 of	 barter,	 anti-bankruptcy	 alliances,	
“authorised”	 business	 structures	 and	 “problem	 solving”	 services	 through	
informal	channels	in	the	local	and	regional	authorities,	tax	inspection	and	
coercive	institutions.	Informal	arrangements	have	been	made	at	the	local	
and	 regional	 levels	 to	 either	 prevent	 or	 facilitate	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	
enterprises,	or	to	intervene	with	the	mechanisms	of	corporate	governance.	
While	the	macroeconomic	level	was	showing	promising	signs	according	to	
international	standards	(IMF	set	requirements),	 the	microeconomic	level	
retarded	 to	 double	 bookkeeping,	 false	 reporting	 and	 bribery.	 (Ledeneva	
2000:	325–326.)	
Blat	practices	enabled	the	transition	to	bribery	in	the	absence	of	structural	
restraints.	Corruption	transformed	structures	and	created	new	ones.	All	of	
this	 took	 place	 without	 political	 controls.	 Political	 risks	 materialized	 in	
questions	about	rule	of	law	in	decision	making	and	execution,	social	and	
economic	rights	of	actors	and	the	legal	protection	of	them.	The	effects	of	
risks	in	society	effectively	slowed	down	the	development	toward	free	market	
and	growing	state	tax	revenues,	thus	creating	great	disbelief	and	frustration	
with	the	transition.	
At	the	same	time,	the	legal	basis	of	local	government	finances	was	being	
developed.	By	1999,	over	12	laws	regulated	the	local	government	financing	
(Fabrichnyi	 1999:	 –9).	The	municipal	 budget	 is	 presently	 drawn	by	 the	
locally	elected	organs	which	also	decide	on	local	taxes	and	payments.	The	
federal	government	controls	 the	use	of	unitary	methodology	and	 federal	
social	minimum	standards	and	norms	in	the	drawing	of	local	budgets.	The	
income	 of	 the	 municipalities	 includes	 sales	 profit	 from	 the	 municipal	
property,	 at	 least	 10%	 of	 the	 proceeds	 from	 the	 privatization	 of	 state	
enterprises	situated	within	the	municipal	limits,	profits	from	the	use	of	land	
according	to	federal	laws,	taxes	and	payments	based	on	federal	laws,	at	least	
50	%	of	the	property	tax	on	enterprises,	income	tax	of	private	entrepreneurs	
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without	 the	status	of	a	 legal	person,	a	part	of	 the	 income	 tax	of	physical	
persons	 and	 a	 part	 of	 the	 value	 added	 tax	 of	 domestic	 production.	
(Federal´nyi	zakon	o	financovykh	osnovakh	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	
Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199.)	
Local	 income	 also	 includes	 federal	 and	 regional	 taxes	 and	 payments	
from	which	different	procentages	 are	given	 to	 the	 subject	 (regional)	 and	
local	levels	for	the	budget	year	or	for	a	longer	period	(Sokolova	2003:	31).In	
the	federal	budget,	there	is	a	fund	for	the	support	of	local	self-government	
from	which	municipalities	are	directly	supported	according	to	demographic	
factors	 such	as	 the	 share	of	 school	 age	 children	and	pensioners,	 and	 the	
geographical	 size	 of	 the	 municipality.	 (Federal´nyi	 zakon	 o	 financovih	
osnovah	mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	199.)	A	large	
part	of	 the	municipal	 tasks	are,	 in	practice,	state	functions	which	receive	
direct	 funding	 from	 the	 federal	 budget.	 An	 example	 is	 the	 payment	 of	
pensions	which	is	done	by	officials	of	municipal	administration	functioning	
in	effect	as	state	civil	servants.	
The	administration	of	the	subject	defines	the	share	of	state	support	which	
its	municipalities	receive	to	perform	their	state	sanctioned	tasks.	(Federal´nyi	
zakon	 o	 financovikh	 osnovakh	 mestnogo	 samoupravleniia	 v	 Rossiiskoi	
Federatsii	199.)	The	legal	position	of	the	local	level	has	been	strengthened	
by	its	right	to	appeal	in	court	those	state	or	regional	decisions	which	infringe	
upon	its	constitutional	rights.	At	the	same	time	its	own	actions	can	be	sued	
in	a	court	of	law	by	any	citizen.	
In	 the	 regional-local	 relations	 a	multitude	 of	 side-effects	 of	 the	 fiscal	
crises	and	break	up	of	institutional	practices	were	felt.	One	result	was	the	
reluctance	of	the	regional	level	to	trust	to	the	local	level	financing	services	
because	 of	 control	 problems.	 The	 financial	 situation	 and	 the	 lack	 of	
internalized	norms	of	good	governance	lead	to	the	strengthening	of	existing	
nepotism	and	corruption	as	means	to	desired	ends.	(Gribanova	2001.)
By	 199,	 the	 debt-swapping	 practice	 was	 forbidden	 by	 a	 presidential	
decree.	As	a	reaction	to	the	continuing	risks	felt	in	the	budgetary	sphere	of	
the	state	and	side-effects	of	the	fiscal	irregularities,	a	Temporary	Emergency	
Committee	 on	 Tax	 and	 Budgetary	 Discipline	 was	 organized	 by	 the	
government.	 Its	 task	was	 to	demand	 immediate	 tax	payment	 from	firms	
and	encourage	citizens	to	duly	pay	their	income	taxes.	(Easter	2000:	310.)
The	 former	 administrative	 market	 went	 through	 a	 great	 structural	
transition	in	the	following	changes	to	the	authority	of	local	organs.	In	the	
background	 to	 the	 changes	 in	municipalities,	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy	
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was	radically	altered	by	the	privatization	program	which	aimed	to	create	a	
private	market	along	with	 the	state	planning	system.	The	main	operative	
move	in	the	early	1990´s	was	the	voucher-sale	which	effected	a	large	scale	
transfer	of	 state	owned	property	 to	new	owners.	This	started	a	period	of	
fighting	 for	 economic	 power	 which	 took	 place	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 society.	
Institutionally	at	stake	was	the	future	political	decision	making	power	 in	
Russia.	 (Sutela	 199.)	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 administrative	 market	 was	
restructuring	itself	while	its	different	levels	received	new	authority	positions	
and	 institutions	 had	 to	 assume	 power	 either	 within	 new	 legislation	 or	
without	it.	While	the	economic	administration	had	to	restructure	itself	in	a	
legal	vacuum,	the	representational	administration	was	in	a	better	position	
because	of	the	perestroika	reforms	which	had	already	began	to	reform	its	
authority	position.	
It	is	uncertain	what	the	practical	extension	is	of	a	purely	local	right	to	
land	and	natural	resources.	The	Constitution	alone	gives	quite	little	to	lean	
on	in	case	there	is	a	dispute	of	the	limits	of	a	town	to	make	its	own	decisions	
in	 ecological	 questions	 involving	 the	 sale	 of	 natural	 resources	 or	 the	
prevention	of	pollution.	The	same	problem	concerns	the	areas	of	social	and	
educational	services,	which	in	every	case	are	locally	administered.	
Even	 as	 the	 economic	 transition	 has	 been	 implemented	 slowly	 at	 the	
local	level	and	the	re-centralization	to	the	federal	and	regional	level	have	
reduced	 the	 impact	of	 the	 taken	measures,	new	 instruments	 in	 the	fiscal	
policies	 of	 the	 local	 level	 can	 be	 found.	 There	 was	 increased	 local	
responsibility	for	general	tax	policy	and	tax	collection.	The	right	of	the	local	
level	 to	 levy	minor	 taxes	and	 fees	going	directly	 into	 its	own	budget	has	
been	an	 important	 step.	Particularly	 the	 fees,	 licenses,	fines,	permits	and	
customs	increased	their	importance	during	the	90´s	as	a	source	of	revenue	
for	both	the	regional	and	local	levels.	The	economical	developments	of	the	
local	and	regional	level	were	by	no	means	linear.	Tax	collection	is	a	good	
example.	It	was	first	decentralized	at	the	very	same	time	as	the	arrears	of	
enterprises	 and	 all	 government	 levels	 were	 increasing.	This	 led	 in	 turn	
towards	 re-centralization	by	 the	 cities,	who	unified	district	budgets	with	
their	own,	and	the	federal	level	also	trying	to	tighten	control	to	reduce	its	
budget	 deficit.	 (Mitchneck	 199:	 1000–1001.)	With	 conflicting	 decisions	
like	this,	the	natural	effect	on	the	provinces	was	an	inability	to	plan	on	a	
long	term	basis.
In	the	early	post-communist	party	period	of	1992–1993	the	standards	of	
living	in	Russia	declined	rapidly.	There	were	constant	shortages	of	products	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
262
and	production	 levels	were	dropping.	The	cost	of	 living	 increased	 twelve	
times	 from	March	1991	 to	March	1992.	The	result	of	 this	picture	can	be	
seen	 in	 the	 first	 elections	 after	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 in	 1993.	 (Williams	
1996:11.)
At	the	same	time,	in	the	last	part	of	the	90´s,	the	regionalist	developments	
created	 great	 difficulties	 in	 the	 much	 needed	 all-federation	 economical	
policy.	This	can	also	be	described	as	a	weak	conceptual	understanding	of	
the	role	of	state	government	in	the	making	and	execution	of	decisions.	The	
lack	of	feeling	for	the	entirety	of	the	state	had,	in	the	view	of	this	criticism,	
led	to	the	break	up	of	the	vertical	power	axis	and	discord	of	opinions	about	
the	 competence	 and	 duties	 of	 federal	 and	 regional	 powers.	This	 did	 not	
necessarily	 create	 more	 local	 democracy	 but	 helped	 the	 formations	 of	
regional	 elites	who	used	 the	 legislative	 and	administrative	powers	of	 the	
regions	to	install	political	and	informational	monopolies	and	to	financially	
bind	the	local	self-government.	(Abdurakhimov	199:	149–150.)
A	 culturally	 negative	 impact	 has	 influenced	 which	 different	 group	
interests	 have	had	 an	 effect	 on	 the	 regions.	Their	 interests	 have	 in	 some	
cases	had	a	criminal	or	at	least	a	legally	uncertain	and	unorganized	nature	
which	 has	 in	 turn	 fed	 the	 negative	 attitudes	 of	 the	 general	 population	
towards	the	system	of	Russian	power.	Privatization	is	seen	as	being	favorable	
to	individual	persons,	groups	and	sometimes	criminal	structures	which	are	
not	punished	for	their	actions.	(Kirianov	&	Moskovtsev	1995.)
At	the	same	time,	a	parliamentary	committee	was	also	working	with	the	
same	problems	by	assuring	the	rights	of	the	local	level	in	the	daily	work	of	
different	 actors	 at	 that	 local	 level.	There	 was	 a	 great	 uncertainty	 of	 the	
practical	decision	makers	as	to	what	the	limits	of	power	at	the	local	level	
were.	 (Komitet	 gosudarstvennoi	 dumi	 po	 voprosam	 mestnogo	 samou-
pravleniia,	Vestnik	1996.)
The	 Federative	 Treaty	 of	 March	 31	 1992	 was	 a	 significant	 legislative	
turning	point	in	the	development	of	regional	authority.	It	gave	the	status	of	
“subject	of	the	federation”	not	only	to	the	republics	themselves	but	to	lower	
level	 areas	 such	 as	 territories,	 regions	 and	 areas,	which	had	 earlier	 been	
ordinary	 administrative-territorial	 units	 of	 local	 bodies.	This	 also	meant	
that	 the	 self-government	 of	 these	 geographical	 areas	 was	 in	 the	 joint	
competence	of	 them	and	 the	 state	of	 the	Russian	Federation.	This	was	 a	
change	from	the	Russian	Law	of	July	1991	which	did	not	add	anything	new	
to	 the	 powers	 of	 regions.	 (Piskotin	 1993:	 3–4.)	 The	 treaty	 favored	
economically	the	ethnic	republics.	These	obtained	the	right	to	master	and	
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sell	 the	mineral	 resources	 of	 their	 areas.	They	 also	 received	 the	 right	 of	
independent	 foreign	 trade	 with	 the	 world	 market	 and	 favorable	 tax	
treatment	which	other	areas	did	not	get.	This	inequality	was	meant	to	calm	
down	the	nationalistic	tendencies	but	it	also	succeeded	in	inciting	protests	
in	other	areas.	(Tekoniemi	199:	19.)
The	position	of	the	subjects	which	are	in	principal	a	rather	independent	
sphere,	 is	 however	 limited	 by	 both	 the	 Constitution	 as	 well	 as	 by	 other	
federal	laws.	The	change	of	status	is,	in	practice,	made	quite	difficult	because	
its	forms	are	not	explained	and	the	term	“mutual	agreement”	is	left	open.	
This	has	created	a	legal	risk	for	those	subjects	which	used	their	strengthened	
political	power	during	the	regionalization	period.	The	transitional	problems	
of	 a	 weak	 legal	 basis,	 unclear	 hierarchy	 of	 decision	making	 and	 lack	 of	
qualified	staff	to	work	in	the	rapidly	changing	environment,	among	other	
things,	led	to	a	situation	where	different	subjects	tried	to	consolidate	their	
authority	 by	 alternative	 routes	 which	 were	 sometimes	 vague	 in	 their	
constitutional	character.	An	example	was	the	mutual	contracts	between	the	
center	and	a	region.	(Adukhov	1996:	113–114.)	These	contracts	which	have	
their	 legal	 bases	 in	 the	 Federation	 Treaty,	 were	 signed	 during	 President	
Eltsin´s	term.	The	power-sharing	bilateral	treaties	formalized	a	unbalanced	
federalism	which	was	based	on	customized	deals.	In	terms	of	the	hierarchy	
of	laws,	the	order	of	importance	was	unclear.	In	addition,	subjects	bypassed	
the	center	and	signed	agreements	among	themselves.	(Sakwa	2000:	1.)
The	 right	 for	 the	 regional	 and	 local	 levels	 to	 form	 their	 own	 charters	
(ustav)	which	determine	their	authority	and	mutual	relations	with	the	center	
created	 many	 side-effects.	 Over	 half	 of	 the	 9	 charters	 contradicted	 the	
federal	 Constitution.	 Some	 subject	 constitutions	 claimed	 rights	 which	
breached	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 between	 subjects.	 (Sakwa	 2000:16.)	 In	
practice	the	process	of	approval	of	these	papers	was	stopped	at	the	central	
level	where	it	was	the	Ministry	of	Justice´s	task	to	go	through	them.	One	of	
the	main	 reasons	was	 the	unacceptable	 levels	of	 independence	which	 the	
regions	were	demanding	in	decisions	concerning	the	use	of	land	and	mineral	
resources,	exceeding	the	constitutional	limits.	(Tekoniemi	199:	20.)
A	formally	diverse	system	of	local	government	evolved	during	the	1990´s.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 remained	 weak	 points	 which	 slowed	 down	 the	
turning	of	this	procedural	freedom	into	a	reliable	system	of	democratic	and	
independent	decision	making.	One	of	 these	 is	 the	process	of	developing	
regional	legislation	about	local	self-government	which	has	not	progressed	
particularly	rapidly	or	easily.	By	199,	the	fragmentation	of	legal	space	had	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
264
developed	into	a	situation	where	nearly	half	of	the	regional	legal	acts	did	
not	comply	with	the	Russian	Constitution	or	 federal	 legislation.	(Sakwa	
2000:	1.)	According	to	Lidiia	Reznitsenko,	in	199	there	were	still	around	
30	subjects	which	had	not	enacted	a	single	law	to	institutionalize	the	new	
local	 self-government.	 In	 some	 regions	 the	 local	 self-government	 had	
been	 transferred	 to	 the	 local	 state	 administration	 –	 in	 violation	 of	 the	
Constitution	(for	instance	Tatarstan,	Yakutia,	Bashkortostan	and	others).	
Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 there	 were	 only	 four	
subjects	 (of	 a	 total	 6)	 whose	 regional	 legislation	 about	 local	 self-
government	 was	 strictly	 consistent	 with	 the	 Constitution.	 Typical	
violations	 of	 local	 self-government	 were	 the	 effort	 to	 form	 the	 whole	
structure	 and	organization	of	 activity	 of	 local	 government	 from	 the	 top,	
violation	of	the	rules	of	elections,	and	the	poor	level	of	public	organization	
of	the	local	government.	Understandably,	the	problems	were	bigger	in	small	
towns	 and	 in	 the	 rural	 areas.	 (Reznitsenko	 199:	 166.)	 One	 of	 the	 first	
legislative	moves	of	President	Putin	was	to	abolish	the	practice	of	signing	
bilateral	treaties.	The	Constitutional	court	of	RF	furthermore	proclaimed	
them	unconstitutional	in	its	decision.	
The	local	administration	is	most	of	all	affected	by	federal	laws	and	decrees	
of	 the	 President,	 the	 latter	 of	 which	 dominated	 legislative	 work	 in	 the	
beginning	 of	 the	 90´s.	 Institutional	 administrative	 instructions	 and	
regulations	form	an	important	way	of	communication	inside	organizations.	
Federal	 laws	 have	 remained	 general	 in	 nature	 and	 thus	 their	 actual	
implementation	has	been	guided	with	sectoral	rules	(i.e.	a	ministry´s	own	
legal	acts)	and	administrative	acts	of	the	implementing	organization.	
Similar	 to	 the	 economic	 changes	 a	 restructuring	 of	 the	 local	 control	
administration	has	taken	place.	As	a	clear	change	to	the	Soviet	times	when	
civil	and	arbitration	cases	were	often	settled	outside	of	the	court	system	in	
the	administrative	market,	the	courts	have	become	a	separate	administrative	
institution,	 new	 courts	 have	 been	 established,	 courts	 have	 the	 power	 of	
judicial	review	which	did	not	exist	in	the	Soviet	period	(Jordan	2000:194)	
and	 legal	 consciousness	 has	 gained	 the	 importance	 it	 has	 in	 the	 liberal-
democratic	model.
The	Constitution	and	the	federal	law	“On	the	Constitutional	Court”	in	
1994	 made	 the	 court	 a	 19	 member	 organ	 which	 is	 nominated	 by	 the	
Federation	Council.	Its	task	is	to	review	legislative	acts,	including	orders	of	
the	President,	federal	 laws,	republican	Constitutions,	and	treaties	of	both	
national	 and	 subject	 levels.	The	 court	 could	 not	 initiate	 a	 review	 of	 the	
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constitutionality	 of	 the	 government´s	 actions	 in	 implementation.	This	 is	
the	task	of	courts	in	general	jurisdiction	which	the	Supreme	Court	heads.	
An	 individual´s	 appeals	 are	 accepted	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 inquiry	 on	 the	
constitutionality	of	legislation	dealing	with	a	particular	case	from	a	court.	
Abstract	review	on	the	legality	of	the	President´s	and	government´s	actions	
is	not	permitted.	(Jordan	2000:	196,	19.)
The	Constitutional	Court	 is	 important	 from	the	point	of	view	of	 local	
officials	 because	 in	 certain	 areas	 of	 Russian	 law,	 for	 instance	 that	which	
concerns	the	freedom	of	movement,	the	Court	has	often	ruled	against	the	
local	organs.	An	example	is	the	residence	permit	(propiska)	which	has	been	
demanded	 by	Moscow	 city	 to	 prevent	 uncontrollable	migration	 into	 the	
city.	Yet,	 the	problem	of	 the	90´s	which	 still	 continues	 is	 the	 inability	 to	
secure	 enforcement	 of	 decisions.	 (Jordan	 2000:	 19.)	 The	 Constitution	
court	 has	 also	 proved	 its	 usefulness	 in	 the	 protection	 of	 constitutional	
relations	 in	 cases	 of	 breaches	 of	 jurisdiction.	 The	 authority	 of	 local	
government	has	been	reinforced	against	a	governor´s	attempt	to	monopolize	
power.	(Gelman	2000:	241.)
The	Constitutional	court	and	the	Supreme	Court	which	has	civil,	criminal	
and	military	judicial	departments	have	both	exercised	the	right	to	review	
the	legality	of	executive	acts.	In	fact	the	Supreme	Court,	which	according	to	
the	Constitution	is	the	highest	court	for	appeal	in	civil	and	criminal	cases	
has	 favored	 a	 diffusion	 of	 constitutional	 control	 by	 directing	 the	 lower	
courts	 in	1995	 to	consider	 the	constitutionality	of	 legal	acts.	 In	199	 the	
Constitutional	Court	assumed	the	leadership	role	in	the	matter	by	ruling	
that	all	other	courts	were	prohibited	from	deciding	on	such	issues.	Instead,	
lower	courts	were	instructed	to	always	apply	the	Constitution	in	ruling	and	
request	the	Constitutional	Court	to	review	any	case	were	a	contradiction	
might	be	found.	(Jordan	2000:	199.)	In	this	way,	the	court	system	experience	
a	similar	type	attempt	of	centralization	and	redefinition	of	authority	as	the	
representational	administration.
The	third	party	in	the	court	system	which	affects	the	administration	is	
the	arbitration	courts.	These	are	 specialized	courts	which	 settle	property	
and	commercial	disputes	and,	at	the	request	of	juridical	persons	(including	
foreign	 companies),	 cases	 involving	 decisions	 by	 authorities.	 The	
consolidation	 of	 the	 arbitration	 court	 system	 as	 an	 independent	 body	
started	 in	1991.	This	was	with	a	 resolution	by	 the	Supreme	Soviet	of	 the	
Russian	 Federation	 which	 abolished	 all	 previous	 arbitration	 bodies	 and	
similar	 systems	 in	 the	government.	 Judicial	proceedings	about	economic	
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disputes	began	to	be	carried	out	according	to	the	Arbitration	Procedural	
Code	of	the	Russian	Federation	from	1992.	(The	Supreme	Arbitration	Court	
of	the	Russian	Federation	199.)	
Its	work	is	presently	regulated	by	the	federal	laws	“On	Arbitration	Courts	
in	the	Russian	Federation”,	and	the	Arbitration	Procedural	Code,	both	from	
1995,	and	by	the	1995	federal	constitutional	law	“On	the	judicial	system	in	
the	Russian	Federation”.	In	the	year	199	there	were	2	first	level	arbitration	
courts	in	Russia.	(The	Supreme	Arbitration	Court	of	the	Russian	Federation	
199.)	
The	judiciary	and	the	prosecutors	form	the	combination	responsible	for	
monitoring	the	legality	of	administrative	acts	and	decisions	of	officials.	The	
prosecutor´s	role	is	presently	governed	by	a	law	on	the	prosecutor´s	office	
(Federal’nyi	zakon	O	prokurature	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii/2000).	After	1991	
the	 prosecutor	 worked	 in	 the	 self-conflictual	 role	 of	 being	 the	 general	
controller	of	legality,	while	at	the	same	time	that	of	the	criminal	investigator	
and	court	prosecutor.	At	the	time	of	the	drafting	of	the	new	Constitution,	
two	main	positions	 existed	 concerning	 the	 future	 role	of	 the	prosecutor.	
The	first	wanted	to	keep	the	office	strong	and	centralized	with	many	official	
tasks.	The	second	wanted	 to	 scale	down	 its	authority	and	strengthen	 the	
courts.	The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 itself	 saw	 the	 courts	 as	 having	 too	 little	
personnel,	 and	 in	 many	 cases	 too	 inexperienced	 judges	 to	 handle	 all	
complaints	against	officials.	In	1993	the	prosecutor´s	office	received	more	
than	100.000	complaints	ranging	from	pollution,	housing,	pension,	 labor	
conflicts	to	administrative	fines.	Of	these	approximately	13.000	resulted	in	
formal	protests	by	 the	prosecutors.	 It	was	argued	 that	 the	process	would	
take	too	much	time	and	money	for	ordinary	citizens.	(Smith	1996:	360.)
After	the	end	of	the	socialist	system,	court	personnel	were	not	purged,	
yet	the	position	of	the	judges	has	undergone	a	major	change.	In	this	sense,	
the	 court	 serves	 as	 a	 prime	 example	 of	 organizational	 learning	 in	
administrative	 transition.	 In	1992	 “Law	on	 the	Status	of	 Judges”	and	 the	
Constitution	 itself	 defined	 the	 role	 and	 authority	 of	 judges.	 Higher	
education,	 life	 long	 tenure,	 immunity	 from	 prosecution	 and	 federal	
financing	for	courts	are	structural	requirements.	In	terms	of	administrative	
practices,	the	judges	are	subordinate	only	to	law,	cannot	join	political	parties	
and	can	find	people	in	contempt	of	the	court.	A	1996	“Law	on	the	Court	
System	of	the	Russian	Federation	established	a	unified	federal	court	system	
of	which	judges	are	a	part.	The	1996	law	on	courts	also	established	subject	
level	constitutional	courts	which	have	the	right	 to	review	the	 local	norm	
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production.	(Jordan	2000:	200–201.)	The	former	local	and	regional	court	
structure	was	authoritatively	buried	and	courts	made	into	state	organs.	
Legal	protection is	built	with	a	multitude	of	legislation	(see	Alekhin	&	
Karmolitskii	&	Kozlov	1996,	for	a	full	list	of	legal	sources).	As	there	is	no	
one	 administrative	 law	 which	 would	 dictate	 the	 procedural	 behavior	 of	
officials,	 different	 laws	 need	 to	 be	 looked	 at	 together.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
Constitution,	 the	Civil	 Code	 (Grazhdanskii kodeks	 Rossiiskoi	 Federatsii	
1994)	 is	 the	 basis	 of	 legal	 protection.	 It	 states	 the	 right	 of	 appeal	 of	
administrative	decisions	in	court	and	gives	the	court	several	tools	for	the	
correction	of	illegal	decisions.	(Grazhdanskii	kodeks	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	
1994,	glava	2:	11–13.)
The	 rulings	 of	 the	Constitutional	Court	 can	 be	 included	 as	 legal	 acts	
which	are	a	part	of	the	legal	basis	of	local	level	decision	making.	Presently,	
this	 legal	 basis	 also	 includes	 the	Constitution	of	 the	Russian	Federation,	
federal	 laws,	 special	 laws	 on	 local	 self-government	 and	 federal	 decrees.	
(Sokolova	2003:	6–9.)	
The	 Civil	 Code	 has	 been	 complemented	 by	 the	 Federal	 Law	 about	
Complaints	 to	 the	Court	 about	decisions	 infringing	upon	 the	 rights	 and	
liberties	of	citizens	from	1995.	It	ordered	the	state	officials	–	and	municipal	
officials	who	acted	as	state	official	in	their	duties	–	to	recognize,	monitor	
and	defend	the	rights	and	liberties	of	citizens.	The	law	gives	a	citizen	the	
right	to	see	material	which	directly	concerns	his	rights.	He	can	appeal	the	
decision	either	with	a	higher	organ	or	in	the	court.	(Federal´nyi	zakon	ob	
obzhalovanii	 v	 sud	 deistvii	 i	 reshenii	 narushaiushchikh	 prava	 i	 svobody	
grazhdan,	No	466–1,	2.	aprelia,	1995.)
The	experiences	of	the	1990´s	has	shown	that	judges	have	generally	been	
disposed	 to	 ruling	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 plaintiffs	 when	 a	 citizen	 has	 filed	 a	
complaint	 against	 an	 official	 or	 administrative	 organ.	 The	 number	 of	
complaints	has	risen	steadily	 throughout	 the	1990´s	 from	about	4.000	 in	
1991	to	over	0.000	in	199.	Claimants	won	in	0%	of	cases.	(Jordan	2000:	
204.)	
Different	sectoral	laws,	such	as	the	Federal	law	on	social	services	from	
1995	states	the	right	of	citizens	to	receive	counseling	as	to	their	rights	and	
services.	However,	 there	has	not	been	a	body	of	 legislation	which	would	
have	 concisely	 gathered	 together	 the	 procedural	 principles	 of	 good	
administrative	work.	The	Law	on	Administrative	misconduct	 from	194	
has	been	the	basis	of	rules	on	behavior.	A	new	Federal	Law	on	Administrative	
Misconduct	 from	 2001	 (Kodeks	 administrativnikh	 pravonarusheniiakh	
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2001)	forms	a	type	of	administrative	guide	for	good	procedure.	Yet	it	can	
best	be	described	as	 a	 separate	 section	of	 criminal	 law	which	deals	with	
misconduct	 somehow	 related	 to	 administration.	 Its	 object	 is	 both	 the	
officials	and	the	citizenry.	An	important	group	of	sanctions	concern	private	
enterprises.	
Legally	 and	 economically	 the	 municipal	 administration	 serves	 two	
masters.	Its	own	space	has	been	strengthened	and	tools	for	its	daily	work	
have	 been	 developed.	 The	 period	 of	 regionalization,	 privatization	 and	
reformation	of	the	administrative	market	have	been	closing	down	since	the	
end	of	1990´s.	The	risks	involved	in	these	processes	from	the	point	of	view	
of	developing	administrative	practices	 are	obvious:	 lack	of	 clear	policies,	
changing	of	laws,	political	instability,	unclear	re-division	of	state	property	
and	resources,	unclear	norm	hierarchy,	growing	political	and	economical	
corruption	replacing	the	blat of	the	Soviet	administrative	market,	 lack	of	
public	trust.	
President	Putin´s	governments	have	answered	these	risks	with	a	strategy	
of	 “dictatorship	 of	 law”	 and	 political	 control	 of	 the	 regions.	At	 first,	 the	
dictatorship	 of	 laws	 and	 the	 centralization	 of	 political	 guidance	 and	
economic	decision	making	was	directed	toward	bringing	some	constitutional	
order	into	the	prevailing	situation	of	regional	and	local	authoritarism.	The	
accent	has	been	on	the	federal	laws	which	would	supersede	any	local	and	
regional	legislation.	The	goal	has	been	to	get	away	from	a	situation	where	
every	organization	has	its	own	rules	according	to	which	the	federal	laws	are	
interpreted.	The	second	political	goal	has	been	to	create	a	unified	economic	
space	in	Russia	where	fiscal	federalism	would	work	according	to	the	same	
rules	of	 the	game	 in	all	parts	of	 the	country	and	 to	make	 the	center	 the	
primary	decision	maker	in	economic	policy.	
Richard	 Sakwa	 has	 noted	 that	 “bargaining	 between	 the	 federal	
government	and	the	subjects	is	one	of	the	most	salient	aspects	of	politics	in	
contemporary	Russia,	but	the	rules	of	this	bargaining	process	have	not	yet	
assumed	a	precise	institutional	form:	the	rules	of	the	game	remain	unclear	
and	arbitrary.	[…]	yet	transparency	is	not	something	that	can	be	imposed	
but	 emerges	 out	 of	 political	 struggle	 itself.	 […]	 The	 imposition	 or	
importation	 of	 practices	 of	 good	 governance	would	 probably	 be	 fragile,	
whereas	 a	 political	 order	 hammered	 out	 in	 conflict	 and	 compromises	
between	the	actors	themselves	would	in	all	likelihood	prove	more	durable.”	
(Sakwa	 2000:	 25.)	The	matrix	 of	 scenarios	 by	 Vladimir	 Gelman	 further	
more	clarifies	the	situation	which	Putin	faces	in	the	political	guidance	of	
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administrative	 reform.	 It	would	 seem	 that	Vladimir	Putin	has	 sought	 to	
move	 from	 the	 “elite	 settlement”	 scenario	 to	 the	 “struggle	 according	 to	
rules”	stage	where	formal	institutions	are	used	as	a	weapon	against	others	in	
the	 struggle	 for	 survival.	 (Comp.	 Gelman	 2000:	 234.)	 Formal	 rules	 are	
important	in	this	scenario	but	their	politically	wise	use	is	the	tactic	which	
makes	a	winner.	
The	 elite	 settlement	 approach	 which	 President	 Eltsin	 used	 can,	 in	
hindsight,	 be	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 risk	 producing	 strategies	 in	
administrative	change.	Such	a	situation	did	not	give	enough	legally	protected	
room	 for	 long	 term	 planning	 and	 institution	 building.	 Guidance	 was	
reacting	 to	 seeming	 side-effects	 and	 deterring	 political	 risks.	 Main	
concentration	was	 given	 to	 regional	 political	 struggle	which	 allowed	 the	
economy	to	become	an	open	field	for	well	positioned	and	connected	players.	
Politically	the	risk	was	high,	because	at	stake	was	state	property	and	huge	
natural	resources	unlike	in	the	small	former	Eastern	European	countries.	
Constitutionally	the	situation	was	unbearable	because	the	local	level	which	
should	 have	 in	 principle	 been	 one	 of	 the	main	 beneficiaries	 of	 the	 new	
developing	market	economy	was	mostly	left	outside	of	the	decision	making.	
It	began	to	bargain	for	a	piece	of	the	budget,	instead	of	becoming	a	master	
in	its	own	geographical	area.	
From	 the	 local	 perspective,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 the	 Putin	 regime	 has	
opted	for	a	strategy	of	 forced	 legalism	by	using	 institutions	 formally	and	
opponents´	 institutional	weakness	 informally.	The	main	 tactic	 is	 gaining	
economic	 control	 of	 Russia´s	 regions	 and	 strengthening	 legality	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 democratic	 practices.	 The	 legitimation	 seems	 to	 be	 that	
constitutionalism	 in	 administration	 can	 only	 be	 realized	 with	 a	 strong	
centrally	guided	state.	The	government´s	view	seems	to	be	that	delegation	
of	authority	to	unregulated	regional	political	elites	in	the	vast	country	leads	
to	risks	which	shatter	economic	planning	and	threaten	the	rights	of	citizens	
more	than	a	controlled	media	and	institutionally	weak	opposition.	
After	stopping	the	signing	of	federal	treaties,	Putin	instituted	seven	new	
administrative	 federal	 areas	 which	 formalized	 the	 unity	 of	 political	 and	
legal	 control	 in	 the	 regions	 and	 created	 new	 super-areas	 which	 are	 not	
mentioned	in	the	Constitution.	The	heads	of	these	regions	report	directly	to	
the	President	and	use	the	information	which	is	primarily	collected	by	the	
security	police	(FSB)	in	the	area.	The	intention	is	to	secure	the	execution	of	
federal	laws,	monitor	the	media	and	elections	in	the	area	and	to	work	with	
the	regional	and	local	authorities	to	combat	corruption	(Gribanova	2001).	
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In	this	sense,	the	policies	follow	the	risk	administration	route:	the	insecure	
environment	and	political	guidance	problems	make	the	security	institutions	
stronger	both	operationally	and	politically.	
Legislative	efforts	have	been	given	a	great	deal	of	importance	in	the	Putin	
policy.	Major	legislative	changes	have	taken	place	in	the	tax	law,	criminal	
law,	 land	 law	 and	 administrative	 law.	The	 former	went	 through	 a	major	
modernization	in	2001	when	a	new	version	of	 the	former	federal	 law	on	
administrative	 offences	was	 revised.	The	 Federal	 Law	 on	Administrative	
Misconduct	(Kodeks	administrativnykh	pravonarusheniiakh	2001)	can	be	
called	“an	administrative	fine	law”	because	it	sanctions	different	fines	for	
different	 types	 of	 actors.	The	 administrative	 duties	 of	 civil	 servants	 are	
united	 with	 different	 categories	 of	 fines	 which	 are	 used	 as	 a	 negative	
guidance	tool.	A	second	important	quality	is	the	requirement	for	 legality	
which	seeks	to	eradicate	the	most	obvious	violations	of	human	rights	from	
the	Soviet	 era.	 It	 is	 important	 that	 any	other	 correctional	decision	other	
than	a	fine,	is	decided	by	a	court.	The	equality	of	all	citizens	before	the	law	
is	underlined,	innocense	is	presumed	and	retrospective	decisions	are	void.	
(Kodeks	administrativnykh	pravonarusheniiakh	2001.)
At	the	work	organization	level,	the	structural	changes	have	produced	a	
need	to	assess	the	service	of	the	population	in	a	new	way.	The	administration	
at	the	local	level	is	no	longer	merely	an	extension	of	the	representative	organ	
which	in	the	Soviet	Union	had	given	popular	legitimation	to	the	decisions	
made	by	 the	party	bureaucracy.	The	 local	 administration	has	been	 faced	
with	 the	dilemma	of	 becoming	 a	 genuine	 separate	 legal	 and	operational	
entity	responsible	for	the	sustainable	development	of	state	programs.
6.3 The New Administrative Culture Since 1991: 
Building Practices of Discretion
This	 chapter	 is	 based	 on	 the	 interview	 data	which	was	 obtained	 for	 the	
research	in	the	October	city	district	administration	in	Murmansk	in	1993	
and	 2000.	 The	 interviewees	 were	 city	 district	 employees,	 altogether	 36	
persons.	 The	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 by	 the	 author,	 transcribed	 in	
Russian	and	then	translated	by	the	author	 into	English.	Interview	quotes	
are	numbered	 to	help	 the	 reader	find	a	 specific	quote	 in	 the	 text.	Quote	
numbers	do	not	represent	different	respondents.	
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6.3.1 A Case Study of the Murmansk City District 
Administration, 1993–2000
The	city	of	Murmansk	can	be	called	a	pure	Soviet	city	because	its	history	as	
a	city	starts	officially	only	a	year	before	the	Revolution	in	October	4th	(21st	
of	September)	in	1916	as	“Romanov-on-Murman”.	Before	that	it	was	a	far	
away	Imperial	post	 in	the	North	whose	economic	growth	was	 in	the	 last	
part	of	the	19th	century	based	on	forestry.	The	growth	of	the	population	in	
the	 area	 required	better	ways	of	 transportation	which	became	a	decisive	
issue	for	the	future	of	the	area.	(Kiselev	and	Tulin	19:	–9.)
By	the	end	of	the	20th	century	Murmansk	has	become	a	commercial	and	
military	port	situated	in	the	Kola	peninsula	on	the	bank	of	a	bay	leading	to	
the	 Arctic	 Ocean.	The	 city	 is	 the	 capital	 of	 Murmansk	 oblast	 in	 which	
metallurgy	 has	 been	 the	main	 industrial	 base	 in	 the	 1990´s	 (Universitet	
Laplandii-Kolskii	Nauchnyi	Tsentr	2000:	Murmanskaia	oblast	v	90	godoh).	
The	 Kola	 Peninsula	 is	 the	most	 important	mineral	 resource	 area	 in	 the	
Russian	Federation,	since	more	than	a	quarter	of	all	known	minerals	in	the	
world	can	be	found	in	this	area.	In	1994,	the	Murmansk	oblast produced	
100%	of	all	apatite	concentrates,	41.2%	of	all	nickel	and	13.0%	of	copper	in	
the	whole	Russian	Federation.	Large	natural	gas	deposits	are	situated	in	the	
Barents	Sea,	of	which	the	largest	is	the	Shokhmanskoe	gas	and	condensate	
field	600	km	away	from	the	city	in	the	sea.	(The	Barents	Euro-Arctic	Council	
1995:	61,	63.)
The	population	of	Murmansk	was	growing	in	the	190´s	from	309.000	
(190)	to	31.000	(199).	In	199	the	city	had	440.000	inhabitants.	By	199	
a	decline	had	taken	place	and	394.000	people	lived	in	Murmansk.	In	2000,	
every	fifth	person	in	Murmansk	was	a	pensioner	(Administratsii	goroda-
geroya	Murmanska	2000:1).	A	steady	number	of	people	have	moved	to	the	
more	Southern	regions	of	Russia,	either	to	work	or	after	their	retirement.	
The	city	has	been	struck	with	unemployment	since	fishing	 lost	 its	earlier	
prominence	as	a	major	economic	provider.	By	1994	the	annual	catch	had	
decreased	from	1.12	million	tons	in	1990	to	0.53	million	tons.	(The	Barents	
Euro-Arctic	Council	1995:	61.)
The	 oblast charter	 (ustav)	 defines	 the	 municipal	 government	 as	 an	
independent	legal	entity	which	does	not	belong	to	the	state	administrative	
structures.	The	municipal	charter	and	the	structure	of	local	government	are	
decided	by	 the	 inhabitants	of	 the	municipalities.	Municipal	 elections	are	
held	according	to	the	oblast	law	on	elections.	Locally	elected	representatives	
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have	a	right	to	take	part	in	the	initiation	of	legislative	acts	in	the	regional	
duma.	 Motions	 and	 official	 requests	 of	 administrators	 in	 the	 local	
administration	 should	 be	 a	 priority	 to	 the	 higher	 administrative	 organs.	
Local	administration	and	state	local	administrative	offices	have	a	right	to	
enter	mutual	contracts.	Citizens	living	in	the	municipality,	organs	of	self-
government	and	administrators	have	a	right	to	appeal	the	decision	of	state	
organs	or	officials,	organs	or	officials	of	local	government,	enterprises	and	
other	organizations	when	these	breach	the	limits	of	local	self-government.	
(Ustav	Murmanskoi	oblast´i	199.)
The	system	of	self-government	in	Murmansk	includes	the	elected	mayor,	
the	city	soviet,	the	administration	and	territorial	(regional)	organs	of	self-
government.	The	mayor	is	elected	every	four	years	by	citizens	over	21	years	
of	age	and	has	a	double	role	as	both	the	head	of	the	administration	and	the	
speaker	of	 the	 soviet.	The	work	of	 the	mayor	 includes	heading	 the	 local	
administration	on	the	basis	of	a	structure	which	the	soviet	has	accepted,	
confirming	 orders	 concerning	 administrative	 organs	 and	 considering	
collective	and	individual	appeals.	(Ustav	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	1995:	
glava	I:,	glava	IV:23,24.)	
The	city	charter	mentions	16	sectoral	organizations	which	can	be	either	
departments,	 committees	 or	 administrations	 and	 which	 receive	 their	
funding	 from	 the	 city	 budget.The	 city	 is	 yet	 further	 divided	 into	 four	
administrative	 areas,	 each	of	which	 is	headed	by	 a	deputy	mayor	within	
whose	 jurisdiction	 have	 a	 right	 to	 give	 orders	 and	 instructions.	 Each	
administrative	district	 (okrug)	 is	directly	 subordinated	 to	 the	mayor	and	
functions	 together	with	sectoral	organizations	of	 the	city	administration.	
(Ustav	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	1995:	glava	VI:32,25.)
Since	1996,	the	city	was	administered	through:
Four	administrations	–	
•	 The	administration	for	social	protection,
•	 The	administration	for	finances,	
•	 The	administration	for	building	maintenance
•	 The	administration	for	building,
three	committees	–	
•	 The	committee	for	health	protection,
•	 The	committee	for	education,
•	 The	committee	for	municipal	property,
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nine	departments	–	
•	 The	department	of	housing
•	 The	department	of	architecture,
•	 The	department	of	citizens´appeals,
•	 The	city	department	of	employment,
•	 The	 department	 for	 the	 cooperation	 and	 development	 of	 private	
enterprises,	
•	 The	department	of	trade,
•	 The	department	of	consumer	protection,	
•	 The	department	of	culture,	
•	 The	department	of	civil	registrations,
and	one	 foundation	which	 is	 the	 ecological	 foundation.	 (Administratsiia	
goroda-geroia	Murmanska	2000:	1.)
The	study	for	this	research	was	conducted	in	the	central	city	district,	in	
the	administration	of	the	October	district.	Murmansk	city	goverment	was	
divided	 into	 districts	 for	 the	 first	 time	 in	 1939.	The	 following	 year	 the	
studied	 district	 was	 organized	 into	 10	 departments,	 including	 the	
department	of	social	services	and	housing.	Nine	years	later,	the	district	was	
abolished	with	 all	 its	 local	 government	 organs,	 only	 to	 be	 re-established	
three	years	later.	The	abolition	was	repeated	in	195	and	the	re-establishment	
in	196.	The	decree	of	the	President	of	Russian	republic	(No	239,	25.11.1991),	
the	subsequent	orders	of	the	head	of	administration	(No	220,	2.3.1992)	and	
the	 October	 district	 executive	 committee	 (N	 100,	 2.3.1992)	 ended	 the	
district	soviet.	The	same	year,	a	new	structure	of	district	administration	was	
formed.	 Finally,	 in	 1994	 the	 decision	 of	 the	 head	 of	 October	 district	
administration	changed	the	earlier	district	department	of	social	protection	
into	 the	 Administration	 for	 social	 protection.	 (Historical	 information	
collected	 from	 the	October	 city	 district	 administration	 during	 a	 visit	 in	
2000.)
The	 Administration	 for	 social	 protection	 of	 the	 population	 (UCZN)	
works	as	a	provider	for	basic	social	services.	Along	with	federal	laws	and	
regional	programs,	social	services	have	been	guided	at	the	city	 level	by	a	
program	which	directs	attention	to	three	issues:	the	condition	of	veterans	
and	 invalids,	 and	 poverty	 in	 general	 (Administratsiia	 goroda-geroia	
Murmanska	2000:	1.).	
The	social	services	provided	by	the	city	district	include	social	assistance	
to	families	with	children,	assigning	pensions	to	retired	persons,	and	special	
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assistance	to	invalids	and	refugees	settling	in	the	area.	In	other	words,	the	
organization	is	concerned	with	the	basic	needs	of	the	population	in	the	city.	
Formally	the	goal	is	to	assign	all	benefits	in	time	to	those	who	are	seeking	
assistance	 or	 legal	 entitlements.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 work	 involves	 a	
certain	amount	of	evaluation	of	the	needs	of	citizen	groups	and	taking	care	
of	 those	 client	 groups	 who	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 initiate	 processes	
themselves.	The	primary	task	is	to	count	benefits	and	guide	clients	to	the	
right	services	which	the	city	is	able	to	provide.	
6.3.1.1 Economy
The	oblast budget	has	suffered	from	deficit	from	1994	onwards,	the	worst	
year	being	199.	The	deficit	has	been	covered	by	subsidies	from	the	state	
budget.	The	state	fund	for	the	support	of	the	regions	had	financed	the	oblast	
level,	and	the	subsidies	for	the	regional	budget	financed	the	municipalities.	
(Universitet	 Laplandii-Kolskii	 Nauchnyi	 Tsentr	 2000.)	 In	 1996	 the	 city	
administration	 reacted	 to	 the	 financial	 challenges	 by	 establishing	 a	
Coordination	 council	 for	 different	 administrative	 organs	 involved	 in	 the	
collection	of	income.	Included	in	this	new	organs	have	been	representatives	
of	the	Tax	inspection,	Tax	police	and	municipal	funds.	The	main	task	was	to	
individually	 see	which	organizations	 and	 enterprises	owed	 the	 city	 taxes	
and	 other	 payments.	 (Administratsiia	 goroda-geroia	 Murmanska	 2000:	
11.)
Between	1996	and	1999	the	practice	of	debt-swapping	was	used	in	the	
administration	to	help	the	finances	of	health	care,	educational	and	housing	
sectors	which	owed	money	for	heating,	food,	medication,	repairs	of	schools,	
hospitals	and	clinics.	A	system	of	dept-swapping	was	also	created	between	
the	 providers	 of	 communal	 services	 and	 the	 oblast	 budget.	 In	 the	
arrangements	 social	 assistance	 payments	 due	 were	 substituted	 with	
exemption	from	rents	and	other	communal	payments.	In	the	year	2000,	the	
city	had	made	205	contracts	with	local	enterprises	for	these	to	provide	free	
material	 support	 and	 food	 stuffs	 for	 inhabitants	 eligible	 for	 assistance.	
(Administratsiia	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	2000:	2,	11.)
In	practice	the	services	largely	included	concrete	material	help.	Between	
1996	 and	2000,	 the	 studied	organization	gave	humanitarian	 aid	 to	.026	
persons,	concrete	material	aid	to	2.196	persons,	free	meals	at	the	sum	of	
103.100	rubles.	Subsidized	medication	was	provided	for	12.65	persons.	In	
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addition	small	numbers	of	people	received	free	newspapers	and	journals,	
trips	 to	 sanatoriums	 and	 had	 their	 travel	 to	 a	 holiday	 place	 paid.	
(Administratsiia	goroda-geroia	Murmanska	2000:	45.)
In	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 transition,	 economic	 difficulties	 penetrated	
everything.	This	meant	inability	to	plan	anything	in	the	work,	not	having	
the	proper	tools	(computers,	calculators	and	so	on)	and	simply	having	too	
little	material	assistance	to	give	to	the	recipients.	Laws	about	benefits	and	
pensions	changed	 four	 times	a	year,	which	made	 taking	care	of	even	 the	
routine	calculations	burdensome.	At	the	same	time,	the	clients´	situation	
worsened	rapidly.	There	was	a	sense	of	diffusion	of	power	in	the	sphere	of	
economy.	 Keeping	 one´s	 head	 above	 water	 by	 trying	 to	 manage	 the	
obligatory	tasks	in	one	way	or	another	dominated	in	1993.	
Along	 with	 the	 braking	 up	 of	 the	 economic	 bureaucracy,	 the	 drastic	
organizational	 changes	 in	 political	 guidance	 and	 authority	 relations	
challenged	the	practices	of	the	administration.	All	through	the	1990´s	there	
was	no	strong	correlation	between	“self-government”	and	the	place	of	local	
level	 legislative	 and	 executive	 decision	making	within	 the	 system	 of	 the	
Russian	 state	 (Gribanova	 2001). In	 the	 studied	 organization	 this	 meant	
both	 opportunities	 and	 risks	 in	 the	 form	 of	 unclear	 jurisdictions	 as	 the	
following	quotes	from	interviews	reveal:	
1. “The [earlier Soviet time] budget was more stable, because we for instance 
in October approved the budget in the session and we in the course of a year 
knew how much and where our expenses went. Now the index is such that 
with our unstable situation, of course it is very difficult to make a prognosis. 
[…] The ´93 budget is more or less unstable, and we consider this budget 
unrealistic because we approved it in May and now it is October and there has	
already been	inflation twice. […] Earlier it was not like this. The earlier budget 
was approved and the whole year we worked peacefully, without any changes.” 
(1993)
2.	Now this question is open because we don´t have any delegates, and the 
budget was approved by the session. […] The session decided if we distributed 
finances in the right way.  It was they who approved the budget.  For us it was 
the law […] I do not know what will happen	 in 1994. Probably we will 
ourselves make and execute the budget.” (1993)
3. “There is no socioeconomic development plan. I do not know how the 
budget will be formed for the next year. It is hard to say what becomes of 
building and financing. I don´t know. The State Duma will be elected on the 
12th, if there are elections. But then, how is the State Duma going to plan 
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because soon it	will be the year of ´94. How is the budget [going to turn out] 
or does the matter just go to the executive powers. In other words, we receive 
some control number and within these “borders” we will work. Like that.” 
(1993)
4. “If all would be normal financially, actually not even financially but 
politically somehow peaceful, then we would be able to arrange everything, 
make a	prognosis, plan and peacefully decide all our financial questions. We 
could think in terms of the	future. Now we practically do not do such things.” 
(1993)
Seven	 years	 later	 in	 2000	 the	 economy	 was	 stabilized.	 Although	 the	
budget	limits	were	felt	in	every	day	work,	other	things	had	become	more	
important	in	the	development	of	work.	Even	though	the	client´s	situation	
had	 scarcely	 become	 better,	 the	 administrators	 themselves	 were	 more	
concerned	about	computer	program	efficiency,	general	attitude	towards	the	
clients,	getting	their	own	voice	heard	 in	the	collective	and	so	on.	As	one	
interviewee	said:	
5. “We can decide. But again we don´t have the financial means.”	( 2000)
6.3.1.2 Authority in the Administrative Market
The	 separation	 from	 the	 party	 structure	 and	 reorganization	 of	 positions	
had	changed	the	organization	in	many	ways	and	altered	personal	careers.	
The	statistics	of	the	organization	from	the	year	199	show	that	altogether	61	
persons	worked	in	the	six	departments.	These	people	were	on	average	3	
years	 old	 and	had	worked	 in	 the	 organization	 for	 an	 average	of	 	 years.	
Those	working	 in	bookkeeping	had	 the	 longest	 careers,	 almost	 14	 years.	
Nineteen	persons	had	worked	in	the	administration	over	15	years.	
In	2000	the	organization	had	again	changed.	It	had	been	streamlined	and	
its	personnel	reorganized.	Some	departments	had	disappeared	and	others	
had	acquired	a	more	meaningful	position.	The	personnel	was	6	persons	of	
which	5%	worked	in	the	social	assistance	sector.	Along	with	these	changes	
the	 professional	 titles	 of	 administrators	 had	 changed,	 although	 the	 job	
descriptions	had	stayed	basically	the	same.	The	organization´s	work	was	a	
state	delegated	task.	
Those	 interviewed	 in	 1993	 still	 had	 fresh	 experience	 from	 the	
administrative	work	 during	 the	 Soviet	 period.	 Interviews	 from	 this	 year	
provide	 evidence	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 disappearance	 of	 the	 political	
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administration	 had	 immediately	 changed	 the	 practices	 in	 terms	 of	
organizational	limits	and	the	restructuring	of	tasks.	
6. “Earlier, for instance, we	had a plan. We subordinate the administration, 
as a rule, salary, methods, explanations of laws and everything else	 comes 
from the regional administration. If earlier the law was written in ´56, it had 
practically not changed in any way, and all possible extra explanations, plans, 
orders, all came from above. Whether we want it or not, whether we considered 
it necessary or not, we were required to implement it. Today everything is 
different. […] Purely in an organizational manner there is more independence. 
I can today, for instance, by	myself arrange the structure of the department, as 
I see it. We can change things.	But again by showing [plans] to the head of the 
administration. Earlier this was not possible.” (1993)
7. “Now the structure is completely different. I feel it is more democratic. 
First of all earlier we absolutely had to, I know it was the Regional committee 
of the party, but we always	presented	the	fulfillment of the plan, looked at the 
results, the fulfillment of the socialist building, [and] drew conclusions. Now 
we don´t have any of this. Now it is simpler. I work only with people. Higher 
questions – well, generally no one interferes.” (1993)
8. “Structure changed, it changed, how would I say it, it became complicated 
for my work. Earlier in the Regional executive	committee, they worked with 
a variety of questions. Now, abolished are the organizational department, 
general department, only one supervisor stayed. […] For me it became 
harder to manage all my duties. I am being alienated by this situation….”	
(1993)
9. “There is a new department of “socioeconomic development” the whole 
structure. Bookkeeping was not at all a part of administration, it was in the 
city administration. […] “General management”, we didn´t have that kind of 
a department. It was all decided by the Secretary. The staff	has now grown in 
the administration and more departments have appeared.” (1993)
The	 local	 city	 district	 level	 depends	 on	 the	 decisions	made	 by	 higher	
organs,	but	at	a	slightly	different	level	than	before.	Along	with	the	political	
freedom	 received	 after	 the	 end	 of	Communist	 party	 double	 control,	 the	
administrators	 felt	 less	direct	 control	 from	 the	 center	 and	 in	 connection	
with	the	regional	higher	administrative	organs.	Tellingly,	In	1993,	the	oblast	
level	was	seen	as	representing	the	state.	
10. “Without a doubt we depend on the city administration, and on the 
oblast administration. Earlier we	depended on the party organ, it was very 
rough. There is dependence, but the structure is such that you cannot escape 
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it. We are not autonomous in the city, we always say that the master in the city 
is the city administration. We are masters in our districts. Inside the district 
we are almost full masters, but because we are the central district of the city 
we sometimes. … We find out who is going to decide a particular question. 
[…] Now the federal level comes down to the oblast level. We practically do 
not feel its control, because it does not control us in an immediate manner. 
This [control] comes probably from the federation. We don´t always think 
about where it comes from. (1993)
11. “No Gosplan, planning does not come from above. […] Generally we 
don´t work on any programs now at the level of a district. In other words, if I 
had a program, it is worked on at the level of the city.” (1993)
The	local	level	independence	was	seen	as	something	of	an	impossibility	
without	virtual	complete	economic	 independence,	which	was	not	even	a	
consideration.	Instead	the	administrators	put	the	emphasis	on	fulfilling	the	
administrative	 tasks	 well	 in	 order	 to	 serve	 their	 specific	 clientele.	 The	
clientele	in	this	manner	was	regarded	more	important	than	other	factors,	
such	as	local	policy	decision	making.	Legal	orders	and	federal	laws	dictated	
the	content	of	the	work.	
Most	 interviewees	 testified	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 actual	 decision	 making	
power	and	control	of	the	work,	while	reminding	that	total	autonomy	was	
not	 realistic.	 In	 2000,	 not	 a	 single	 individual	 admitted	 to	 feeling	 any	
particular	pressure	 from	any	higher	organ	 in	 their	daily	routines.	 In	 this	
sense	they	described	the	organization	to	be	quite	free	in	its	daily	routines	
from	the	controlling	of	little	details	by	higher	organs.	
12. So, of course	earlier, before deciding some question it was necessary to 
have it approved, particularly because we are the lower level, and above us is 
enough observation. But now we can practically decide ourselves any question 
which lies in our competence and	then talk with the city administration. In 
that sense things have become simpler.” (1993)
The	view	on	organizational	authority	was	mixed.	If	the	comparison	was	
the	Soviet	situation,	definite	changes	were	recognized	and	mostly	seen	as	
giving	much	more	flexibility.	Even	as	administrative	independence	as	such	
was	generally	considered	a	good	thing,	its	meaning	at	the	bottom	rung	of	
the	local	level	was	questioned.	At	the	same	time,	this	development	was	not	
regarded	as	complete. The	reasons	were	both	organizational	and	financial.	
Too	 wide	 authority	 was	 seen	 as	 producing	 risks	 for	 work.	 The	 city	
administration	 was	 the	 receiver	 who	 executes	 federal	 and	 regional	
decisions.
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13. “The only thing is that now we have more freedom. In other words 
earlier we had to consult the city with many questions, but now we can decide 
many of them ourselves. […] I would like to limit our decision making rights. 
[…] If we knew that this issue does not belong to us we would not start to work 
on it.” (1993)
14. “… I feel that in the direct meaning of the word we don´t have 
independence. We have double subordination. We subordinate to the 
department in the city administration and in the oblast administration as 
higher organizations. But I want to say that the department still is on its own, 
work is	independent and self-sufficient. We don´t feel from any side any kind 
of [influence] on ourselves. (1993)
In	general,	the	period	of	regionalism	did	not	help	the	Russian	local	level	
in	uncertain	situations	to	decide	which	of	the	two	powers	[state	or	region]	
is	more	 important	 for	 it,	 and	where	 it	 could	find	 its	 rights.	 (Sherbakova	
199:	163.)	The	unclear	jurisdictions	of	different	levels	of	government	were	
also	 challenges	 for	 the	 Murmansk	 administration.	 Instability	 and	
ineffectiveness	 of	 the	 state	 structures,	 insufficient	 legal	 background	 to	
support	the	local	level,	the	absence	of	minimal	federal	social	standards	and	
the	principles	of	work	in	the	social	questions,	the	unclear	budget	relations	
of	different	 levels	which	would	have	guaranteed	the	 independence	of	 the	
local	level,	as	well	as	the	lack	of	experience	in	self-government	all	affected	
directly	the	creation	of	a	new	local	administration	in	the	1990´s.	An	example	
of	a	legally	unspecified	area	are	those	situations	where	the	municipality	has	
the	right	to	transfer	its	decision	making	authority	to	the	region.	(Pankratov	
1995,	Vasiljev	&	Peshin	199.)	In	the	October	city	district	administration	
similar	situations	had	also	appeared.	
15. “Administrative independence will never work out. He who makes	the 
budget, – we don´t plan it ourselves. We are given everything from above. 
Then we will have independence when we ourselves build the budget and by 
ourselves implement it. But now we are given control numbers from above 
and we just implement them. And we don´t always agree with them. […] This 
will never change because the tax system is such. If tax collection changes a 
little bit, then maybe. Maybe the State Duma will change the new way of tax 
collection, maybe, I don´t know. But independence. I feel that we cannot get 
rid of the [central] government. All the same somehow there is a separation in 
the federal budget.	And it will stay that way. How else can we keep up this 
army and so on? In other words it makes no difference. But it would be good	
if we ourselves would plan and would make our numbers.”	(1993)
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In	 2000	 it	 was	 explicitly	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 local	 city	 district	 level	
performs	state	tasks at	the	local	level.	Localism	in	this	issue	is	reached	by	
knowing	 the	 clientele	 and	 its	 specific	 situation	 in	 the	 city	of	Murmansk.	
Political	localism	did	not	particularly	touch	the	daily	work	of	the	studied	
organization.	
Changes	in	the	administrative	market	were	felt	mostly	as	a	positive	thing.	
The	position	of	the	administration,	or	the	emergence	of	such,	was	seen	as	a	
possibility	 to	 take	decision	making	 closer	 to	 the	 citizens.	The	 separation	
from	the	work	of	the	council	was	not	seen	as	a	negative	matter.	The	former	
Soviet´s	role	was	viewed	with	some	reluctance.	From	the	point	of	view	of	
some	persons	interviewed,	it´s	role	in	the	new	situation	had	been	formed	
into	a	lobbying	system	for	clients´	cases.	Others	simply	saw	the	soviet´s	role	
as	diminished	in	the	daily	running	of	things	after	the	formal	separation	of	
structures.	Some	regarded	this	as	not	merely	a	positive	move.	Answering	to	
the	 needs	 of	 the	 citizens	 in	 new	 ways,	 such	 as	 with	 the	 help	 of	 non-
governmental	organizations,	was	welcomed	with	a	mixed	feeling.	
The	work	of	 the	 soviet	delegates	did	not	have	a	 clear	 role	 for	 the	 line	
workers.	In	the	new	local	self-government	structure,	the	soviet	had	standing	
commissions	which	took	care	of	sectoral	issues.	The	job	of	the	commissions	
was	 to	 prepare	 normative	 acts,	 initiative	 on	 policy	 issues	 and	 look	 into	
appeals	of	citizens.	The	social	sector	was	handled	by	the	standing	commission	
on	 socioeconomic	 development,	 privatization	 and	 the	management	 and	
distribution	of	municipal	property.	This	commission	made	decisions	on	the	
initiative	 of	 the	 city	 administration.	 (Polozhenie	 o	 postoiannykh	
kommissiiakh	Murmanskogo	gorodskogo	 soveta,	prilozhenie	k	 resheniiu	
Murmanskogo	gorodskogo	Soveta	ot	4.2.199,	N3–42.)	
The	changes	in	the	administrative	market	and	the	strengthening	of	the	
executive	were	described	in	the	following	way:	
16. “Now delegates […] only [for] purely material help, only with purely 
these kinds of technical questions they turn [to us] […] Yes, if I earlier worked 
with delegates, knew all that they worked with from the beginning to the end, 
so now these questions were taken away from the supervisor. These questions 
do not concern me.	I work for the head of administration. I execute his orders. 
I do everything in order for his machinery to work normally.	And the soviet 
works on its own and with its own questions. […] If anyone comes to me 
directly, it is only the chairman of the soviet and only for purely technical 
questions. For example, to influence the politics of the district he can only [do 
so] through the head of administration, he does not come directly to me. If he 
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came to me, I would send him to the head. I am commanded by the head of 
administration.” (1993)
17. “I would like that the delegates would come, in case they have questions 
about the law, showed interest, asked questions. But they understand their 
task a little bit differently. A particular person comes to them and they come 
with this person to me behaving quite strangely. At least as far as I have been 
in contact with the delegates, they all behave the same way. “We have to decide 
this voter´s question.” But they don´t for some reason want to explain to the 
voter why the question cannot be decided in a certain way. […] They explain 
to their constituent that “the political executive board does not want to decide 
your question, we cannot do anything.” I would like them to study the situation 
and to explain it to the person. […] They put us in opposing positions with the 
constituent.” (1993)
18. “The disconnection of the work of the speaker of the	soviet and the head 
of administration was, in my view, not very reasonable, because it created a 
static in the sense that when the speaker and the head were one and the same 
person, the speaker knew how he was going to implement decisions in the 
administration. But now we have a situation where the soviet makes decisions 
and they are not interested in how we will carry them out, and in this sense 
rose misunderstandings.”	(1993)
19. “… Now of course there is more freedom in activities, because earlier we 
were completely dependent on the work of the party organs and they came to 
the Executive political committee and dictated their terms to the committee. 
Now the head of administration himself makes practically all decisions but 
has to approve them with the soviet and higher administrative organs in the 
city administration. He has double subordination.” (1993)
20. “First of all, our delegates were not very competent people, unfortunately. 
They were good people as people, well meaning, – good person, orderly, but 
here you should also be a professional. One	should at least know the basics of 
law to know whether it is possible to deal with the situation or not. A person 
must be explained to immediately. Unfortunately, this is not so. Here, you 
know, things are always decided at an emotional level. […] I felt that the 
professionals did not work with their constituents. They met with them from 
time to time when they had an appointment, but further than that… Now I 
do understand, they may not have very much time for that, but	we either 
agree to do this work or we should refuse it.” (1993)
21. “… There were no special contacts with the delegates. They came only 
for their constituents´ questions, if they were retired persons. […] They come 
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with the same questions to somehow help someone. To sort out retirement 
questions.” (1993)
6.3.1.3 Information and Guidance
Connected	to	decision	making	and	direction	giving	in	the	administration	is	
organizational	communication.	By	the	year	2000	the	knowledge	gathered	
by	the	line	workers	in	the	appointments	moved	to	a	certain	degree	upwards	
in	 the	 hierarchy.	 Unanimously	 the	 interviewees	 in	 the	 2000	 sample	
acknowledged	their	ability	to	influence	planning	and	practical	work	in	their	
own	department,	thanks	again	to	the	immediate	leadership.
22. “We give our points of	view	there upstairs, about what the retirees want, 
what kinds of problems they have. We help, maybe, the leadership to work on 
the policy which they are supposed to have. Of course from our discourse with 
people we gather a lot of information, of what should be done and how it 
should be done. ” (2000)
23. “Earlier you were not asked. Nobody was interested.”(2000)
24. “… In other words, what	concerns changes of a local nature, in other 
words the city, we write to the city [as	to] how things have	to be done, this has 
to be done that way, – and we are heard in some places and in some others 
not, but we have a direct connection. […] We in a sense	 have a double 
subordination, a set of local questions the city decides, and if the questions are 
federal, then we as a matter of fact don´t have a general center of coordination, 
we instead go straight to the oblast level. […] In all of this, we have it easier 
with questions of local self-government. Things move from the bottom upstairs 
easier. The connection is better. But what concerns the connection through the 
subject of Federation, in federal questions, it is more difficult.	In this connection 
it is more just executing decisions of higher organs. And our initiatives play a 
lesser role. It is more a matter of correcting already made documents. In 
practice we start to implement them and we see that they don´t work, then we 
start to write how they work and what should be changed, if indeed changes 
will be done, if they are considered needed … if it is seen that something does 
not work here, then we write to the oblast committee.	There are of course 
points of collision.	There are questions which are not decided.	 I can´t say 
about it more directly because I don´t work with these questions, but one feels. 
Because, for instance in our work, when there are two masters of the house, as 
a result nothing works out. That is why a sharp separation is better, just one 
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[decision maker], and the other does not touch the question. We have this 
situation for instance with homeless people.” (2000)
The	higher	vertical	line	was	mostly	in	the	hands	of	the	director	of	district	
administration,	as	the	answers	indicated	some	hesitance	as	to	how	much	
the	practical	experiences	directly	influence	higher	decision	making	outside	
of	the	administration.	All	in	all,	the	change	in	the	way	information	could	be	
obtained	by	 the	clients	and	 let	out	by	 the	administrators	 themselves	had	
radically	altered	during	the	90´s	compared	to	the	Soviet	times.	The	work	
organization	itself	had	become	more	responsible	for	its	work	and	making	a	
difference	in	the	realization	of	federal	policy.	
25. “If I have been given a task, I will myself decided it. I am not dependent 
on anyone. I look at the financial situation in the district. And that is why no-
one can influence me because I can personally decide certain questions. Earlier 
all came from the center.	 There was the center, only the center	 decided 
everything. And now the questions are here in the district. We don´t even 
have to go to the city but we can decide questions here. […] We became more 
independent, than for instance in the 80´s because then the center decided.” 
(1993)
Another	side	of	the	information	and	guidance	is	the	way	work	conditions	
and	information	processing	itself	has	developed.	In	the	studied	organization,	
the	practical	 conditions	had	 improved	 significantly	 since	 computers	had	
been	 bought	 for	 each	 cabinet.	 Even	 though	 two	 persons	 shared	 one	
computer	this	was	a	major	improvement	in	the	way	information	could	be	
processed	and	clients	served.	It	had	also	added	to	the	professional	skills	of	
administrators.	Even	though	there	was	a	hope	to	have	each	one	have	her	
own	personal	computer,	and	to	improve	the	quality	of	the	programs	used,	
the	general	development	was	seen	as	positive	by	the	informants.	
26. “We have a shortage of work space. I think that we don´t even have the 
elementary conditions for an inspector´s work, because generally in one room 
four people hold consulting hours. Four people ask questions and four people 
answer. Eight people speak at the same time.	It is not possible to work in such 
conditions.	Maybe in time, we will be helped. We were promised computers, 
calculators which work on the light not electricity. In other words we have 
many problems. Especially our department. They involve technical questions 
and the staff. We have a problem with the staff, people do not wish this kind of 
[working condition]. We have a big shortage of staff. On top of this I would to 
say that we endure on enthusiasm. If they were offered something better, I 
think that many would leave our department.” (1993)
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Computerization	 had	 been	 the	major	 change	 in	 the	 90´s.	This	 had	 a	
significant	effect	on	the	way	each	citizen´s	affairs	could	be	managed.	The	
administrators	 could	 instantly	 control	 the	 situation	 of	 each	 client	 by	
checking	 his/her	 information	 and	 by	 calculating	 the	 possible	 needs	 for	
changes.	This	obviously	decreased	the	possibility	for	error	as	well	 for	the	
misplacement	of	paper	documentation.	At	the	same	time	it	made	keeping	
records	 easier.	The	 effect	 that	 these	 routine	 issues	 had	 for	 the	 sense	 of	
efficiency	and	client	service	was	worthy	of	note.	
27. “The most important thing is computerization. I am convinced of this 
because one of the first who started to work with computers was our 
department.” (1993)
28. “Here is our problem. People cannot ask questions. Also, all kinds of 
letters	come. Even if you would like to answer, you don´t know what is the 
concrete point of interest, what is needed.” (2000)
29.	“I would like that we would have, – that we would not collect papers, 
but would have computers. […] At least now it is very difficult, even with the 
Tax inspection we cannot make this connection with computers, so that we 
would have a uniform system. […] Even though in the finance department we 
all have computers, but information is not such as we would like to have.” 
(1993)
30. “Work became more productive. First of all, earlier we had a lot of hand 
work. […] But now we have computers in out rooms. In other words, 
information is before your eyes in the computer.	There is more information.” 
(2000)
At	the	same	time,	good	service	to	citizens	(sensitivity	to	their	problems,	
professionalism)	even	under	the	strains	of	change	was	brought	up	by	some	
of	those	interviewed.	This	line	of	thinking	had	strengthened	itself	in	2000.	
It	had	become	the	new	norm	of	action	which	was	reflected	in	the	answers	
and	in	the behavior	of	the	work	collective.	Giving	information	in	a	more	
open	manner	and	according	to	clients´	needs	had	become	an	important	“self-
	evident”	norm.	This	was	also	reflected	in	the	way	the	physical	surroundings	
were	organized.	The	names	of	directors,	their	room	and	phone	numbers	as	
well	as	times	of	appointments	were	on	the	wall	in	the	first	floor	lobby.
In	 the	 studied	 organization,	 openness	 in	 information	 giving	 was	
unproblematic.	 However,	 this	 does	 not	 directly	 correlate	 with	 active	
administration.	Clients	were	still	expected	to	initiate	processes	and	be	active	
in	 their	own	cases.	They	could	get	 service	but	 the	quality	of	 the	process	
depended	also	on	the	specific	client.
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6.3.1.4 Leadership
The	break	up	of	the	administrative	market	had	altered	the	position	of	the	
director	considerably.	The	head	of	the	new	administration	who	in	the	Soviet	
system	had	a	double	position	as	a	member	of	the	soviet	and	the	head	of	its	
executive	committee	(present	administration)	had	structurally	new	limits	
but	within	his	own	organization	at	 least	 the	same	amount	of	power.	The	
1995	city	charter	again	founded	the	double	role.	The	head	of	a	district	acts	
as	 a	 deputy	mayor.	 (Ustav	 goroda	 geroia	Murmanska	 1995:	 glava	 IV:23,	
glava	VI:35).	
The	view	on	leadership	and	its	role	had	changed	in	a	quite	note	worthy	
manner	between	1993	and	2001.	The	change	 is	even	more	evident	when	
viewed	against	the	leadership	qualities	dominant	in	the perestroika	period.	
In	1993	some	expressed	the	view	that	the	head	of	the	district	administration	
had	in	effect	become	an	authoritative	leader	only	after	the	changes	when	
the	Soviet	no	longer	had	institutional	power	over	the	administrations	daily	
actions.	
31. “We decided things in a collegial manner earlier. The chairman of the 
Political Executive committee was here and the committee decided everything. 
Now almost all decisions, maybe since ´93, since ´92 when we became an 
administration, – in a collegial manner are decided	very difficult questions,	
the collegiate is founded along the administration- and generally the head of 
administration can decide small questions himself.” (1993)
32. “… With the appearance of administration, we began to execute the 
politics which the head of the administrations guides, in other words we 
execute the will of one person, who stands on top of our administration. All 
departments are for that and exist so that we can bring to life his politics. 
Earlier, when there was the Regional political executive committee, we 
executed the will, – in other words the highest was named the Executive 
committee of the Regional Soviet of delegates	–, in other words we executed 
the will of delegates. Here is the difference.” (1993)
In	 2000,	 the	 leadership´s	 role	 was	 drawn	 from	 a	 distinctly	 different	
corner.	His	role	as	a	model	for	good	a	administrator,	organizer	and	controller	
of	work	was	emphasized.	He	was	seen	as	a	person	who	shaped	the	spirit	of	
the	organization	and	also	defended	 it	against	 the	outside.	The	 leadership	
was	given	credit	for	creating	a	comfortable	and	open	working	atmosphere	
which	in	the	assessment	of	the	administrators	differed	from	other	districts.	
The	meaning	of	open	communication	style	and	practical	initiatives	of	the	
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immediate	 leadership	 in	 the	 department	 was	 stressed.	 Against	 this	
background	 the	director	of	 the	whole	organization	was	 seen	mostly	 as	 a	
controller	and	defender	of	the	formal	interest	of	the	city´s	administrative	
market.
	
6.3.1.5 Personnel
The	most	visible	effect	of	the	changes	in	the	administrative	market	had	take	
place	on	 the	personal	 authority	of	 the	 interviewed	administrators	which	
had	 grown	 in	 a	 noteworthy	 manner	 both	 formally	 and	 factually.	 Most	
independent	in	the	sense	of	their	own	initiative	and	activeness	was	the	work	
of	social	assistance	administrators.	Their	ability	to	use	discretion	could	in	
certain	situations	be	quite	large.	They	had	direct	access	to	the	population	
and	had	legal	rights	to	make	immediate	decisions	concerning	benefits	by	
themselves.	It	was	also	pointed	out	that	the	city	district	as	an	organization	
now	enjoyed	fuller	power.	Issues	had	gained	more	importance	along	with	
the	hierarchy	 of	 relations.	Yet,	 this	was	not	 regarded	 solely	 as	 a	 positive	
matter,	since	it	also	created	new	practical	problems.	Control	of	everyone´s	
personal	 performance	 was	 ensured	 by	 way	 of	 withdrawing	 a	 wrongly	
calculated	sum	of	money	from	the	administrator´s	salary. This,	along	with	
citizen´s	 complaints	 to	 the	 immediate	 leadership,	 were	 enough	 to	make	
everybody	keen	on	not	openly	making	mistakes.	Control	 in	general	was	
now	 coming	 more	 from	 those	 parts	 of	 the	 population	 which	 the	
administrators	 were	 supposed	 to	 serve	 than	 from	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 the	
administration	itself.	
Democratic	and	open	working	style	where	each	individual	administrator	
had	a	say	in	her	daily	routines	and	in	the	development	of	the	organization´s	
work	was	seen	as	such	a	value	in	itself	that	it	compensated	for	salary	and	the	
hardships	of	the	client	service.	In	contrast	with	the	earlier	Soviet	times	and	
even	the	beginning	of	1990´s,	there	was	clear	change	in	attitudes	towards	
this	end	which	was	born	out	of	personally	positive	work	experiences.	Even	
though	a	social	and	authoritative	hierarchy	existed	within	the	organization,	
its	immediate	weight	on	practical	work	had	diminished	and	the	line	workers	
felt	 more	 authoritative	 in	 their	 respective	 roles.	They	 had	 in	 this	 sense	
acquired	“faces”.	
33. “Disturbing impression. Very disturbing. When you came to a higher 
ranking person in the administration, earlier it was called obkom, – he did not 
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see you. Can you imagine, it was a terrifying impression when you stood 
before him and he did not see you. Now I don´t feel such things anymore. I 
don´t know why. Thanks to perestroika, I don´t know.	But now I don´t feel 
that anymore.	They see me. They don´t always listen to me, but at least they 
see! They see that I stand before them.” (2000)
34. “Rights, generally speaking they don´t solve anything. Our supervisor is 
such that – she is democratic. You can always say your opinion. There are 
demands. Of course, if you are not right, you can be told about it – but only 
by the leadership.	Otherwise, suit yourself.	It is normal pressure. […] I observe 
a certain distance, distance in official relationships, not in the sphere of human 
rights. This distance, it has not shrunk or grown, it has become more 
democratic. […] The head of administration values our work. Understands 
what it is, that it is very hard to work with people. […] Questions concerning 
the organization of work, we as far as I know, decide together. Our director, 
she collects all the interested parties and	together everybody decided what to 
do and how to do it best.	Because of this, there is talk that October district 
wants to do everything. That this district tries to do things which others do 
not. This is the way we decide. ” (2000)
At	the	same	time	personal	independence	had	become	important	for	the	
administrators.	The	official	 roles	had	 grown	and	 the	work	had	 thus	 also	
become	more	demanding.	They	did	not	need	to	ask	for	permission	from	the	
higher	authorities	 in	matters	which	were	within	their	 legal	discretion,	or	
indeed	 wait	 for	 general	 administrative	 directions	 in	 all	 details.	 The	
organization	itself	had	become	the	general	manager	in	its	daily	practices.	
Laws	were	the	primary	limitation	to	what	decisions	to	make.	
35. “You don´t feel any pressure. Here are your duties and here are your 
rights. […] You feel freer here. You breath more freely. But, along with this, 
you know, that you breath freely only thanks to your sense of responsibility. If 
you	don´t do something, you also won´t feel that free.” ( 2000)
The	position	of	the	administrative	personnel	had	changed	in	two	ways	
during	the	studied	time	periods.	First	of	all	the	work	load	itself	had	changed	
dramatically	in	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s,	laws	and	regulations	changed	
rapidly	and	made	the	practical	work	difficult	and	tiresome.	Client	interest	
in	the	changing	laws,	together	with	the	acutely	difficult	financial	situation,	
made	the	work	very	demanding	both	physically	and	psychologically.	At	the	
same	time	the	conditions	for	organization	had	not	improved.	All	the	work	
was	 done	 with	 a	 pencil	 and	 paper	 which	meant	 a	 physical	 build	 up	 of	
documentation.	Even	the	privacy	of	clients	was	questionable	when	in	some	
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cases	there	were	four	inspectors	working	in	the	same	room.	Computerization	
began	 in	 the	 organization	 in	 1995.	The	 continuously	 changing	 pensions	
made	calculating	the	amounts	people	were	supposed	to	receive	burdensome.	
Many	 interviewed	 persons	 told	 about	 having	 to	 bring	 work	 home	 and	
receiving	people	not	only	on	the	official	days	of	Monday	and	Wednesday,	
but	every	day	when	necessary.	Generally	speaking	the	personnel	felt	that	
more	of	it	was	demanded	on	daily	basis	and	the	environment	in	which	the	
increasingly	 demanding	 work	 had	 to	 be	 completed	 was	 all	 the	 more	
unstable.	 Planning	 and	personal	 development	of	 the	work	where	mostly	
goals	for	the	future.
According	to	the	city	charter,	the	staff	of	administrative	organs	are	chosen	
and	approved	internally	with	the	exception	of	the	director	of	the	organization,	
who	is	appointed	by	the	mayor	and	the	vice-directors,	who	are	nominated	
by	 their	 director	 and	 appointed	 by	 the	 mayor.	 (Ustav	 goroda-geroia	
Murmansk	1995:	glava	VI:34.) The	recruitment	practices	had	principally	
stayed	the	same	in	the	90´s.	This	meant	a	situation	of	usually	knowing	about	
vacant	 positions	 through	 personal	 contacts	 and	 then	 getting	 to	 be	
interviewed	by	 the	 immediate	 leadership.	A	person´s	 interpersonal	 skills	
played	an	important	part	in	the	choosing	along	with	specialization.	
Affiliation	with	any	particular	political	party	did	not	play	a	role	in	the	
choosing	of	line	workers,	the	leadership	on	the	other	hand	was	chosen	by	
higher	administrative	organs.	The	employees	represented	different	types	of	
personal	backgrounds,	so	there	was	no	clear	indication	of	the	recruitment	
system	officially	favoring	a	particular	group.	In	general,	politics	was	removed	
from	the	discussion	which	instead	emphasized	legalism	and	service	to	the	
population.	
36. “Work is work. Under which flag it takes place makes no difference.” 
(1993)
The	interviewed	persons	had	different	educational	backgrounds.	That	is	
why	many	 of	 them	 had	 learned	 about	 administrative	 processes	 and	 the	
respective	 laws	 at	 work.	The	 education	 of	 the	 collective	 was	 of	 notable	
importance	to	the	interviewed	group	of	2000. The	reorientation	of	the	work	
collective	into	the	new	situation	had	already	started	in	1993,	but	in	2000	the	
studied	collective	had	specifically	started	a	loose	program	of	work	related	
education.	This	involved	both	knowing	about	the	implementation	of	new	
legislation	and	regulations and on	the	job	computer	education.	Besides	this,	
many	in	the	organization	had	taken	it	upon	themselves	to	take	extra	classes	
on	 their	 own	 in	 different	 types	 of	 educational	 institutions	 of	 which	 the	
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Academy	 of	 Administration	 in	 Saint-Petersburg	 was	 one	 of	 the	 most	
prominent.	Even	though	this	type	of	adult	education	was	not	compensated	
by	salary,	it	was	seen	as	a	great	plus	and	personal	insurance	for	the	future.	
In	this	sense,	learning	had	become	a	new	tool	for	survival	as	well	as	a	value	
in	itself.
37. “… The most important thing is professionalism. So that specialist 
would work here.	Not just anyone, but for instance and inspector should be 
correspondingly educated in law. He should know the law. He should not work 
just for one day. He should have a job contract for some time, in other words 
he should be a professional in his work. Today it is still very, – of 29 people 
there are maybe 6 professionals. The rest are new, just again coming to work 
without the corresponding education. As a rule in the Soviet Union there were 
only 6 colleges for our area. Now it is almost not possible to find the ideal 
specialist who could come and work. Maybe in the future there will be support 
for this. Maybe the government pays attention to it. Of course retired persons 
need specialists.” (1993)
38. “Yes! The thing is that from ´85 on and especially since ´86 when 
perestroika started. Earlier our department was named “social security”, and 
the task was very narrow. In other words it was decisions on pensions, state 
payments and somehow distribute travelling tickets [for trips to sanatoriums], 
this kind of one time help, very small. But in today´s life our functions of course 
are expanded very much, we have an extra acute service “social help” […] We 
started to invest more support materially, our workload grew much. (1993)
39. “Autumn arrives. And then you will of course work longer, and at home 
too. I	had to sit at home till late night, I took work home, because one must. 
[…] With all these new government decisions, in addition to that we in the 
administration work with all kinds of	other questions, all kinds of humanitarian 
assistance, which take your work time. And all the rest we are supposed to do, 
to do within	time limits, time limits … You know, it is a habit! A habit, and 
still I love my work. I would not change it.” (2000)
40. “I fear getting older.	Not that I will be unemployed. But that I will 
become worse. […]	One is ashamed to become worse. Earlier this was not the 
case. But now it is.	Because I started to notice how people lose their work skills 
as they get older. […] For the future´s sake one has to study. And I really don´t 
want to study.	I really don´t want to.	It is not the studying itself, but … first of 
all education is not free, and I have a daughter. It is	 problematic.	And 
secondly, our director takes this issue very seriously.	I don´t particularly wish 
to discuss this theme with him.” ( 2000)
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The	growth	of	discretionary	area	for	each	official	was	described	in	the	
following	manner:	
41. “People themselves I suppose changed. Earlier there was a different 
climate, demands were different. Here you have to think about every case 
separately.	But its not just that, I mean that you cannot discuss with a retiree 
the way you would at home or in the street. You talk with him as an official. 
You cannot bring anything unnecessary into the situation. […]Do you know 
the type of demands we had earlier: to do things fast. We had to perform our 
tasks fast, with quality, but – the main thing was speed. Now things are already 
a little bit different.	You are supposed to perform your tasks not only fast, not 
just with quality, but you are supposed to take responsibility, think,	you know, 
the main thing is to think. Earlier it was : do, do, do. Here it is not. We started 
to have more responsibility.”	(2000)
The	only	visible	distinction	which	had	remained	was	that	in	spite	of	the	
staff	being	nearly	100%	female,	the	top	leadership	of	the	house	was	male.	At	
the	 city	 level,	 though,	 the	mayor	 did	 have	 female	 deputies.	The	 issue	 of	
equality	was	not	 specifically	 raised	 in	 the	questions,	and	 the	 interviewed	
persons	themselves	did	not	mention	this	question.	The	fact	that	a	woman	
had	never	headed	the	whole	house	did	indicate	men	being	traditionally	top	
leaders.	For	one	reason	or	another	the	chance	for	a	male	worker	to	one	day	
reach	 the	 top	 in	 the	organization	was	proportionally	many	 times	greater	
than	for	a	woman.	
42. “Sometimes I think it is our men, the directors are used to seeing men 
in leading positions and women they think need to be freed from workloads. 
Maybe it is on one hand good but if you take a look, in our government sits 
only one [woman] minister, Panfilova. There are no others. This is telling. We 
have one woman at the city administration, deputy head of the administration. 
But at the county level there are no woman deputies. […] That´s how I feel. 
Women should not take on their shoulders any responsibility. (1993)
The	 composition	 of	 men	 and	 women	 in	 decision	 making	 positions	
seemed	to	show	that	the	old	culture	of	male	leadership	was	quite	firmly	in	
place.	The	development	of	equal	advancement	opportunities	for	women	in	
Russian	 administrative	 organizations	 can	 be	 linked	 with	 the	 general	
strengthening	of	 formal,	 legal	and	 impersonal	 institutional	channels.	For	
instance	in	Friedgut´s	193	study	one	conclusion	was	that	informal	work	
related	 communication	networks	which	 supplement	 the	 formal	 channels	
are	most	useful	 to	male	workers.	 In	other	words,	 there	has	been	“a	male	
bias”	 in	 the	 informal	 networks	 in	 the	 Soviet	 local	 administration	which	
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stops	 women	 from	 advancing	 to	more	 important	 posts.	 (Friedgut	 193:	
150.)	For	future	studies	this	characteristic	of	Russian	local	administration	is	
particularly	important	because	the	services	which	the	local	administration	
provide	such	as	education,	health	and	social	services	are	both	vital	for	the	
support	of	the	transition	and	“female”	in	the	Soviet	hierarchy	of	matters.
6.3.1.6 Citizens and Non-governmental Organizations
The	client	service	was	described	as	requiring	good	psychological	skills	from	
the	administrators	because	the	people	who	came	to	the	organization	were	
either	 old,	 poor,	 stressed	 out,	 sometimes	 in	 need	 of	 psychiatric	 help,	 or	
families	with	children, sometimes	living	in	particularly	bad	conditions,	or	
homeless.	Each	case	needed	individual	consideration	which	also	gave	the	
administrators	room	for	discretion.	The	year	2000	group	stressed	that	those	
who	are	not	suited	for	the	conditions	of	the	work,	simply	leave.	
The	information	the	administrators	gathered	in	their	client	contacts	was	
generally	speaking	quite	routine.	It	involved	finding	out	the	benefit	seekers	
economical	status,	work	background,	marital	and	family	situation	and	the	
personal	grounds	for	seeking	assistance	or	pension.	The	clients	filled	in	a	
respective	document	and	came	to	the	appointment	with	the	proper	papers	
to	hand.	With	the	help	of	 the	administrator,	 they	hand	wrote	on	a	blank	
piece	of	paper	their	personal	history	which	served	as	the	basis	for	judging	
whether	they	were	eligible	for	benefits	or	not.	The	decision	itself	was	made	
by	the	commission	of	the	pension	and	benefit	department	which	met	every	
Friday.	
The	activeness	of	the	clients	themselves	was	raised	by	many.	The	pension	
receivers	particularly	were	described	as	very	active	and	aware	of	their	rights	
in	different	situations.	This	was	a	clear	change	from	the	time	before	1991.	
Many	described	 their	 clients	 as	very	demanding	which	made	 their	work	
both	more	interesting	and	stressful	at	 the	same	time.The	clients	followed	
the	 newspapers	 and	 demanded	 that	 the	 administrators	 took	 action	
immediately.	In	this	way	the	role	of	 the	client	had	gone	through	a	major	
change	since	the	Soviet	times	ended.
Between	1996	and	2000,	44	civil	complaints	were	filed	in	the	court	about	
the	 district	 administration.	 Of	 these,	 seven	 were	 ruled	 in	 favor	 of	 the	
plaintiff.	In	comparison,	during	the	same	time	period	the	administration	
took	to	court	6	cases	of	which	32	were	ruled	in	its	favor	and	36	were	still	
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waiting	 the	 result	 in	 the	 year	 2000.	 (Material	 o	 rabote	 administratsii	 g.	
Murmanska	s	noiabr	1996	po	nostoiashee	vremia	2000:	46.)	The	city	charter	
also	formalizes	the	citizens´right	to	appeal	in	the	administration	as	well	as	
to	the	Murmansk	city	prosecutor	who	works	as	part	of	the	federal	system	of	
prosecutors.	(Ustav	goroda	geroia	Murmanska	1995:	glava	VI:	3.)
Within	10	years,	the	client	had	been	transformed	from	a	legally	passive	
recipient	into	a	citizen	with	a	voice.	Changes	in	laws	were	being	followed	
even	by	the	oldest	of	the	clients	and	hesitations	towards	expressing	one´s	
view	had	disappeared.	The	clients	also	protested	the	decisions	made	by	the	
administrators	and	used	many	channels	to	get	results	at	the	same	time.	This	
made	 taking	 care	 of	 their	 matters	 sometimes	 confusing	 for	 the	 line	
workers.
43. “… Earlier we received [people] one day in a week, now we practically 
receive [them] at any time, but officially two days a week, Monday and 
Wednesday.” (1993)
44. “Personally my working became harder. I already told you about how 
people have become less good willed in their relation to us civil servants, even 
though in principle in my work and in my relationship to people nothing has 
changed.” (1993)
45. “Generally I don´t have problems. People turn to me usually with 
questions about social security. They are usually retired persons. So … Of course 
it is mostly material means. Surely we don´t have enough of material means, 
and that is why we have very many people who need welfare. If we had more 
material means we could help people of our district more. […] The door is open 
at any time and people come and consult me with questions of interest to them. 
Generally the door is always open, any time of the day …” (1993)
46. “Goodwill from my part and attention. This is from my part. For the 
part of the clients, – we have had a problem which is even hard to formulate 
–, it is anger. People come to us very angry. […] Earlier we first of all had 
“ranks”. It was not always possible to express your negativity –	 this is first. 
People have become freer- they express themselves. Maybe our life changed 
somewhat. In some ways	it has become worse, because of prices, salary (you 
understand this perfectly) – this is secondly.	And thirdly – maybe the negative 
reaction from the part of the mass media. You know, “civil servant- bribe 
taker” and so on. This is one reason. And of course the general low level of 
culture –	people are not very cultivated.	I suppose that these	are the problems. 
And then, naturally, when people come to us to the department, the government 
cannot give an apartment to us. Never in principle could, but it did advertise 
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this possibility. Now it doesn´t advertise it. […] I have everything in order as 
far as contacts are concerned. Because this is a department which works with 
people all the time. Who ever	comes here, we talk with them.” (1993)
47. “Pressure? I don´t feel pressure. Demands grow. And how? They don´t 
grow to benefit for instance me but to benefit those who we serve.	I don´t even 
think that it is always good, because sometimes you feel ashamed to have to 
protect for instance some alcoholic, some mother who has deserted seven 
children, and I for some reason should take her from outside the line and give 
her material assistance, or in some way console her with words, and I know 
that she is an alcoholic woman who has deserted seven children.	But I have to!	
This outrages me.	It is the only pressure I have.	Otherwise nothing. There are 
demands, yes. But I consider that it is necessary. I am not against it.	Maybe I 
don´t like it.	Maybe it takes extra time from me. Extra physical energy. But I 
understand that it is necessary.” (2000)
48. “For me sharp changes have taken place. Although they came as 
planned. There was no shock therapy, but sharp changes in every case.	How I 
used to view my work and how I do it now, they are two different things. In 
other words, sense of responsibility grew a lot. […] You know, you handle 
consulting hours quite differently.	You understand that you for example, – 
when I worked in the center of pensions, yes, I could “relax”.	I could allow 
myself to talk to the retirees in a way that I can´t today, then it was a different 
style. In general, nobody asked about this.	Here I have a different attitude, 
totally different. “Paws up.” ( 2000)
49. “We are forced to work all our free days to do to them what they [clients] 
ask. (2000)
50. “We are worse off, but you know, I want to say that in my own work 
even 10 years ago I more often met people who said: “Oy, I wish I would die 
soon! ” These were old people. Now this happens rarely. It does take place. 
Because there have always been pessimistic people, and always will be.	But 
more rarely.	With all these difficulties, life became more interesting. Yes. More 
interesting.” (2000)
The	 situation	 in	 1993	 was	 at	 the	 cross	 roads	 of	 old	 and	 new	 in	 the	
environmental	 relations.	The	 old	 party	 organized	 connections	 had	 been	
broken	and	many	of	the	services	which	had	thus	earlier	been	provided	by	
the	community,	such	as	centers	for	retiree´s,	New	Year	parties	for	children	
and	such	had	been	discontinued.	The	help	of	humanitarian	organizations,	
including	foreign,	was	greeted	mostly	with	a	certain	amount	of	indifference.	
Their	role	was	not	yet	clear	at	the	time,	and	many	interviewed	persons	did	
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not	see	a	clear	benefit	to	their	work.Yet	at	the	same	time	there	were	cases	
where	 the	organizations	work	was	recognized	and	 in	one	particular	case	
assessed	 as	 highly	 meaningful.	 It	 seemed	 that	 the	 more	 vulnerable	 and	
marginalized	the	clients´	situation	was	at	the	time	of	the	interviews	(such	as	
for	 instance	 children	 living	 in	 orphanages),	 the	 more	 the	 interviewed	
persons	working	with	that	group	of	clients	appreciated	outside	help.
51. “You know, social organizations practically do not work with my 
department, especially so because they have no influence on my work. They do 
not give any help, they only turn to us with questions. Frankly speaking I 
would like that before they [the social organizations] turn to us, they would	
carefully look at what it possible. […] I would like that when they turn to us, 
they would have studied the situation before coming to us. […] Then of course 
it	would be easier to work. […] I have a commission in the department, social 
commission, where representatives	of organizations come and we work with 
them. Only, we do not meet often and [then]we deal with concrete questions 
of distributing living quarters.” (1993)
52. “To have time to find these people. It has only began here, we just started 
a service “Urgent social assistance” and we try to [provide it] from all of these 
social organizations	and clinics and such services which are essentially joined 
with our area, with retired person and invalids. So that we would ourselves 
find these people. So that they would not come to us as today but we would go 
to them, to give help or what ever.” (1993)
53. “They of course influence us a great deal, because these organization 
are unions of our people. “The organization of invalids”, they meet and some 
piece of this work they do themselves through	their own contacts, people don´t 
feel forgotten. (…) “Red cross” has a very tight contact with us. Foundations 
for children, we work with them. So they help us in a wonderful way and we 
try to help them.” (1993)
55. “Now, how can they [social organizations] influence? They by nature do 
not influence. They try to show us some help … The Association of Veterans, 
which is joined in work with the administration, it helped us. We had to collect 
documentation from many. They organized the collection of documentations 
beginning early March till May. If a signal comes that somewhere someone 
lives badly, some retired person, they help us to go to the place, follow how that 
person lives.” (1993)
The	 regional	 administration	 had	 passed	 a	 decree	 on	 the	 cooperation	
between	 executive	 organs	 and	 non-governmental	 organizations	 in	 1996	
according	to	which	administration	and	the	organizations	could	enter	into	
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contracts	to	realize	federal	and	regional	social	programs.	For	these	purposes	
the	 regional	 government	 offers	 grants	 over	 which	 it	 makes	 decisions.	
(Postonovleniia,	 administratsiia	Murmanskoi	 oblast´i,	 ot	 2.11.1996,	No	
42.)	In	this	way,	the	third	sector	had	been	incorporated	into	the	official	
policy	execution	hierarchy.	
In	 year	 2000,	 the	 official	 forms	 of	 co-operation	 with	 some	 non-
governmental	organizations	such	as	the	Red	Cross,	had	been	in	place	for	
some	time.	These	were	now	viewed	as	a	part	of	the	community	service	but	
at	the	same	time	their	role	was	secondary.	The	effort	was	to	do	things	within	
the	system	and	use	the	help	of	NGO´s	such	as	the	Red	Cross	only	in	those	
programs	where	acute	material	help	was	needed,	such	as	the	soup	kitchens	
for	poor	retiree´s	and	clothing	for	homeless	persons.	The	role	of	civil	society	
was	not	expressly	underlined	and	the	NGO´s,	as	a	part	of	the	regional	social	
policy,	was	still	a	new	thing.	The	third	sector,	even	if	in	some	cases	vital,	was	
not	 seen	 as	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 administrative	 structure.	 Mostly	 it	 was	
viewed	as	a	necessary	helper.	Relying	on	the	help	of	the	third	sector	also,	to	
an	extent,	indicated	“failure”	by	the	official	structures.	There	was	not	yet	an	
expressed	 transition	 toward,	 for	 instance,	 the	American	 type	a	 system	of	
local	government.	
By	 the	 year	 2000,	 the	 situation	 had	 stabilized	 itself	 to	 a	 degree	 and	
planning	 of	 work	 tasks	 had	 received	 a	 place	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	
service.	This	stabilization	of	the	situation	meant	that	the	quality	of	the	client	
service	 itself	had	become	a	manifestly	more	important	matter.	What	was	
earlier	a	duty	that	needed	to	be	done,	was	now	a	specific	goal.	Every	person	
interviewed	told	about	the	client	service	from	the	point	of	view	of	quality:	
what	type	of	information	people	receive,	how	they	have	to	be	treated,	and	
what	 types	 of	 person´s	 are	 suited	 to	 this	 work.	 The	 organization	 had	
acquired	a	sense	of	a	common	working	style.	
55. “We have a remarkable work collective. We, 50% of our collective, 
worked together already for 20 years. In other words, you understand, in 
Russia to work 20 years together means one family. ”(2000)
56. “I think that the most important quality for a worker is the will to work 
right here. Because the work is hard. We are in contact with such a category of 
people, grandmothers and grandfathers, with them the level has to be such 
that they understand, one has to help, just talk with them, maybe feel sorry for 
them even so that they … as people. Then of course knowledge is necessary, 
ability to work with computers. […] The social culture should be	a certain 
kind. […] Respect towards people, work discipline.” (2000)
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6.3.1.7 Law and Rules
The	changes	in	legislation	and	the	lack	of	clear	decision	making	norms	had	
gradually	been	replaced	with	a	more	stable	situation.	Yet	 there	remained	
practical	challenges	in	the	way	the	new	legislation	was	implemented	at	the	
customer	service	level.	The	importance	of	legal	promptness	and	accuracy	
was	 stressed	 as	 the	 main	 indicator	 of	 success	 in	 the	 timely	 delivery	 of	
payments	and	regulated	material	assistance.	The	level	of	financial	assistance	
or	the	direction	of	social	services	in	general	was	not	discussed.	
In	 1993	 many	 administrators	 pointed	 out	 that	 their	 practical	 work	
consisted	of	“carrying	out”	the	laws	–	work	on	which	nobody	could	have	an	
effect.	Some	pointed	out	that	planning	itself	was	not	carried	out	at	the	district	
level.	Laws	at	the	time	of	the	first	interviews	were	changing	very	rapidly	and	
the	relationship	with	them	was	mixed.	The	past	system	was	viewed	as	stable	
and	monolithic	with	regard	to	changes	in	law.	New	norms	had	not	emerged	
to	replace	earlier	ones:	there	was	more	of	a	sense	of	being	in	limbo.
This	 transition	 was	 described	 in	 the	 following	 series	 of	 excerpts	 as	 a	
tumbling	of	changing	laws,	more	vigilant	and	worried	clients	and	a	break	
down	of	legal	planning.	The	flow	of	information	outside	of	the	administration	
collided	with	difficulties	in	micro-managing	federal	laws	locally.	
57. “… It is as if we were guilty of everything, you know. And of course we 
have delays, because the law making is not very calculated. We all waited for 
the law on	pensions but it didn´t turn out quite the way we expected. We work 
with the old laws and the new ones. […] I feel that earlier people came to	
appointments less frequently. It was only in some particular cases. The 
workload has grown but you cannot make much sense out of it. […] Maybe 
there were always some kinds of problems. But really now the conditions of life 
have changed, the problems with which we work have changed.” (1993)
58. “ They could come and say that they will send you to the party organs 
or some other place, they wrote to newspapers. This they could. But, first of all, 
it would have been a great exception. Why? […] People woke up. Back then, 
ne in a hundred did not sleep. In other words one in a hundred was active. 
And for a person to come with a law, he should have first of all found it 
somewhere. Well, yes. He could have come, could have. But maybe he wouldn´t 
have been listened to. Or maybe they would have listened to him only because 
he was such a wonder. Why did he come?! Then it was a wonder. How on 
earth? …	How can there be such an educated person?! Where did he find the 
law?!	Now things are different.” (2000)
The TransiTion oF adminisTraTive culTure since 1991
29
59. “Earlier documents, instructions or laws came more quickly.Now they 
are delayed somewhere on the road, one can say to the residents	 that	 they 
come delayed. And we, as all citizens, read about the laws in the newspapers.” 
(1993)
60. “And of course we have delays	because law making is not very calculated. 
We all waited for the law on	pensions but it didn´t turn out quite the way we 
expected. We work with the old laws and the new ones.” (1993)
61. “Today we have the peak, because as you have probably seen the 
retirement law changed, it changes practically every quarter of the year. But 
the laws in question have not come here yet, many are already published and 
therefore we, for instance, do not know how many of these should be 
implemented in today´s situation. And people may already know about this 
law but its implementation mechanism is not specified. This is why we try to 
do something, order something, but we cannot just pay what they should by 
law receive. […] So far it is worse. So far this conflicting problem is pointed.” 
(1993)
62. “Once in three months this year already. This is of course a big weight. 
… Stressful? I don´t even know … the same situation. If there weren´t these 
recalculations, everything would be normal.” (2000)
63. “You know, now they tell me about laws. They started to read papers, a 
lot. Earlier we had only one newspaper, The Poliarnaia Pravda. […] Now we 
have many papers. They come to me with newspapers. They tell about what 
kinds of laws they have read and what I am supposed to do for them according 
to that law.	In other words, it is they who are teaching me.	You know, now we 
have new law about a raise in pensions in August. This law only came out and 
they already during the second day call, after they have completely calculated 
their pensions. Can you imagine! I still do not know how to calculate it, but 
they already know. […] Just as new laws come out, they already run here.	[…] 
In other words, now they have become very well versed. They watch television 
…. They sit in the waiting room line and all discuss new laws.	Imagine. They 
read newspapers outloud while they sit in the line. Earlier they didn´t need 
anything. You know, they … they didn´t need anything. Absolutely. This is not 
just because I myself was young.	What would they have needed?! There were 
no changes. Always the same! But now of course everything is different.” 
(2000)
Yet,	in	2000	legal	changes	still	took	place	often	but	the	organization	had	
overcome	the	first	stage	of	adaptation	and	moved	on	to	thinking	about	its	
methods	of	work.	The	sense	of	disorientation	and	day	by	day	survival	had	
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disappeared	and	the	work	collective	was	concentrated	on	the	planning	of	
weekly	 and	 monthly	 tasks.	 There	 was	 also	 a	 pronounced	 feeling	 of	
appreciation	of	 the	changes.	Even	as	 the	economic	situation	was	difficult	
and	sureness	of	future	was	gone,	the	work	itself	was	considered	much	more	
rewarding	 and	 challenging.	The	 ability	 to	 enact	 changes	 at	 the	 personal	
level	and	have	a	voice	in	the	decisions	of	client	services	was	regarded	as	a	
positive	aspect	of	the	transition.	The	quality	of	the	work	in	this	sense	had	
improved	according	to	all	those	interviewed.
The	 period	 between	 fall	 1993	 and	 summer	 2000	 had	 changed	 the	
organization	in	terms	of	clarification	of	priorities.	The	stabilization	of	legal	
interpretation	 and	 the	 changing	 of	 major	 legislation	 had	 begun	 to	 take	
effect.	If	in	the	fall	of	1993	the	political,	legal	and	economic	situation	in	the	
country	 was	 so	 confusing	 that	 any	 type	 of	 long	 term	 goal	 setting	 and	
guidance	policy	would	have	seemed	futile	dreaming,	by	2000	it	was	already	
a	natural	part	of	the	agenda.	The	difference	in	attitude	was	also	quite	clear.	
Professionalism	 in	 customer	 service	 and	 getting	 results	 in	 helping	 the	
clients	was	mentioned	in	both	sample	periods	but	with	more	unity	in	the	
latter	 group.	The	 idea	of	 citizenry	had	 emerged	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 people	
came	more	prepared	to	the	meetings	and	they	needed	to	be	handled	in	a	
certain	way	in	spite	of	their	individual	qualities.	Guidance	to	this	end	–	or	
control	of	every	one´s	work	style	–	was	the	leadership´s	role.	
In	 2000	 short	 term	 work-task	 goals	 had	 become	 routine	 and	
professionalism	was	raised	by	both	the	leadership	and	the	line	workers	as	
the	number	one	goal.	Merely	being	able	to	pay	more	money	to	people	was	
not	 raised	 as	 a	primary	purpose	of	 the	work.	 Instead	 the	general	moral,	
psychological	and	professional	assistance	of	clients	was	seen	as	the	officially	
most	important	tasks.	A	shift	in	the	clarity	of	norms	had	emerged	compared	
to	 the	 situation	 in	 1993	 during	 which	 people´s	 orientations	 were	 still	
uncertain.	There	was	a	great	deal	of	a	sense	of	loss	which	was	reflected	in	“it	
makes	no	difference	anymore”	type	of	reactions	to	questions.	The	sense	of	
guidance	 vacuum	was	 not	 present	 in	 2000,	when	 people	 had	 a	 sense	 of	
commonly	accepted	orientation	towards	work	and	goals.
6.3.2 The New Local Administration Culture
The	 crumbling	 of	 the	 administrative	market	was	 felt	 in	 a	 very	 dramatic	
manner	in	1993.	Representational	and	economical	administrations	were	in	
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upheaval.	By	the	year	2000,	enough	stabilization	had	taken	place	that	the	
administrative	 orientation	 had	 in	 the	 example	 case	 organization	 shifted	
from	waiting	for	answers	from	the	political	machinery	to	practical	actions	
and	changes	in	their	daily	work.	Both	legislatively	and	culturally,	the	local	
level	had	acquired	a	sense	of	organizational	responsibility.	It	did	need	the	
state´s	money,	and	it	did	execute	state	laws,	but	its	daily	work	was	in	its	own	
hands.	Politics	have	taken	a	back	seat	in	the	organization	of	practical	citizen	
service.	The	change	from	the	perspective	of	the	studied	organization	can	be	
summarized	by	the	following	respondent´s	analysis:	
64. “Responsibility grew.	 Responsibility, both materially and morally. 
Because, first of all, you feel that you want to – the face of administration- you 
want to … You want to support the reputation of the collective. Because we 
have the best collective in the city.	Because of this, of course, you feel a huge 
responsibility.	Our supervisor is such that you always wish to support her. You 
know, making mistakes, in the work, – you don´t want to hit her in the face … 
Things changed, of course they changed a	lot. Earlier you came to work and 
just mechanically performed your duties. Now you already fundamentally feel 
that on	the basis of that work depend, not only for example, the retirees, but 
your colleagues. […] And knowledge grew.	I don´t think that we only suffer 
from the situation which we have in our country …	that there is something 
that people don´t receive, because in any case, there is progress.	There is 
progress both in the head and in the work, naturally.	 In practice a lot has 
changed with the influx of information. Earlier, things were different.	You see, 
you know more, you try to understand more.	Here in the administration we 
study, you get to know all the laws[…]	you yourself start to grow. Because of 
this, I see only positive things.” (2000)
Even	as	 the	Constitution	 secures	 the	new	 status	of	 the	 local	 level,	 the	
regional	emphasis	in	the	political	power	balance	has	not	given	the	municipal	
administration	more	practical	space	for	independent	decision	making	and	
planning.	Instead	the	regional	centers	advanced	their	own	independence	in	
the	 joint-government	 system	 of	 subjects	 and	 the	 state.	 This	 means	
decentralization	in	the	sense	that	the	“battleground”	is	closer	to	home,	but	
on	 the	 other	 hand	 it	means	 the	 continual	 difficulty	 of	 unified	 economic	
policy	 for	 the	central	government	which	 forms	 the	financial	basis	of	 the	
municipal	services.	For	the	consolidation	of	administrative	practices,	all	of	
this	results	in	delayed	attention	to	actual	policy	implementation.	
The	 present	 local	 administration	 culture	 can	 be	 viewed	 from	 three	
different	 perspectives.	 Firstly	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 local	 administration	 as	
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management	 which	 underlines	 the	 economic	 efficiency	 and	 control	 of	
decision	making	and	execution.	Secondly	by	seeing	local	administration	as	
governance	which	emphasizes	the	development	of	democratic	political	life	
in	connection	with	legally	based	institutions.	And	thirdly	by	emphasizing	
“good public administration”	 in	which	 the	 principles	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 have	
materialized	in	client-oriented	service	culture.	In	the	last	one	the	focus	is	
on	 the	 actual	 daily	 contact	with	 the	 population	who	 have	 certain	 rights	
(equality	 and	 trust	 in	 the	 predictability	 of	 the	 service).	 (Terms	 in	 italics	
from	Mäenpää	2001.)	
The	political	leadership	in	the	transitional	Russia	has	already	used	several	
administrative	 strategies	 for	 change.	 President	 Eltsin´s	 period	 could	 be	
said	 to	 have	 emphasized	 the	 governance	 side	 by	 giving	 the	 regions	 and	
localities	the	decision	making	power	but	also	the	responsibility	in	sorting	
out	 transitional	 problems.	 President	 Putin´s	 period	 seems	 to	 have	
underlined	 management	 of	 the	 economy	 through	 legal	 control.	 Good	
government	has	been	developing	along	side	but	its	development	has	suffered	
from	economic	 and	political	 setbacks.	This	has	 created	a	paradox	where	
talk	about	the	unity	of	the	state	and	the	underlining	of	law	as	the	guarantor	
of	order,	safety	and	equality	–	although	basically	constitutional	requirements	
–	 have	 been	 associated	 with	 political	 centralization	 and	 authoritarian	
tendencies.
The	worst	institutional	chaos	which	was	apparent	in	the	early	years	of	the	
transition	is,	for	the	most	part	over	and	organizations	can	again	start	looking	
inside	to	their	own	practices.	As	in	the	previous	administrative	transitions,	
this	allows	the	actual	administrative	ideology	to	develop.	A	major	factor	in	
the	stabilization	of	administrative	work	is	the	creation	of	basic	legislation	
which	has	been	a	massive	and	difficult	effort	(see	Sharlet	1999:	6–9).
Yet	new	risks	also	present	themselves	in	the	overall	social	development	
in	the	vast	majority	of	Russian	municipalities	of	which	Murmansk	is	a	more	
typical	 case	 than,	 for	 instance,	 St.	 Petersburg	 or	 the	 capital.	 In	 his	 1994	
study	about	the	disintegration	of	the	Russian	economy	Michael	Spagat	has	
contended	that	the	deficit	of	good	physical	capital	is	likely	persist	for	a	long	
time.	By	this	he	means	that	first	of	all	the	wages	of	educated	labor	will	be	
held	 down	 to	 levels	which	 do	 not	 encourage	 younger	 people	 to	 acquire	
human	capital.	Secondly	the	older	generations	will	abandon	their	professions	
which	leads	to	knowledge	not	being	transmitted	to	younger	people.	Thirdly	
the	cost	of	education	will	become	higher	as	the	general	level	of	education	
falls.	(Spagat	1994:	64.)
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The	Murmansk	city	administration	case	would	seem	to	indicate	that	the	
falling	of	 salary	 levels	and	new	requirements	 for	on	 the	 job	 training	and	
general	level	of	education	has	put	a	lot	of	stress	on	individual	administrators	
and	poses	a	great	challenge	to	the	leadership.	One	of	the	main	tasks	of	the	
transition	period	has	been	to	change	the	use	of	information	as	a	mechanical	
tool	for	implementing	decisions	to	a	socializing	and	educational	medium.	
In	 the	 193	 study	 conducted	 by	 Sternheimer	 the	 interviewed	 ex-
administrators	placed	a	low	value	on	the	educative-socialization	function	
of	information.	Customer	complaints,	social	survey	data,	research	in	general	
and	 “the	 public	 opinion”	 had	 little	 practical	 meaning	 in	 city	 planning.	
(Sternheimer	193:	142–143.)	The	transition	to	a	local	level	administrative	
work	that	involves	internalizing	the	principles	of	rule	of	law	and	democratic	
government	practices,	requires	a	much	wider	personal	discretion	from	the	
rank	and	file	administrative	workers.
The	 political	 ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	 has	 received	 more	
concentrated	attention	after	the	199	financial	crisis.	By	that	time,	ideas	of	
developing	the	state	structures	and	service	culture	had	taken	off.	The	need	
for	more	legislative	control	was	seen	as	a	paramount	question	for	the	future	
of	Russian	society.	The	period	of	regionalism	had	come	to	an	end	and	the	
legally	controlled	unity	of	the	state	became	the	main	administrative	method	
by	which	to	advance	the	purposes	of	change,	which	by	now	generally	tried	to	
advance	the	market	economy	with	a	functioning	social	sector.	Constitutio-
nalism	continues	to	suffer	from	ideological	crisis	as	 long	as	the	war	in	the	
Chechen	republic	continues	and	the	central	government	and	major	business	
do	 not	 have	 clearly	 separate	 areas	 in	 society.	 Yet	 at	 the	 same	 time,	
constitutionalism	has	gained	importance	in	the	administrative	practices	both	
through	the	activeness	of	ordinary	citizens	and	the	learning	of	officials.	
In	 the	 1990´s,	 the	 administrative	 work	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 two	
qualities	 in	 the	 development	 process	 which	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 obstacles	 to	
transition:	the	unclear	hierarchy	in	actual	implementation	of	laws	and	the	
vagueness,	or	general	character	of	laws	themselves	which	does	not	define	
execution	precisely	enough	and	thus	leaves	the	lower	level	administrators	
with	the	task	of	deciding	even	policy	issues.	This	latter	quality	can	be	seen	
in	the	previously	described	risk	administration.	In	this	example	organization	
the	change	in	the	way	of	working	was	most	of	all	a	matter	of	returning	to	a	
balanced	situation	which	allowed	relying	on	laws,	clearer	guidance	in	the	
application	of	laws	and	timely	decision	making.	Time	limits	have	a	major	
importance	for	a	guidance	method	in	transitions.	
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The	 political	 measures	 which	 have	 been	 taken	 by	 President	 Putin´s	
administrations	in	the	form	of	“dictatorship	of	laws”	have	responded	to	the	
anxieties	shared	by	the	local	administrations	workers	across	Russia.	In	his	
1994	study	made	in	Kirov	(population	500.000)	and	Syktyvkar	(population	
240.000)	James	Alexander	found	that	 in	terms	of	corruption	and	law	the	
most	 common	 complaint	 was	 that	 the	 state	 officials	 function	 for	 their	
personal	 interest	 and	 do	 not	 fulfill	 their	 jobs.	 Officials	 were	 often	 held	
responsible	for	the	social	instability.	Respect	for	the	legal	foundation	was	
supported	as	 the	solution	by	reformers	and	conservatives	alike.	This	was	
seen	particularly	important	for	the	development	of	trade	and	production.	
(Alexander	199:	424.)
The	 local	 level	 served	 as	 the	 laboratory	 for	 the	 effects	 of	 both	 radical	
economic	restructuring	and	administrative-political	decentralization	which	
took	place	in	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s.	Neither	of	the	theories	of	society	
(privatization	 and	 constitutionalism)	 took	 effect	 completely	 or	 in	 the	
manner	 intended	 in	 the	 original	 texts.	 The	 privatization	 program	 in	
particular	was	 chosen	and	put	 to	 effect	 in	 the	first	place	 as	 a	method	of	
political	competition	for	power	which	came	to	influence	its	acceptance.	The	
lack	of	 legal	rules	and	institutions	willing	and	capable	of	enforcing	them	
soon	 created	 wide	 spread	 mistrust	 in	 the	 way	 privatization	 transferred	
property	 inside	 the	 society.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 turbulent	 situation	 in	
which	fast	economic	deterioration,	intensive	political	battles	at	the	center	
and	unclear	state	relations	both	vertically	and	 laterally	made	any	 type	of	
planning	needed	in	the	constitutional	state	building	very	difficult.	
At	the	work	organization	level,	the	transition	has	brought	about	a	sense	
of	independent	administrative	collective	which	in	many	cases	can	not	only	
use	its	own	initiatives	and	discretion	but	is	also	responsible	to	a	degree	for	
its	own	development.	The	greater	freedom	to	choose	local	accent	and	ways	
of	approach	in	customer	service	within	the	time	limits	set	by	law	is	a	positive	
sign	 of	 development.	 Yet,	 it	 cannot	 be	 said	 that	 active	 administration	
(Heusala-Pushnov	 2003)	 would	 still	 be	 firmly	 institutionalized	 in	 the	
practices.	There	 is	not	 even	 federal	 legislation	which	would	 require	 this.	
Currently,	administrative	 law	 in	Russia	means	mostly	a	 list	of	prohibited	
things.	 Citizens	 and	 other	 clients	 generally	 speaking	 need	 to	 be	 active,	
rather	well	informed	or	at	least	able	to	find	information	and	ask	for	their	
rights.	Because	of	the	economic	situation,	the	clients	are	generally	vulnerable.	
This	makes	possible	arbitrary	decision	making	and	action	by	administration	
even	more	hurtful.	
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At	the	work	collective	level	the	Russian	administration	may	have	–	again,	
paradoxically	 –	 been	 more	 ready	 for	 the	 changes	 than	 was	 previously	
thought.	 Because	 of	 the	 high	 need	 for	 latent	 unofficial	 contacts	 among	
organization	members	in	the	Soviet	system	to	get	things	done,	administrators	
are	used	to	forming	lateral	contacts	in	their	daily	work.	As	Aarrevaara	has	
concluded	it	is	useful	for	the	employer	to	encourage	the	unofficial,	reciprocal	
dimension	 to	 make	 the	 organization	 work	 more	 efficiently	 (Aarrevaara	
1999:	55).
Municipal	 administration	 leadership	 has	 acquired	 a	 more	 prominent	
role	 as	 the	 executive	 line	 has	 been	 strengthened	 and	 the	 administrative	
market	 reorganized.	The	 line	workers	 had	 lost	 their	 double	 role	 as	 both	
party	members	and	administrators	and	in	this	sense	their	professionalism	
had	 changed.	 A	 sense	 of	 developing	 the	 content	 of	 one´s	 work	 was	
strengthened	while	dependence	on	the	organization,	as	a	such,	was	more	
acute.	As	a	reaction	to	growing	personal	risks,	further	education	was	highly	
regarded	by	most.	
The	local	level	in	the	transitional	Russia	since	1991	has	tried	to	develop	
itself	toward	all	of	these	aspects	of	public	decision	making	and	client	service.	
The	 experiences	 of	 the	 example	 case	 organization	 show	 that	 since	 the	
separation	 of	 administration	 from	 the	 soviet,	 political	 governance	 has	
become	 a	 separate	 sphere	which	does	not	 touch	upon	 the	daily	work	of	
administrative	 officials.	 Economic	 management	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 has	
suffered	from	the	budget	restraints	and	dependence	from	the	center.	Yet	on	
the	other,	economic	responsibility	of	the	administration	and	demands	from	
the	population	have	grown.	
The	main	area	of	independent	development	has	taken	place	in	the	“good	
public	administration”	side	of	 the	work.	Rule	of	 law	principles,	although	
not	always	explicitly	underlined,	have	emerged	at	least	partially	as	a	side-
effect	 of	 legalism	 and	 educational	 awareness	 of	 the	 administrators.	The	
personal	 responsibility	 of	 officials	 has	 grown	 along	 with	 demands	 on	
commitment.	The	example	case	showed	that	the	Russian	local	administration	
organ	 can	 possess	 considerable	 initiative	 in	 the	 organization	 of	 its	 own	
work	 and	 in	 its	 personnel	 policies.	 Probably	 the	 single	 most	 important	
factor	which	enables	the	birth	and	growth	of	more	open	and	accountable	
service	is	the	flow	of	information	and	computerization.
In	retrospect	it	can	be	said,	that	the	liberal	economic	and	state	reformist	
lines	 had	 some	 of	 their	 initial	 thoughts	 (such	 as	 citizen´s	 right	 to	 sue,	
separation	of	powers	and	so	on)	materializing.	These	groups	have	dominated	
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the	 official	 administrative-political	 discourse	 of	 the	 1990´s.	 Simon	
Kordonskii	has	categorized	the	new	political	thinking	as	the	legalized	form	
of	the	old	dissident	thinking.	As	the	formerly	dissident	became	the	dominant	
force	in	public	discourse,	the	administrative	market	could	not	function	in	
its	old	way.	(Kordonskii	2000.)	
The	post-perestroika	new	Russian	local	administration	has	worked	in	an	
environment	where	the	state	became	a	separate	entity	from	the	transitional	
private	 economy.	 The	 roles	 which	 actors,	 including	 the	 local	 level	
administration	have	in	this	new	situation	are	much	more	clearly	defined.	
The	 political	 has	 evolved	 into	 a	 new	 meaning,	 truly	 political,	 and	 the	
administration	into	a	management	of	state	administrative	affairs.	
Socially	 the	 state	 and	 the	market	 economy	now	preside	over	different	
realities.	In	the	former,	the	position	of	people	who	were	“functionaries”	or	
“bourgeois”	 in	the	Soviet	system	have	been	dominant.	 (Kordonskii	2000:	
132.)	Whether	 this	 translates	 directly	 into	 a	 some	 type	 of	 a	 behavior	 in	
administrative	work	cannot	be	shown	here.	The	case	study	in	the	Murmansk	
administration	showed	that	people	had	mostly	left	behind	the	institutional	
thinking	which	was	needed	in	the	soviet	administrative	market	and	were	
concerned	about	raising	their	administrative	status	through	qualifications,	
re-education	 and	 personnel	 policy.	 In	 every	 case,	 the	 local	 level	 line	
administrator	 had	 acquired	 a	 social	 space	 which	 was	 wider	 and	 a	 legal	
status	which	was	stronger	than	the	one	in	the	Soviet	Union.	
The	 ongoing	 serious	 conflicts	 in	 the	 Russian	 society	 (polarization	 of	
wealth,	 poverty,	 weak	 services	 and	 war)	 have	 continued	 to	 affect	 the	
development	of	 administrative	 thinking	 through	political	 instability.	The	
reaction	 to	 these	 risks	 has	 been	 to	 use	 legal	 reasons	 as	 purposes	 and	
security	organs	as	a	method	 to	 tighten	 the	administrative	control	 from	
the	 center.	 As	 a	 side-effect,	 casualties	 in	 this	 struggle	 have	 appeared.	
Particularly	 control	of	 the	media	presents	 a	 long	 term	risk	 to	adminis-
trative	accountability.	The	risks	society	(see	the	author´s	description	of	this	
concept	in	chapter	1.2.3)	which	developed	in	the	190´s	is	going	through	
another	wave	of	alternating	administrative	approaches	to	state	building.	It	
remains	 to	be	 seen	which	elements	of	 administrative	 culture	 survive	 the	
competition.
To summarize,	the	analysis	of	this	chapter	shows	how	principles	of	“good	
government”	have	suffered	from	economic	and	political	set	bacs.	As	a	result,	
the	unity	of	the	Russian	state	and	the	underlining	of	law	as	the	guarantor	of	
order,	safety	and	equality	have	in	recent	years	been	associated	with	political	
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centralization	and	authoritarian	 tendencies.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	use	of	
information	 which	 began	 in	 the	 perestroika	 period,	 has	 fundamentally	
changed	administrative	culture	at	all	levels.	
In	the	structuration	process,	neither	privatization	nor	constitutionalism	
took	effect	completely	or	in	the	manner	intended	originally.	Serious	risks	to	
democratic	 administrative	 development	 were	 created	 in	 the	 economic	
decisions	of	the	early	1990´s.	Planning	became	very	difficult	which	under-
mined	laws,	clear	guidance	in	their	application	and	timely	decision	making.	
Yet	rule	of	law	principles	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	legalism	and	education,	
similar	to	the	legal	developments	in	post-reform	19th	century	Russia.	
The	main	result	of	the	transition	has	been	a	separation	of	powers,	for	the	
first	 time	 in	 Russian	 history	 (shown	 in	 annex	 E).	 A	 place	 for	 local	
administration	exists	where	administrators	can	develop	the	use	of	discretion.	
The	use	of	information	seems	to	have	assumed	a	“revolutionary”	role.	Work	
collectives	 and	 individuals	 can	 use	 information	 gathered	 from	 different	
sources	as	a	socializing	and	educational	medium.	
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7 Conclusions
This	 study	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 transition	 of	 administrative	 culture	 in	 the	
municipal	administration	of	Russia	in	four	different	historical	time	periods.	
I	 have	 described	 how	 new	 structures	 based	 on	 a	 new	 ideology	 of	
administrative	 change	 and	 the	 old	 culture	 converged	 in	 the	 transition	
processes	to	produce	cultures	different	from	the	original	political	purposes	
of	 those	 transitions.	Here	 I	wish	 to	 return	 to	 the	 theoretical	 framework	
described	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	work	and	draw	on	the	main	empirical	
findings	 to	 answer	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 concerning	 the	 transitions	 of	
local	administration	culture	in	Russia.	Each	question	forms	a	sub-heading	
to	the	subsequent	sections	of	this	concluding	chapter.	
7.1 How Can One Define Local Administration in 
the Russian Context? 
I	 defined	 the	 focus	 of	 this	 work	 to	 be	 the	 executive	 functions	 of	 local	
government,	 jointly	administered	 functions	of	 the	 local	and	state	 levels	
and	 state	 organs	 in	municipalities.	The	 reason	 for	 this	 wide	 definition	
which	includes	different	internal	variations	of	administration	at	the	local	
level,	 is	practical.	From	a	historical	perspective,	 the	cultural	 realities	of	
local	self-government	have	been	administratively	less	important	in	Russia	
than	state	administration´s	extension	of	 itself	 to	 the	 localities.	 It	would	
have	been	difficult	to	draw	a	strict	line	between	“real”	local	government	
and	mere	structural	arrangements.	In	addition,	I	have	wanted	to	include	
the	Soviet	period	in	this	study	for	its	importance	in	the	understanding	of	
the	 present	 transition.	 Instead	 of	 strict	 limitations	 on	 the	 meaning	 of	
structural	arrangements	as	the	focus	of	this	work,	I	have	wanted	to	show	
the	plurality	of	organizational	forms	and	territorial	arrangements	which	
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have	existed	in	Russia	for	a	period	of	well	over	a	100	years.	Clearly	though,	
the	 territorial	 designs	 and	 the	 hierarchy	 of	 decision	 making	 which	
followed	held	a	significant	meaning	in	the	creation	of	local	administrative	
culture.	
Historically,	 a	 more	 difficult	 task	 is	 to	 decide	 what	 is	 considered	
“administration”	 in	 general.	 Is	 there	 a	difference	between	governing	 and	
administration?	Is	it	the	goal	of	modernization	to	make	governing	into	a	
professional	administration?	 In	 this	 study	administration	was	defined	by	
reference	 to	 three	 key	 aspects:	 the	 publicness	 of	 its	 decision	making,	 its	
relationship	 with	 citizenry	 and	 the	 organizational	 frame	 in	 which	
professionalism	 developed.	 I	 argued	 that	 all	 these	 aspects	 are	 important	
when	we	try	to	see	what	administrative	culture	is	like.
In	 the	 19th	 century	 the	 Russian	 provincial	 development	 also	 served	
territorial	control.	Regional	and	local	levels	were	connected	with	the	need	
to	strengthen	the	political	rule	of	the	Tsar	and	his	court.	Peter	the	Great´s	
reforms	meant	 an	 attempt	 to	 professionalize	 the	 bureaucratic	 structures	
through	 civil	 service	 reforms.	His	 reforms	were	 indeed	 a	 perestroika of	
turning	governing	into	a	more	professional	administration.	The	transition	
was	only	partial,	most	of	all	because	of	the	political	restraints	which	enabled	
the	 law	 from	 becoming	 a	 genuine	 independent	 instrument	 of	 the	
administration.	 In	 the	 transitions	 of	 the	 160´s	 and	 10´s,	 the	 local	
political	 freedoms	 were	 extended	 to	 manage	 the	 population´s	 social,	
educational,	 legal	 and	other	needs	better.	The	political	discussions	about	
the	 local	 level	 stressed	 most	 of	 all	 the	 governing	 aspect	 of	 the	 local	
administration.	The	Bolshevik	government	tried	to	unite	both	professional	
expertise	 and	 political	 participation	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 In	 the	 transition	
process,	 the	 Soviet	 local	 level	 became	 a	 market	 of	 different	 sectoral	
administrative	organizations	under	the	political	umbrella	of	 the	party.	In	
this	 sense,	 it	 represented	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 territorial	 governing	
tradition.	
The	question	of	the	definition	of	local	administration	has	again	followed	
the	latest	transition	period	which	started	with	Gorbachev´s	reforms.	This	
transition	 has	 also	 meant	 a	 period	 of	 fluctuating	 development.	 On	 one	
hand,	 there	was	 a	 possibility	 to	 develop	 local	 executive	 functions	 into	 a	
separate	 administration.	 And	 this	 indeed	 took	 place	 after	 1991.	 On	 the	
other	 hand,	 the	 political	 and	 economic	 instability	 and	 the	 regional	
developments	 have	 slowed	 down	 the	 professional	 modernization	 of	 the	
local	level.	The	centralization	which	has	been	used	by	President	Putin	as	a	
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means	to	gain	more	stable	control	over	territory,	has	again	steered	the	ship	
toward	governance.	
The	definition	of	administration,	its	role	in	the	society	and	the	meaning	
of	the	local	level,	re-emerges	as	a	political	issue	in	crises	situations	in	Russian	
history.	One	could	define	the	four	studied	periods	in	the	following	way:	1)	
state	 administration	 as	 the	 governance	 of	 the	 Tsar,	 combined	 with	 a	
restricted	civil	society	in	the	grass	roots,	2)	state	administration	as	the	all-
encompassing	economic	structure	with	the	party	controlling	the	politics	of	
the	developing	local	administrative	market,	3)	state	administration	as	the	
economy	with	a	hierarchy	of	administrative	market,	and	4)	the	definition	of	
the	local	administration	undefined	in	the	transition	of	state	economy	into	a	
separate	executive	administration.	
It	 is	 too	 early	 to	 say	what	 the	 present	 transition	 really	means	 for	 the	
development	of	 local	 administration.	A	new	 federal	 law	“On	 the	general	
principles	of	Local	Government”	(Federalnyi	zakon	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii	ot	
6	 oktiabria	 2003	 g.,	 N131-F3	 Ob	 obshchikh	 printsipakh	 organizatsii	
mestnogo	samoupravleniia	v	Rossiiskoi	Federatsii)	will	come	into	effect	in	
2006.	At	the	same	time	the	integration	of	Russian	economy	into	European	
structures	and	the	world	market	will	in	the	best	case	strengthen	the	work	of	
local	administration.	Even	with	its	political	risks,	Russian	society	has	never	
been	 as	 open	 as	 it	 is	 now.	 Information	 and	 technology	particularly	 help	
organizational	 learning	 at	 the	 local	 level.	 Legality	 as	 an	 ideology	 of	
administration	in	the	present	constitutional	context	would	seem	to	offer	a	
chance	 for	 institutional	 modernization.	 Economic	 independence	 of	 the	
local	 level	 would	 ideally	 follow	 the	 institutionalization	 of	 formal	 legal	
administrative	channels	as	the	only	way	to	get	things	done.	Centralization,	
paradoxically,	may	strengthen	the	local	administration.	
However,	it	needs	to	be	remembered	that	efficient	administration	is	not	
the	same	as	democracy.	The	contents	of	the	laws	themselves	and	the	interest	
and	ability	of	citizens	to	take	part	in	the	formulation	of	policies	matter.	In	
the	long	run	though,	paradoxically,	if	the	rule	of	law	thinking	materializes	
in	the	practices	of	administration,	core	democratic	values	can	be	sustained	
even	when	popular	passivity	dominates.
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7.2 How Valid Is the Concept of Culture in Studies 
of Administration?
The	theoretical	background	of	this	work	relies	heavily	on	the	idea	that	the	
concept	of	culture	is	valid	and,	furthermore,	a	necessary	one	to	understand	
how	administrations	work.	I	argue	that	the	historical	cultures	upon	which	
the	 present	 culture	 develops	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 discovering	 why	 an	
administration	is	the	way	it	is.	Culture	has	been	understood	as	a	mixture	of	
structures	and	social	systems.	Have	I	 then	studied	the	so	called	“cultural	
legacies”	of	the	past	to	understand	the	present?
Stephen	Holmes	(1996)	has	criticized	the	use	of	“cultural	legacies”	as	a	
concept	 in	explanations	of	post-communist	experiences	because	they	are	
vague	and	use	pop-psychology.	He	does	not	agree	with	those	who	see	the	
future	in	the	developments	of	the	past	and	demand	that	good	knowledge	of	
history	is	needed	for	the	understanding	of	what	has	happened	later	on.	In	
this,	an	analogy	is	confused	with	causality,	researchers	“mistook	the	false	
pleasure	 of	 pattern	 recognition	 for	 the	 genuine	 pleasure	 of	 causal	
explanation”.	 Holmes	 suggests	 that	 instead	 of	 reaching	 for	 the	 past,	 we	
should	 look	 at	 the	 present	 in	 order	 to	 find	 reasons	 for	 reform	 slowness	
(Holmes	1996:	2,	49).
Holmes	argues	that	“the	reform-inhibiting	baggage	that	Russians	carry	
with	 them	 is	 more	 situational	 than	 psychological.	 Russians	 are	
psychologically	 prepared	 to	 obey	 the	 law,	 provided	 the	 law	 is	 enforced”.	
Holmes	 concludes	 that	 in	 the	 attempts	 to	 explain	 the	 shortcomings	 of	
changes,	excessive	emphasis	has	been	place	on	a	purported	lack	of	receptivity	
to	Western	values	as	result	of	habits	born	under	communism.	Not	enough	
attention	has	been	given	to	the	collapse	of	the	state.	Instead	of	asking	why	
reform	has	been	difficult	or	slow	even	though	the	totalitarian	state	is	gone,	
Holmes	suggests	that	we	should	wonder	if	the	dismantling	of	the	state	is	the	
cause.	His	thesis	is	that	instead	of	vague	cultural	explanations,	the	universal	
problem	of	post-communism	has	been	the	crises	of	governability.	A	legally	
bound	strong	state	is	needed	not	only	to	execute	the	changes	but	also	for	the	
civil	society.	(Holmes	1996:	49,	52.)
Using	 Holmes´arguments	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	 I	 ask	 the	 following	
questions:	1)	How	much	can	we	understand	of	the	present	by	knowing	what	
past	cultures	have	been	like?	2)	Does	analyzing	the	present	administrative	
culture	 help	 to	 see	 what	 is	 ahead	 after	 10	 or	 20	 years?	 3)	What	 is	 the	
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connection	 of	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	 Soviet	 state	 and	 its	 administrative	
culture?
Administrative	 types	 show	 the	 dominant	 qualities	 of	 administrative	
elements	 in	 their	 historical	 contexts.	 As	 has	 been	 pointed	 out	 in	 the	
theoretical	part	of	this	study,	the	types	of	administrative	culture	which	are	
built	do	not	correlate	directly	into	actions	of	organizations	and	individuals.	
They	only	show	the	most	dominant	general	features	of	the	four	studied	time	
periods.	 Reform	 attempts	 which	 have	 been	 looked	 at	 as	 processes	 of	
transforming	 administrative	 ideologies	 into	 state	 building	 are	 a	 separate	
matter.	In	order	to	understand	how	a	transition	happened	it	is	more	useful	
to	look	at	the	ideology	of	administrative	change	and	compare	its	purposes	
with	the	end	results	of	the	state	building	process.	
This	 same	 view	 is	 expressed	 also	 by	Matti	Mälkiä,	 for	 instance,	 who	
categorizes	 different	 approaches	 to	 studying	 the	 history	 of	 public	
administration	 (Mälkiä	 1995).	 Particularly	 policy-analytic	 studies	 which	
consider	 the	 tasks	 and	 goals,	 and	 their	 attainment	 involve	 studying	 that	
which	 lies	 behind	 a	 certain	 culture.	 Similarly,	 administrative-historical	
studies	 seek	 to	 make	 the	 past	 understandable	 in	 order	 to	 see	 how	
administrative	structures	have	developed	and	what	types	of	restraints	bind	
present	development.
The	meaning	of	culture	was	explained	at	length	at	the	beginning	of	this	
work.	Culture	is	seen	as	a	process	in	which	transition	takes	place	as	the	new	
purposes	 meet	 the	 old	 structures.	 Side-effects	 of	 the	 transition	 can	
sometimes	be	dysfunctional	and	if	 they	are	 institutionalized	as	practices,	
they	may	be	hard	to	change.	The blat-system	in	the	Soviet	Union	is	a	good	
example.	The	historical	background	of	 the	present	administrative	culture	
helps	us	to	understand	what	elements	of	the	old	have	survived	change	and	
what	 has	 happened	 to	 them.	 By	 understanding	 what	 meaning	 different	
elements	of	the	culture	have,	we	can	better	see	what	must	be	the	focus	of	
change.	Yet,	it	needs	to	be	remembered	that	looking	at	the	present	culture	
does	not	help	us	to	predict	the	future.	Changes	happen	as	a	result	of	political	
purposes	and	administration	follows	behind.	
In	this	work	culture	is	not	an	alternative	to	studying	the	structures.	Even	
more	 importantly,	 culture	 is	 not	 something	 psychological	 or	 historical	
which	is	detached	from	the	modern	state.	I	defined	culture	as	the	product	
of	the	social	system	of	administration	within	the	administrative	structures.	
Major	changes	in	the	structures	(of	the	state)	effect	the	culture	directly,	but	
the	 state	 in	 this	 process	 is	 also	 effected	 by	 the	 old	 culture.	 Both	major	
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ruptures	in	191	and	1991	show	the	strength	of	the	old	culture	in	structural	
changes.	 Transitions	 have	 been	 long	 and	 costly	 both	 humanly	 and	
economically.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 collapse	of	 the	 Soviet	 state,	 the	dysfunctions	of	 the	
administrative	market	can	be	offered	as	a	major	cause	for	the	impossibility	
of	a	political	reform.	The	market	in	a	sense	was	a	giant	fusion	of	the	political,	
economical	and	administrative	into	a	system	of	commodities	and	services	
exchange.	The	party´s	strength	in	this	system	was	less	political	and	more	
administrative,	guiding	and	mediating.	The	party	was	the	ultimate	source	
of	legitimacy,	an	arbitration	court	of	interests.	The	state	administration	was	
the	structure	upon	which	this	authority	rested.	
The	study	of	the	collapse	of	the	state is	thus	a	study	of	the	break	down	of	
a	culture.	The	problem	of	transition	is	 the	fact	 that	 the	structures	can	be	
changed	quite	fast	compared	to	the	change	of	social	systems.	All	though	the	
old	Soviet	state	collapsed,	it	took	a	much	longer	time	before	the	administrative	
market	of	the	old	culture	was	reshuffled	into	new	administrative	practices.	
This	process	is	still	continuing.	
7.3 The Specificity of Russian Administration
The	 cultural	 elements	 studied	 in	 this	work	 and	 the	 changes	which	 took	
place	 in	 them	 across	 different	 time	 periods,	 are	 shown	 in	 the	 following	
tables	(tables	1–).	The	tables	are	based	on	the	previously	presented	findings	
of	the	study	describing	the	new	administrative	cultures	of	each	time	period.	
Each	table	takes	one	of	the	eight	analytic	elements	of	administrative	culture	
used	 in	 this	 study	 (economy,	 authority,	 laws	 and	 rules,	 organization,	
information	and	language,	leadership,	personnel,	clients	and	citizens)	and	
maps	 the	 shifts	 in	 their	 local	 interpretation	 and	 application	 across	 four	
identifiable	administrative	time	periods	in	contrast	to	the	liberal	democratic	
ideal	type.
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Table 1: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by economy 
in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type
1870–1906 local 
administration
1917–1938 local 
administration
1985–1990 local 
administration
Post 1993 local 
administration
open market 
economy regulated 
by a universalistic 
approach to law
developing 
market economy
state planning 
and central 
delegation of 
resources 
“administration 
as the economy”
state planning 
with small 
enclave for local 
cooperative 
initiative
administrative 
reorganization of 
economics and 
moving toward a 
market system
shock therapy
local level self-
government in 
economic matters
limited local 
taxes (land)
local level as a 
part of the 
central planning 
system 
no rights for local 
taxes
uneven economic 
development 
territorially and 
organizationally
differences in the 
share of public 
funding for local 
services
restricted local 
government rights 
and poor funding 
of services
regional 
specialization 
central delegation 
of resources 
administrative 
market in front of 
major economic 
reforms
company towns
great dependency 
on the regional 
level, difficulties 
of planning and 
weak resources
differences in the 
arrangements of 
local services
local 
administration 
developing 
services such as 
schools, 
maintenance of 
buildings, 
firefighting and 
local police
state assuming 
responsibility for 
local services 
such as schools, 
medical care, 
housing, cultural 
services and 
security
state retaining its 
role as the 
provider of 
services with 
greater 
difficulties
different regional 
survival 
techniques (e.g. 
debt-swapping)
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Table 2: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
authority in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type
1870–1906 local 
administration
1917–1938 local 
administration
1985–1990 local 
administration
Post 1993 local 
administration
separation of 
powers and 
authority based on 
law
autocracy as the 
source, personal 
authority of 
directors in 
organizations, 
“irrational” 
authority
fusion of powers 
in the same 
identity party of 
as the source, 
delegated with 
political 
discretionary 
rights “irrational” 
authority
no separation of 
powers, the party 
as the ultimate 
source of 
authority, 
reshuffling of 
authority locally, 
personal 
authority through 
political status
separation of 
powers for the 
first time in 
Russian history, 
unclear 
jurisdictions in 
the 1990´s, 
centralization of 
authority
legal limits and 
control of 
discretion
unclear 
administrative 
limits, double 
control of 
decision making
strong formal 
control through 
diversification
legal (rule of law) 
consciousness 
introduced, 
network relations 
before formal 
authority 
building legally 
constrained 
discretion, diffuse 
practical 
authority in 
organization level
civil 
servants´authority 
defined by law 
which is upheld by 
culture
authority 
depending on 
organizational 
leadership, patron 
culture
many types of 
authority 
positions 
depending on the 
organizational 
context
re-examination of 
the rationality of 
authority
a combination of 
a loss of control 
and gaining new 
authority
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Table 3: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by laws 
and rules in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type
1870–1906 local 
administration
1917–1938 local 
administration
1985–1990 local 
administration
Post 1993 local 
administration
separation of 
powers
no separation of 
powers until 1906
no separation of 
powers
no separation of 
powers
separation of 
powers
clear norm 
hierarchy and state 
legitimating law
Emperor-based 
legality 
codification of 
laws incomplete
sectoral 
regulations 
dominating norm 
hierarchy, 
commands in 
place of civil law
“socialist rule of 
law” – ideal
federal laws in a 
“dictatorship of 
laws” 
legal protection a 
high priority 
(arbitrary use of 
law strongly 
denounced) 
rigid guidance 
through 
regulations 
substituting 
professional 
knowledge, low 
level of legal 
protection 
emergency 
regulations and 
“special 
measures”, 
“telephone 
justice”, 
prosecutors 
enforcing legality 
and repression
organizational 
and ministerial 
instructions more 
important than 
federal laws in 
daily work
suspicious public 
views about 
administration,
learning legal 
protection
use of independent 
courts in 
administrative law
appellation 
important, 
developing legal 
profession and 
courts
networks 
replacing courts
prosecutors 
dominating the 
judicial system 
and assuming 
new roles in 
transition
courts gaining 
importance as a 
venue for 
securing rights, 
prosecutors as 
supervisors of 
legality
universal laws and 
application of 
them, transparency 
in the application 
of laws and rules, 
institutional trust
contextual 
application of 
laws, trust 
personal
contextual 
application of 
law, 
administrative 
secrets, 
trust personal 
contextual 
application of 
laws, 
unavailability of 
laws to the 
public, trust 
personal
forced policy 
toward a 
universalistic 
legal culture, 
availability of 
laws to the 
public, toward 
institutional trust
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Table 4: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
organization in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type
1870–1906 local 
administration
1917–1938 local 
administration
1985–1990 local 
administration
Post 1993 local 
administration
separate elected 
and executive side
council and 
executive officials 
often the same 
people,
in principle 
separated
integration of the 
party with 
administration 
and economical 
institutions
administrative 
market and
institutional 
competition 
dissolution of the 
administrative 
market
separate 
administration
congruence of 
authority and 
powers based on 
laws
incongruence of 
formal authority 
and power
incongruence of 
formal authority 
and power
incongruence of 
formal authority 
and power 
incongruence of 
formal authority 
and power 
clear hierarchy and 
rules of decision 
making between 
different levels 
double control double control
for local 
representational, 
political and 
economic 
administrations
vedomstvennost,
double control
dependency on 
regional decision 
making
guidance through 
universal 
administrative 
procedural 
principles
no universal 
administrative 
procedural 
principles 
no universal 
administrative 
procedural 
principles,
guidance through 
repression and 
party
no universal 
administrative 
procedural 
principles,
guidance with 
legislation (fines) 
and party
policy of trying to 
develop universal 
procedural 
principles
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Table 5: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
information and language in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal 
type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type 
1870–1906 local 
administration 
1917–1938 local 
administration 
1985–1990 local 
administration 
Post 1993 local 
administration 
transparency of 
public 
administration
censorship secrecy rules and 
censorship 
glasnost major growth of 
transparency 
right to be heard 
in decision making 
process 
illiteracy 
widespread, poor 
access to 
information 
classification of 
information
right to ask and 
demand answers 
allowed
active and well 
informed citizens 
using new rights 
access to 
information 
concerning oneself
poor feedback 
and illiteracy 
unreliable access, 
feedback through 
party structures
weak access but 
more direct 
feedback to the 
administrative 
decision makers
feedback through 
appeals and in 
administrative 
procedures of 
offices
procedural 
principles guiding 
information 
processing
formally correct 
document 
production and 
circulation a high 
priority
formally correct 
documentation 
and circulation a 
high priority 
intelligence used 
in planning 
formally correct 
documentation 
and circulation 
main task 
creation of new 
working styles in 
organizations, 
technology as a 
modernizing tool
Citizenship, public 
and work 
organization 
aspects important 
in the rhetoric
directive 
language, public 
organization 
aspect referred to 
in the rhetoric 
work organization 
underlined, 
language 
purification 
all aspects 
referred to in the 
official rhetoric
all aspects 
underlined 
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Table 6: Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
leadership in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type 
1870–1906 local 
administration 
1917–1938 local 
administration 
1985–1990 local 
administration 
Post 1993 local 
administration 
democratic 
controls
absence of legal 
controls at the 
top
meeting targets 
of the plan a 
priority for 
leadership, 
arbitrary political 
control 
meeting the 
targets of plan a 
priority for 
leadership, 
democratic 
pressure from the 
public
reshuffling of 
leadership 
positions, 
developing 
democratic 
controls
law bound 
discretion
individualistic 
authority
party setting the 
limits of 
discretion
party setting the 
limits of 
discretion
learning rule of 
law 
open competition 
for posts
table of ranks, 
patrons used
nomenklatura 
peasants and 
workers raised to 
new positions
nomenklatura new advancement 
routes, updated 
professional skills 
valued
democratic 
leadership style
authoritarian 
leadership style
hands on, highly 
authoritarian 
leadership style
authoritarian 
leadership style
mixture of 
authoritarian and 
democratic 
leadership styles
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Table 7 : Analysis of changes in local administration culture by 
personnel in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type
1870–1906 local 
administration
1917–1938 local 
administration
1985–1990 local 
administration
1993- local 
administration
open competion 
for posts,
transparent 
requirements
all-male 
administration,
patrons and table 
of ranks,
relative 
professional 
autonomy locally
women included,
political and 
technical 
requirements,
nomenklatura,
fragility of 
positions
male-dominance,
nomenklatura,
networks
new opportunities 
for women,
educational 
credentials 
valued,
transparency of 
requirements 
along networks
discretion limited 
by law
discretion limited 
by supervisors 
and law
discretion limited 
by party,
repression in 
guidance
discretion limited 
by party,
administrative 
law (fines) used 
in guidance
building practices 
of legally limited 
discretion
transparent 
salaries and 
compensations
rules depended 
on organizations
social and other 
benefits through 
work,
nomenklatura
social and other 
benefits through 
work,
nomenklatura
transparency of 
official 
compensation but 
low salaries 
present a risk 
(corruption)
citizenship aspect 
valued in work
rigid social 
hierarchies
administration as 
the society,
legal protection 
not important
practices 
remaining the 
same,
citizenship aspect 
debated in public
development of 
practices through 
legality
rather low power 
distance and task 
specific power 
changes
very high power 
distance
very high actual 
power distance
high power 
distance,
inflexible 
structures
collective 
solidarity and 
high power 
distance 
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Table 8 : Analysis of changes in local administration culture by clients 
and citizens in contrast to the liberal-democratic ideal type
Liberal-democratic 
ideal type 
1870–1906 local 
administration 
1917–1938 local 
administration 
1985–1990 local 
administration  
Post 1993 local 
administration 
access to 
information
limited by 
illiteracy and 
office cultures
restricted for 
security and 
political control 
reasons
restricted for 
security reasons, 
glasnost
access to many 
new types of 
information
appellation appellation in 
courts introduced
appeals mainly 
through higher 
executive and 
party organs
appeals mainly 
through higher 
executive and 
party organs
courts used 
actively by 
citizens 
legal protection a 
high priority
legal protection 
not a priority
individual rights 
transferred to 
organizations
legal 
consciousness 
tolerated
legal protection 
introduced
equal treatment estates giving 
rights
arbitrary political 
considerations
from blat to 
corruption
“dictatorship of 
laws”, 
constitutional 
rights tested 
democratic 
controls
no democratic 
controls
no democratic 
controls
no democratic 
controls
democratic 
controls suffering 
from risk society
free civil society 
and administration 
coexisting 
controlled civil 
society along 
limited local 
government 
civil society 
incorporated into 
the 
administration 
glasnost, civil 
society activated
civil society along 
administration
low power distance high power 
distance
quickly growing 
high power 
distance
high power 
distance
locally reduced 
power distance
The	 specificity	 of	 Russian	 administration	 refers	 to	 the	 unique	 historical	
features	which	separate	 the	Russian	 local	 level	administration	both	 from	
the	liberal-democratic	ideal	and	other	types	of	administration.	This	work	
has	been	based	on	the	positivist	presumption	that	Russia	can	and	needs	to	
be	observed	with	a	general	analytic	 tool.	The	picture	which	has	emerged	
shows	 that	Russian	 local	 administration	has	 gone	 through	 several	major	
changes	and	some	of	the	features	which	have	emerged,	seem	to	reappear	
again	in	a	cycle.
	The	purpose	of	the	above	tables	is	to	show	the	transition	of	Russian	local	
administration	culture	at	a	general	level.	The	elements	initially	chosen	on	
the	basis	of	the	ideal	liberal-democratic	model	of	administration	proved	to	
be	useful	in	bringing	out	the	specific	features	of	Russian	change.	
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The	citizenship,	public	organization	and	work	organization	aspect	(see	
chapter	1.1.3	for	a	description	of	these)	have	all	received	attention	in	the	
Russian	transitions.	The	citizenship	aspect	was	clearly	undermined	in	the	
pre-revolutionary	 and	post-revolution	 Stalinist	 administrations	 from	 the	
point	of	view	of	a	liberal-democratic	ideal	type.	In	both	periods	the	interests	
of	the	state,	represented	in	the	personas	of	the	leadership,	were	dominant.	
The	power	distance	between	the	citizens	and	the	administrative	leadership	
was	high	in	the	first	case	and	remained	so	in	the	latter.	The	same	was	true	of	
the	inside	communication	of	administrative	hierarchies.	Restricted	access	
to	information	was	a	major	obstacle	to	a	citizen´s	enjoyment	of	real	power	
in	both	administrative	cultures.	In	the	Stalinist	administration	this	feature	
took	its	extreme	form	in	the	language	purification	and	secrecy	rules.	In	the	
perestroika	 and	 the	 post	 1993	 periods,	 the	 citizenship	 aspect	 has	 been	
important	in	the	modernization	of	the	administration	both	rhetorically	and	
in	practice	for	the	first	time	in	Russian	administrative	history.	
Since	1993,	the	citizenship	aspect	of	administrative	work	has	taken	the	
form	of	 coexistence	and	cooperation	of	non-governmental	organizations	
and	the	local	administration.	This	in	itself	is	not	a	new	phenomenon	but	
something	which	was	very	important	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	when	
the	role	of	non-governmental	organizations	was	debated.	The	local	soviets,	
after	 becoming	 more	 or	 less	 multiparty	 and	 multi-interest,	 have	 in	 the	
1990´s	lost	their	former	official	position	in	the	administrative	market.	On	
one	hand,	this	has	made	them	political	actors	in	their	own	right.	On	the	
other,	the	financial	difficulties	at	the	municipal	level	and	the	dependency	on	
state	 subsidies	 for	 fulfilling	 local	 tasks	has	 reduced	 the	meaning	of	 local	
decision	making	from	the	point	of	view	of	 the	executive	side.	Today,	 the	
citizen´s	voice	can	most	effectively	be	heard	in	local	activism	of	different	
sorts.	 The	 Murmansk	 case	 study	 shows	 an	 example	 of	 Russian	 local	
administration	which	has	 for	 the	most	part	 had	 an	 active	 and	 informed	
clientele,	often	demanding	the	service	which	it	is	entitled	to.	
In	 comparison,	 the	 post-revolutionary	 Stalinist	 local	 government	
suffocated	 free	 competition	 and	 local	 activism.	The	 leadership	 thought	
that	 political	 control	 of	 local	 developments	 and	 the	 mobilization	 of	
resources	 to	 create	 a	 socialist	 economy	 demanded	 repressive	 methods	
with	which	to	guide	the	citizenry	into	a	new	social	reality.	There	was	no	
demand	for	civil	society	in	its	liberal-democratic	meaning.	Civil	society,	
as	such,	was	an	conceptual	impossibility	because	the	social	and	political	
aspects	of	local	life	became	linked	to	the	party	and	administration.	As	a	
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result,	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 there	 were	 many	 locally	 organized	 state	
organizations	 which	 performed	 social	 and	 cultural	 functions	 and	 now	
have	 to	 be	 managed	 by	 local	 governments,	 non-governmental	 organi-
zations	or	private	enterprises.	
The	 information	 revolution	 started	 in	 the	 perestroika	 period.	 The	
relaxation	 of	 censorship	 and	 the	 possibility	 to	 receive	 information	 from	
around	 the	world	 changed	Russian	 localities	more	 than	 anything	 else.	 It	
also	 changed	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 local	 administration	 and	 its	
clientele	which	became	divided	into	new	social	and	ethnic	groups	which	
had	no	official	meaning	in	the	Soviet	Union.	Because	of	information,	the	
administration	 became	 accountable	 in	 terms	 of	 its	 client´s	 expectations.	
Citizens	had	access	to	information	concerning	themselves	and	could	contest	
the	decisions	of	the	local	administration.	Administrators	on	the	other	hand	
could	get	 information	which	was	educationally	valuable	 in	their	effort	to	
modernize	their	work	organization.	Active	administrators	such	as	the	ones	
which	 were	 interviewed	 in	 the	Murmansk	 case	 study	 could	 in	 this	 way	
moderate	the	difficulties	faced	by	the	organization	in	the	transition	period.	
More	 individualistic	 discourse	 has	 replace	 the	 collective	 one	 in	 some	
senses	since	the	perestroika time.	This	presents	itself	in	the	way	citizens´s	
rights	are	viewed	and	discussed,	and	how	the	administration	is	viewed	in	
terms	of	its	performance.	At	the	same	time,	the	stress	of	the	collective	has	
not	evaporated	from	the	Russian	work	culture,	as	the	Murmansk	case	study	
shows.	The	collective	is	the	source	of	solidarity	and	comfort	in	the	face	of	
the	 administration´s	 internal	 power	 struggles.	 The	 collective	 is	 also	
important	in	terms	of	introducing	new	methods	of	working	style.	
The	 tsarist	 administrative	 culture	 was	 characterized	 by	 the	 formal	
circulation	 of	 paperwork	 because	 reporting	 in	 the	 hierarchy	was	 a	 high	
priority.	At	the	same	time,	the	information	from	the	local	level	was	censured	
and	politically	controlled.	The	same	was	true	in	the	post-revolution	Stalinist	
administrative	culture	which	used	secrecy	rules	extensively	and	specifically	
at	an	organizational	level.	One	of	the	noteworthy	routes	for	an	individual	to	
voice	 his	 concern	was	 the	 Senate	which	 acted	 as	 the	 highest	 arbitration	
court.	After	the	revolution,	this	possibility	was,	in	essence,	abolished.	
The	work	organization	aspect	has	presented	itself	most	of	all	in	the	way	
professionalism	has	been	stressed	in	the	studied	time	periods.	In	imperial	
Russia,	 professional	 standards	 were	 most	 effectively	 introduced	 by	
independent	 non-governmental	 organizations,	 such	 as	 the	 lawyers´	 and	
teachers´professional	 associations.	 In	 the	 pre-1905	 class	 based	 adminis-
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tration,	 professionalism	 was	 a	 relative	 matter.	 Even	 after	 that,	 political	
considerations	and	the	social	status	quo	in	the	provinces	was	the	highest	
priority	of	the	state	leadership.	
The	Imperial	Russian	local	administration	and	the	present	day	Russian	
local	 administration	 both	 serve	 as	 examples	 of	 time	 periods	 when	
experiments	 in	 the	delegation	of	power	and	subsequent	centralization	of	
political	power	have	followed	each	other.	In	both	periods,	local	professional	
groups	working	for	the	 local	government	or	 inside	of	 it,	have	 in	practice	
shaped	the	towns	and	cities	of	Russia	and	enacted	quiet	social	changes	in	
their	own	right.	Examples	are	teachers	in	the	late	19th	century,	and	lawyers	
working	in	city	departments	in	the	present	day.	
The	 Stalinist	 local	 administration	 was	 geared	 most	 of	 all	 toward	 the	
division	 of	 power	 territorially	 and	 functionally	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	
administration	 in	 the	 full	 form	of	 the	 ideal	would	have	resembled	a	well	
working	factory	with	central	power	system.	The	local	level	in	this	respect	
needed	(and	in	due	course	was)	professionalized	along	two	lines:	1)	party	
bureaucratization	and	2)	the	professionalization	of	executive	administrative	
functionaries	by	critical	groups	–	engineers,	book	keepers,	economist	and	
lawyers.	Two	main	types	of	professionals	were	created,	 the	first	of	which	
controlled	 the	 latter.	 In	 the	 administrative	 culture,	 the	 professional	
knowledge	of	the	these	groups	was	subordinated	to	the	task	of	executing	
decisions	 which	 were	 politically	 based	 bureaucratic	 directives	 from	 the	
ministry.	In	cases	of	resources,	the	executive	committee	of	the	local	soviet	
was	one	player	in	the	local	decision	making	market	politically	coordinated	
by	 the	party	organs.	Professionalism	was	very	 important	but	 it	was	very	
tightly	controlled	to	benefit	the	growth	of	the	economy	and	the	balance	of	
the	political	system.	
Since	the	party	became	bureaucratized,	political	in	the	common	use	of	
the	word	lost	its	meaning	in	the	Soviet	Union.	Political	activity	became	a	
way	 of	 socializing	 the	 work	 force	 and	 reproducing	 the	 state´s	 authority	
base.	 Executive	 power	 was	 shifted	 to	 the	 administration	 in	 which	 the	
ministries	 were	 playing	 a	 central	 role.	The	 party	 assumed	 the	 role	 of	 a	
guardian	which	needed	to	be	informed	about	everything	and	which	acted	
as	the	arbitrator	between	different	interests.	Yet,	it	did	not	lose	its	authority	
in	society.	
A	 contradictory	 view	 is	 presented	 by	 Stephen	Whitefield	 in	 his	 1993	
study	of	the	ministerial	power	in	the	Soviet	Union.	He	has	stated	as	a	result	
of	his	analysis	that	there	is	strong	evidence	to	see	the	ministries	as	being	
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disinclined	 to	 pay	 great	 attention	 to	 party	 resolutions	 concerning	 their	
activity	 in	 the	Soviet	period.	Economic	power	which	 the	ministries	had,	
“took	over	and	dominated	the	political	sphere	to	the	extent	that	the	latter	
was	itself	economized,	or	ministerialized.	[…]	The	power	of	the	ministerial	
apparatus,	 through	 its	 control	 over	material	 resources,	 allowed	 them	 to	
determine	 the	 success	 or	 otherwise	 of	 those	who	were	nominally	 in	 the	
position	 of	 supervising	 them.	 To	 get	 something	 done,	 required	 the	 co-
operation	of	the	people	with	real	power,	the	ministerial	allocators.	For	this	
reason,	it	was	necessary	to	ensure	their	presence	on	the	party	committees	at	
all	levels,	not	as	is	often	assumed,	in	order	to	discipline	the	members	of	the	
ministries	through	their	party	membership,	but	rather	the	reverse,	in	order	
to	allow	party	access	to	influence	of	the	latter.	The	coincidence	of	personnel	
at	the	highest	level	of	the	ministry	and	of	the	party,	for	this	reason,	takes	on	
a	new	significance.”	(Whitefield	1993:	12–129.)	
Stressing	the	role	of	the	ministries	in	the	mature	Soviet	system	is	probably	
an	accurate	systemic	approach.	The	ministerial	power,	however,	in	the	view	
of	my	 study	 was	 not	 purely	 structural,	 but	 political.	The	 administrative	
ideology	 of	 change	 in	 the	 post	 191	 Soviet	 Russia	 was	 meant	 to	 effect	
structural	and	social	changes	which	would	merge	the	state	and	economy	
into	one	centrally	run	administration.	The	ministerial	system,	in	this	sense,	
was	the	materialization	of	that	goal.	The	party	gave	the	managerial	role	of	
daily	planning	to	the	administration	which	received	its	legitimation	from	
the	party.	Ministries	did	not	perform	in	a	political	vacuum	but	had	acquired	
a	 social	 identity	which	was	 identical	with	 the	party´s	bureaucratic	goals.	
The	party	exerted	its	authority	in	the	form	of	personnel	policies	which	were	
also	incorporated	into	the	formal	administrative	structures	and	practices	of	
the	administration.	The	distinction	of	the	two	in	this	sense,	can	be	seen	as	a	
theoretical	question	of	politology	and	less	as	matter	of	two	clearly	separate	
structures.	
Whitefield´s	analysis	brings	out	the	role	of	ministerial	opposition	to	the	
Soviet	time	reforms.	This	opposition	mainly	manifested	itself	in	the	way	the	
internal	priorities	of	the	various	ministries	were	prioritized	before	the	goals	
of	 the	general	plan.	 Inter-branch	efficiency	consideration	of	 the	different	
reform	attempts	were	not	taken	very	seriously	and	structural	modernization	
was	thus	delayed.	(Whitefield	1993:	0.)	The	administrative	modernization	
attempts	which	were	enacted	–	of	course	–	as	policies	of	the	party,	can	also	
be	 seen	 as	having	 failed	because	of	 the	 administrative	market	 itself.	The	
party	could	not	dictate	structural	changes,	because	it	had	given	up	repressive	
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methods	of	the	kind	which	were	used	in	the	revolution.	The	mature	Soviet	
administrative	 market	 had	 created	 rather	 safe	 enclaves	 for	 different	
participants	 which	 could	 not	 be	 broken	 or	 easily	 changed.	 In	 a	 society	
where	unemployment	 could	not	 exist,	 the	 question	 is	 also	what	was	 the	
actual	 meaning	 of	 party	 resolutions?	 Was	 the	 meaning	 to	 execute	 the	
modernization	 of	 whole	 structures	 or	most	 of	 all	 show	 concern	 for	 the	
society´s	 development	 and	 perform	 a	 rhetorical	 role	 in	 the	 public	
discussion?	
In	 the	 perestroika	 administration	 professionalism	was	 looked	 at	 from	
the	point	of	view	of	work	ethics.	Symptoms	of	the	lack	of	motivation	and	
the	 dysfunctional	 features	 of	 the	 administrative	 market	 needed	 to	 be	
corrected.	 Professionalism	 was	 underlined	 in	 the	 work	 environment	
campaigns	 concerning	 alcoholism	 and	 unearned	 incomes.	 Yet,	 the	
perestroika	 period	 remained	 similar	 to	 the	 pre-revolutionary	 imperial	
Russia	in	respect	of	its	conservative	outlook	on	administrative	culture.	
In	the	post	1993	period,	critique	of	unprofessional	work	has	been	directed	
at	the	core	of	the	administrative	culture.	The	main	focus,	in	some	way	similar	
to	the	post	191	challenges,	has	been	the	functioning	of	administrators	as	
state	 servants	or	 local	 government	 administrative	workers.	This	 time,	 the	
need	has	been	to	create	a	work	force	able	to	make	delegated	decisions	in	a	
constantly	changing	 legal	environment	and	demanding	pressure	 from	the	
public.	 In	 the	 case	 study,	 the	 Murmansk	 administrators	 underlined	 the	
importance	 of	 continued	 adult	 education	 and	 the	 strengthening	 of	
professional	qualification	on	the	job	for	getting	a	promotion,	or	simply	to	
keep	up	with	daily	demands.	Delegation	of	decision	making	also	requires	
that	the	 limits	of	 jurisdiction	between	different	administrative	bodies	and	
practices	of	their	cooperation	are	clear	at	the	local	level.	
The	public	organization	aspect	has	been	at	the	center	of	attention	in	all	
transitions.	 Legality	was	 raised	 in	 19th	 century	Russia	 by	 the	 developing	
legal	profession	as	a	central	question	for	the	relationship	between	the	state	
and	individuals.	Legal	procedures	were	being	developed	and	the	state	tried	
to	coordinate	the	norm	creation	in	the	Code	of	Laws.	In	the	late	19th	century,	
the	 legal	reforms	resulted	in	the	use	of	appellation.	Courts	and	attorneys	
became	more	independent	with	developing	a	set	of	procedural	regulations	
and	a	professionally	more	independent	role	in	society.	After	the	revolution,	
the	 question	 of	 new	 soviet	 legality	 was	 developed	 parallel	 with	 the	
economical	needs	of	the	new	regime	in	the	middle	of	a	civil	war	and	fear	of	
opposition.	In	the	late	1920´s	and	at	the	end	of	the	1930´s,	repression	was	
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accepted	 as	 an	 administrative	 control	 method	 according	 to	 the	 legal	
principle	which	placed	group	interest	above	individual	rights.	
Perestroika	tried	to	return	some	of	the	liberal-democratic	ideals	which	
had	began	to	take	root	in	the	19th	century	reforms.	“Soviet	legal	conscious-
ness”	returned	to	the	public	the	right	to	have	a	legal	voice	which	was	not	
completely	 regulated	by	official	group	 structures.	The	prosecutor´s	office	
which	in	the	Stalinist	soviet	system	was	the	most	effective	organization	for	
political	control,	in	essence	a	branch	of	the	secret	police,	began	to	control	
the	unity	of	municipal	legality.	Many	of	its	workers	wanted	to	include	the	
KGB	and	the	party	in	this	supervising	function	(Smith	199:	335).	
The	publicness	aspect	of	the	administration	has	been	institutionalized	in	
the	 form	 of	 the	 prosecutor´s	 office.	The	 prosecutor´s	 office	 in	 the	 post-
revolution	Russia	became	a	powerful	 and	authoritative	 institution	which	
guided	the	preliminary	inquiry,	raised	charges	on	the	basis	of	it	and	played	
a	dominant	role	in	the	court.	On	top	of	this,	the	prosecutors	acted	as	the	
general	supervisors	of	all	administrative	decisions	and	could	demand	their	
correction.	In	fact,	the	prosecutors	acted	as	the	most	effective	channel	of	
political	 supervision.	 In	 comparison	with	 other	 professions,	 such	 as	 the	
police,	for	instance,	the	prosecutors	were	the	core	around	which	the	legal	
life	of	the	state	was	built.	The	police,	or	militia,	in	comparison,	took	a	longer	
time	to	evolve	into	a	state	wide	system.	(See	Kositsin	&	Vlasova	19.)
In	 the	 transition	 period	 since	 196,	 the	 prosecutor´s	 role	 has	 been	
changing	from	an	almighty	institution	into	an	important,	yet	more	balanced	
party	in	the	legal	sphere.	However,	the	role	of	the	prosecutor´s	office	in	the	
control	of	administrative	legality	has	remained.	The	prosecutors	have	locally	
assumed	tasks	which	make	them	the	enforcers	of	new	policies,	such	as	the	
environmental	policy.	
After	the	1993	Constitution,	the	administration	was	able	to	push	forward	
many	of	the	hopes	raised	in	the	perestroika	period.	The	public	organization	
aspect	of	administration	has	been	underlined	in	the	media	and	in	the	legal	
reforms	since	the	early	1990´s.	In	the	post	1993	Russia,	the	separation	of	
powers,	 and	 the	 emergence	of	 independent	 court	 rooms,	has	 resulted	 in	
people	having	increasing	recourse	to	the	law.	Administrative	disputes	are	
often	contested,	not	endured.	Legal	consciousness	has	emerged	both	in	the	
ranks	of	the	administrators	themselves,	but	most	of	all	in	the	population.	
This	in	itself	does	not	always	mean	effective	and	timely	work	–	because	it	
requires	 extra	 attention	 from	 the	 administration	 –	 but	 it	 is	 vital	 for	 the	
existence	of	the	rule	of	law	in	Russia.
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7.4 What Cultural Significance Does the Level of 
Administration Have?
The	meaning	of	territoriality	in	general	and	in	Russian	political	history	in	
particular	has	been	great	(see	for	instance	Bennett	199	and	Bours	199).	
Territoriality	can	be	looked	at	from	the	point	of	view	of	structural	divisions	
and	 structural	 levels	 (administrative	 and	 economic	 hierarchies,	 center-
periphery	 balance).	 It	 can	 also	 be	 looked	 at	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
governing	policy	“by	territory”.	Important	questions	involved	here	include	
localism	in	political	ideologies,	territorial	policies	in	administrative	reforms,	
territoriality	in	risk	administration	(e.g.	in	the	interpretation	of	laws,	loss	of	
power	by	authorities)	and	 territoriality	of	different	administrative	classes	
inside	 the	 civil	 service	 (central-regional-local,	 regional	 heads	 of	
municipalities	and	so	on).	In	the	light	of	history,	territoriality	has	been	a	
major	cultural	element	in	administration.	
The	 local	 level	 and	 local	 decision	 making	 authority	 was	 particularly	
important	in	the	late	19th	century	reforms	and	the	period	195–1992.	In	the	
imperial	Russian	discussions,	tempers	flew	over	what	should	constitute	the	
basic	limits	of	administration	at	the	local	level.	Was	the	local	level	a	part	of	
the	Russian	state	or	a	separate	institutional	sphere?	Originally	the	local	level	
was	developed	as	a	means	to	govern	provinces	better	(Koivisto	2001).	In	the	
reforms	 of	 the	 160´s	 and	 10´s	 it	 acquired	 a	 new	 social	 and	 political	
meaning	as	the	zemstvo	and	town	governments	were	given	responsibility	
over	 local	matters.	But	again,	as	Russian	statehood	began	 to	emerge,	 the	
local	 level	 became	 officially	 subordinated	 to	 the	 state´s	 administrative	
needs.	 In	 terms	 of	 practices,	 the	 changes	 in	 ideology	meant	 alternating	
possibilities	 for	 local	 activists	 and	 professionals	 to	 work	 for	 their	
community.
In	the	perestroika	years,	local	level	activism	was	encouraged	as	a	means	
to	attack	dysfunctions	created	by	the	Soviet	work	culture	and	administrative	
autarchy.	The	delegation	of	political	power	to	the	local	level	was	chosen	as	
the	main	method,	along	with	more	freedom	of	expression	in	the	media.	For	
the	sustainment	or	gradual	reform	of	the	existing	system,	these	strategies	
proved	to	be	wrong.	At	the	level	of	local	administrative	culture,	the	system	
of	blat	and	power	balance	in	the	administrative	market	were	important.	The	
ideology	 of	 administrative	 change	 overlooked	 these	 practices	 and	
paradoxically	introduced	bigger	risks	to	the	system.	
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In	the	transition	since	1991,	territoriality	has	been	an	important	factor	in	
the	birth	of	risk	administration	in	at	least	two	ways.	Firstly	in	the	period	of	
local	democracy	at	the	start	of	the	1990´s	which	was	followed	by	the	stronger	
executive	 rule	 at	 the	 local	 and	 regional	 level.	 Secondly	 in	 the	 period	 of	
regionalism	which	was	followed	by	the	centralization	of	policy	making	at	
the	end	of	the	1990´s.	Paradoxically,	the	period	of	regionalism	coincided	
with	the	tendency	to	strengthen	the	executive	decision	making	power	(e.g.	
Campbell	1992).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 time	of	 “purely”	 local	democracy	was	
only	a	brief	moment	in	the	beginning	of	the	1990´s,	in	very	much	the	same	
way	as	power	was	“purely”	proletarian	in	the	191	revolution.	In	both	cases,	
the	state	administrative	needs	in	the	reforms	quickly	superseded	the	local	
activism.	
In	the	Soviet	Union,	the	meaning	of	territoriality	was	very	important	for	
the	 administrative	market.	The	double	 administrative	 structure,	 in	 itself,	
meant	 that	 in	 the	 political	 administration	 the	 higher	 party	 organ	 could	
always	influence	the	lower	level	decision	making.	The	administrative	organs	
in	general	acted	as	extra-constitutional	arbitrators	in	the	market.	The	fact	
that	 the	higher	 level	has	retained	 the	final	 say	 in	administrative	decision	
making	in	Russian	history	has	itself	been	connected	with	the	problems	of	
geographic	 governance	 and	 the	 coexistence	 of	 unofficial	 networks	 along	
formal	channels.	
Territoriality	is	present	in	the	formation	of	administrative	culture	at	the	
local	 level	 today	because	 the	 separation	of	 state	 administration	 from	 the	
economic	 administration	 (Kordonskii	 2000)	has	made	 the	 lines	between	
different	 institutions	more	distinct	at	 the	 local	 level.	 “An	administration”	
has	appeared	which	can	concentrate	more	on	professional	matters	rather	
than	institutional	bargaining.	
Yet,	it	needs	to	be	remembered	that	local	administration	work	today	is	
different	than	local	government	as	such.	The	local	level	takes	care	of	a	large	
part	 of	 the	 social	 functions	 which	 the	 state	 has	 promised	 to	 provide.	
Constitutionalism	takes	a	territorial	form	in	the	way	local	communities	can	
provide	the	same	services	to	their	clients	irrespective	of	the	location.	In	the	
debate	over	how	the	local	level	should	be	viewed,	this	basic	starting	point	
receives	surprisingly	little	attention	over	other	matters.	From	the	point	of	
view	of	legal	protection,	territorial	equality	is	one	of	the	main	concerns.	For	
Russia,	 the	analysis	of	administrative	methods	and	policy	guidance	from	
this	perspective	deserves	more	attention.
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7.5 Is the Liberal-Democratic Ideal Type Useful in 
Understanding Other Types?
This	work	attempted	 to	describe	 and	understand	 the	Russian	and	Soviet	
local	administration	cultures	with	a	set	of	elements	derived	from	the	liberal-
democratic	ideal	type.	The	purpose	was	to	see	how	the	present	transition	
can	 be	 understood	 from	 a	 historical	 comparative	 perspective	 when	 set	
against	this	ideal	type.	There	are	obvious	benefits	to	having	a	clear	definition	
of	what	one	is	looking	for.	The	use	of	the	liberal-democratic	ideal	type	is	
based	on	those	requirements	for	administration	which	emphasize	its	public	
nature.	This	makes	the	choosing	of	what	one	is	looking	for	easier.	
Looking	 at	 the	 historical	 Russian	 local	 level	 administrations	with	 the	
help	of	definitions	rising	from	the	liberal-democratic	model	of	administration	
can	be	criticized	as	being	ethnocentric.	It	can	be	said	that	understanding	
the	deeper	cultural	meaning	of	words	 in	an	alien	and	historically	distant	
environment	becomes	difficult	with	the	ready-made	yardstick	of	an	other	
culture	 and	 time.	The	 rule	 of	 law	 framework	 can	 be	 equated	 with	 the	
modernization	approaches	and	be	seen	valuing	development	by	its	closeness	
to	Western	politics	and	economy.	The	use	of	“outside	models”	can	be	said	to	
forget	historical	contexts	and	causes	by	looking	at	the	results	of	processes.	
The	characteristics	which	distinguish	different	historical	time	periods	may	
not	be	clearly	defined.	Often	it	is	nearly	impossible	to	find	common	traits	
for	different	subjects	under	study.	(Brower	196:	320–321.)
The	critique	which	can	be	directed	to	the	use	of	concepts	from	an	ideal	
type,	 is	 of	 course,	 that	 they	 do	 not	 cover	 all	 types	 and	 are	 particularly	
difficult	 to	 apply	when	 transitional	 regimes/states	 are	 concerned.	This	 is	
why	 I	 have	 included	 other	 considerations	 in	 the	 examination	 of	 the	
transition	in	which	the	administrative	culture	develops.	For	instance,	ideas	
from	Fred	Riggs´classic	“Prismatic	Society”	model	have	been	borrowed	in	
the	 analysis	 of	 former	 socialist	 societies	 in	 transition,	 although	 it	 was	
originally	created	for	the	analysis	of	so	called	developing	nations.	In	this	
work,	 Riggs´	 ideas	 are	 used	 in	 the	 description	 of	 the	 ecology	 of	
administration.	Critiques	of	Riggs´	model	have	pointed	out	 that	 it	has	 a	
negative	starting	point	which	is	based	on	a	Western	bias	and	that	it	overlooks	
similar	prismatic	behavior	in	stable	market	economies,	such	as	the	United	
States.	It	is	also	pointed	out	that	“formalism”,	which	Riggs	uses	to	describe	
a	 situation	 in	which	 there	 is	 a	 gap	 between	 stated	 objectives	 and	 actual	
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behavior,	may	have	both	negative	and	positive	consequences	depending	on	
the	circumstances.	(Heady	1996:	105.)
One	can	argue	that	the	liberal-democratic	ideal	type	is	a	representation	
of	political	values	and	does	not	correspond	to	administrative	realities	in	any	
society.	It	is	possible	to	say	that	the	elements	of	culture	included	in	this	ideal	
type	reflect	values	which	are	difficult	to	study	systematically	without	making	
mechanistic	 requirements	 for	 each	 element.	 For	 instance	 “transparency”	
could	be	studied	by	looking	at	how	many	institutional	actors	can	take	part	
in	 decision	 making	 and	 at	 what	 moment	 the	 general	 public	 has	 been	
informed	about	a	forthcoming	decision	making	process.	
Yet	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 an	 administration	 more	 or	 less	 meets	 all	 the	
necessary	formal	requirements	and	remains	far	from	the	liberal-democratic	
type.	Because	of	this,	I	would	say	that	the	use	of	one	ideal	type	in	the	study	
of	other	forms	of	administrations	is	most	useful	in	clarifying	what	makes	
administrations	different	from	each	other.	This	“something”	is	often	seen	
as	 “culture”.	 In	 this	 work,	 differences	 have	 been	 looked	 as	 qualities	 of	
elements	 of	 administrative	 culture.	 Administrative	 elements	 have	 been	
described	 as	 parts	 of	 the	 historical	 transition	 processes.	Their	 different	
qualities	have	been	described	to	the	extent	they	have	changed	and	affected	
the	transition.
The	rule	of	law	administration	concept	is	often	discarded	since	it	does	
not	match	the	reality	of	the	present	societies	in	transition.	Yet	this	is	precisely	
its	strength	when	the	purposes	of	administration	need	to	be	understood.	It	
is	quite	impossible	to	look	at	an	administrative	organization	without	regard	
to	the	client-organization	relationship	in	some	form.	Instead	of	 trying	to	
discard	 a	 concept	 related	 with	 liberal-democratic	 tradition,	 it	 is	 more	
fruitful	to	see	what	its	meaning	has	been	in	other	contexts.	As	the	Russian/
Soviet	 administrative	 and	 legal	 history	 shows,	 merely	 the	 word	 “rights”	
opens	up	a	vast	landscape	of	theoretical	and	practical	discussion	about	the	
state	and	citizenship,	among	other	things.	
The	building	of	administrative	ideal	types	from	the	Russian	transitional	
experiences	is	mostly	interesting	as	an	attempt	to	see	what	effects	structural	
changes	based	on	new	political	purposes	have	on	institutional	requirements.	
Transitions	are	meant	to	have	purposes.	These	purposes	are	meant	to	effect	
institutional	practices	and	ways	of	thoughts.	In	this	work	I	have	explained	
how	 things	 have	 happened	 in	 the	 transitions	 of	 chosen	 elements	 of	
administrative	 culture.	 Summing	 up	 the	 main	 changes	 and	 the	 new	
dominant	 elements	 of	 local	 administrative	 culture	 has	 shown	 the	
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complexities	of	transitional	processes.	Ideal	types	are	in	this	sense	useful	for	
the	understanding	of	the	transition	itself.
Each	 of	 the	 studied	 administrative	 ideologies	 had	 qualities	 which	
correspond	with	the	“good	government”	ideal	type	described	in	the	chapter	
1.1.3.	In	the	19th	century	Russian	town,	civil	service	was	being	reorganized	
and	legality	was	pushed	forward.	Legal	protection	was	structurally	strongest	
in	the	form	of	appeals	to	the	Senate.	The	Emperor´s	position,	no	separation	
of	powers,	wide	discretionary	powers	of	the	security	administration,	secrecy	
and	limited	political	rights	of	the	citizenry	made	the	rule	of	law	impossible,	
but	the	development	was	toward	this	direction.	Town	government	authority	
was	 also	 instituted	 which	 involved	 a	 larger	 group	 of	 people	 into	 the	
administration.	
In	comparison	to	the	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	government,	the	
tsarist	 town	 administration	 culture	had	 a	 limited	non-political	 authority	
base.	This	authority	was	mediated	by	the	decision	making	procedures	which	
underpinned	the	autocratic	character	of	the	state.	Local	actors	could,	within	
their	 own	 restricted	 sphere	 (particularly	 professional),	 effect	 changes.	
However,	 the	 weakness	 of	 the	 administrative	 authority	 (both	 the	
organizational	 and	 civil	 servants´)	 created	 dysfunctions	 (bureaucratism,	
multiplication	of	paper	work)	and	risks	(poor	feedback	and	an	authoritarian,	
personal	decision	making	style).
The	socialist	local	administration	instituted	a	complicated	structure	and	
strong	control	of	formal	procedures.	In	theory	this	should	have	structured	
and	 limited	 the	 use	 of	 personal	 discretion	 in	 a	 way	 which	 could	 have	
protected	the	citizens	from	the	arbitrary	behavior	of	the	tsarist	local	level.	
However,	the	political	paranoia	which	was	attached	to	local	decision	making	
overrode	the	modernization	side	of	the	changes.	In	theory,	the	Soviet	state	
could	have	provided	a	structure	and	mechanism	for	a	clear	norm	hierarchy.	
Instead,	law	became	mostly	a	tool	for	the	administration	which	was	led	by	
the	 double	 bureaucracy	 of	 the	 party.	 In	 addition,	 during	 the	 Stalinist	
administrative	culture,	law	became	inseparable	from	political	purposes	and	
thus	arbitrary.	As	a	side-effect	of	this,	law	assumed	a	formal	role	and	lost	its	
authority	to	the	party	instructions	and	personal	decisions	by	powerful	party	
leaders.	Individual	rights	as	such	could	not	exist	because	the	basis	of	society	
was	the	same	identity	for	all	member	classes.	
In	comparison	to	the	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	government,	the	
core	of	the	new	socialist	administrative	culture	remained	essentially	same	
compared	 to	 the	 tsarist	 system.	This	 meant	 that:	 1)	 final	 authority	 was	
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beyond	 and	 above	 law	 (in	 the	 party);	 2)	 local	 administration	 was	 non-
political	 (concentration	on	quantity);	3)	administrative	procedures	based	
on	trust	between	organizations	and	citizens	were	not	created	(no	rule	of	law	
or	legal	protection);	4)	law	remained	weak	(formalism);	and	5)	bureaucratic	
language	 and	 secrecy	 were	 used	 (separation	 of	 different	 administrative	
levels	and	actors	from	each	other).	
Perestroika	tried	to	remedy	the	worst	dysfunction	of	the	Soviet	system.	
In	this	attempt	the	concept	of	legal	consciousness	became	a	tool	for	change.	
Glasnost	 encouraged	 discussion	 about	 the	 administration.	 Political	
repression	was	no	longer	a	weapon	against	the	opposition	inside	the	party.	
“Socialist	 rule	 of	 law”	 was	 an	 attempt	 to	 incorporate	 liberal-democratic	
ideals	of	good	government	into	the	system	of	democratic	centralism.	The	
contradiction	was	impossible	to	overcome	and	its	failure	was	all	the	more	
disappointing	 because	 of	 the	 other	 great	 problems	 of	 the	 perestroika 
period.	
In	comparison	to	the	ideal	type	of	liberal-democratic	government,	the	
perestroika	 local	 administration	 created	 new	 client	 relations	 through	
glasnost.	At	the	same	time,	risks	were	created	to	these	new	relations	because	
local	administrative	markets	were	de-stabilized.	Since	systemic	change	was	
not	the	original	goal	of	administrative	change,	the	reforms	did	not	have	a	
clear	institutional	direction.	This	led	to	uncertainty	in	authority	relations	
which	greatly	affected	the	following	transition.	
Russia,	since	its	new	Constitution	of	1993,	must	and	has	been	evaluated	
according	 to	 the	 requirements	 which	 the	 Constitution	 and	 federal	 laws	
based	on	it	have	set.	The	present	administrative	law	in	Russia,	although	still	
partially	in	the	making,	does	build	the	legislative	base	–	for	the	first	time	in	
Russian	history	–	 for	a	 rule	of	 law	administration.	 In	comparison	 to	 the	
ideal	 type	 of	 liberal-democratic	 government,	 the	 “good	 government”	
principles	in	the	work	of	Russian	local	administration	have	suffered	from	
economic	 and	 political	 set	 backs.	 Planning	 has	 been	 difficult	 which	
undersmines	laws,	clear	guidance	in	their	application	and	timely	decision	
making.	Yet	rule	of	law	principles	have	emerged	as	a	result	of	legalism	and	
education.	The	main	result	of	the	transition	has	been	a	separation	of	powers.	
A	place	 for	 local	administration	exists	where	administrators	can	develop	
the	use	of	discretion.	The	use	of	information	has	assumed	a	“revolutionary”	
role.	Work	collectives	and	individuals	can	use	information	gathered	from	
different	sources	as	a	socializing	and	educational	medium.	
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7.6 Does the Risk Administration Concept Help to 
Understand the Transitions?
The	historical	experiences	analyzed	in	this	work	show	that	reforms	have	a	
common	problem:	They	require	reactions	to	risks	which	arise	as	side-effects	
of	 political	 decisions	 made	 in	 situations	 where	 planning	 is	 difficult	 or	
impossible.	The	connection	between	decisions,	 side-effects	 and	 risks	 can	
help	show	why	cultural	change	is	such	a	long	term	process.	Cultural	change	
at	 an	 organizational	 level	 rarely	 happens	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 intended	
purposes.	In	some	cases,	transitions	happen	as	a	side-effect	themselves.	In	
other	cases,	organizations	adapt	to	new	risk	without	higher	planning.	
Looking	at	the	transition	as	a	combination	of	side-effects	and	risks	helps	
one	to	understand	the	interests	that	functioning	structures	serve.	From	the	
Russian	 experience	 since	 the	 1990´s,	 the	 administratively	 problematic	
starting	point	was	 the	 lack	of	 institutional	consideration.	Too	many	vital	
questions	were	left	out	of	the	plan	because	it	was	hoped	that	society	itself	
would	eventually	 replace	most	 state	 services,	 and	 that	 law	and	hierarchy	
relations	 in	the	political	system	would	develop	in	time.	The	risks	created	
were	 both	 economic	 and	 political.	The	 development	 from	 then	 on	 has	
followed	the	text	book	description	of	risk	administration.	
Political	and	economic	changes	effect	administrations	directly,	but	not	
always	 in	 the	 intended	 way.	 In	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union,	 Steven	
Solnick	 (199)	 has	 concluded	 that	 when	 either	 authority	 relations	 or	
property	rights	eroded,	institutional	collapse	followed.	Hierarchy	collapse	
in	 the	Soviet	Union	was	not	a	consequence	of	political-economic	 factors	
but	constituted	the	collapse	itself.	(Solnick	1999:4–5.)	
In	transitional	organizations	it	is	easier	to	adopt	a	formal	organizational	
structure	with	a	manifest	function	than	it	is	to	change	actual	social	behavior.	
Thus	the	old	culture	in	fact	stays	strong	and	a	profound	organization	wide	
change	in	the	ethics	and	procedures	is	difficult	to	achieve.	When	side-effects	
assume	 a	 powerful	 role	 in	 the	 whole	 social	 system,	 a	 social	 need	 for	
structural	 change	 grows.	 In	 these	 situations,	 the	 existing	 structures	 can	
regress	to	defensive	practices	and	thus	easily	alienate	the	actual	social	life	
from	official	legitimation	even	further.	But	another	choice	is	also	possible.	
When	the	leadership	meets	persistent	deviations	from	the	official	purpose	
of	work,	the	leadership	can	change	its	political	goals	in	order	to	accommodate	
the	deviations.	The	leadership	manipulates	the	side-effects	to	its	own	benefit	
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and	 alters	 the	 justification	 of	 an	 organization´s	 functioning	 without	
touching	the	foundation	of	its	belief	system.	In	the	structuration	process,	
this	takes	place	during	the	mediation	stage.	Both	examples	can	be	found	in	
Russian	administrative	history.	
The	 historical	 case	 studies	 in	 this	 work	 show	 the	 patterns	 of	 risk	
administration	formation	quite	clearly.	The	risk	administration	ecology	can	
be	found	in	all	four	studied	administrative	transitions.	The	most	dominant	
risk	administration	qualities	which	can	be	found	include	
1.	 The	use	of	security	organs	(19th	century	tsarist	administration,	the	
191	revolutionary	administration	and	the	present	administration),
2.	 ineffective	 planning	 as	 a	 result	 of	 structural	 changes	 (perestroika	
administration,	present	time)
3.	 quasi-market	of	 the	 economy	 (revolution	of	 191	 and	 the	present	
time)
4.	 non-coherent	state	system	(all	administrations)
5.	 formalistic	 laws	 (most	 intense	 in	 the	 191	 revolutionary	
administration)
6.	 severity	of	policy	rules	increases	as	power	and	control	change	their	
nature	(all	transitions)
.	 administrators	need	to	fill	the	gap	left	by	politicians	or	state	heads	
(all	transitions)	
.	 client	relations	are	complicated	by	 the	attempts	 to	enforce	 the	 law	
(all	administrations).	
The	use	 of	 security	 organs	 by	 the	 tsarist	 administration	 and	 the	 present	
administration	 present	 an	 interesting	 parallel	 because	 in	 both	 cases	 the	
precedent	of	centralization	was	the	establishment	of	local	self-government	
for	the	first	time.	In	19th	century	Russia,	the	local	level	was	made	a	part	of	
the	state	administration	and	given	wider	rights	to	pass	decisions	albeit	at	
the	expense	of	becoming	more	closely	monitored	and	run	by	the	elite	group.	
In	tsarist	Russia,	administrators	often	needed	to	act	as	enforces	of	policies.	
In	 the	present	 transition,	 the	 centralization	has	 paradoxically	 served	 the	
strengthening	of	the	legal	position	of	the	local	level	at	the	expense	of	the	
regions	which	were	given	very	wide	power	in	the	beginning.	Regionalization	
resulted	 in	 a	 non-coherent	 state	 system	 and	 administrators	 acting	 as	
politicians.	The	developing	market	economy	was	often	abused	by	a	small	
elite	at	the	central	and	regional	levels.	The	response	has	been	the	setting	of	
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new	 policy	 rules	 (central	 policy	 and	 dictatorship	 of	 laws)	 and	 partially	
complicated	client	relations.	At	the	same	time,	clients	have	acquired	a	more	
prominent	role	through	the	courts	and	information	society.	
It	would	seem	that	the	notions	of	both	Peters	(194)	and	Salminen	and	
Temmes	 (2000)	 concerning	 the	 diffusion	 of	 political	 power	 to	 the	
administrators	in	transitional	times	is	true	in	the	studied	periods.	Yet	more	
political	risks	are	created	in	the	form	of	centralization	policies	which	are	
meant	to	strengthen	political	control	of	the	administration.	In	addition,	the	
diffusion	of	power	to	the	administrators	seems	to	create	an	environment	
were	old	practices	and	ways	of	 thought	are	recycled.	This	was	evident	 in	
Whitefield´s	(1993)	study.	Risks	created	by	the	transition	itself,	have	resulted	
in	 the	 centralization	 of	 political	 power	 and	 its	 bureaucratization	 in	 the	
administration.
The	perestroika	 period	 in	 comparison	meant	 this	 development	 in	 the	
reverse	 order.	The	 centralization	 was	 dismantled	 with	 the	 help	 of	 tight	
policy	 rules	 (the	 anti-alcohol	 campaign,	 campaign	 against	 unearned	
incomes	and	so	on).	Political	pressure	 led	 to	complicated	client	relations	
which	 made	 enforcing	 already	 formalistic	 laws	 of	 the	 political	 system	
difficult.	At	the	same	time	though,	law	served	a	revolutionary	purpose	by	
creating	a	space	for	legal	consciousness.	
It	would	be	tempting	to	say	that	transition	equals	poor	planning.	To	an	
extent	this	is	the	case	in	all	the	studied	periods.	Poor	planning	in	this	case	
would	mean	 choosing	 a	 political	 course	 instead	 of	 the	 “rational”	 choice	
which	 would	 consider	 “practical”	 realities	 (financial,	 organizational	
effectiveness	 and	 so	on)	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 strategic	 choices.	Political	 courses	
mean	that	transitional	problems	are	tackled	through	reactions	to	immediate	
political	risks.	
When	a	leadership	style	changes,	as	with	Presidents	Eltsin	and	Putin,	it	
means	yet	another	adjustment	for	the	administration.	Policy	rules	(written	
and	unwritten,	 “historical”)	 become	more	 severe	 because	 administrators	
need	to	be	forced	to	understand	the	changes.	It	could	be	said	for	instance,	
that	 President	 Putin	 has	 employed	 a	managerial	 style	 which	 underlines	
unity	of	decision	making	and	the	use	of	legal	grounds	for	strategic	choices.	
The	legislation	passed	during	Putin´s	regime	has	at	the	same	time	demanded	
the	 centralization	 of	 economic	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 and	 strengthened	 the	
local	 level	by	clearing	 the	 rights	of	different	administrative	 levels	and	by	
enforcing	the	norm	hierarchy.	This	tendency	of	centralization	in	connection	
with	the	stronger	local	role	follows	the	cycle	of	administrative	changes	in	
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Russian	 history.	 Similarly,	 the	 strategic	 administrative	 methods	 in	 this	
process	have	included	the	involvement	of	the	security	administration	more	
closely	in	the	monitoring	and	staffing	of	administration.	At	the	local	level,	
the	strengthening	of	the	norm	hierarchy,	centralization	of	executive	decision	
making	and	stabilization	of	economics	have	also	served	to	provide	better	
chances	 for	 developing	 rule	 of	 law	 practices.	This	 is	 the	 paradox	 of	 the	
present	transition.
7.7 How Can Local Administration Cultures Be 
Viewed in Terms of Pluralist vs. Totalitarian and 
Integration vs. Political Process Theories of 
Government?
The	Russian/Soviet	administration	can	be	understood	both	as	a	totalitarian/
highly	 authoritarian	 regime	 and	 as	 an	 administratively	 pluralistic	
government.	Both	ways	of	looking	at	the	administration	concentrate	on	the	
central	government	and	see	 the	 local	 level	mostly	as	an	extension	of	 the	
central	culture.	
The	first	view	emphasizes	the	ruler	at	the	top	of	the	hierarchy	as	the	sole	
source	of	power	and	group	conflict	 stemming	 from	 the	fight	 to	gain	 the	
rulers	attention.	The	latter	view	sees	the	administration	as	representing	a	
force	of	its	own	which,	even	as	it	was	always	dependent	on	the	final	word	of	
the	ruler	or	ruling	group,	has	been	able	to	distribute	resources	and	actual	
decision	 making	 power	 among	 different	 constituents.	 This	 was	 mainly	
because	 of	 the	 vast	 geographical	 area	 of	 Russia.	According	 to	 this	 latter	
view,	 the	geographically	 spread	Russian	administration	has	never	been	a	
direct	“machinery”	of	the	center	but	instead	a	bargaining	field	for	different	
locally	and	territorially	important	actors	and	groups.	
The	first	view	concentrates	on	the	ruler´s	need	to	control	and	integrate	
all	 parts	 of	 the	 vast	 land	 into	 one	 structure	 which	 leads	 to	 him.	 The	
totalitarian	view	of	 the	Soviet	administration	sees	 that	 it	was	monolithic	
both	in	its	structures	and	in	the	way	decisions	about	resources	were	made.	
Arbitrariness	and	coercion	in	the	face	of	different	types	of	ruling	risks	are	
natural	results	of	this	tendency	to	secure	the	power	of	one	family	or	party	
leadership.	This	view	can	be	criticized	for	creating	a	myth	that	such	total	
control	is	possible	in	the	first	place.
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
336
A	modified	interpretation	of	the	totalitarian/highly	authoritarian	regime	
interpretation	has	been	a	view	of	the	Soviet	government	as	an	oligarchy	(for	
instance	Hammer	 1993).	According	 to	 this	 view,	 the	 Soviet	 government	
after	Stalin	was	not	ruled	by	a	single	dictator	but	by	the	most	 influential	
members	of	the	ruling	elite.	This	group	shared	the	same	prestige,	by	and	
large	 the	 same	 potential	 for	 leadership	 and	 a	 wide	 constituency	 in	 the	
structures	 of	 the	 country.	 No	 one	 person,	 in	 spite	 of	 his	 institutional	
position,	could	alone	decide	anything.	The	solidarity	of	all	members	of	the	
ruling	group	was	in	fact	needed	for	policy	decisions.	According	to	this	view,	
the	 decision	making	 at	 the	 top	was	 indeed	 a	 type	 of	 a	 political	 process,	
although	within	the	approved	version	of	the	communist	ideology.	
For	 the	 local	 level,	 however,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 it	 is	 less	 significant	
whether	the	top	consisted	of	one	or	10	people	if	the	authoritarian	culture	
demanded	unquestionable	obedience.	The	question	then	becomes:	did	the	
local	 level	 possess	 similar	 strong	 actors	 who	 reached	 a	 consensus	 in	 a	
bargaining	process?	The	pluralist	view	would	answer	this	question	positively.	
It	sees	the	local	level	as	a	battle	field	for	different	interests	who	could	gain	or	
lose	power	 in	 the	net	 effect.	The	political	 process	 view	of	 culture	 comes	
close	to	this	view	by	emphasizing	actual	interest	conflicts	and	unpredictable	
end	results.	
Yet,	the	question	with	the	pluralist	view	is:	does	all	the	local	meddling	
actually	change	the	course	of	events	at	the	local	level	administration?	Even	
if	resources	are	 temporarily	shifted	a	 little	bit	 from	one	place	 to	another,	
does	this	mean	that	the	local	level	makes	it	own	future?	Furthermore,	did	
power	changes	actually	take	place	 in	the	Soviet	Union	or	 in	the	imperial	
Russia?
This	work	has	not	advocated	any	particular	view	of	looking	at	the	local	
administrative	culture.	The	results	of	my	analysis	suggest	that	some	issues	
connected	with	these	mentioned	views	are	better	suited	for	the	understanding	
of	Russian	administrative	cultures	than	others.	I	would	look	at	these	views	
in	the	light	of	the	pre-revolutionary	time,	the	Soviet	perestroika period	and	
the	present	time	to	see	if	a	common	view	can	be	used.	
The	time	period	before	the	revolution	was	at	 least	officially	one	which	
greatly	 emphasized	 one	 man	 rule,	 authoritarian	 and	 very	 personal,	
unpredictable	and	extralegal	nature	of	administrative	decision	making	at	
the	top.	This	was	also	reflected	in	the	position	of	the	local	level	which	was	
limited	in	its	authoritative	role.	Yet,	the	fact	of	life	was	that	the	ruler	was	far	
away.	Local	and	territorial	mini-rulers,	and	institutional	heads	could	impose	
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their	own	will	on	the	administration	and	on	single	officials.	The	lack	of	legal	
limits	in	many	cases,	class	society	particularly	and	the	punitive	general	role	
which	the	administration	had	as	a	controller	rather	than	provider,	added	to	
the	independent	behavior	at	the	local	level.	Was	this	pluralism	in	the	present	
meaning	of	the	word?	Hardly.	More	likely	it	was	mundane	arbitrariness	and	
lack	of	rule	of	law	in	the	structures.	Even	as	it	is	true	that	semi-autonomous	
power	 holders	 existed	 at	 the	 regional	 and	 local	 level,	 their	 institutional	
position	depended	on	the	personal	power	of	the	ruler.	
Whether	the	administrative	competition	at	the	Soviet	local	level	can	be	
seen	as	proof	of	some	type	of	independent	local	decision	making	is	a	more	
difficult	question.	It	clearly	shows	that	individual	actors	and	actor	groups	
could	 adapt	 both	 their	 own	 behavior	 and	 affect	 the	 system.	 The	 local	
administrators	 had	 also	 possessed	 different	 channels	 of	 influence	 in	 the	
pre-perestroika	period.	It	had	been	possible	to	achieve	change	within	the	
political	 limitations	 of	 the	 system.The	 elite´s	 privileged	 position	 had	
revealed	 itself	 in	 the	way	personal	 contacts	helped	 to	maintain	position,	
improve	it	or	achieve	needed	results.	The	norms	of	the	social	system	had	in	
fact	made	contacts	a	fully	accepted	way	of	bypassing	the	legal	limitations	of	
the	system	both	materially	and	socially	 (for	 instance	Sungurov	199	and	
Ledeneva	2000).	On	the	whole	though	it	can	be	argued	that	the	logic	of	the	
local	level	had	been	a	part	of	a	unitarian	system	where	diversity	presented	
itself	in	different	types	of	unofficial	social	networks	which	had	mediated	the	
rigidity	of	the	political	system.	The	perestroika	period	did	not	change	any	
of	 this.	 Perestroika merely	made	 these	 unofficial	 ties	 even	more	 acutely	
necessary	and	changed	the	influencing	capabilities	of	different	groups.	
The	definition	of	the	local	administration	as	a	market	requires	accepting	
the	idea	that	in	spite	of	a	political	totalitarian	culture,	there	was	functional	
pluralism	in	the	bargaining	over	resources.	The	perestroika	period	changed	
the	administrative	market	in	which	the	local	bargaining	over	resources	was	
done.	The	change	was	due	to	the	loss	of	authority	by	the	party	in	society	in	
general.	A	type	of	authority	vacuum	was	being	created	in	the	municipalities,	
which	opened	doors	for	actual	political	and	then	economic	fights	over	the	
localities.	
In	the	end	of	the	tsarist	era,	the	new	occupational	and	social	groups	in	
towns	 presented	 the	 town	 administration	 with	 legal	 and	 economic	
challenges.	 The	 authoritarian	 practices	 and	 ways	 of	 thought	 required	
officials	to	develop	a	set	of	administrative	skills	in	order	to	either	maximize	
their	influence	through	social	networks	or	retain	their	position.	Essential	to	
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the	political	bargaining	was	the	avoidance	of	conflicts	with	the	local	heads	
of	administration	who	controlled	the	fate	of	individuals.	It	was	a	political	
process	directed	at	maintaining	official	harmony.	The	closed	administrative	
market	could	not	 function	as	a	separate	enclave	of	 the	society	any	more.	
The	 smallness	 (both	 geographically	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 personnel)	 of	 the	
administration	itself	presented	a	problem.	There	were	not	genuinely	separate	
institutional	powers	at	the	local	level.	
The	 revolution	 at	 first	 seemed	 to	 change	 this	 culture.	 Not	 long	 after,	
however,	the	centralizing	policies	directed	the	administrative	culture	of	the	
local	level	into	its	old	position	of	limited	power	over	its	own	fate.	It	had	a	
new	authority	in	the	formal	structures,	but	the	central	political	process	made	
the	 local	decision	makers	dependent	on	the	winning	dictator.	They	could	
not	be	sure	their	institutional	positions	would	give	them	any	safety.	Stalin´s	
purges	were	 specifically	 aimed	 at	 creating	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 institutional	
insecurity.	 Since	 the	 ruler	was	beyond	 law,	 and	 interpretation	of	 law	was	
dependent	on	his	political	calculations,	there	was	really	nothing	which	the	
administration	 could	 lean	 on.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 began	 to	 execute	 directions	
according	to	the	risk	factor	involved	in	not	obeying	orders	fast	enough.	This	
led	to	an	intense	political	process	of	its	own	sort.	Yet	it	can	also	seen	as	a	part	
of	Stalin´s	own	game	plan	of	 integrating	different	geographical	areas	 into	
one	economic	planning	structure.	Administrative	culture	of	this	type	was,	in	
a	way,	a	most	effective	resource	in	itself	for	him	to	use.
The	 totalitarian	 view	 has	 emphasized	 that	 the	 resulting	 Soviet	
administration	was	one	of	total	control.	I	would	see	the	Soviet	administrative	
culture	as	one	which	did	succeed	in	creating	a	total	economic	bureaucracy	
as	 a	 structural	 arrangement	 and	 a	 supporting	 political-administrative	
bureaucracy	which	did	not	allow	a	real	opposition	of	state	plans	to	emerge.	
It	did	not	develop	total	control	of	practices	and	thoughts,	however.	These	
developed	as	a	side-effect	of	the	structural	changes	in	the	Stalin	period	and	
were	modified	during	the	following	leaderships.	A	system	of	administrative	
market	developed	in	which	different	actors	took	their	place	in	the	bargaining	
of	local	resources	(Kordonskii	2000).	Campbell	has	proposed	an	idea	that	
in	Russia	there	has	always	been	unofficial	local	insubordination	which	has	
mediated	 the	official	 state	domination.	 (Campbell	 1992.)	These	practices	
were	affected	by	many	cultural	factors,	such	as	the	relationship	which	the	
administration	at	all	levels	had	with	law.	
In	my	view,	the	bargaining	of	the	local	level	which	affected	the	work	of	
the	local	administration	cannot	be	seen	as	proof	of	pluralism	as	such.	This	
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is	because	all	 the	 institutional	actors	as	well	 as	 individuals	had	 the	 same	
political	 identity.	 For	 this	 to	 be	 certain,	 there	 was	 enough	 direct	 legal	
control.	Yet,	as	Darrell	Hammer	has	pointed	out,	 this	did	not	mean	 that	
conflict	 could	 not	 arise	 between	 the	 dominating	 party	 and	 the	 other	
institutional	 actors.	This	was	 in	 fact	 a	 continuous	 situation	which	was	 a	
result	 of	 their	 different	 functions	 (and	 cultural	 roles)	 in	 the	 planning	
structures.	All	actors	in	the	local	level	had	a	need	to	retain	their	positions	
and	 strove	 toward	 an	 equilibrium	 which	 would	 keep	 problems	 at	 a	
minimum.	(Hammer	1993:	234.)	The	local	 level	supported	and	recreated	
the	integrationist	culture	because	there	could	not	be	a	struggle	for	actual	
power,	only	for	resources.	
The	perestroika period	tried	to	attack	the	institutionalized	administrative	
market	with	new	strategies.	In	the	end	it	was	forced	to	create	an	internal	
opposition	 to	 the	 party	 which	 led	 to	 the	 disintegration	 of	 the	 political	
process	in	the	municipalities	and	paralyzed	the	economic	bureaucracy.	In	
this	situation	true	pluralism	emerged	for	the	first	time.	The	time	since	1991	
has	meant	a	differentiation	of	administrative	thoughts	and	practices.	There	
has	been	a	chance	for	 local	development	which	has	never	existed	before.	
The	political	process	has	been	 intense	and	old	actors	have	assumed	new	
roles	in	the	rearranged	administrative	market.	New	important	actors	have	
emerged:	 the	 courts,	 independent	 legal	 profession,	 administration	 heads	
with	their	own	local	programs,	a	media	and	public	which	has	access	to	laws	
and	the	new	ideas.	These	undermine	the	oligarchic	tendencies	both	at	the	
central	and	local	levels.
Since	 1991,	 the	 administrative	 market	 has	 been	 dominated	 by	 the	
executive	side	of	the	representational	administration	while	the	political	has	
disappeared	and	the	economic	administration	has	been	divided	into	state	
and	 private	 sectors.	 Tax	 collection	 has	 become	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	
administrative	change	in	the	formation	of	administrative	market	relations.	
For	 this	 reason,	 the	 centralization	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 decision	
making	can	be	seen	as	a	part	of	the	change	strategy.	
The	integrationist	tendencies	which	have	emerged	in	the	Putin	era	can	
be	explained	as	an	attempt	to	safeguard	the	legal	control	and	unity	which	
sustains	 democracy.	 So	 far,	 this	 view	 has	 by	 and	 large	 been	 accepted,	
particularly	after	the	side-effects	and	risks	which	the	delegation	of	power	to	
regional	 level	effected	in	the	early	1990´s.	The	majority	of	Russian	voters	
have	 supported	 a	 view	 that	 intense	political	 fight	which	 affects	 the	 local	
administration	is	not	desirable.	Bureaucratic	politics	in	today´s	Russia	are	
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directed	 not	 just	 toward	 resources,	 but	 indeed	 toward	 the	 choosing	 of	
policies	 inside	 individual	 organizations.	 This,	 together	 with	 the	 legally	
stronger	position	of	officials,	makes	it	possible	for	them	the	have	the	kind	of	
institutional	power	that	has	not	existed	before.	It	is	too	early	to	predict	what	
the	 change	 will	 bring	 as	 a	 side-effect.	 That	 is,	 whether	 the	 political	
centralization	will	lead	to	more	control	of	the	economic	side	and	eventual	
liberalization	of	 administration,	or	 fail	 and	 lead	 to	more	dependency	on	
security	control,	or	something	else	entirely.
7.8 What Is the Meaning of Ideologies and 
Bureaucratic Myths in Transitions of Russian 
Administrative Cultures?
George	L.	Yaney	(193)	has	written	that	once	a	myth	gains	acceptance	in	
society,	it	becomes	a	force	in	itself.	People	grow	accustomed	to	it,	develop	
habits	and	practices	based	on	it,	and	pass	it	 to	younger	generations.	At	a	
deeper	level	they	start	seeing	denials	of	that	myth	as	a	threat	to	their	way	of	
life.	As	Yaney	has	said:	“not	only	do	people	believe	in	the	myth,	they	depend	
on	their	fellows	to	believe	in	it.	[…]	The	customs	attached	to	a	myth	may	go	
on	making	 sense	 of	 experience	 long	 after	 the	myth	 itself	 has	 ceased	 to	
correspond	 to	 observed	 facts,	 because	 they	 are	 a	 vital	 part	 of	 the	 social	
relationships	through	which	men	conduct	themselves.”	(Yaney	193:	13.)
I	 would	 separate	 three	 types	 of	 myths	 with	 regard	 to	 transitions	 of	
administrative	culture:	political	 ideologies	as	 texts,	 laws	 in	 state	building	
and	finally	traditions/rituals	which	sustain	a	belief	in	the	justification	of	the	
transition.	Political	 ideologies	serve	as	 the	starting	point	 from	which	 the	
enthusiasm	 for	 the	 change	 is	 drawn.	They	 are	 idealistic	 but	 yet	 contain	
enough	practical	suggestion	and	plans	to	have	significance	for	law	makers	
who	execute	the	actual	planning	of	ideologies.	This	is	why	laws	are	systems	
of	 political	 myths.	 They	 have	 a	 mythical	 aspect	 because	 they	 give	 the	
impression	of	a	world	which	can	be	controlled.	But	this	is,	in	my	view,	less	
interesting	culturally	(although	very	important	in	itself)	than	the	mythical	
view	of	a	political	society	that	laws	uphold.	
Do	 political	 programs	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 seriously?	 Should	we	 instead	
start	from	laws	which	are	supposed	to	be	orderly	statements	of	what	is	right	
and	good	in	society,	and	which	structure	reality?	My	view	is	that	everywhere	
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it	 is	 necessary	 to	 look	 at	 both	 in	 conjunction	 with	 each	 other.	 Political	
ideologies	may	vary,	in	the	contemporary	world	they	are	less	party	political	
and	more	“administrative”.	In	the	European	context	they	are	styled	in	the	
fashion	of	European	Council	or	EU	programs	which	build	a	vision	of	good	
living	in	an	open	and	economically	active	lifestyle	(consumption	oriented	
and	freely	competitive)	where	borders	are	mostly	a	barrier	to	 innovation	
(for	 instance	moving	 workplaces	 to	 cheaper	 locations	 to	 improve	 profit	
margins).	The	myths	of	freedom,	openness	and	competition	ring	in	the	ears	
of	today´s	listeners	and	they	give	us	an	idea	that	what	is	being	decided	in	
the	political	arena	benefits	all	of	us.	We	firmly	wish	to	continue	our	way	of	
life	 and	 improve	 our	 position	 to	 be	 ready	 for	 the	 challenges	 which	 this	
competitive,	open	and	free	society	requires.	Then	there	is	the	problematic	
group	of	people	who	are	“marginal”	and	who	need	to	be	rehabilitated	or	
“removed	from	the	statistics”	with	the	help	of	administrative	maneuvers.	
Who	can	say	that	these	political	texts	which	we	read	everyday	are	in	any	
manner	different	from	the	more	party	political	exhortations	of	the	past?	All	
the	requirements	are	there:	lexicon,	pre-accepted	orders	of	importance	and	
inevitability.	
Mikhail	Gorbachev´s	perestroika	 reforms	are	 the	most	 recent	Russian	
example	 of	 an	 attempt	 to	 materialize	 myths.	 Kordonskii	 (2000)	 has	
concluded	that	the	result	was	the	legitimization	of	the	dissident	language.	
The	 19th	 century	 reforms	 and	 Vladimir	 Putin´s	 presidency	 have	 been	
somewhat	more	 pragmatic	 in	 rhetoric.	The	main	 concern	 has	 been	 the	
strengthening	of	governability	at	all	levels	of	the	state.	Yet	this	purpose	has	
been	 legitimized	 with	 the	 idea	 of	 “restoration	 of	 Russian	 greatness”	 to	
motivate	changes	and	obedience	to	law.	
Myths	become	interesting	in	the	state	building	process.	Laws	are	fickle	
tools	which	 can	 both	 build	 harmony	 and	 security,	 or	 create	 inequalities	
which	affect	generations	to	come.	No	dictator	is	needed	for	the	latter	to	take	
place.	 Nor	 are	 all	 harmful	 laws	 evil	 from	 the	 outset.	 The	 study	 of	
administrative	culture	shows	that	inaction	is	one	of	the	most	effective	long	
term	 degenerative	 factors.	 Legal	 myths	 of	 rationality	 and	 objectiveness	
make	the	correction	of	mistakes	harder.	When	in	some	cases	generations	of	
people	have	gone	about	their	business	believing	and	behaving	in	a	certain	
manner	which	is	legal,	changing	the	behavior	will	take	time	and	incentives.	
New	laws	maybe	required	to	brake	or	modify	an	old	custom	which	is	not	
acceptable.	Law	in	these	cases	becomes	highly	political.	Suddenly	it	needs	
to	be	justified	with	an	extralegal	rationality	of	good	and	bad.	
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The	 relationship	 of	 laws	 and	 political	 values	 which	 are	 commonly	
accepted	as	a	“rational”	basis	for	a	certain	life	style	in	society,	is	extended	to	
the	issue	of	trust	which	Yaney	wrote	of	above.	People	trust	each	other	to	
behave	in	a	certain	way	and	that	is	why	laws	have	a	meaning	in	their	lives.	
In	Russian	history,	this	relationship	has	been	somewhat	different.	The	tsarist	
Russian	 law	 was	 most	 of	 all	 a	 punishing	 and	 demanding	 tool	 for	 the	
authorities	 which	 sustained	 order	 in	 the	 society	 or	 collected	 taxes.	The	
developing	 legal	 protection	 and	 sense	 of	 citizen´s	 rights	 did	 not	 have	
enough	 time	 to	make	 deep	 roots	 before	 the	 revolution.	 Stalinism	 in	 the	
Soviet	Union	on	the	other	hand	strived	to	make	law	a	tool	of	both	irregular	
political	 coercion	 and	 systematic	 administrative	 non-policy	 routines.	 In	
this	a	“non-systematic”	administrative	society	was	created	from	the	point	of	
view	of	legal	trust	in	which	dependency	was	attached	to	a	person	of	authority	
(comp.Yaney	 193:	 15).	 Feedback	 from	 the	 population	 through	
representational	organs	was	limited	and	replaced	by	intelligence	which	was	
extended	territorially	for	use	in	planning.	Other	types	of	control	systems	
evolved	 inside	organizations	and	 in	 society	at	 large	which	 supplemented	
the	 lack	 of	 legal	 consciousness	 in	 social	 relations.	 The	 administrative	
market,	 which	 has	 been	 discussed	 previously	 in	 this	 work,	 is	 a	 major	
example.	
The	 present	 transition	 is	 unique,	 because	 its	 manifest	 purpose	 is	 to	
change	the	foundation	of	social	life	from	a	relationship	based	on	personal	
networks	and	authority	centered	obedience,	to	a	dependency	of	commonly	
respected	abstract	 ideals	of	 laws.	The	relationship	which	Russians	should	
from	now	on	have	with	their	administration	should	be	based	on	the	belief	
that	 they	 benefit	when	 they	 behave	 as	 others	who	 follow	 laws	 based	 on	
political	myths	such	as	democracy,	a	strong	nation-state,	the	rule	of	law	and	
so	on.	
Problematic	for	state	building	is	that	laws	(even	supposedly	revolutionary)	
are	 most	 of	 all	 a	 reaction	 to	 the	 past.	 They	 are	 usually	 meant	 to	 stop	
something,	 to	 enable	 something	 else	 to	 take	 place	 and	 in	 this	 negative	
reinforcing	manner	teach	people	to	choose	right.	Traditions	and	rituals,	on	
the	other	hand,	give	direct	incentives	to	people.	These	may	be	decorative	or	
concrete	benefits,	or	they	may	be	social	mass	celebrations	which	enhance	
the	core	values	of	a	transition	period.	After	dramatic	transitions,	ceremonial	
traditions	and	systems	of	ranks	also	help	to	heal.	The	use	of	such	elements	
has	played	an	important	role	in	President	Putin´s	response	to	risks.
conclusions
343
7.9 What Is a Successful Transition?
Transitions	are	often	studied	by	choosing	between	the	structural	(economic	
and	legal),	social	(practices	and	power	dynamics)	and	political	as	the	focus	
of	 the	study.	A	choice	 is	often	made	by	choosing	between	actor-centered	
and	institutional	approaches.	
In	addition	to	this,	different	fields	have	developed	their	favorite	ways	of	
assessing	the	reasons	for	the	difficulties	of	transitions.	Economists	usually	
concentrate	on	 the	macroeconomic	 side	of	developments,	 treat	 adminis-
tration	as	an	obstacle	to	changes	and	legal	issues	as	“something	that	needs	
to	be	taken	care	of	fast”.	Legal	experts	ponder	about	the	lack	of	rule	of	law,	
concentrate	on	the	creation	of	new	laws	and	the	strengthening	of	the	legal	
institutions	at	a	formal	level	while	hoping	that	“cultures	would	change	and	
there	would	just	be	enough	money”.	Social	scientists	can	retrieve	statistics	
to	explain	complex	issues	of	societal	transition,	or	merely	echo	the	general	
media/public	perception	to	describe	the	difficulties	faced	by	the	population	
in	the	hands	of	the	bureaucracy.
At	best,	different	fields	which	choose	a	specific	focus	of	study,	can	add	to	
the	understanding	of	a	particular	sector	of	the	society,	but	unfortunately	do	
not	 give	 an	 adequate	 answer	 to	 the	 problems	 of	 change	 in	 public	
administration.	Going	back	to	what	was	said	in	the	beginning	of	this	work,	
public	administrations	which	involve	complex	economic,	legal	and	social	
issues	in	each	policy,	need	to	be	looked	at	with	a	holistic	view	which	starts	
from	the	nature	of	public	organizations	themselves	–	not	from	economics,	
laws	or	political	ambitions	alone.
The	publicness	of	administration	is	something	in	which	social	scientists	
need	to	be	strong	advocates	since	the	other	fields,	as	a	result	of	their	more	
sectoral	views,	often	fail	to	take	it	into	account.	Transitions	at	the	state	level	
require	 taking	 the	public	 sector	as	 the	 starting	point	of	 changes.	Careful	
consideration	 needs	 to	 be	 given	 to	 that	 which	 needs	 to	 be	 public.	The	
authority	of	different	institutions	needs	to	be	clarified	and	supported	with	
strong	 economic	 policies	 to	 avoid	 power	 vacuums	 and	 anarchic	
reorganization	 of	 power	 relations	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 law.	 The	 Russian	
transitions	 show	 that	 the	 absence	 of	 authority	 is	 a	 strong	 risk	 factor	 for	
ideological	 transitional	 policies.	 It	 leads	 to	 side-effects	 taking	 over	 the	
process.	
At	the	start	of	 this	study	I	stated	that	for	a	transition	to	succeed	in	its	
purposes,	all	three	administrative	levels	of	society	(state,	regional	and	local)	
The TransiTions oF local adminisTraTion culTure in russia
344
have	to	be	connected	to	each	other	through	the	actions	of	people	sharing	
the	same	cultural	meanings.	Problems	arise	when	these	connections	serve	
different	purposes	for	different	actors	and	actor	groups.	Goal	attainment	is	
disrupted	 by	 side-effects	 of	 the	 social	 system	 which	 returns	 them	 as	
dysfunctions.	In	many	cases	the	dysfunctions	become	institutionalized	and	
it	 is	 difficult	 to	 separate	 them	 from	 the	 formal	 system.	 An	 important	
example	of	such	a	dysfunction	is	the blat	 in	the	Soviet	system	(Ledeneva	
2000).	Blat	as	a	system	of	mutual	assistance	was	used	as	an	informal	daily	
practice	 in	 the	 official	 administrative	 market	 (Kordonskii	 2000)	 of	 the	
state.	
The	evaluative	approach	which	concentrates	on	the	ideological	purposes	
is	to	my	mind	a	useful	way	to	structure	the	transitional	reality	and	analyze	
the	 outcome	 of	 intervention.	 The	 success	 of	 transition	 is	 naturally	 the	
correspondence	of	the	outcome	with	the	original	purposes	of	administrative	
change.	But	in	actuality,	the	side-effects	which	easily	take	over	the	process,	
demand	 alterations	 and	modifications	 to	 the	 original	 purposes.	 In	 some	
cases,	side-effects	produce	positive	consequences.	
In	recent	times,	the	activity	of	Russian	citizens	at	the	grass	roots	level	has	
increased	 considerably	 because	 the	 state	 is	 unable	 to	 provide	 economic	
security	and	adequate	services	for	all.	In	this	paradox	way,	a	citizenry	which	
corresponds	with	the	 liberal-democratic	 ideal	active	citizen	has	begun	to	
develop.	Perestroika	itself	led	to	the	side-effects	taking	over.	The	outcome	
was	the	end	of	one-party	rule.	The	transition	certainly	was	not	successful.	
The	 outcome	 of	 the	 191	 revolution	 in	 the	 longer	 term	was	 a	 bit	more	
successful	in	terms	of	the	original	purposes	which	Lenin	formulated.	The	
evaluation	 problem	 here	 is	 more	 the	 romanticization	 of	 Lenin´s	
revolutionary	 thinking,	 followed	 by	 the	 idea	 that	 “the	 new	 culture”	 –	
ideology	in	this	case	–	failed.	
There	 is	 a	 rather	 cynical	 and	 surrendering	 idea	 that	major	 economic	
changes	necessarily	produce	“casualties”,	even	 in	 the	 form	of	 loss	of	 lives	
and	destroyed	 futures,	which	pass	 in	 a	 generation´s	 time	and	 eventually	
result	in	a	better	life	for	everyone.	This	idea	is	often	seen	as	the	only	realistic	
choice,	sad	but	unavoidable.	Looking	at	Russian	transitions,	it	is	possible	to	
see,	 that	major	 economic	problems	 and	 transitional	 “losses”	were	 policy	
decisions,	and	a	result	of	oligarchic	political	competition.	Even	economic	
programs	had	political	purposes	as	their	main	target.	The	strategies	which	
were	chosen	overlooked	areas	of	society	because	of	the	tactical	views	which	
the	 leaders	 of	 the	 moment	 had.	 Judging	 from	 these	 experiences,	 it	 is	
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impossible	to	say	whether	transitions	could	be	managed	in	a	planned	and	
rational	 manner	 which	 considered	 avoiding	 power	 vacuums	 in	 state	
building	as	the	main	priority	of	political	changes.	This	has	never	been	done.	
Other	 forms	of	revolutions	have	 taken	place	with	a	high	cost	and	mixed	
results,	 which	 have	 then	 required	 remedies	 for	 long	 periods	 of	 time.	
Permanent	 administrative	 dysfunctions	 have	 been	 created	 as	 a	 result	 of	
revolutionary	changes.	
In	 the	 evaluation	 of	 transitions,	 dysfunctions	 present	 a	 challenge.	
Dysfunctions	which	are	permanent	dominant	features	of	the	old	culture	are	
often	 seen	 as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 in	 the	 development	 of	 new	
administrative	practices.	Yet	 still,	historical	experiences	which	have	been	
examined	 in	 this	 study	 also	 point	 to	 another	 explanation.	 Ideologies	 of	
administrative	 change	which	do	not	understand	or	 consider	 the	 cultural	
meaning	of	dysfunctions	(such	as	blat)	within	the	old	culture	and	use	these	
mechanisms	in	the	building	of	new	practices,	can	lead	to	failure	or	cycle	of	
risk	 decision	 making.	 One	 result	 of	 this	 is	 that	 instead	 of	 wiping	 the	
dysfunction	 away,	 the	 administrative	 culture	 recycles	 it	 in	 a	 new	 form.	
Examples	 are,	 for	 instance,	 the	 system	 of	 ranks-nomenklatura,	 blat-
corruption/privatization	practices.	
In	his	study	about	the	systematization	of	Russian	imperial	administration,	
George	L.	Yaney	has	pointed	out	that	in	many	of	the	social	reforms	of	the	
1th	and	19th	century	the	“advanced	leader”	approach	has	been	used.	These	
individuals	 are	 given	 encouragement	 to	 bridge	 the	 gap	between	old	 and	
new.	 In	 reality	 though,	 the	 result	 has	 usually	 been	 the	 isolation	of	 these	
example	individuals	while	the	majority	has	not	moved	at	all,	sometimes	due	
to	lack	of	good	leaders.	(Yaney	193:	3.)
The	 Russian	 experience	 seem	 to	 evidence	 that	 strong	 institutions	 are	
needed	for	the	transitions	to	start	having	real	effects.	It	is	not	necessary	to	
destroy	old	institutions	but	to	change	the	incentives	for	their	behavior.	For	
individuals,	weak	institutions	which	cannot	manage	their	public	tasks	well	
enough,	mean	a	loss	of	faith	in	laws.	This	authority	vacuum	leads	to	behavior	
which	is	poorly	manageable	from	the	point	of	view	of	reformists.	
Stephan	 Holmes	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 state	
depends	on	 its	ability	 to	elicit	voluntary	cooperation.	This	 takes	place	 in	
liberalized	structures	which	rebuild	 the	nation´s	 infrastructure	and	push	
the	illegal	elements	to	their	“normal”	sphere.	Civil	society	also	requires	a	
stable	 government	 which	 does	 not	 change	 legal	 rules	 too	 often.	 As	 a	
conclusion	 to	his	analyses	of	 the	 success	 factors	he	makes	 the	point	 that	
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“rights,	quite	obviously,	are	an	enforced	uniformity.	Equality	before	the	law	
cannot	be	secured	over	a	vast	territory	without	a	relatively	effective,	honest,	
centralized	bureaucratic	organization.	The	resource-dependency	of	a	liberal	
rights	regime	becomes	undeniably	clear	when	we	inspect	the	weakness	of	
rights	enforcement	in	a	financially	strapped	state.	Even	negative	rights	will	
not	be	protected	in	an	insolvent	country.	[…]	Rights	protection	is	a	problem	
of	complex	institutional	design	and	resource	allocation,	and	of	maintaining	
an	 effective	 chain	 of	 command,	 not	 merely	 building	 judicially	 tended	
“limits”	 around	 government	 and	 its	 agents.”	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 ideas,	
Holmes	further	concludes	that	rampant	criminality	is	a	major	obstacle	to	
the	rise	of	legal	(rights)	consciousness	in	post-communism.	(Holmes	1996:	
5.)	In	Russia´s	case,	the	administrative	and	political	strategies	that	sacrifice	
pluralism	and	centralization	can	be	understood	as	a	way	to	gain	control	of	
the	economy	in	order	to	combat	these	ills.	
Instead	of	looking	at	transitions	from	one	field	alone,	or	concentrating	
on	a	macro-micro	choice	of	approach,	it	is	more	fruitful	to	look	at	the	level	
of	management	of	the	process.	How	can	it	be	enhanced	without	sacrificing	
the	original	purposes?	What	 is	needed	 from	different	parts	of	 society	 to	
change?	Instead	of	destroying	authority	relations	and	economical	resources,	
this	view	would	emphasize	building	new	demands	 inside	 the	old	culture	
right	from	the	beginning.	One	thing	which	all	the	studied	transitions	show	
is	 that	 weak	 administrative	 structures,	 whether	 as	 a	 result	 of	 politics	 or	
economics,	cannot	maximize	the	benefit	from	organizational	learning.
34
Annex A: Zemstvos in the main structures of the Russian government 
after 1864  (from chapter 3)
CENTRAL LEVEL
TSAR
Supreme organs:    
(Verkhovnye organy)
1.SENATE (Supreme Court) 
2.STATE COUNCIL
3.COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
4.His Majesty´s Imperial Chancellery
5.Council of Ministers
the Military  Council, the Admiralty 
Council,the  Finance Committee, 
the Guard ship Council
6.Imperial Office of Petitions
Ministerial system:
MINISTRIES
Ministry of Interior: The Central
Statistical Committee (Zemstvo affairs)    
Special committees
 
Prosecutor
Imperial  Secret Police (1883)
        
REGIONAL or TERRITORIAL LEVEL (GUBERNIIA)
Governor (named by Senate)
heading the regional board:
general bureau and chancellery
Estates
Ministries and their departments in the 
region
Prosecutors     Courts
Administration of zemstvo and town 
affairs (1870-1917): supervision of 
legality and jurisdistion of local 
government and police
Provincial bureau of zemstvo affairs 
(1890)
LOCAL LEVEL OF THE GUBERNIIA
Provincial sub-level
Estates
Local agencies of the central 
government, for instance police 
(subordinated to the Ministry of Interior 
in 1880)
Prosecutors     Courts
Zemstvos (1864): assembly (sobranie) and adminisration (board), headed by a chairman 
(predsedatel zemskogo uprava)
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Annex B: Town administration in the main structures of the Russian 
government after 1870 (from chapter 3)
CENTRAL LEVEL
TSAR
Supreme organs:    
(Verkhovnye organy)
1. SENATE
(Supreme Court)
2.STATE COUNCIL
3. COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS
4. His Majesty´s Imperial Chancellery
5.Council of Ministers
the Military  Council, the Admiralty 
Council,the  Finance Committee, 
the Guard ship Council
6.Imperial Office of Petitions
Ministerial system:
MINISTRIES
Ministry of Interior: The Central
Statistical Committee (Zemstvo affairs)    
 
Special committees
 
Prosecutor
Imperial  Secret
Police (1883)
REGIONAL or TERRITORIAL LEVEL (GUBERNIIA)
Governor (named by Senate)
who headed the regional (or provincial) 
board: general bureau and chancellery
Estates
Ministries and their departments in the 
region
Prosecutors    Courts
Administration of zemstvo and town 
affairs (1870-1917):
supervision of legality and jurisdistion 
of local government and police
LOCAL LEVEL OF THE GUBERNIIA
Provincial sub-level
Estates
Local agencies of the central
government, for instance police 
(subordinated to the Ministry of Interior 
in 1880)
Prosecutors    Courts
Provincial town Dumas and executive boards, headed by mayors
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Annex C: The main structures of the Soviet government in 1930´s 
(from chapter 4)
Control Representational Political Economic
STATE LEVEL
Congress of Soviets: 
Federal Soviet
and Soviet of Nationalities
The Supreme
and
the Supreme
arbitration
court
Prosecutor
Central 
Executive Committee (CEC)
Presidium Communist party
Central Committee
Politburo
Orgburo
Council of
People´s 
comissariats 
(Sovnarkom)
COMISSARIATS
State councils
and committees
such as the 
GOSPLAN
party members
REPUBLICS
Territorial courts
Prosecutors
Soviet and  its
executive committee
Republican
level party 
committee
Directors of 
all-union
service and 
production units
party members
REGIONS (OBLAST)
Courts
Prosecutors
Congresses of Soviets
Soviet and its
executive committee
Regional party
committee
Directors of 
production 
and service units
party members
LOCAL LEVEL
District courts
Prosecutors
Local soviet
and its executive
committee
Local party 
committee
Directors of 
production  and
service units
in the municipality
party members
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Annex D: The main structures of the Soviet government, 1986-1990 
(from chapter 5)
Control Representational Political Economic
STATE LEVEL
The Supreme
and
the Supreme
arbitration
court
Prosecutor
Congress of People´s 
representatives of USSR
Supreme
Soviet of USSR (two chambers)
Presidium
President (1990)
Communist party 
congress 
Central Committee 
Politburo
Council of
Ministers
MINISTRIES
State councils
and committees
such as the 
GOSKOMSTAT
and
GOSPLAN
party members (primary party organizations at work places)
REPUBLICS
Appeal courts
Prosecutors
Soviet and  its
executive committee
Republican 
congresss
level party 
committee
Directors of 
all-union
service and 
production units
party members (primary party organizations at work places)
REGIONS (OBLAST)
Courts
Prosecutors
Soviet and its
executive committee
Regional party
committee
Directors of 
production 
and service units
party members (primary party organizations at work places)
LOCAL LEVEL
Town and town
district courts
Prosecutors
Local soviet
and its executive
committee
Local party 
committee
Directors of 
production  and
service units
in the municipality
party members (primary party organizations at work places)
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REPRESENTATIONAL EXECUTIVE JUDICIAL
CENTRAL LEVEL
 
FEDERAL COUNCIL
1. Duma 2. Upper House
(450)                (150)
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERATION 
SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL
COURT
SUPREME
COURT
THE SUPREME
ARBITRATION
COURT
THE HEAD     
PROSECUTOR´S 
OFFICE
GOVERNMENT
1. MINISTRIES
2. STATE COMMITTEES
3. FEDERAL SERVICES
THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AREA LEVEL 
(7 AREAS IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION)
Headed by a presidential representative who 
is assisted by a staff
SUBJECT LEVEL (Regional level)
AN ELECTED ASSEMBLY
AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS 
LED BY A GOVERNOR
Courts
THE REGIONAL  ORGANIZATIONS OF
MINISTRIES AND CENTRAL 
ADMINISTRATIONS (SERVICES)
THE JOINT ADMINISTRATION OF STATE
AND REGION
Prosecutors
LOCAL LEVEL (Municipalities)
Local courts  
Prosecutors
Locally elected
reprentative body CITY ADMINISTRATION WHICH IS LED
BY AN ELECTED MAYOR
STATE ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL:
 a) State administration carried out by the 
local executive organ such as pensions and 
social services.
 b)Locally functioning state administration 
bodies such the militia.
ANNEX E: The main structures of the Russian government in 2005 
(from chapter 6)
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